Com. v. Douglas, S.

J-S27005-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
STANFORD AUGUSTO DOUGLAS, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 3843 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 27, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003034-2005
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*
JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 22, 2017
Appellant, Stanford Augusto Douglas, Jr., appeals pro se from the
order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his
fourth petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On December 5, 2005, Appellant pled guilty to
first-degree murder and related offenses arising from his involvement in a
shooting death on March 27, 2005. Appellant was 29 years old at the time
of the incident. The court sentenced Appellant on December 5, 2005, to
mandatory life imprisonment, and a consecutive term of 1 to 7 years’
imprisonment. Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on October 10, 2006,
which the PCRA court denied on October 3, 2008. This Court affirmed on
February 19, 2010. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 996 A.2d 5_____________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S27005-17
(Pa.Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant unsuccessfully
pursued his second and third PCRA petitions in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
On August 1, 2016, Appellant filed the current pro se PCRA petition. The
PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice on September 28, 2016, and denied
Appellant’s petition on October 27, 2016. Appellant filed pro se on
November 21, 2016, a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary Rule 1925(b)
statement.
The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be filed within one
year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A §
9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct review or
at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA allow
for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be
excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner asserting a timeliness
exception must file a petition within sixty days of the date the claim could
have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). When asserting the
newly created constitutional right exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), “a
petitioner must prove that there is a new constitutional right and that the
right has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” Commonwealth
v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 41 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 616 Pa.
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625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (internal quotations omitted).
Instantly, Appellant relies upon two United States Supreme Court
decisions as the bases for an exception to the PCRA timeliness requirement
as well as for substantive PCRA relief: Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___,
132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (ruling unconstitutional mandatory
life without possibility of parole (“LWOP”) sentences for juvenile offenders),
and Montgomery v. Louisiana ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d
599 (filed January 25, 2016, and revised on January 27, 2016) (holding
Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review). Appellant filed the
current PCRA petition on August 1, 2016, beyond sixty days of the
Montgomery decision. Accordingly, Appellant’s petition is untimely. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), supra; Commonwealth v. Secreti, 134 A.3d
77 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding date of Montgomery decision controls for
juveniles, who received LWOP sentences, for purposes of 60-day rule in 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)). Appellant correctly observes that mandatory LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional under
Montgomery/Miller. At the time of the offenses, however, Appellant was
not a juvenile; he was 29 years old and would not be entitled to relief under
Montgomery/Miller in any event. Accordingly, we affirm.1
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
1
Due to our disposition, we deny as moot Appellant’s motion “for leave to
file a reply brief nunc pro tunc or for enlargement of time.”
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/22/2017
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