In the Interest of: D.N.M., a Minor

J-S45013-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.N.M., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: D.D., MOTHER,
Appellant No. 237 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree January 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000711-2013, CP-51-DP-0001380-2011
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.E.J., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: D.D., MOTHER,
Appellant No. 240 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree January 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000710-2013, CP-51-DP-0001379-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2014
D.D
whereby the trial court involuntarily terminated her parental rights to two of
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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to adoption.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court delineated the salient facts as follows.
On June 14, 2011, the Department of Human Services
(DHS) received a General Protective Services (GPS) report
alleging that the Mother of D.N.M. and S.E.J., D.D., was
hospitalized for mental health treatment pursuant to a 302 and
that the children were with maternal grandmother. The report
further alleged that [Mother] abused drugs and hit the children.
The report was substantiated.
K.C. signed a Safety Plan whereby she would care for the
children in her home; however, DHS was subsequently informed
her home and would not be able to continue caring for S.E.J. and
D.N.M. On June 30, 2011, Mother failed to attend an intake at
Interim House, a residential substance abuse treatment
program.
On July 7, 2011, DHS obtained an Order of Protective
Custody (OPC) and placed S.E.J. and D.N.M. with their maternal
aunt, K.S. A shelter care hearing was held on July 8, 2011[,] at
which time the OPC was lifted, and the temporary commitment
to DHS was ordered to stand. The children were adjudicated
dependent on July 13, 2011[,] and committed to DHS. Mother
was permitted to have supervised visits at the agency and was
referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a dual diagnosis
assessment and screen. Mother was also referred to the
Achieving Reunification Center (ARC).
At the permanency review hearing on October 6, 2011, the
[c]ourt found that Mother was participating in mental health and
drug and alcohol treatment at Gaudenzia House, rendering
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1
The instant termination proceeding also addressed the parental rights of
terminated. Both fathers have filed separate appeals, which are before this
same panel and are addressed separately.
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negative drug screens twice per week and taking her medication
as prescribed. Mother was permitted to have twice weekly
supervised visits and was referred to CEU for monitoring.
Mother was found to be in full compliance with the permanency
plan.
At the permanency review hearing on January 4, 2012, a
CEU Report of non-compliance was issued as to Mother, and
Mother was referred to the CEU for a dual diagnosis assessment,
screen and monitoring. At the end of 2011, Mother was
unsuccessfully discharged from her program at Washington
screen. On March 28, 2012, it was reported that Mother had
resumed outpatient drug treatment at Gaudenzia after she was
drug screen was negative, visits with the children could be
modified to unsupervised; however, Mother failed to maintain
sobriety. On July 27, 2012, it was reported that Mother was
attending outpatient drug treatment at Gaudenzia, had
completed [a] parenting [program] and was in moderate
compliance with the permanency plan. At the permanency
hearing on October 26, 2012, a [r]eport of non-compliance from
the CEU was issued as to Mother, and Mother was referred to
CEU for an assessment and screen and three random drug
screens prior to the next court date. CEU was ordered to
explore alternative drug treatment programs for Mother. At the
permanency review hearing on January 4, 2013, it was reported
that Mother only attended three of the eight visits afforded her,
and a CEU [r]eport of [n]on-[c]ompliance as to Mother was
submitted to the [c]ourt.
At the permanency reviewing [sic] hearing held by [the
court] on March 20, 2013, the [c]ourt found that Mother was
non-compliant with drug and alcohol treatment and ordered her
to have five random drug screens prior to the next court date.
The [c]ourt noted that supervised visits with Mother were
problematic and ordered that if Mother tested positive on any
two of the five drug screens or refused any two, visits were to be
positive drug screens.
On January 8, 2014, [the court] found clear and convincing
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) & (8) and further found that
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pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), adoption would be in the
best interest of S.E.J. and D.N.M.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/11/14, at 2-4 (internal citations omitted).
This timely appeal ensued. Mother complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i), and filed a Rule 1925(b) concise statement. The court
authored its decision and the matter is now ready for this
Mother raises four issues for our consideration.
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, when it
determination was not supported by clear and convincing
evidence under the adoption act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1),
(2), (5) and (8)?
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination
would have on the developmental, physical and emotional
needs of the child as required by the adoption act, 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?
3. Whether, [sic] the trial court erred because the evidence was
overwhelming and undisputed that Mother, [sic]
demonstrated a genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and
unrelenting effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with
her children?
4. Whether, [sic] the trial court erred when it changed the goal
to adoption when there did not exist clear and convincing
evidence to do so?
We begin by setting forth our settled standard of review regarding an
order terminating parental rights:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the
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trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse
of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support
trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate
parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing verdict. We
must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
by competent evidence.
In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879
A.2d 802, 805 (Pa.Super. 2005)).
clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the
In re R.N.J., supra at 276. We
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247,
1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)). The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d
68, 73-
findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite
In re N.C., 763 A.2d 913, 917 (Pa.Super. 2000).
R
governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which provides in relevant part:
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(a) General rule. The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
....
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonable
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best service
the needs and welfare of the child.
....
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
....
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(b) Other considerations. The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
Mother first contends that DHS did not meet its burden by clear and
convincing evidence that her parental rights should be terminated. She
completion of her [family service plan] by the time of the filing of the
at 10-11.
quired her to
participate in drug and alcohol treatment, a mental health and parenting
program, visit her children, and obtain suitable housing. According to
Mother, she testified that she was presently enrolled in a drug treatment
program and was in mental health treatment. Mother highlights that DHS
social worker, Akilah Owens, averred that Mother successfully completed
two parenting programs. In addition, Mother submits that she provided
proof of housing by introducing a lease of a three-bedroom apartment into
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evidence. Mother also points out that an additional social worker, Zakiah
Snead, remarked that she made the majority of visits with her children, and
was engaged with them during those visits.
DHS responds that under any of the subsections, § 2511(a)(1), (2),
efforts to address and resolve her drug and alcohol and mental health
deficiencies t
DHS asserts that Mother did not work toward substantial completion of her
FSP, noting that she regularly tested positive for drugs and was twice
unsuccessfully discharged from drug treatmen
visitation rights were suspended with her children due to her drug addiction
drug screen.
Further, DHS submits that Mother did not complete mental health
lack of engagement during the visits. DHS further provides that Mother
provided no credible support for her own self-serving testimony that she was
enrolled in drug and alcohol or mental health treatment. Indeed, it
accurately recognizes that the court below found her testimony lacking
credulity and rejected that she had obtained suitable housing.
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satisfied or was working toward completion of her FSP. The court below
to successfully complete drug treatment, going so far as to procure another
See N.T., 1/8/14, at 21-
testimony, there was no evidence that she obtained proper housing. Here,
the record supports that Mother has been unable for a period of three years
to overcome her drug addiction or alleviate her mental health problems.
Mother next contends that the trial court erred in failing to give
between Mother and her children would result in any detrimental harm to
DHS rejoins that it presented testimony that Mother and children
It posits that when Mother did visit with the children, the overall quality of
the visits was poor. DHS maintains that the children did not wish to see
Id.
According to DHS, Mother only attended approximately forty-five percent of
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would not have a negative effect on the children. Importantly, and in
contrast to their relationship with Mother, the children exhibited a strong
bond with their pre-adoptive parents.
warrants termination of his or her parental rights, the court must conduct an
analysis of the needs and welfare of the children based on the best interests
of the children. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). In In re
L.M., supraanalysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of
casewor In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121
(Pa.Super. 2010).
factual findings, it is apparent that Mother is not entitled to relief.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, DHS presented sufficient
emotional needs. Ms. Owens testified that the children addressed their
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foster mother as Mom and their foster father as Dad. N.T, 1/8/14, at 40.
She remarked that there would be no negative effects on either child if
appropriate option. Id. at 40-41. She referenced that Mother had failed to
remedy her drug problems, there was no record of mental health treatment
at her June 19, 2013 meeting, and that the quality of her visits with the
children prior to being suspended were not good. Id. at 36.
Ms. Snead testified that Mother was in denial about her drug habit,
that her children would become hysterical before visitation and did not want
to visit with Mother. According to Ms. Snead, the children would kick,
scream and cry. She also stated that when Mother did visit with the
children, she was high on drugs sixty-five percent of the time. In this
regard, she discussed that Mother would have significant mood swings, fall
asleep during visitation, and snap at the children if they referred to foster
mother as Mom.
Ms. Snead set forth that Mother had not met her objectives for drug
and alcohol testing, mental health treatment, or housing. In her view, the
1/8/14, at 88. She opined that there would be no negative effect on the
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Id. at
90. Like Ms. Owens, she testified that adoption was the most appropriate
the reasons already outlined. The final issue Mother advances is that the
court erred in changing the goal from reunification to adoption. However,
her argument is that because her parental rights should not have been
terminated, the goal should not have been changed to adoption. As
discussed above, the court did not err in terminating her parental rights.
Since this is the only position forwarded by Mother relative to her final claim,
and she fails to cite or discuss any case law, she is not entitled to relief.
Acco
D.N.M. and S.E.J.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/8/2014
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