Eill v. Tegler

KELLY, J.,

dissenting:

The purpose of the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act at 63 P.S. §§ 455.101-455.902 is to protect buyers and sellers of real estate from abuse by persons engaged in the real estate business. See Joseph A. Cairone, Inc. v. Edward M. Frey Realty, 715 A.2d 536 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Kalins v. Pennsylvania State Real Estate Commission, 92 Pa.Cmwlth. 569, 500 A.2d 200, 203 (Pa.Cmwlth.1985). The Act was not intended to protect a salesperson engaged in the real estate business from suit by a fellow salesperson also engaged in the real estate business. Therefore, I conclude that the Act does not preclude Appellant’s suit. Accordingly, Appellant has standing to sue Appellee for a portion of the commission monies that Appellant is allegedly owed under the terms of an oral contract.

The majority cites Kreider v. Kleinfelter, supra, and McTamney v. Glenview Corporate Center, supra, for the proposition that a salesperson has no standing to sue a third party for an unpaid commission. Both cases, however, involved a suit between a salesperson and a third party vendor whom the statute was designed to protect from abuse. The instant case is distinguishable because the dispute has nothing to do with the collection of an unpaid commission owed by a third party vendor. Rather, this case involves a dispute between a licensed broker and two salespersons, all of whom are engaged in the real estate business, concerning the apportionment of a commission which has already been paid by the third party vendor. In light of the stated purpose of the Real Estate Licensing Act, I think that the majority’s interpretation of the statute and case law is too broad. The application of the Act to the facts of this case is misplaced. Thus, I am compelled to dissent.