Com. v. Smith, A.

J-S44031-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ANTHONY TUSWEET SMITH
Appellant No. 137 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 18, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0000967-2001
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 13, 2014
Anthony Tusweet Smith appeals pro se from the order entered on
December 18, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, that
dismissed, without a hearing, his third petition filed pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
Smith claims (1) all prior appellate and post conviction counsel were
ineffective with regard to a stipulation made at trial, (2) that Smith is
entitled to discovery, and (3) that the PCRA’s time limitation is
unconstitutional. Based upon the following, we affirm.
The PCRA court aptly summarized the relevant procedural history of
this case in its Preliminary Order and Notice of Court, issued pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), and therefore we do not restate it here. See PCRA
Court Preliminary Order and Notice of Court, 10/18/2013, at 1–2.
J-S44031-14
In response to the court’s Rule 907 notice, Smith filed a pleading
captioned “Amended Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition” on November 20,
2013. On December 18, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed Smith’s petition as
untimely, and this appeal followed.
Preliminary, we state the principles that guide our review:
This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s
order is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. Great deference is granted to the findings of the
PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed
unless they have no support in the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 72 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore,
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one,
must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner's
judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and
proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review by [the Pennsylvania
Supreme] Court or the United States Supreme Court, or
at the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 42
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness
requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may
not address the merits of the issues raised if the petition
was not timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to
all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the
individual claims raised therein. The PCRA squarely places
upon the petitioner the burden of proving an untimely
petition fits within one of the three exceptions.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16–17 (Pa. 2012) (case citations
and footnote omitted).
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Instantly, Smith’s judgment of sentence became final on September
29, 2004, upon expiration of the 90-day appeal period for filing a petition for
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3) (providing judgment is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
for seeking the review”); U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 13 (allowing 90 days to file a
petition for writ of certiorari). Therefore, Smith had one year from that date
to file a petition for collateral relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Here,
Smith filed the current petition on August 28, 2013, nearly nine years after
his judgment of sentence became final.
Our review of the record in light of the PCRA and relevant case law
confirms that the PCRA court correctly determined Smith’s petition was
untimely and that he failed to prove a statutory exception to the PCRA’s one
year time-bar. Moreover, we adopt the discussion of the PCRA court as
dispositive of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/19/2013.1
____________________________________________
1
To the PCRA court’s analysis, we simply add that this Court has held that
the PCRA’s time restriction is constitutionally valid. See Commonwealth v.
Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. 1998) (“the PCRA’s time limitation upon
the filing of PCRA petitions does not unreasonably or unconstitutionally limit
[a petitioner’s] constitutional right to habeas corpus relief.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (reiterating that
the time-for-filing restriction of the PCRA is reasonable and does not run
afoul of a petitioner’s due process rights).
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Accordingly, as neither the PCRA court, nor this Court, has jurisdiction
to address the substantive claims raised in Smith’s untimely petition, see
Jones, supra, we affirm the order of the PCRA court that dismissed, without
a hearing, this third petition seeking post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/13/2014
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