Com. v. Johnson, M.

J-S33008-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MAYA DANEE JOHNSON :
:
Appellant : No. 1395 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0003858-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2021
Maya Danee Johnson appeals from her June 29, 2020 judgment of
sentence of time-served to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by
four years of probation, which was imposed following her convictions for three
counts of corruption of minors. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts as follows:
Detective Thomas J. Schreiber works for the Radnor
Township Police Department. In 2017, his department received a
Childline referral from Children and Youth Services of Delaware
County. The referral concerned a teacher’s aide who had shown
inappropriate materials to a juvenile at Presbyterian Children’s
Village, which is a residential treatment facility for children with
behavioral and mental health issues located in the township.
Presbyterian Children’s Village is a several acre property. It has
classrooms, recreation centers and cottages. The cottages are
used as dormitories for the students. Each cottage has an aid[e]
who is responsible for the residents living in the cottage.
As part of his investigation, Detective Schreiber interviewed
five children (girls) at the facility. [Appellant] was the aid[e] in
J-S33008-21
charge of the cottage the girls lived in. The girls told Detective
Schreiber [Appellant] showed them a photo of herself in purple
lingerie where her breast area could be plainly seen. The girls
who saw the photo told Detective Schreiber they were taken back
by it. The girls also reported seeing a video where [Appellant]
flashed her buttocks area. Thereafter, Detective Schreiber applied
for an arrest warrant for [Appellant] as well as a search warrant
for her personal iPhone. Using the search warrant Detective
Schreiber performed a logical extraction of [Appellant’s] iPhone
and recovered several videos and photos which matched the
photos and videos which were described to him by the juveniles.
Admitted into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit C-1 was a set
of three photos found on [Appellant’s] iPhone which matched the
description of the lingerie that the girls described to Detective
Schreiber. There were also approximately five to nine close-up
videos that showed female genitalia masturbating. These videos
were significant for Detective Schreiber[’s] investigation because
they also matched the description previously told him by the
juveniles that they were shown a video of somebody [“playing
with herself”] up close, by [Appellant]. [N.T. Non-Jury Trial,
1/15/19, at 123. The videos were admitted into evidence as
Commonwealth Exhibit C-3.
Three of the girls testified at trial and corroborated the
allegations testified to by Detective Schreiber. M.S. was
[seventeen] at the time of the incident. She testified [that
Appellant] showed her and [another girl] a picture of herself in
lingerie with her breasts exposed. She identified Commonwealth
Exhibit C-1 as the pictures she was shown. M.S. testified the
pictures made her feel uncomfortable.
S.H. was [sixteen] at the time of trial and approximately
[fourteen] at the time of the incident. She testified [that
Appellant] showed her and other girls a video of herself
masturbating. She was shown the video by [Appellant] in the staff
room at the Cottage where she resided. S.H. testified the video
made her feel uncomfortable and “grossed out.” S.H. also
testified [that Appellant] on one occasion exposed her buttocks to
her while S.H. was in her bedroom and [Appellant] was in the
upstairs hallway of the Cottage. S.H. generally felt uncomfortable
with [Appellant] because [Appellant] was always talking about
sex.
-2-
J-S33008-21
M.L. was [seventeen] at the time of trial and approximately
[fifteen] at the time of the incident. She testified [Appellant]
showed her and four other girls a video of herself masturbating
corroborating S.H.’s testimony. She also corroborated S.H.’s
testimony about being “mooned” by [Appellant].
Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 1-4.
On January 22, 2019, following a non-jury trial, Appellant was convicted
of three counts of corruption of minors. Sentencing was deferred so that a
pre-sentence investigation report could be prepared. On June 8, 2020,
Appellant received an aggregate sentence of four to forty-six months of
incarceration followed by four years of probation. Appellant filed a post-
sentence motion alleging multiple discretionary sentencing issues and
requesting a new trial based on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
On July 6, 2020, the trial court held a hearing, after which it granted
Appellant’s request for reconsideration of her sentence. Appellant was
resentenced to an aggregate sentence of time-served to twenty-three months
of incarceration followed by four years of probation. The court denied
Appellant’s remaining post-sentence motion claims. This timely appeal
followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the mandates of
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Was the evidence
insufficient to prove [Appellant] guilty of corruption of minors?” Appellant’s
brief at 4.
-3-
J-S33008-21
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her
convictions for corruption of minors. Our standard of review when considering
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
[w]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
In order to sustain a misdemeanor conviction for corruption of minors,
the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) the defendant was at least eighteen
years old at the time of the offense; (2) the victim was less than eighteen
years old at the time of the offense; and (3) that the defendant’s specific
actions corrupted or tended to corrupt the minor’s morals. See 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 6301(a)(1)(i). The corruption of minors statute does not require proof that
the minor’s morals were actually corrupted. See Commonwealth v.
Mumma, 414 A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. 1980). Rather, a conviction will be upheld
-4-
J-S33008-21
where the knowing or intentional conduct of the defendant tends to have the
effect of corrupting the morals of a minor. See Commonwealth v. Dewalt,
752 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa.Super. 2000).
This court has visited the question of what constitutes “corruption” of a
minor’s morals before. In Commonwealth v. Decker, 698 A.2d 99, 101
(Pa.Super.1997), we held that actions that tended to corrupt the morals of a
minor were those that “would offend the common sense of the community and
the sense of decency, propriety and morality which most people entertain.”
See DeWalt, supra at 918. This is a deliberately “broad” statute, as we have
explained:
[C]orruption of a minor can involve conduct towards a child in an
unlimited number of ways. The purpose of such statutes is
basically protective in nature. These statutes are designed to
cover a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare
and security of our children. Because of the diverse types of
conduct that must be proscribed, such statutes must be drawn
broadly. It would be impossible to enumerate every particular act
against which our children need to be protected.
Commonwealth v. Barnette, 760 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2000).
Herein, Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to prove her
guilty of corruption of minors on four grounds that the Commonwealth failed
to prove: 1) that Appellant was eighteen years old at the time of the conduct;
2) that Appellant’s conduct corrupted M.O.’s morals, since viewing cleavage
was insufficient to corrupt the morals of a minor and the Commonwealth failed
to prove what picture M.O. was shown; 3) that Appellant intentionally showed
S.H. the video of Appellant masturbating and that “mooning” her was
-5-
J-S33008-21
insufficient to corrupt her morals; and 4) that Appellant corrupted M.L.’s
morals because she testified that after being shown the video of Appellant
masturbating “she was just quiet.” See Appellant’s brief at 9.
The trial court, who also sat as the fact-finder at trial, disagreed and
addressed Appellant’s arguments together:
In this case the record, as referenced above, establishes
[Appellant] was the adult aid in charge of the cottage where the
juveniles resided. The victims, M.S., S.H., and M.L. were under
[eighteen] years old at the time of the incident. Clearly
[Appellant] showing juveniles pictures of herself in lingerie bare-
chested and showing a video where she was masturbating are
actions that would offend the sense of decency, propriety and
morality which most people in the community entertain.
Additionally, it must be noted that the juvenile victims in this case
were in a residential treatment facility for behavioral and mental
health issues. In other words, they were more vulnerable than
the average child. Based on this evidence and the totality of the
circumstances taken in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence was clearly
sufficient to sustain [Appellant’s] conviction for corruption of
minors. All the elements of the crimes were met by the
Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 10-11. We agree with the trial court.
First, Appellant argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove she was
at least eighteen years old at the time of the criminal conduct. See Appellant’s
brief at 11. We disagree. It is well-settled that a defendant’s age can be
proven solely by circumstantial evidence, including a jury’s opportunity to
observe a defendant. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 657 A.2d 946, 947
(Pa.Super. 1995) (finding circumstantial evidence was enough to prove
appellant’s age where the victim identified appellant at trial, the jury observed
appellant, and evidence was presented that appellant had a prior marriage
-6-
J-S33008-21
resulting in two daughters). Herein, like in Miller, the trial court was given
ample opportunity to observe Appellant and draw his own conclusions as to
her age. Additionally, at the time of the crimes, Appellant maintained
employment where she supervised children up to age eighteen years of age
at a residential treatment facility as the “adult aid.” See N.T. Non-Jury Trial,
1/15/19, at 85; see also Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 10. Appellant also
had several jobs prior to this one, such as a residential treatment counselor
and paraprofessional educator with Victoria Hayes, a defense witness. Id. at
217. Accordingly, circumstantial evidence established that Appellant was over
the age of eighteen at the time of this conduct.
Next, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth failed to establish that
Appellant’s conduct corrupted M.O.’s morals. See Appellant’s brief at 11.
M.O. testified that she was a juvenile resident of the cottage that Appellant
was supervising when Appellant showed her and another resident a picture of
herself in lingerie with her chest exposed. N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 1/15/19, at
52-55, 58-59. M.O. identified photographs of Appellant in lingerie as “similar
to what [she] remember[ed]” in that the color of the lingerie and the way
Appellant’s face was angled were the same. Id. at 55. M.O. further explained
that viewing the photograph “made me like uncomfortable” so a few days later
she reported the incident to a different staff member. Id. at 56.
First, Appellant avers that the evidence was insufficient because M.O.
testified that she “merely felt uncomfortable as a result of seeing the picture.”
Appellant’s brief at 11. However, to establish corruption of a minor, the
-7-
J-S33008-21
Commonwealth did not need to prove that M.O.’s morals were actually
corrupted. Instead, the Commonwealth need only prove that Appellant’s
actions tended to corrupt the morals of a minor and “would offend the common
sense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety, and morality
which most people entertain.” Decker, supra, at 101. The record supports
this conclusion.
Alternatively, Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient since
M.O. testified that the photograph was similar to the one she saw but did not
identify the photograph as the exact picture. See Appellant’s brief at 12.
Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Shirey, 494 A.2d 420, 424 (Pa.Super.
1985), a case where we found the evidence insufficient to uphold a corruption
of minors conviction after the Commonwealth failed to produce any of the
“dirty” books, magazines, or pictures that the victims testified to being shown
at trial. We find Shirey distinguishable from the case at bar.
Unlike in Shirey, here, the Commonwealth admitted all of the lingerie
pictures and videos from Appellant’s phone, which matched the description
given by M.O. and the other girls. While M.O. did not explicitly identify the
photograph as the one she saw, she did describe the lingerie and pose that
Appellant made, which matched the pose and lingerie from the photographs
that were admitted. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
together with all reasonable inferences, the trial court was free to find that
one of these pictures was the one that Appellant showed to M.O. Accordingly,
-8-
J-S33008-21
the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of the corruption of minors
charge related to M.O. and this sub-claim fails.
In her third sufficiency challenge, Appellant alleges that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that she intentionally showed S.H. the video of
her masturbating. See Appellant’s brief at 12. S.H. testified that she was in
Appellant’s office with a couple of other girls when Appellant showed all of
them pictures of her body and a video of herself masturbating. See N.T. Non-
Jury Trial, 1/15/19, at 94, 105. While S.H. clarified that Appellant did not
show the video directly to S.H., S.H. was in the small room with the other girls
when Appellant was playing the video on her iPhone. Id. Based on this
testimony, Appellant argues that Appellant did not directly show S.H. the video
and, therefore, the conviction for corruption of minors of S.H. was insufficient.
Appellant relies on Dewalt, supra to support her argument. We do not find
Dewalt applicable herein.
In Dewalt, supra at 916, the evidence at trial revealed that appellant,
while outside on her own back porch and in the company of two adults, lifted
her shirt and performed a short striptease. During the striptease, the
appellant accidentally removed her underwear with her jeans. Id. at 919.
Unbeknownst to her, three minor boys looked on while standing atop a roof
next door. Id. Appellant was convicted of corruption of minors based on what
the minor boys witnessed. Thereafter, she appealed her corruption of minors
convictions on sufficiency grounds. On appeal, we found that the evidence
-9-
J-S33008-21
belied the intentional aspect of the corruption of minors charges, since the
appellant was unaware that the minor boys were watching. Id.
In contrast to Dewalt, herein, Appellant knew S.H. and the other girls
were in the room and intended to show the underage female residents the
video of her masturbating. In addition to S.H.’s testimony about the video,
M.L. also testified. M.L. corroborated and expanded on S.H.’s testimony,
agreeing that they were both in the office when Appellant showed them the
video. See N.T Non-Jury Trial, 1/15/19, at 118. M.L. also explained how
Appellant identified herself in the video before tilting her phone towards the
girls. Id. at 118-24, 150-51. Viewing the record as a whole, Dewalt does
not apply.
As an alternative avenue to relief, Appellant argues that “mooning” S.H.,
by exposing her butt and some of her thighs, did not offend the propriety and
morality that most people entertain. See Appellant’s brief at 12-13. Appellant
does not cite to any authority in support of her position that we should
consider her various lewd acts towards one victim individually. In addition to
showing S.H. a video of herself masturbating, S.H. also testified that Appellant
stopped in front of her open bedroom door, pulled down her pants, and
“mooned” S.H., exposing her butt and some of her thighs. N.T. Non-Jury
Trial, 1/15/19, at 84-85, 90-91, 109-110. Viewing this evidence as a whole,
the trial court did not err when it found that this evidence was sufficient to
convict Appellant of corruption of minors related to S.H.
- 10 -
J-S33008-21
In her final allegation of error, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth
failed to prove that Appellant corrupted M.L.’s morals because she testified
that her reaction to Appellant’s actions was to be “quiet.” See Appellant’s
brief at 13; see also N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 1/15/19, at 125. We disagree with
Appellant’s characterization of M.L.’s testimony. At trial, M.L. described
Appellant’s actions in the video as “playing with herself” or touching her vagina
with her fingers and said that she could hear “something wet.” N.T. Non-Jury
Trial, 1/15/19, at 123-25. M.L. explained that viewing the video and hearing
this noise made her feel “uncomfortable.” Id. at 118. M.L. also described
Appellant “mooning” them as “inappropriate.” Id. at 125-26.
Further, the trial court was not required to find that M.L.’s morals were
actually corrupted before convicting Appellant of corruption of minors.
Instead, the court needed to determine whether Appellant’s actions tended to
corrupt the morals of M.L. and that Appellant’s actions “would offend the
common sense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety and
morality which most people entertain.” See DeWalt, supra at 918. The trial
court, sitting as fact finder, was given the opportunity to assess M.L.’s
testimony in conjunction with the video, and found that Appellant’s actions
were of such a type. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 10. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable
inferences, there was sufficient evidence for the court to convict Appellant of
corruption of minors related to M.L. Appellant’s final claim fails.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
- 11 -
J-S33008-21
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2021
- 12 -