Com. v. Martinez, A., Jr.

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
AMAVILES MARTINEZ, JR.
Appellant No. 1350 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 31, 2017 In the
Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at Nos:
CP-06-CR-0000907-2014
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2018
Appellant, Amaviles Martinez, Jr., appeals from his judgment of
sentence of six to fifteen years’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by
a felon1 and possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver. 2 We
affirm.
On February 6, 2014, Berks County probation officers visited Appellant’s
residence while Appellant was on probation for a corrupt organizations
conviction. The officers discovered a substantial amount of marijuana and a
firearm during the visit.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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On March 21, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an information charging
Appellant with the above offenses along with possession of drug
paraphernalia. The trial court granted Appellant an extension of time until
May 16, 2014 to file omnibus pretrial motions. Appellant did not file a motion
to suppress until October 24, 2016, two years and five months after the
extended deadline. On October 27, 2016, the trial court denied the
suppression motion as untimely.
Almost two months later, on December 22, 2016, Appellant filed a
motion seeking reconsideration of the order denying his suppression motion.
Appellant admitted that his initial motion was both untimely and boilerplate in
nature but asked the court to excuse these defects in the interests of justice.
On December 27, 2016, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
On March 13, 2017, Appellant filed a second motion for reconsideration
fleshing out his argument for suppression. In essence, Appellant asserted
that (1) on the afternoon of February 6, 2014, probation officers visited his
residence without advance notice and demanded entry without any reasonable
suspicion of any criminal wrongdoing; (2) Appellant did not voluntarily consent
to their entry; (3) during the visit, the probation officers obtained
incriminating statements from Appellant without first providing Miranda3
warnings; and (4) based on these incriminating statements, a probation officer
found marijuana in the living room, and (5) a police officer who responded to
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3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the probation officer’s call unlocked a bedroom door and found a gun inside.
On March 17, 2017, the court denied Appellant’s second motion for
reconsideration.
The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to sever the
firearms charge from the other charges. During trial on the firearms charge,
Appellant’s wife testified that she owned the firearm instead of Appellant and
that she obtained the firearm to “protect her family.” N.T., 6/7/17, at 136.
Nevertheless, the jury found Appellant guilty of the firearms charge. On July
26, 2017, the trial court, sitting without a jury, found Appellant guilty of the
remaining charges.
On July 31, 2017, the trial court imposed sentence. Appellant filed
timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied, and a timely notice
of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The trial court stated in its opinion that it denied Appellant’s initial suppression
motion and two motions for reconsideration because they were untimely and
boilerplate in nature. Trial Ct. Op., 10/5/17, at 4-5.
Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:
A. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion first, by
failing to hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s
amended motion to suppress based on violation of the Appellant’s
rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States constitution and analogous provisions of the Pennsylvania
constitution, and second, thereby in effect denying the motion to
suppress?
B. Whether, in this prosecution of [Appellant] for alleged unlawful
possession of a firearm, the trial court erred and abused its
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discretion by barring [Appellant’s] wife from testifying to the
circumstances supporting her testimony that she alone obtained
the firearm for protection of her household and family?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
In his first argument, Appellant objects to the trial court’s refusal to hold
a pretrial hearing due to the tardiness of his suppression motion. We review
decisions denying leave to file an untimely suppression motion for abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Long, 753 A.2d 272, 279 (Pa. Super. 2000).
The Rules of Criminal Procedure require defendants to file suppression
issues within an omnibus pretrial motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). The
defendant must file and serve the omnibus motion “within 30 days after
arraignment . . . unless the time for filing has been extended by the court for
cause shown.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). If the defendant files an untimely
suppression motion, “the issue of suppression of such evidence shall be
deemed to be waived” unless the court excuses the defendant’s tardiness in
the “interests of justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). The “interests of justice” test
requires consideration of “the length and cause of the delay, the merits of the
suppression claim, and the court’s ability, considering the complexity of the
issues and the availability of the witnesses, to hold the hearing promptly.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 378 A.2d 1262, 1266 (Pa. Super. 1977). The
trial court should invoke the “interests of justice” exception when “the merits
of counsel’s [untimely] motion [are] so apparent that justice require[s] that it
be heard.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687, 693 (Pa. 1977),
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overruled on different grounds, Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726,
738 (Pa. 2002).
Courts are unwilling to apply the “interests of justice” exception in the
defendant’s favor when he raises an untimely suppression issue whose merits
are not apparent. Hubbard, 372 A.2d at 695 (where officers requested
consent to inspect defendant’s automobile and boots after short, informal
questioning period in defendant’s home in which officers twice advised
defendant of his right to refuse consent, defendant’s motion at murder trial to
suppress evidence relating to automobile and boots on ground that he had not
been advised of his Miranda rights before consenting to inspection did not
raise apparently meritorious claim; thus, “interests of justice” did not require
that such motion be heard). Courts are also reluctant to excuse untimely
motions arguing issues that the defendant could have timely raised by the
original due date. Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 561 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (trial court properly denied defendant’s supplemental
suppression motion as untimely where defendant knew facts and
circumstances surrounding traffic stop at time of original suppression motion
but limited original motion to different issue and did not file supplemental
motion until four months later, after court had denied original motion);
compare Commonwealth v. Long, 753 A.2d 272, 279-80 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(trial court properly considered, in prosecution for driving under the influence,
defendant’s oral suppression motion presented at conclusion of
Commonwealth's case, on ground that recently obtained videotape of traffic
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stop and arresting officer’s trial testimony provided basis for the motion not
available pretrial).
In this case, the original deadline for Appellant’s motion to suppress was
Monday, April 21, 2014, thirty days after Appellant’s arraignment.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). Appellant requested and received an extension to file
his motion until May 14, 2014. Despite this extension, he did not file his
original suppression motion until October 24, 2016, two years and five months
after the extended deadline, and he failed to present good cause for this
lengthy delay. Bluntly put, Appellant displayed abject indifference to the
court’s schedule. Moreover, Appellant’s original motion and initial motion for
reconsideration were boilerplate in nature. His second motion for
reconsideration, which claimed that the probation officers performed the
search without his consent and failed to provide Miranda warnings, was more
detailed than his prior motions, but its merit was not “so apparent that justice
required it be heard.” Hubbard, 372 A.2d at 693. Further, nothing prevented
Appellant from raising these arguments 2½ years earlier in a timely
suppression motion. We conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion by denying Appellant’s original motion to suppress and motions for
reconsideration without a hearing.
In his second argument, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
precluding Appellant’s wife from explaining her reasons for obtaining the
firearm that law enforcement officers discovered in the residence. We review
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the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth
v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2007).
We conclude that this ruling was a proper exercise of the trial court’s
discretion. The court explained that it permitted Appellant’s wife to testify
that the gun belonged to her and not Appellant, but it barred testimony about
her reasons for owning the gun because they “[had] no bearing on any
material fact. The material fact in this case was possession of the gun by
Appellant. Whether [Appellant’s wife] had acquired the gun legally or with a
substantial justification was irrelevant [to whether Appellant was in possession
of the gun].” Trial Ct. Op. at 9 (emphasis added). We also observe that this
ruling did not prejudice Appellant, for his wife still managed to explain her
reason for obtaining the gun by testifying that she needed the gun to “protect
her family.” N.T., 6/7/17, at 136.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/14/18
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