Com. v. Hamilton, B.

J-S23002-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BRIAN HAMILTON,
Appellant No. 3533 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 21, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010189-2007
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MAY 02, 2016
Brian Hamilton appeals pro se from the order dismissing his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
9541-9546. We affirm.
On June 18, 2007, Appellant and another man robbed a local
convenience store while holding the store’s three employees at gunpoint.
After a bench trial, the court convicted him of three counts of robbery and
related charges. On February 18, 2009, the trial court sentenced him to an
aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years of incarceration, followed by a ten-
year probationary term. Appellant filed neither a post-sentence motion nor a
direct appeal.
____________________________________________

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as
follows:
[Appellant] filed a timely pro se [PCRA petition] on August
6, 2009. [Appellant specifically requested reinstatement of his
direct appellate rights on the grounds that prior counsel failed to
file an appeal on his behalf. This petition, however, did not
reference a post-sentence motion or indicate that Appellant
requested one be filed on his behalf.] After counsel was
appointed, the petition was amended on January 20, 2010 and
August 19, 2010. On September 10, 2010 this court granted
[Appellant’s] request and reinstated his appellate rights nunc pro
tunc. Thereafter, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal on
September 22, 2010. On September 23, 2010, [Appellant] was
ordered to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal
in accordance with [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b). On September 15, 2010,
this court permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw and [new
counsel] entered his appearance on September 16, 2010 and
filed [the Rule 1925(b)] statement on September 30, 2010. This
court filed its opinion on January 11, 2011. On January 3,
2012[,] the Superior Court dismissed [Appellant’s] appeal after
finding that he failed to preserve a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence because he did not request
reinstatement of his right to file a post-sentence motion. [See
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, No. 2699 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super.,
filed January 3, 2012) (unpublished memorandum)]
On March 1, 2012, [Appellant] filed his second PCRA
petition pro se and later filed an amended petition on January
11, 2013. [PCRA counsel] was appointed on January 10, 2013
and filed an amended petition [on] January 8, 2014. On April 28,
2014 the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Dismiss [Appellant’s]
PCRA petition. On June 15, 2014 [Appellant] filed a Motion for
Removal of Counsel, which was denied on June 27, 2014. On
that same day, this court issued notice of its intent to dismiss
the petition. On August 15, 2014, after conducting a Grazier
hearing, this court granted [Appellant’s] request to represent
himself and permitted counsel to withdraw. [Appellant] again
amended his petition on October 15, 2014 and later
supplemented it on November 18, 2014. On November 21, 2014
the petition was formally dismissed by this court. [Appellant]
filed the instant Notice of Appeal on December 2, 2014.
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PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/15, 2-3 (footnotes omitted).
Appellant raises the following issues.
1. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for abandoning [Appellant] and
forfeiting [Appellant’s] post sentencing rights without
informing [Appellant]?
2. Was Appellate Counsel ineffective for failing to properly
preserve the issue when counsel had the chance to do so?
3. Should Appellant’s post-sentencing rights be reinstated and
sentence vacated and remanded for a new sentencing
hearing?
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnumbered). We will address Appellant’s claims
together.
In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA relief,
this Court is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the
determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.
See Commonwealth v. Payne, 794 A.2d 902, 905 (Pa. Super. 2002). We
pay great deference to the findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb
these findings unless they have no support in the certified record. See id.Furthermore, to be entitled to relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must
plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction or
sentence arose from one or more of the errors enumerated in section
9543(a)(2) of the PCRA. One such error involves the ineffective assistance of
counsel.
To obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was
ineffective, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
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that counsel's ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process
that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
See Payne, 794 A.2d at 905. Because Appellant’s claims challenge the
stewardship of prior counsel, we apply the following principles.
Counsel is presumed to be effective, and Appellant has the burden of
proving otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Pond, 846 A.2d 699, 708 (Pa.
Super. 2004).
In order for Appellant to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, he must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place. Appellant must demonstrate:
(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel
had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or
inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. The petitioner bears the
burden of proving all three prongs of the test.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 868 A.2d 1278, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citations omitted).
In assessing a claim of ineffectiveness, when it is clear that appellant
has failed to meet the prejudice prong, the court may dispose of the claim
on that basis alone, without a determination of whether the first two prongs
have been met. See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa.
1995). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. See
Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).
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In essence, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred in denying his
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a discretionary
aspects claim via the filing of a post-sentence motion, and that subsequent
counsel was ineffective for failing to seek reinstatement of his right to file a
post-sentence motion once his appellate rights were reinstated nunc pro
tunc. We agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant has failed to
establish any of the prongs of the tripartite ineffectiveness test.
Before dismissing Appellant’s direct appeal and affirming his judgment
of sentence, a panel of this Court explained that
[a]fter sentence was pronounced, [Appellant] was specifically
told he had the option to file a motion for reconsideration of
sentence within ten days and/or file an appeal within 30 days.
Counsel told [Appellant] to contact him if he wanted to file
either.
Neither a motion for reconsideration nor an appeal was
filed. [Appellant] filed a timely PCRA petition specifically claiming
he had instructed counsel to file a direct appeal, but counsel had
not. He sought reinstatement of direct appeal rights. His PCRA
petition made no mention of seeking a modified sentence.
Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed listing
several issues, including, for the first time, a claim that his
sentence was unreasonable.
***
A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence may
be raised nunc pro tunc, if the petitioner seeks reinstatement of
his post-sentence rights rather than solely his right to direct
appeal. See Commonwealth v. Fransen, 986 A.2d 154 (Pa.
Super. 2009). If, however, post-sentence rights are not
specifically requested and granted, the petitioner is left unable to
challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id. at 156.
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Hamilton, No. 2699 EDA 2010 at 2-3 (footnote omitted). We then
concluded that because Appellant had not requested the reinstatement of his
right to file a post-sentence motion, he could not raise his discretionary
aspect of sentence claim on appeal. See id. at 4.
The record flatly refutes Appellant’s claim of trial counsel
abandonment. Therefore, Appellant’s claim of trial counsel abandonment
fails.
Appellant next claims that appellate counsel, John Cotter, Esquire, was
ineffective for not seeking to reinstate the right to file a post-sentence
motion. Appellant impugns the wrong counsel. Attorney Cotter, acting as
appellate counsel, could not request the right to file a post-sentence motion.
That request would have had to have been made by Appellant’s initial PCRA
counsel, Richard Moore, Esquire. Attorney Cotter had to play the hand he
was dealt, so to speak, on appeal. He rendered no ineffective assistance of
counsel in this regard, as he was in no position, at that procedural point in
the proceedings, to request reinstatement of the right to file a post-sentence
motion. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim regarding appellate counsel fails.
Within his appellate brief, Appellant offers no reasons to disturb the
PCRA court’s conclusions.1 Thus, he is not entitled to post-conviction relief.
We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying his PCRA petition.
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1
We further note that Appellant is unable to challenge the application of the
mandatory minimum pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. section 9712, because his
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order affirmed.
Justice Fitzgerald joins the memorandum.
Judge Ott concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/2/2016
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
judgment of sentence came before Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct.
2151 (2013) was decided. See generally Commonwealth v. Miller, 102
A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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