Commonwealth v. Cobb

CERCONE, Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.

In this case, the Commonwealth sought to prove that appellant Kenneth Cobb had assaulted Ms. Bonnie M. Rogers. At trial, the alleged victim testified that appellant punched her in the face after she demanded one hundred dollars ($100.00) from him. Ms. Rogers explained that she had previously driven appellant to Philadelphia to obtain drugs in exchange for the aforementioned sum. According to Ms. Rogers, appellant broke her jaw in two places, causing profuse bleeding, severe pain and swelling and necessitating surgery.

On December 12, 1989, a jury found appellant guilty of simple assault. Subsequently, appellant’s post-trial motions were denied and he was sentenced. This appeal followed.

While appellant raises seven issues for our review, we need only address appellant’s claim concerning the lower court’s restricting his cross-examination of a Commonwealth witness because our grant of a new trial based on this issue.¹ Specifically, appellant argues that the lower court erred in refusing to allow him to question the alleged victim about a capias issued for her arrest. Appellant maintains that this evidence was admissible to show the witnesses’ potential bias. We agree.

With regard to such inquiries, our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

whenever a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to the jury. Even if the prosecutor has made no promises, either on the present case or on other pending criminal matters, the witness may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if the witness presently testifies in a way that is helpful to the prosecution. And if that possibility exists, the jury should know about it.

The jury may choose to believe the witness even after it learns of actual promises made or possible promises of leniency which may be made in the future, but the defendant, under the right guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution to confront witnesses against him, must have the opportunity at least to raise some doubt in the mind of the jury as to whether the prosecution witness is biased. It is not for the court to determine whether the ■ cross-examination for bias would affect the jury's determination of the case.

Commonwealth v. Evans, 511 Pa. 214, 224-25, 512 A.2d 626, 631-32 (1986) (footnote omitted). In such an instance, however, the possibility of motive or bias must be more than mere speculation. Commonwealth v. Mines, 321 Pa.Super. 529, 533, 468 A.2d 1115, 1117 (1983). In sum, “[tjhere must be a logical connection between the facts to be proven and the inference to be drawn from the facts.” Commonwealth v. Gay, 369 Pa.Super. 340, 343, 535 A.2d 189, 190 (1988) (citation omitted).

While cross-examining Ms. Rogers, appellant attempted to prove that a warrant had been issued for the witnesses’ arrest in a separate matter. In sum, appellant hoped to show possible bias on the part of Ms. Rogers: under this theory, appellant sought to demonstrate that Ms. Rogers testified in a manner helpful to the prosecution with the hope that she might later receive favorable treatment from the Commonwealth. Accordingly, in light of Evans, supra, and its progeny, we are required to conclude that this evidence was relevant and that the lower court erred in refusing to permit its introduction.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial. Jurisdiction is not retained.

JOHNSON, J., files a dissenting opinion.

1 . In his brief, appellant raises the following contentions for our review:

A. Whether the trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] motion to dismiss based on [the] Commonwealth’s violation of Rule 1100;

B. whether the trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] motion in limine to prohibit reference[s] to drugs and in making repeated references to drugs;

C. whether the trial court erred in failing to allow full inquiry into the reasons for the victim’s inconsistent and contradictory statements and [the] victim’s having a capias issued against her;

D. whether the verdict reached was against the weight of the evidence and contrary to the law;

E. whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict;

F. whether trial judges comments were so prejudicial as to constitute error warranting a new trial;

G. whether [appellant] was denied effective assistance of counsel.