Com. v. Shaw, W.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
WILLIAM SEBON SHAW, JR., :
:
Appellant : No. 8 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 28, 2012,
Court of Common Pleas, Fayette County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-26-CR-0001425-2011
BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2014
William Sebon Shaw, Jr. (“Shaw”) appeals from the November 28,
2012 judgment of sentence entered by the Fayette County Court of Common
Pleas following his conviction of defiant trespass.1 After careful review, we
affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural histories of this
case as follows:
The Fayette County Housing Authority (FCHA) is a
duly established municipal authority with its mission
to provide a safe and healthy physical environment
for eligible low income citizens. The FCHA owns and
operates numerous multi-unit residential apartment
complexes in Fayette County and specifically owns
and operates the multi-unit residential apartment
complex known as Snowden Terrace in Brownsville,
Fayette County, Pennsylvania. (N.T. 3) All tenants
residing in Snowden Terrace are subject to the
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i).
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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provisions contained in a lease with the FCHA which
includes a booklet containing the ‘FCHA Residential
Lease Agreement, Terms and Conditions.’ (N.T. 7)
The FCHA lease provides the Authority with the right
to terminate for offering shelter to persons on the
Authority’s defiant trespass list.[FN] The FCHA
maintains a ‘defiant trespass’ list of persons who are
barred from entry into the Housing Authority
complex onto property owned and maintained by the
Authority. (N.T. 4) Individuals are placed on the
defiant trespass list by a Housing Administrator
employed by the Authority for reasons which include
buying or attempting to buy or sell drugs, harassing
tenants or staff, vandalism and other illegal activities
carried out on the premises of the FCHA. (N.T. 21)
______________________
[FN]
The terms and conditions for termination of the
lease include, inter alia, the following:
XIV. Termination of the lease.
(a) This lease may be terminated for serious or
repeated violations of material terms of the lease, …
Such serious or repeated violation of terms shall
include but not be limited to:
[* * *]
(12) If a tenant knowingly houses, boards, or tries to
offer shelter to anyone known to the tenant as being
on the FCHA’s Defiant Trespass list;
[* * *]
______________________
Any individual placed on the defiant trespass list is
personally served a written notice that they are
barred from the premises and that entry onto the
premises of the authority will result in the filing of
defiant trespass charges. (N.T.20) Persons whose
names are on the Authority's defiant trespass list
and who enter into the Housing Authority complex
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are subject to being arrested by the police for
Defiant Trespass in accordance with 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§3503(b).
On May 10, 2011, [Shaw], a 26-year-old adult male,
was observed sitting on the porch of the residence at
418 Clover Street in Snowden Terrace in violation of
the defiant trespass order personally served on him
by the housing administrator of the housing
complex. (N.T.3) It is stipulated that [Shaw] was on
the Authority’s defiant trespass list, had been placed
on the list for a valid reason and was personally
served with notice against trespass on the
authority’s property. (N.T. 4, 6, 17)
The residential unit at 418 Clover Street was under
lease by the Authority to Barbara Harris, [Shaw]’s
mother, with the specific occupants to be Barbara
Harris and Charlene Shaw, Barbara’s 30-year-old
daughter. (N.T. 4, Com. Exhibit 2) After having
observed [Shaw] on the premises of the Housing
Authority in violation of the defiant trespass order
issued by the Authority, [t]he Brownsville borough
[p]olice filed a criminal complaint charging [Shaw]
with Defiant Trespass, a third degree misdemeanor.
Following a hearing on the Omnibus Pretrial Motion
filed by [Shaw][,] the Honorable Judge Steve
Leskinen reduced the degree of the offense to a
summary.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/13, at 1-4 (majority of footnote omitted).
The case proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Ralph C.
Warman, Senior Judge, at which Shaw stipulated that he was on the
Authority’s defiant trespasser list and had received actual notice thereof, as
stated supra. The Commonwealth also stipulated that, if called to testify,
Shaw’s mother would state that Shaw was present at her apartment at
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Snowden Terrace with her permission, and that he was aware that he had
his mother’s permission to be there.
The trial court convicted Shaw of defiant trespass and sentenced him
to pay a $300.00 fine and the cost of prosecution. This timely appeal
followed, and both Shaw and the trial court complied with Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925. Shaw raises one issue for our review:
Whether the evidence was legally insufficient to
establish that [Shaw] was not licensed or privileged
to enter upon or remain on his mother’s porch or to
rebut the statutory defense presented by [Shaw], as
contained at 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3503 (c)(3), that
he reasonably believed that a person empowered to
license access to the apartment in question, namely
his mother, the tenant, would have licensed him to
enter or remain on the property?
Shaw’s Brief at 5.
Shaw challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented to convict
him of defiant trespass. “Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the
verdict is a question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 151 (Pa.
2013). We must “determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences
therefrom is sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the
crimes charged is established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines defiant trespass, in relevant
part, as follows: “A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not
licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which
notice against trespass is given by [] actual communication to the actor[.]”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). Shaw asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to find that he had satisfied his burden of proving a defense to that
crime, namely that he “reasonably believed that the owner of the premises,
or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed
him to enter or remain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(c)(3); see Shaw’s Brief at 9,
12. Specifically, he states, “the invitation of his mother, as the tenant of the
apartment in question, negates the evidence necessary to sustain a
conviction.” Shaw’s Brief at 12.
There is no Pennsylvania case law addressing the issue raised. The
trial court relies upon Williams v. Nagel, 643 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. 1994), in
support of its finding that because the lease restricted Shaw’s mother from
“attempting to offer shelter” to anyone on the defiant trespass list, her
invitation to Shaw was not valid. Thus, according to the trial court, Shaw
“could not reasonably have believed that [her] invitation” permitted him to
enter the property. Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/13, at 16-19. Shaw cites to
several cases from other jurisdictions to support his argument to the
contrary. See Shaw’s Brief at 11, 15-16 (citing State v. McCave, 805
N.W.2d 290 (Neb. 2011); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 909 N.E.2d 42-5-
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(Mass. App. 2009); In re Jason Allen D., 733 A.2d 351 (Md. App. 1999),
overruled on other grounds by In re Antoine M., 907 A.2d 158 (Md. 2006);
State v. Dixon, 725 A.2d 920 (Vt. 1999); Bean v. U.S., 709 A.2d 85 (D.C.
1998); State v. Blair, 827 P.2d 356 (Wash. App. 1992); L.D.L. v. State,
569 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884(Minn. 1981)).
As stated above, the affirmative defense raised by Shaw to the crime
of defiant trespass was that he “reasonably believed” that he was permitted
on the property by virtue of his mother’s invitation. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3503(c)(3). In the context of another affirmative defense – self-defense –
our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he requirement of a reasonable
belief encompasses two aspects, one subjective and one objective.”
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (Pa. 2012). The subjective
element requires that the defendant “acted out of an honest, bona fide
belief[.]” Id. The objective element contemplates that the defendant’s
honest belief must be reasonable in light of the information and facts
available to the defendant. Id.The record before us reveals that Shaw did not testify at trial. The
only evidence he presented in his defense was in the form of a stipulation by
the Commonwealth that Shaw’s mother invited him to come to her
apartment, which she leased from the Housing Authority, and that Shaw was
“aware” of her invitation. N.T., 11/28/12, at 4-5. Shaw also stipulated to
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the Commonwealth’s evidence that he was on the Housing Authority’s
“defiant trespass” list, was on the list for a valid reason, had actual notice of
his inclusion of that list, and that this barred him from entry onto property
owned by the Housing Authority. Id. at 3-4. Shaw presented no evidence
that his presence on Housing Authority property was based on an actual,
bona fide belief that his mother’s invitation overrode the prohibition set forth
by the Housing Authority. We note that in the cases of our sister states
relied upon Shaw that are factually similar and are predicated on comparable
laws to section 3503 and(b)(1)(i) and (c)(3),2 the defendant presented
evidence of his subjective belief that he or she was permitted on the
property in question. See, e.g., In re Jason Allen D., 733 A.2d at 357(defendant testified that he was told he was permitted to be on the premises
if he was visiting a resident); Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d at 892 (finding the
defendant’s claim of right was bona fide based upon her testimony).
2
Several of the cases cited by Shaw are factually or legally inapposite to
the case before us. See, e.g., Bean, 709 A.2d at 86 (the defendant “was
not unconditionally barred” from the property in question and was permitted
to be on the property “for a legitimate reason, e.g., in order to visit a
tenant”); Blair, 827 P.2d at 359 n.4 (same); McCave, 805 N.W.2d at 314-
18 (issue before the court was whether the trial court erred by excluding
statements as hearsay); Dixon, 725 A.2d at 923 (the State proceeded
“solely on the theory that only the nonconsent of the landlord was needed
for a conviction,” and did not argue that the landlord imposed “reasonable
regulations” to protect “the premises themselves or [] other tenants,” which
the court suggested may have led to a different result); Nelson, 909 N.E.2d
at 45 (no “reasonable belief” required, just a blanket, case law created-
prohibition against the landlord excluding another from a tenant’s residential
apartment and the common areas leading thereto).
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The evidence presented by the Commonwealth, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, reveals that Shaw was on the
Housing Authority’s property with actual knowledge that he was prohibited
from being there. We therefore agree with the trial court that the evidence
was legally sufficient to convict Shaw of defiant trespass.3
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/2014
3
“We are not limited by the trial court’s rationale and may affirm its
decision on any basis.” Commonwealth v. Hunter, 60 A.3d 156, 162
(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
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