Com. v. Mason, J.

J-A23003-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JACKIE MASON, :
:
Appellant : No. 778 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 3, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0010462-2012
BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2014
Jackie Mason (“Mason”) appeals from the April 3, 2013 judgment of
sentence entered by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.
Specifically, Mason appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress
a gun found in his vehicle during a traffic stop. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts adduced at the suppression
hearing as follows:
On May 24, 2012, plain clothes narcotics detectives
of the City of Pittsburgh Police Department were
patrolling Shadeland Avenue in the Marshall-
Shadeland section of the North Side of the City of
Pittsburgh in an unmarked police car. (T.R. 4). While
driving behind a car driven by [Mason], the
detectives observed that the taillight on the
driver[’]s side of [Mason]’s vehicle was completely
burned out or not illuminated. The detectives
initiated a traffic stop at the intersection of Woodland
and Shadeland Avenues. (T.R. 4).
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Detective Scott Love, along with three (3) other plain
clothes detectives, approached [Mason]’s car. (T.R.
9). Each detective had his badge displayed around
his neck at the time of the encounter with [Mason].
(TR. 7). All of their weapons were holstered and not
drawn. (T.R. 12-13). As he approached the vehicle,
Detective Love noted that there was a bullet hole in
the front windshield, two (2) bullet holes in the
passenger side of the car, and that the passenger
side window was shattered. (T.R. 5, 9). Detective
Love asked [Mason] to produce his license,
registration and proof of insurance. (T.R. 5, 9). As
[Mason] began to reach around to retrieve those
items, Detective Love asked him if there were any
weapons in the car that he (Detective Love) should
know about. (T.R. 5-6, 10). [Mason] responded that
there were no weapons, but he appeared to be
visibly shaking, sweating and nervous. (T.R. 6, 10).
Because of how nervous [Mason] was, Detective
Love asked him if he could search the car, and
[Mason] said ‘go ahead.’ (T.R. 6, 10). As [Mason]
was exiting the vehicle at the request of the officers
so that a search could be performed, [Mason] told
Detective Love that he had lied and that he had a
gun under his seat. (T.R. 6, 10-11). Detective Love
looked under the driver’s seat and could see a gun,
which he recovered. (T.R. 7, 11). The gun was a nine
millimeter (9 mm) black Ruger. (T.R. 7).
Detective Love stated that he asked [Mason] about
the presence of a weapon because of the visible
bullet holes in [Mason]’s vehicle and the way that he
was behaving, i.e., sweating, shaking and being very
nervous. (T.R. 8, 10). [Mason] had indicated to the
officers that he had received the bullet holes in the
East Commons housing complex, a high crime area
that the officers were familiar with and in which they
had made numerous gun and drug arrests. (T.R. 8).
Given this history, Detective Love believed that
[Mason] might have a gun in his vehicle for
protection. (T.R. 8).
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At the suppression hearing, [Mason] argued that he
was detained at the time of the traffic stop, that his
consent to search was not voluntary under the
circumstance[s] and that he should have been
Mirandized before he was asked about the presence
of the gun. The Commonwealth argued that the
consent to search was voluntary, the statement
made was a spontaneous utterance, and that the
detectives were permitted to ask [Mason] to step out
of the vehicle for officer safety. This court denied
[Mason]’s suppression motion, finding that [Mason]’s
consent to search was voluntary and that the
statement made by [Mason] was a spontaneous
utterance. Following the denial of the suppression
motion, [Mason] proceeded to a stipulated non-jury
trial, after which this court found him guilty of both
charges and sentenced him to one (1) year of
probation and the payment of the summary fine.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/13, at 2-4.
Mason filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s
order to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). He raises one issue for our review: “Did the trial
court err in denying [] Mason’s motion to suppress where, under the totality
of the circumstances, [] Mason’s consent was involuntarily obtained and
police independently lacked reasonable suspicion to believe [] Mason was
armed and dangerous?” Mason’s Brief at 4.
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a
suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.
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Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 484 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We are
not bound by the trial court’s legal conclusions, but must apply the law to
the supported facts found by the trial court. Id. The trial court’s
conclusions of law are subject to our plenary review. Id.The trial court found that the police conducted a lawful traffic stop and
Mason voluntarily gave the police consent to search his vehicle. Trial Court
Opinion, 12/19/13, at 10. Mason asserts that the circumstances attendant
to his interaction with police – the number of detectives present, that each
detective was armed, the stop occurred at night, the investigative detention
was ongoing at the time of the request to search his car, and the detectives
did not inform Mason that he could decline their request to search his vehicle
– rendered involuntary his consent for police to search his vehicle pursuant
to, inter alia, this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d
1078 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc). Mason’s Brief at 18-19. Mason further
argues that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to search the car for
weapons and therefore, the gun recovered during Detective Love’s search of
Mason’s car should have been suppressed. Id. at 22-23.
We need not decide the issue of the voluntariness of Mason’s consent
because the record reflects that the police were justified in conducting a
protective search of the car pursuant to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032(1983), and Commonwealth v. Morris, 644 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1994), which
permit
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the search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden, […] if the police officer
possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant’ the officers in believing that the suspect is
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate
control of weapons. ‘[T]he issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.’
Long, 463 U.S. at 1049–50 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)); Morris, 644 A.2d at 421.
The Commonwealth points us to Commonwealth v. Buchert, 68
A.3d 911 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2014), to
support a finding that the police in the case at bar had the requisite
reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective search of Mason’s vehicle.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-13. In Buchert, police stopped a vehicle with
a broken taillight. Buchert, 68 A.3d at 912. As they approached the car,
the officers saw the defendant, seated in the front passenger seat, bend
forward and reaching under his seat. Police did not see the defendant’s
hands or anything in them. The defendant and the driver were cooperative
with the police and kept their hands visible at their direction. According to
police, “the defendant appeared nervous as they were talking to him, and []
[the officer] could see the defendant’s heavy breathing and rapid heartbeat.”
Id. The officers ordered the two occupants to exit the car. A frisk of the
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defendant did not reveal any contraband. Thereafter, the officer performed
a protective search of the area of the vehicle within the defendant’s
immediate control, revealing a .22 caliber revolver. Id. Although the officer
testified that the stop occurred in a high narcotics area, the trial court did
not find that testimony to be credible. Id.The defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm, which the trial
court granted, finding the police lacked “probable cause to search the
passenger area.” Id. at 913. The Commonwealth appealed, and this Court
reversed, concluding:
The combination of [the defendant’s] furtive
movement of leaning forward and appearing to
conceal something under his seat, along with his
extreme nervousness and the night time stop, was
sufficient to warrant a reasonable police officer to
believe that his safety was in danger and that
Appellee might gain immediate control of a weapon.
Id. at 916-17.
The record reflects that the stop in question occurred at 12:22 a.m.
during Detective Love’s routine patrol, and that he was “assigned to the
highest crime areas within the City of Pittsburgh.” N.T., 4/13/13, at 3-4;
Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/24/12, at 2. As Detective Love approached
the car, he observed that there was a bullet hole in its windshield, two bullet
holes in the passenger side of the car, and its passenger-side window was
shattered. N.T., 4/13/13, at 5. Prior to Mason providing his license and
registration, Detective Love asked him if there were any weapons in the
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vehicle, as he routinely did during traffic stops. Id. at 5-6, 10. Mason said
there were no weapons in the car. Id. at 6. Mason was shaking, sweating,
and visibly nervous. Id. Despite Mason’s statement to the contrary,
Detective Love was nonetheless concerned that there were weapons in the
car because when he asked about the bullet holes in the car, Mason “said
that he had just gotten shot at down at 255 East Ohio Street. It’s a housing
complex that’s known to me as a high crime area. I’ve made numerous gun
[and] drug [] arrests.”1 Id. at 8. Detective Love testified that based on the
information he had before him, he believed Mason might have a gun in the
car for protection. Id.
Thus, the specific facts articulated by Detective Love that led him to
believe Mason might have a weapon in the car included: a late-night traffic
stop in a high crime area; the car was riddled with bullet holes from a
shooting of which occurred in another high crime area; and Mason was
visibly nervous and sweating during his interaction with the police. Unlike
the defendant in Buchert, Mason did not make furtive movements;
however, the additional factors present in the case at bar include the
1
Mason challenges the support in the record for the conclusion that Mason
informed the police about the source of the bullet holes prior to the search.
Mason’s Brief at 23. In his testimony, Detective Love indicated that his
concern that there was a weapon in the car stemmed in part from the
presence of the bullet holes and Mason’s statement “that he had just gotten
shot down at 255 East Ohio Street […] known to me as a high crime area.”
N.T., 4/13/13, at 8. It is clear from this testimony that Detective Love
became aware of this information prior to conducting the search of Mason’s
car.
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presence of bullet holes in the vehicle, Mason’s statement that he was shot
at in a high crime area, and his presence in yet another high crime area at
the time of the stop. These factors, coupled with Mason’s nervousness
during the traffic stop, are sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent man to
believe that his safety was in danger. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049–50;
Morris, 644 A.2d at 421; see also Buchert, 68 A.3d at 917.
The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. Although
the trial court did not deny Mason’s motion to suppress based upon a finding
that the police had a reasonable suspicion to suspect that Mason had a
firearm in the car, its decision to deny suppression was correct. We may
affirm a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to suppress on any ground,
“even where those grounds were not suggested to or known by the trial
court.” Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 62 n.14 (Pa. Super. 2013);
see also Thompson, 93 A.3d at 484 (we are not bound by the trial court’s
legal conclusions, but must apply the law to the supported facts found by the
trial court). We therefore affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/9/2014
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