Com. v. Baldwin, A.

J-S55029-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
ANDRE SCOTT BALDWIN
Appellant No. 396 MDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 7, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001056-2001
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., RANSOM, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2017
Appellant, Andre Scott Baldwin, appeals from the order entered
February 7, 2017, denying as untimely his petition for collateral relief filed
under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On December 19, 2001, following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted
of second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, four counts of
robbery, and one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license,
possession of a firearm with the manufacturer’s number altered, and
recklessly endangering another person.1 He received a mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment and did not appeal his sentence. Accordingly, his
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 3701(a)(1),
6106(a)(1), 6110.2(a), and 2705, respectively.
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sentence became final on January 18, 2002, thirty days after the entry of the
sentencing order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903; see also Commonwealth v.
Concordia, 97 A.3d 366 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v.
Pollard, 911 A.2d 1005 (Pa. Super. 2006).
On May 27, 2016, Appellant pro se filed an untimely petition seeking
PCRA relief, his first. Counsel was appointed and filed a Turner/Finley
letter.2 The PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw and gave
Appellant notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 that his petition would be
dismissed within twenty days. Appellant filed a response to the court’s notice,
requesting that the PCRA court extend the relief provided by Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), to apply to adult individuals who might
otherwise mentally be considered a juvenile. The PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s petition.
Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court issued a
responsive opinion, finding 1) that Appellant’s claims were waived for failure
to sufficiently articulate them in his statement, and 2) all matters previously
raised by Appellant were time-barred.3
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2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1998).
3 We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
is deficient in its vagueness. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); see also
Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2001)
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
1. Whether the court erred in denying the PCRA petition due to
the change in law as announced by Montgomery v. Louisiana4
as newly stated constitutional law to have all factors which would
increase his sentence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the federal court’s action in similar cases have created
a precedent that the state courts should follow, allow retroactive,
or whether retroactive application was necessary when the
defendant filed a timely post conviction petition.
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Although his brief is unnumbered and appears to be missing a page,
essentially, Appellant argues that due to his life circumstances and cognitive
abilities, he is a technical juvenile who should be allowed the relief offered by
Miller, made retroactive by Montgomery.
We review an order denying a petition under the PCRA to determine
whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the evidence of
record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169,
1170 (Pa. 2007). We afford the court’s findings deference unless there is no
support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d
1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995
A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
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(noting that where a court has to guess the issues appellant is appealing, that
is insufficient for meaningful review). However, as it was clear that Appellant’s
challenge was based upon Miller, and jurisdictional issues bar a merits review,
we decline to find waiver for this particular reason.
4 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
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We begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, as the
PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or
disregarded in order to address the merits of his claims. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
PCRA, any petition for relief, including second and subsequent petitions, must
be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence
becomes final. Id. There are three exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke these
exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see Commonwealth v. Gamboa-
Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).
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Appellant’s petition is untimely.5 Accordingly, in order to reach the
merits of his issues, he must plead and prove one of the exceptions to the
time bar. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267. Appellant has failed to do so. In
his brief he argues, incorrectly, that his sentence is unconstitutional because
he was a juvenile who received a mandatory life sentence.6 Although
Appellant argues that he is entitled to the retroactive application of Miller due
to his mental age at the time of the murder, this Court has previously rejected
the argument that offenders who are over eighteen may be considered
“technical juveniles” per Miller. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149
A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Accordingly, the PCRA court’s determination that Appellant’s petition is
untimely and meets no timeliness exception is supported by the record and
free of legal error. Ragan, 923 A.2d at 1170.
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5 Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 18, 2002, at the
expiration of the thirty-day period to file a direct appeal to this court. See
Pa.R.A.P. 903; see also Concordia, 97 A.3d at 366; see also 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3) (a judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking the review). Accordingly,
Appellant’s petition was over a decade untimely.
6The record reflects that Appellant was over eighteen years of age at the time
he committed the murder. See PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 3/27/17, at 5.
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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/18/2017
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