Com. v. Crenshaw, M.

J-A09015-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MUSTAFA CRENSHAW, :
:
Appellant : No. 3590 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 9, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006318-2015.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JUNE 07, 2019
Mustafa Crenshaw appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after
a jury convicted him of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, possession of
an instrument of a crime,1 as well as various firearm violations. After careful
review, we affirm.
Crenshaw and his co-defendant, Mohammed Kamana, were arrested
and charged in connection with the April 13, 2015 shooting of Michael
Pritchette.2 The trial court summarized Pritchette’s trial testimony as follows:
[At trial,] Pritchette testified that he had moved out of
Pennsylvania but returned because the Commonwealth
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 903, and 907.
2 Kamana’s surname is actually “Kamara.” See No. 3446 EDA 2017. The jury
found him guilty of attempted murder and other crimes. Id. For consistency,
we will refer to Crenshaw’s co-defendant as “Kamana.”
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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notified him that there was a warrant out for him. He stated
that he had not wanted to participate in the trial because he
was afraid for himself and his family. He identified
[Crenshaw] and Kamana, known to him as “Staf” and
“Ham,” as men he had known for more than five years from
around the neighborhood. Pritchette testified that two days
before the shooting, he got into an argument with
[Crenshaw] and Kamana at his friend “D Rock’s” house on
Elmwood Avenue. He stated that on April 13, [2015], he
walked out of a store with D Rock and headed towards a
friend’s house so he could get a ride to work when a white
Buick pulled up next to him. [Crenshaw] and Kamana exited
the vehicle and began fighting with Pritchette. Pritchette
testified that he saw [Crenshaw] pass a gun to Kamana.
Pritchette stated that he then saw Kamana aim the gun at
him so he turned around to run away, and Kamana shot him
once in the back. Pritchette testified that a friend of D
Rock’s drove him to the hospital in a red Mitsubishi.
Pritchette stated that once he arrived at the hospital, an
ambulance transported him to a different hospital.
Pritchette testified that police detectives spoke to him in the
hospital and that he refused to tell them who shot him
because he was afraid. He stated that he did tell detectives
at the hospital that a white Buick pulled up before he was
shot. Pritchette testified that later, after warrants were
issued for his arrest, the police came to his house and took
him in handcuffs to the police station. At that time, he gave
another statement and finally told the police the identities
of the men who shot him. He testified that he also identified
[Crenshaw] and Kamana in a photo array. He stated that
he had refused to disclose the shooters’ identities prior to
the warrants because he was afraid for his safety. He
further testified that he had moved out of Pennsylvania
because he was concerned for his safety due to his
involvement in this matter.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/18, at 4-5. The Commonwealth corroborated
Pritchette’s version of the incident by the testimony from the investigating
officers and video surveillance.
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That matter went to trial, where the jury found Crenshaw guilty of the
aforementioned charges on March 29, 2017. On June 9, 2017, the trial court
sentenced Crenshaw to an aggregate sentence of 8 to 16 years of
incarceration, plus 10 years of probation. Crenshaw filed post-sentence
motions, which were denied. This timely appeal follows. Both the trial court
and Crenshaw have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Crenshaw raises the following issues for our substantive review:
1. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict
for aggravated assault, where there was insufficient
evidence proving Crenshaw had the criminal specific intent
to attempt to cause or even recklessly caused Pritchette
serious bodily injury, and Crenshaw was not the one who
shot Pritchette?
2. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict
for criminal conspiracy where there was insufficient
evidence that Crenshaw conspired with the shooter, and at
most, Crenshaw was merely present at the scene when
Pritchette was shot?
3. Were the verdicts for aggravated assault, criminal
conspiracy, PIC and all the VUFA charges against the weight
of the evidence as the only identifying evidence tying
Crenshaw as one of the offenders came from Pritchette, who
gave constantly changing and materially contradictory
statements and testimony, which were rendered completely
unreliable?
See Crenshaw’s Brief at 7.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
requires us to determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, with all
reasonable inferences viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to establish every element of
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the convicted offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v.
Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. 1997). Circumstantial evidence must be
considered equally with direct evidence, and the Commonwealth may sustain
its burden by relying on circumstantial evidence alone. Commonwealth v.
Davalos, 779 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Pa. Super. 2001). The Commonwealth's
established facts and circumstances need not preclude the possibility of
innocence. Commonwealth v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, 503 (Pa. Super.
2006). If the evidence allows a fact-finder to reasonably determine that all
necessary elements are established, then the evidence will be deemed to
support the verdict. Davalos, 779 A.2d at 1193.
We will first address Crenshaw’s sufficiency challenge in regards to his
conspiracy conviction.
To prove conspiracy, the trier of fact must find that: 1)
the defendant intended to commit or aid in the commission
of the criminal act; 2) the defendant entered into an
agreement with another to engage in the crime; and 3) the
defendant or one or more of the other co-conspirators
committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed upon
crime. In most cases of conspiracy, it is difficult to prove
an explicit or formal agreement; hence, the agreement is
generally established via circumstantial evidence, such as
by the relations, conduct, or circumstances of the parties or
overt acts on the part of co-conspirators.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 920 (Pa. 2009).
In support of his sufficiency challenge, Crenshaw argues:
[Crenshaw] was merely present and did not direct anyone
to shoot the complainant. The lower court points out in its
Opinion, that the complainant had an argument with the co-
defendant and [Crenshaw], a few days prior to the shooting.
[Crenshaw] concedes that this could serve as evidence of a
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motive to engage in later violence. However, [Crenshaw]
argues that this coupled with a mere passing of a firearm,
does not rise to the level of an agreement to commit a
shooting or that the passing of a firearm [constituted a]
significant overt act.
Crenshaw’s Brief at 19-20. In addition, Crenshaw further notes that Pritchette
originally told police that he was a victim of a drive-by shooting. Finally,
Crenshaw emphasizes that Pritchette did not mention that Crenshaw passed
a gun to Kamana in his statement to police and his grand jury testimony.
In concluding Crenshaw conspired with Kamana to harm Pritchette, the
court focused on the particular circumstances and conduct in this case. The
trial court reasoned:
The record supports the jury’s finding that [Crenshaw]
entered into a conspiracy with Kamana to shoot Pritchette.
Pritchette testified that he, [Crenshaw], and Kamana had
argued at D Rock’s house on Elmwood Avenue a couple days
prior to the shooting. As Pritchette walked down Elmwood
Avenue with D Rock two days later, Kamana and
[Crenshaw] drove up in a white Buick, exited the vehicle and
began to fight with Pritchette. Pritchette then saw
[Crenshaw] pull out a gun and pass it to Kamana, who then
shot Pritchette in the back as he turned to run away. These
facts demonstrate that [Crenshaw] and Kamana had formed
a plan to shoot Pritchette and worked together to effectuate
this goal, as evidenced by the fact that [Crenshaw] and
Kamana arrived at the scene of the shooting together in the
white Buick and [Crenshaw] passed the gun to Kamana so
that he could shoot Pritchette. Indeed, all four elements of
conspiracy were proven: first, [Crenshaw] and Kamana
were known associates as they had argued with Pritchette
two days earlier at D Rock’s house; second and third,
[Crenshaw] had knowledge of the crime as he was present
during the shooting; and last, [Crenshaw] actively
participated in the commission of the crime as he initially
possessed the firearm and then passed it to Kamana so he
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could shoot Pritchette. The totality of the evidence supports
[Crenshaw’s criminal conspiracy conviction[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/18, at 13-14.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Both co-
codefendants, Crenshaw and Kamana both argued with Pritchette, jointly
approached and attacked him, and Crenshaw provided Kamana with the gun
that he shot Pritchette with. Crenshaw’s argument regarding Pritchette’s
inconsistent statements during the investigation of this case goes to the
weight rather than the sufficiency of his testimony. Thus, Crenshaw’s
sufficiency challenge to his conspiracy conviction fails.
Next, we turn to Crenshaw’s second issue, which challenges the
sufficiency of his aggravated assault conviction.
An individual is guilty of aggravated assault if he or she “attempts to
cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly, under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). ”For
aggravated assault purposes, an ‘attempt’ is found where the accused, with
the required specific intent, acts in a manner which constitutes a substantial
step toward perpetrating a serious bodily injury upon another.”
Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980, 984 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). “A person acts intentionally with respect to a material aspect of an
offense when . . . it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result[.]” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441,
446 (Pa. Super. 2008). The General Assembly has defined serious bodily injury
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as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes
serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
Crenshaw argues that he could not be convicted for aggravated assault
because he was not the shooter. He argues that he “did not direct the co-
defendant to shoot the complainant. [He] made no command nor made any
non-verbal command for [Kamana] to shoot [Pritchette].” Crenshaw’s Brief
at 16-17. Crenshaw would have this Court conclude that “he was merely
present” and that “handing a firearm to another . . . does not rise to the level
of aggravated assault.” Id.
The trial court provided the following reasons in concluding the
Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to prove Crenshaw was guilty of
aggravated assault:
The evidence shows that [Crenshaw] and Kamana
planned to confront Pritchette and shoot him. Together,
they drove up in a car, got out, and approached Pritchette
on the street. [Crenshaw] handed the gun to Kamana just
prior to Kamana shooting Pritchette in the back as he
attempted to run away. As a result of his gunshot wound,
Pritchette was hospitalized for three days. There is no
question that a gunshot to the back constituted an attempt
to cause or causes serious bodily injury, as any gunshot
“creates a substantial risk of death or [can cause] serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Even
though [Crenshaw] did not personally pull the trigger,
[Crenshaw] passing the gun to Kamana was a “substantial
step toward perpetrating a serious bodily injury upon
another.” Thus, there was sufficient evidence adduced at
trial to support the jury’s finding that [Crenshaw] was guilty
of aggravated assault.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/18, at 12.
It appears that the trial court concluded that Crenshaw was liable for
aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2702, itself and upon the principle of
conspiratorial liability. We find that Crenshaw’s conviction was proper under
the theory of conspiratorial liability and as a principal actor who attempted to
cause serious bodily injury. We will address each of these theories that the
conviction rests on in turn.
Conspiratorial liability, “permits vicarious criminal liability for the
substantive offenses committed by other members of the conspiracy that are
undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Chambers,
188 A.3d 400, 405 (Pa. 2018). The trial court found that Crenshaw was
criminally liable for the acts of his co-conspirator which were undertaken in
furtherance of the crime. Ultimately, it was the pre-existing quarrel that
Crenshaw and Kamana had with Pritchette and their subsequent joint attack
on him that led the trial court to conclude that a conspiracy had been formed
between them to effectuate a shared intent to assault. Such evidence
established a shared criminal intent, making Crenshaw vicariously liable for
the shooting.
As for a principal actor, the evidence of record supports the court’s
finding that Crenshaw himself attempted to cause serious bodily injury to
Pritchette. The circumstantial evidence demonstrates that Crenshaw
possessed the required specific intent. One could infer that Crenshaw’s
conscious objective was to shoot Pritchette because the facts demonstrate
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that (1) Crenshaw and Mustafa had an argument with Pritchette several days
prior to the shooting, (2) immediately upon approaching Pritchette, they
raised their fists and began fighting him, and (3) Crenshaw handed the gun
to Mustafa during the fight. N.T. 3/23/17, 131-40. As the trial court noted,
Crenshaw handing the gun over to Mustafa was a substantial step toward
perpetrating the shooting. We agree with the assessment and therefore find
the evidence was sufficient to convict Crenshaw of aggravated assault.
In his third issue, Crenshaw challenges the weight of the evidence
supporting his convictions. When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the
evidence, our standard of review is as follows: This Court has summarized:
The determination of the weight of the evidence
exclusively is within the province of the fact-finder, who may
believe all, part, or none of the evidence. A new trial should
be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award
of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given
another opportunity to prevail. In this regard, the evidence
must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict
shocks the conscience of the court.
Commonwealth v. Ross, 856 A.2d 93, 99 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations
omitted). Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision will not be
disturbed. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 515 A.2d 865, 869 (Pa. 1986).
An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error in judgment. Rather, it involves
bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, manifest unreasonableness or a
misapplication of the law.” Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 521
(Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
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The trial court found no merit to Crenshaw’s weight claim. See Trial
Court Opinion, 6/26/18, at 14-15. Considering the testimony provided by the
Commonwealth, the trial court reasoned:
In the case at bar, the jury properly assessed the evidence
presented at trial and based its verdict upon that evidence.
The jury, as fact-finder, was free to believe all, part or none
of the evidence presented, and […] its conclusion should not
be disturbed unless it “shock’s one’s sense of justice.” That
is not the case here. During the trial, the jury was able to
observe the demeanor of victim Pritchette and eyewitness
Bivens, and found each of them to be credible. The jury
also viewed the surveillance video from the corner beauty
store, which depicted two males emerging from a white
vehicle, a scuffle ensuing, a man running away, and a SEPTA
bus driving through [the] intersection.
Id.Crenshaw argues the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
because “the only person tying [him] to the scene of the shooting was
[Pritchette] whose story changed in material ways.” Crenshaw’s Brief at 21.
However, Pritchette explained he changed his story because he feared
retaliation from the defendants if he testified truthfully. It was within the
jury’s province to reconcile these inconsistencies in Pritchette’s testimony.
Because the evidence was not “tenuous, vague, and uncertain” the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding the verdict was not against the weight
of the evidence. Ross, 856 A.2d at 99. Thus, Crenshaw’s weight claim is
without merit.
In sum, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth demonstrates
that Crenshaw’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, and we
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find the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the weight claim. We
therefore affirm Crenshaw’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/7/19
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