In the Interest of: V.L.S., Appeal of: J.E.S.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: V.L.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.E.S., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 2980 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 13, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000670-2015,
FID# 51-FN-002194-2015
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2019
J.E.S. (Father) appeals from the decree granting the petition of T.P.
(Mother) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to V.L.S. (Child),
born in February 2007. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the background of this matter as follows:
Mother and Father have been engaged in a lengthy custody battle
long before this case arrived in [the trial] court. Mother and
Father were previously married.[1] Both Mother and Father had
substance abuse issues.[2] In 2008, Mother left the home that she
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1 Mother and Father were married in 1999 and divorced in 2010. N.T.,
11/14/17, at 22. Mother subsequently remarried, and her spouse, M.P.
(Stepfather), filed a petition to adopt Child concomitant with Mother’s petition
to terminate Father’s parental rights to Child.
2Mother reported that she has been sober since July 2009. N.T., 9/12/17, at
18, 21.
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was sharing with Father and took [] Child with her.[3] . . . Child
was one year old at the time.
Around 2010, when . . . Child was around [three] years old,
Mother started dating [Stepfather]. On September 25, 2012,
Mother married [Stepfather]. Child has been living with [Mother
and Stepfather] since they got married.
Trial Ct. Op., 2/26/19, at 1-2 (record citations omitted).
By way of further background, on February 18, 2009, the court presiding
over the custody matter (the custody court) granted Father unsupervised
visitation, but directed Mother and Father to submit to drug and alcohol testing
that same day. Father did not report for testing that day. As a result, Father
began supervised visitations with Child.
On November 12, 2009, the custody court granted Mother primary
physical and legal custody of Child, with Father having supervised visitation
with Child at the Family Court nursery every other Sunday. See Order
11/12/09. The custody court suspended Father’s visitation from October 2012
to October 2013 and again on February 11, 2015.4 See Order, 10/2/12;
Order, 10/30/13; Order, 2/11/15.
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3 Mother testified to leaving the home with Child in March 2008. Id. at 17.
4 Child had difficulties with the visits with Father. Moreover, Child reported
that Father threatened to kill Mother with a big knife and that Father touched
and kissed Child inappropriately. The custody court directed Robert
Tanenbaum, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to evaluate Child and Father. Child
also referred to Father as “bad dad.” N.T., 6/5/18, at 24-25; see also N.T.,
2/20/18, at 59.
We also note that Father was arrested for possession of marijuana in Maryland
in 2013 or 2014. See N.T., 9/11/18, at 73, 87. Father also tested positive
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In the February 11, 2015 order, the custody court stated:
Based upon the court’s observations of Child . . . as regards her
testimony and demeanor while discussing her custodial time with
Father, the court finds that presently supervised physical custody
of Child . . . with Father is not in Child[’s] . . . best interest.
Father’s supervised physical custody of Child . . . is suspended
until further order of court.
Order, 2/11/15, at 2 (full capitalization omitted). The custody court also
suspended telephone contact between Father and Child and prohibited Father
from posting pictures of Child. Id.
Additionally, the custody court directed Father to seek drug and alcohol
treatment and follow any treatment recommendations. Id. The custody court
also ordered Father to participate in any mental health treatment and therapy
recommended by a licensed psychologist “to work towards improving his
ability to interact with and relate to children of [Child]’s age.” Id.
On October 5, 2015, Mother filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and
(b),5 and Stepfather filed a petition for adoption. While a termination hearing
was initially scheduled for December 2015, and then April 2016, pursuant to
order dated April 5, 2016, and entered April 7, 2016, the proceedings were
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for opiates and marijuana on July 3, 2014. See Ex. M-2; N.T., 9/12/17, at
24-25.
5 Amended petitions for involuntary termination were filed on January 13,
2016 and July 11, 2017.
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stayed pending resolution of the custody matter, which included Father’s filing
of a petition to modify custody on November 20, 2015. Order, 4/7/16.
In November 2016, the custody court found that Father did not comply
with “important components” of its February 2015 order and that it was not
in Child’s best interests to further delay the matter.6 Order, 11/8/16, at 1-2.
The custody court dismissed Father’s outstanding petition to modify custody
without prejudice and transferred the matter to the trial court for disposition
of the petitions to involuntarily terminate parental rights and for adoption. Id.
at 2.
The trial court thereafter held hearings on the petition to terminate
Father’s parental rights on September 12, 2017, November 14, 2017,
February 20, 2018, June 5, 2018, September 11, 2018, and September 13,
2018. Mother and Stepfather testified in support of the petition. Mother also
presented testimony from three expert witnesses: (1) Dr. Tanenbaum, the
clinical psychologist appointed by the custody court, see note 4, supra; (2)
Dolores Berk, Ph.D., Child’s therapist at Care Connection Counseling Center;
and (3) Thomas Kenney, a court psychologist who conducted mental health
assessments of Mother and Father at the request of the custody court.
Father, who was represented by counsel, testified on his own behalf.
Child, who was represented by a child advocate, Marilyn Rigmaiden-DeLeon,
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6The custody court did “commend [Father] for the efforts he made.” Order
11/8/16, at 2.
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Esq., also participated in the proceedings.7 The trial court also spoke with
Child, in camera, on September 13, 2018, and Child indicated that she
supported termination of Father’s parental rights.8
By decree entered September 13, 2018, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of Father to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
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7 It appears that the trial court appointed Attorney Rigmaiden-DeLeon on
November 5, 2015, to represent both Child’s best interests and legal interests.
Attorney Rigmaiden-DeLeon stated, “Unfortunately, I wear the hat of the
attorney who has to argue what’s in the best interest of this child and what
the child wants. As the [c]ourt knows, that task is usually split between two
attorneys, but I feel confident that I can point the [c]ourt in the right
direction.” N.T., 9/13/18, at 31. Attorney Rigmaiden-DeLeon argued in
support of terminating Father’s parental rights. Id. at 31-34.
Here, Child was eleven years old at the conclusion of the hearings. At the
time she spoke with the court, Child was vocal and unwavering as to her desire
for Father’s parental rights to be terminated and to be adopted by Stepfather.
Id. at 14, 18, 22. We determine that there is no conflict between Child’s best
interests and legal interests. As such, we find the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2313(a) were satisfied. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 174-
75, 180 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (stating that, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a),
a child who is the subject of a contested involuntary termination proceeding
has a statutory right to counsel who discerns and advocates for the child’s
legal interests, defined as a child’s preferred outcome); see also In re T.S.,
192 A.3d 1080, 1089-90, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (finding the preferred outcome
of a child who is too young or non-communicative unascertainable in holding
a child’s statutory right to counsel not waivable and reaffirming the ability of
an attorney-guardian ad litem to serve a dual role and represent a child’s non-
conflicting best interests and legal interests).
8 All counsel were present during the court’s questioning of Child. N.T.,
9/13/18, at 11-14.
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2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).9 On October 10, 2018, Father filed a timely
notice of appeal, as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). In his Rule 1925(b)
statement, Father claimed:
[1]. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it
terminated [F]ather’s parental rights because termination was not
in the best interest of [C]hild.
[2]. The trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily
terminated [F]ather’s parental rights without giving primary
consideration to the effect that the termination would have on the
developmental physical and emotional needs of the child as
required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511(b).
Father’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/10/18.
Father raises the following issues on appeal:10
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9 The decree memorialized the decision placed by the court on the record at
the conclusion of the hearing on September 13, 2018. N.T., 9/13/18, at 34-
36.
10 We note that Mother and Stepfather filed a motion to quash for failure to
file a reproduced record, which was denied without prejudice and subject to
be raised in a new motion once the matter was assigned to a merits panel
pursuant to order of this Court on May 10, 2019. Order, 5/10/19. This issue
has not been raised in a new motion. Regardless, we would find this issue
without merit. The failure to file a reproduced record will not result in
dismissal where there has been no prejudice to the parties and where effective
appellate review has not been precluded. See Pa.R.A.P. 902 (failure to take
any step, other than filing of a timely notice of appeal will not provide grounds
for dismissal of the appeal); Stout v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 421
A.2d 1047, 1049 (Pa. 1980) (Pa.R.A.P. 902 provides that the extreme action
of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court sparingly and clearly
would be inappropriate where there has been substantial compliance with the
rules and when the moving party has suffered no prejudice); Hagel v. United
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[1]. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
involuntarily terminated [F]ather’s parental rights where such
determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence
under the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), and
(a)(5)?
[2]. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
involuntarily terminated [F]ather’s parental rights without giving
primary consideration to the effect that the termination would
have on the developmental physical and emotional needs of the
child as required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511(b)?
Father’s Brief at 4.
Father first argues that the record reveals his continued attempts to
obtain custody of Child. Id. at 7. Father notes that he “tried vigorously to
contact and communicate with [Child], but his efforts were continually
thwarted by [Mother]. Father filed custody petitions and contempt petitions
because [Mother] would withhold [Child] from [Father].” Id. at 6.
Father further asserts that he remedied his drug problem and has
remained sober for ten years.11 Id. at 7. Father states:
In the instant matter, evidence demonstrates [F]ather’s attempt
at trying to gain custody of [Child], although [Child] was not in
his care. The trial court noted that Father continued to fight for
custody of [Child]. Father even remedied his drug problem which
was an issue when [Child] was younger. He had been clean for
ten years and still attends [Narcotics Anonymous] meetings.
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Lawn Mower Sales & Service Inc., 653 A.2d 17 (Pa. Super. 1995).
Moreover, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2151(b), a party who is in forma pauperis,
as Father is, is not required to file a reproduced record.
11Although Father asserts that he has been sober for ten years, the trial court
noted that Father was arrested for possession of marijuana in 2013 or 2014.
See Trial Ct. Op., 2/26/19, at 7; see also note 4, supra. Additionally, as
noted above, Father tested positive for opiates and marijuana on July 3, 2014.
See note 4, supra.
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Id. (record citations omitted). In sum, Father contends that he “has
demonstrated his commitment to [remain] close to [Child] because he had a
good relationship with her” and “[M]other has not proved that he could not
remedy” the conditions causing any incapacity to parent. Id. (record citations
omitted).
At the outset, we reiterate that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Father
challenged the trial court’s rulings on “the best interests of the child” and
Section 2511(b). See Father’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/10/18. Father
did not specifically take issue with the trial court’s analysis of Section
2511(a).12 Therefore, we could find Father’s argument waived. See In re
M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Nevertheless, Father’s argument would merit no relief. In matters
involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our standard of review is
as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The
trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
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12 The trial court, however, did address its rulings under Section 2511(a) in
its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
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multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.,
855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent
evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record
could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d
387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights requires a bifurcated analysis of the
grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
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C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). We have long held that, in order to
affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court
as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, we
first consider whether termination was proper under Section 2511(a)(2). See
id.Sections 2511(a)(2) provides as follows:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
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causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
This Court has stated that Section 2511(a)(2)
does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or failure to perform
parental duties, but instead emphasizes the child’s present and
future need for essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being. Therefore, the
language in subsection (a)(2) should not be read to compel courts
to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong, continuous
parental ties, which the policy of restraint in state intervention is
intended to protect. This is particularly so where disruption of the
family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect
for reuniting it.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
Moreover, “[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A]
parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding
the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely
or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
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Here, in finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court stated the following:
Applying [M.E.P.] and the elements set forth under 2511(a)(2) to
the instant case, it is clear that [Mother and Stepfather] met their
burden of demonstrating that termination was proper. The
evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under
2511(a)(2) existed given that Father repeatedly failed to inquire
about [Child] or reach out to [Child]. Father failed to contact
[Child’s] therapist to ask how she was doing. Father did not make
any attempts to send Christmas cards to [Child]. Moreover, the
evidence established that once Father found out that he was not
listed as the father of [Child] by the school, no efforts were made
by Father to remedy that situation. Once his supervised visits
were suspended in 2015, he did not reach out to [Child].
Doctor Tanenb[a]um (“Doctor”), a child psychology and an adult
child assessment expert, who was appointed in prior proceedings,
testified that the relationship between Father and Child “had never
been solid” and that no matter what Father tried . . . Child would
react negatively for the most part “and it would just be impossible
for them to form a relationship.” The Doctor further testified that
based on his observations, he diagnosed Father with antisocial
personality. The Doctor noted that people diagnosed with an
antisocial personality are usually insensitive to the needs and
feelings of others, they can be very “self[-]centered and may
neglect or otherwise misuse what would be helpful in forming
relationships with children and adults.”
* * *
Based on the foregoing, this [c]ourt found that competent
evidence existed to justify the termination of Father’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7 (record citations omitted).
A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Although Father vigorously litigated
his custody and visitation rights, the record shows that Father did not
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demonstrate a significant interest in the day-to-day affairs of Child’s life, a
capacity to parent Child appropriately, or the awareness or skills to reconcile
with Child. Father has taken steps to address his addictions and remain in
contact with Child. However, the trial court was entitled to credit Dr.
Tanenbaum’s opinion that there was a “tremendously uphill battle in terms of
imagining any kind of relationship, healthy relationship between [Child] and
[Father].” See N.T., 2/20/18, at 46-47. Similarly, the trial court was entitled
to consider how Father’s antisocial personality disorder affected his capacity
to parent and his ability to develop a healthy parent-child relationship with
Child.13 See id. at 40-43. Therefore, we conclude that the record supports
the determination that Father was incapable of parenting Child and could not
remedy the situation. See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Accordingly, we will
not disturb the trial court’s findings that termination was justified under
Section 2511(a)(2). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Father next argues that the trial court failed to consider the bond
between himself and Child, noting that he and Child had a “great relationship”
and “fun times when they were together.” Father’s Brief at 8. Moreover,
Father asserts “Mother continually blocked [Father] from strengthening his
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13 As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while
a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Z.P.,
994 A.2d at 1117.
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bond with his child. Mother impugned her ill feelings toward [Father] onto
their child. Ultimately, she had the child adopt a negative attitude toward
[Father].” Id. at 12 (citation to record omitted).
Section 2511(b) states, in part:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481,
485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the
child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently
severing the parental bond. However, as discussed below,
evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond
between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
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Moreover,
[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort,
security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent. . . .
C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (citation omitted).
In finding that Child’s emotional needs and welfare favor termination
pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court reasoned as follows:
In the instant matter, this [c]ourt determined . . . Child would not
suffer irreparable emotional harm if Father’s parental rights were
terminated. There was compelling testimony offered at the
[termination of parental rights] hearings that . . . Child is not
bonded with Father. Father failed to offer any evidence
establishing the existence of a parent-child bond. The testimony
demonstrated that . . . Child’s primary bond is with [Stepfather].
[] Child calls [Stepfather] dad and Father[ by his first name].
Furthermore, this [c]ourt found Father’s significant gap in
visitation and lack of contact with . . . Child insufficient to foster a
meaningful and healthy parental connection. Additionally, in
determining that termination would best serve the needs and
welfare of . . . Child, this [c]ourt considered that Father has not
been able to meet . . . Child’s emotional, physical, and
developmental needs.[14] In fact, [Stepfather] is the one that has
been performing fatherly duties. For the foregoing reasons, this
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14 Notably, Dr. Berk testified that Child is “flourishing” absent visitation with
Father. N.T., 6/5/16, at 29-30, 41. When asked to describe Child’s progress
approximately three years since Father’s visitation ended, Dr. Berk stated,
“She is flourishing, she is thriving, she is a different child. She is involved in
school activities, she has friends at school, she has cheerleading and other
activities. She has her animals that she loves. She is a child that is coming
from a well-adjusted, loving family.” Id. at 41.
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[c]ourt properly granted [Mother and Stepfather’s] petition to
involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
Trial Ct. Op. at 9 (record citations omitted).
Our review reveals that the record supports the trial court’s finding that
Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor
termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. While Father loves Child, his own feelings of love and
affection for Child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. See
C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219.
Here, at the time of the conclusion of the hearings, Father’s visitation
with Child had been suspended for three and a half years, and Child is entitled
to permanency and stability. As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put
on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s
basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s
parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/15/19
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