Com. v. Johnson, R., Jr.

J-S12018-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RODNEY JAY JOHNSON, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 1042 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-29-CR-0000083-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2019
Appellant, Rodney Jay Johnson, Jr., appeals from the June 6, 2018
Judgment of Sentence entered in the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas
following his non-jury conviction for two counts of Persons Not to Possess
Firearms.1 Appellant challenges the denial of his Motion to Suppress
statements that he made to police, asserting that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his Miranda2 rights. After careful review, we affirm.
A detailed recitation of the factual and procedural history is not
necessary to our disposition. Briefly, Pennsylvania State Police arrested
Appellant on May 26, 2017, for the sale of two firearms to another individual
on April 7, 2017, when Appellant had been disqualified from possessing
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
J-S12018-19
firearms due to prior felony convictions in Florida. On the same day, Trooper
J.R. Holderbaum read Appellant his Miranda rights and conducted a recorded
interview of Appellant at the police station.
On September 18, 2017, Appellant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion,
which included a Motion to Suppress Appellant’s statements to police because
he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.
On December 5, 2017, the suppression court held a hearing on
Appellant’s Motion. The Commonwealth entered the May 26, 2017 recorded
police interview into evidence. See Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Police
Interview. At the beginning of the interview, Trooper Holderbaum states to
Appellant, “Before we get started, since you are under arrest, I got to read
you your rights, alright. Then I’ll explain what this is all about.”
Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Police Interview. After Trooper Holderbaum read
Miranda warnings to Appellant, the following exchange occurred:
Appellant: I understand.
Trooper Holderbaum: Alright, you’re being charged, uh, you’re a
convicted felon, right?
Appellant: Um-hum (nodding affirmatively).
Trooper Holderbaum: You had some burglaries and thefts out of
Florida (last two works inaudible).
Appellant: Um-hum (nodding affirmatively).
Trooper Holderbaum: Alright, you’re being charged with Person
Not to Possess a Firearm . . .
-2-
J-S12018-19
Id. Trooper Holderbaum proceeded to question Appellant about his
involvement with stolen firearms from Franklin County that Appellant allegedly
sold in Fulton County. Appellant made incriminating statements that the
Commonwealth later used against him at trial.
On February 26, 2018, the suppression court issued an Opinion and
Order of Court denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress. Appellant filed a
Motion to Reconsider, which the suppression court denied on March 19, 2018.
On June 6, 2018, after a bench trial where the parties entered all
evidence by stipulation, the trial court convicted Appellant of two counts of
Persons Not to Possess Firearms. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of 60 to 120 months’ incarceration.
Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “Whether the trial court
erred by denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress the statement he made to
the police, as well as his corresponding Motion for Reconsideration, where
Appellant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights?”
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
When we review the denial of a Motion to Suppress, “we are limited to
considering only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence
for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the
record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1198 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When
-3-
J-S12018-19
the testimony and other evidence support the trial court's findings of fact, this
Court is bound by them and we “may reverse only if the court erred in reaching
its legal conclusions based upon the facts.” Id. at 1198 (citation omitted).
“Moreover, it is within the lower court's province to pass on the credibility of
witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony.”
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 154 A.3d 813, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017). This Court
will not disturb a suppression court's credibility determination absent a clear
and manifest error. Commonwealth v. Camacho, 625 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa.
Super. 1993).
“The scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the
evidentiary record created at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.
Neal, 151 A.3d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2016). Importantly, “[o]nce a motion
to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the Commonwealth's burden to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was
not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights.” Commonwealth v.
Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. 2012) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H)).
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant avers that his Miranda waiver
was not valid because Trooper Holderbaum immediately started asking
incriminating questions after giving Appellant Miranda warnings and before
advising him of the “nature of the transaction.” Appellant’s Brief at 10, 15
(citing Commonwealth v. Dixon, 379 A.2d 553, 555 (Pa. 1977)).
Specifically, Appellant asserts that because proving that a person has a prior
felony conviction is an element of the offense with which Appellant was
-4-
J-S12018-19
charged, when Trooper Holderbaum asked Appellant if he had a prior felony
conviction in Florida, Trooper Holderbaum first obtained an admission as to an
element of the offense and then advised Appellant of the offense. Id. at 16-
17. Therefore, Appellant asserts, his Miranda waiver was invalid. Id. at 16.
Generally, “because of the inherently coercive nature of police custodial
interrogation, statements elicited from an accused in that environment are
inadmissible unless the accused was informed of and, inter alia, voluntarily
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.”
Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 471–72 (Pa. 2019) (citing
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1066 (Pa. 2013)). To determine
whether a waiver is valid, a suppression court must look to the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the waiver, “including but not limited to the
declarant's physical and psychological state, the attitude exhibited by the
police during the interrogation, and any other factors which may serve to drain
one's powers of resistance to suggestion and coercion.” Id. at 472 (citing
Lyons, 79 A.3d at 1066). A valid waiver does not necessarily require a verbal
expression of waiver and “can be clearly inferred from the actions and words
of the person interrogated.” Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 843
(Pa. 2003) (citation omitted). A waiver is valid if a person clearly indicates
that they understand their Miranda rights and “immediately thereafter”
proceeds to answer questions posed by police “during the course of the same
dialogue.” Id.-5-
J-S12018-19
Our Supreme Court has consistently held that a valid waiver of Miranda
rights requires that “the suspect is aware of the general nature of the
transaction giving rise to the investigation.” Commonwealth v. Johnson,
160 A.3d 127, 138 (Pa. 2017) (citing Dixon, 379 A.2d at 556). The suspect
cannot understand the consequences of waiving Miranda rights unless they
possess this knowledge. Dixon, 379 A.2d at 556. “It is a far different thing
to forgo a lawyer where a traffic offense is involved than to waive counsel
where first degree murder is at stake.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 259 A.2d
160, 163 (Pa. 1969). When a defendant asserts that his Miranda waiver is
invalid on this basis, “the Commonwealth must establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the defendant was aware of the reason for the
interrogation.” Johnson, 160 A.3d at 138.
While Appellant cites Dixon, supra, to support his argument that he
did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights, Dixon is
factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Dixon, the police were
investigating appellant for the murder of her child at the same time they were
serving a warrant upon her for failure to pay restitution regarding a prior
conviction for Malicious Mischief. Dixon, 379 A.2d at 554-55. Police read the
appellant her Miranda rights without informing her which crime they were
investigating; Appellant stated that she understood her Miranda rights and
signed a written waiver form. Id. at 555. Police then began questioning the
appellant regarding the death of her child. Id. The Court found the appellant’s
waiver to be unintelligent because at the time she signed the waiver there
-6-
J-S12018-19
was a “palpable ambiguity” as to the nature of the crime that police were
investigating. Id. at 557.
In contrast, in the instant case, in a matter of a few seconds, Appellant
indicated that he understood his Miranda rights, police informed him of the
nature of the crime that was the subject of the interrogation, and Appellant
began answering questions without invoking his Miranda rights. Unlike the
invalid waiver in Dixon, in this case there was no “palpable ambiguity” as to
the nature of the crime being investigated.
The suppression court characterized Trooper Holderbaum’s question
regarding Appellant’s prior felony conviction in Florida as “help[ing] to
elucidate the current matter under investigation” rather than the beginning of
the interrogation. Order of Court, filed 3/26/18, at 2 (unpaginated). The
suppression court concluded that the Commonwealth proved that Appellant
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights after Appellant was
aware of the reason for the interrogation. The suppression court opined:
At the beginning of the investigation, Trooper Holderbaum advised
[Appellant] of his Miranda rights. After [Appellant] was advised
of these rights, the Trooper informed [Appellant] of the subject
matter under investigation. At no point in time, prior to informing
[Appellant] of the nature of the charges under investigation, did
the Trooper obtain a waiver from [Appellant]. In other words,
[Appellant] did not waive his Miranda rights prior to being
informed of the charges against him. [Appellant] waived his rights
by the act of responding to the Trooper’s questions, after being
informed of his rights and after being informed about the nature
of the investigation. Accordingly, [Appellant]’s waiver was
knowing and intelligent and therefore, [Appellant]’s Motion to
Suppress is denied.
-7-
J-S12018-19
Opinion and Order of Court, filed 2/26/18, at 4. The evidence supports the
suppression court’s findings and we decline to find error.
We reject Appellant’s argument that he answered incriminating
questions prior to police informing him of the nature of the crime they were
investigating. Rather, we accept the suppression court’s finding that Trooper
Holderbaum asked the questions regarding Appellant’s prior felony convictions
in Florida to help Appellant understand the nature of the charges against him.
In conclusion, we find that Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived
his Miranda rights and the suppression court did not err when it denied
Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.3
Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
____________________________________________
3 We note that Appellant avers in the alternative, without citation to
precedential authority, that his waiver was not valid because it was implicit
rather than explicit. Appellant’s Brief at 14-16. He relies on Commonwealth
v. Bussey, 404 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1979), and its progeny to support his
argument. In Bussey, a three-Justice plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejected the more lenient Federal constitutional rule that a defendant
can implicitly waive his Miranda rights, instead holding that “an explicit
waiver is a mandatory requirement.” Bussey, 404 A.2d at 1314. Our
Supreme Court has subsequently concluded, “[b]ecause Bussey was not a
majority opinion, it is not a binding precedent.” Bomar, 826 A.2d at 844. As
discussed above, in Bomar, our Supreme Court more recently held that a
defendant’s twice stating he understood his Miranda rights after they were
read to him and answering questions immediately thereafter sufficiently
“manifested the intent to waive his rights.” Id. at 844 n. 13. Accordingly,
Appellant’s argument lacks merit.
-8-
J-S12018-19
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/15/2019
-9-