Com. v. Ledford, W.

J-S07029-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM TERRY LEDFORD
Appellant No. 966 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 6, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-31-CR-0000260-2011
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 05, 2014
William Ledford appeals his December 6, 2012 judgment of sentence.
We vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
On September 25, 2012, following a jury trial, Ledford was convicted
of aggravated assault1 2
for a shooting incident that occurred on May 11, 2011 in Huntingdon
-sentence
motions, the trial court provided the following summary of the facts
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). The jury acquitted Ledford of criminal
attempt criminal homicide, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 2501.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
J-S07029-14
The event giving rise to this prosecution occurred in the late
afternoon of May 11, 2011, at an apartment building at 1211
Mifflin Street, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania.
Patrolman Adam McBride, a four (4)[-]year veteran of the
Huntingdon Borough Police Department, testified [that] he was
working the 5:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. shift that day and was
dispatched to investigate gunshots at the 1211 address. The
officer proceeded to the address and parked his patrol car on
Mifflin Street in front of 1211, an apartment building owned by
dispatch that he had arrived, [Ledford] appeared at the window
ride described [Ledford] as
told him he was referring to Jeremiah Shoop who throughout the
McBride [testified that] he was
familiar not only with [Ledford] but also Miah Shoop.
McBride testified [that] he followed Ledford into the building
where Ledford showed him a door that led downstairs. [Ledford]
told [Officer McBride that] Shoop was downstairs. Thinking it
asked if there was another way to get in. Ledford, he said, took
him around the side of the house and showed him a door and
stairway to the basement.
Security personnel from nearby Juniata College arrived and
backed up Officer McBride as he entered the building with gun
drawn.
Going down the stairs, Officer McBride said he immediately
smelled gun powder. To the right of the stairway the officer said
he saw a door with a large number of bullet holes exiting out
into the hallway. There was, he said, a belt through the
doorknob hole securing the door.
Officer McBride made entry into the basement apartment. He
immediately encountered Rex Cuff and Dustin Scott. Also to his
right, he saw Josh Lemin lying on the floor with a wound that
was bleeding. [Officer] McBride knew all these young men.
[Ledford], who was behind [Officer] McBride, ran to Lemin.
Officer McBride cleared all the other rooms to make certain
[that] Miah Shoop was not there since he had every reason to
believe Mr. Shoop, whom he believed to be the shooter, was still
there.
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[Officer] McBride retrieved his personal trauma kit from his
patrol car and began to administer first aid to Lemin. Soon
thereafter EMS arrived and took over treatment of Lemin.
clothing. Lemin, he said, was screaming in pain.
McBride reported that he saw a Ju
hand. He picked it up, [] cleared it and set it aside. Since he
observed a lot of shell casings in different calibers on the floor,
he asked [Ledford] if there were other weapons. Ledford
retrieved two (2) from a back bedroom. The officer cleared both
weapons and found no rounds. The weapons in the apartment
were 1) a Tarus Judge model revolver; 2) a Sportsman 12 auto
12[-]gauge shotgun; and 3) a Sega SKS style .223 semi-
automatic rifle with scope.
Officer McBride said he questioned [Ledford] and was told [that]
Miah Shoop was responsible for the scene he found that
afternoon. [Ledford] related that Mr. Shoop shot and they shot
back.
EMS removed Lemin and Officer McBride moved all the players
outside where other Huntingdon Borough officers were waiting.
Thereafter, McBride assisted in the collection of evidence.
John C. Stevens, a twenty-seven (27)[-]year veteran of the
Huntington Borough Police Department, testified [that] he
interviewed [Ledford] on May 11 at the police offices. He had
known [Ledford] since he was ten (10) or eleven (11). Miranda
rights were administered, and the statement was recorded and
played at trial. It lasted an hour and provided listeners with an
appreciation for the effects of bath salts on users.
On May 11[, Ledford] related that he was living in the small
basement apartment at 1211 Mifflin Street. His roommate was
Josh Lemin. His best friend, Dustin Scott, lived several doors
further up Mifflin Street.
On the days leading to May 11, Ledford said that he and Scott
were experimenting with bath salts. On May 11, the evidence in
the case was unequivocal that all three (3) Ledford, Scott,
Lemin were using the salts prior to the events which brought
Officer McBride to the apartment. For reasons that are anything
but clear, on May 11, [Ledford] and his friends were convinced
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that Miah Shoop and his friends were going to come to the
apartment to take their bath salts by force. [Ledford] told
Officer Steven
to the assault the trio believed was imminent. Rex Cuff, a friend
of all the players in this event, arrived late in the afternoon and
involuntarily became a participant. No evidence indicated the
use of bath salts by Cuff.
[Ledford] related a phone call from Shoop and his warning to
knew that they were going to try to get me tonight. I knew it in
[Ledford] said [that] they barricaded [themselves] inside the
apartment by using belts to secure the knobless door. Rex, he
said, started getting calls from Garrett Steele, and then, he said,
apartment), [Ledford] told Stevens [that] he saw two (2) guys
climb out of a dark SUV and retrieve weapons from the back of
the vehicle. He said he could hear Miah taunting him to come
outside and the yanking on the door was becoming harder.
into the floor joists. [Scott], he said, fired a warning shot from
the Judge.
Subsequently, Scott obtained the shotgun, and Lemin, the Judge
revolver. The description of the subsequent shooting inside the
apartment was difficult to understand[,] but when the shooting
was over, Josh Lemin had been shot in his arm with the shotgun.
[Ledford] told Officer Stevens that the guns were all his, and
that Scott and Lemin followed his orders that afternoon. He
readily accepted responsibility for Josh [Lemin] getting shot but
insisted that they had to defend themselves.
Jeremiah Shoop, 32, testified [that] he knew [Ledford] on May
11 since he was a friend of his friend, Dustin Scott. He
acknowledged knowing Josh Lemin and Rex Cuff as well. He
never, he said, had a problem with any of these guys until that
day.
[Shoop testified that, on May 11, he had] multiple phone
conversations with Dustin [Scott]. At one point, he said he
talked to [Ledford]. They told him, he said, to come down. It
seemed, he said, like he was being goaded into going to 1211.
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He went to 1211. He testified [that] he wanted to get to the
bottom of it. He took a friend but no weapons. In fact, he
denied owning any guns. He knew [that] they had weapons. He
to find out what the problem was.
Shoop testified [that] he never entered the building but yelled
down the steps. There was a lot of yelling back and forth, he
said, but no shooting. This dialogue lasted [] five (5) minutes[,]
after which he left and went home. On his way he said he heard
two (2) bangs.
Trooper Charles Stitt has worked full[-]time since 1996 in the
forensic services unit of the Pennsylvania State Police. He
arrived at 1211 Mifflin Street on May 11 at 5:40 p.m. and began
collecting evidence at 7:32 p.m. after a search warrant had been
secured. He finished at 12:55 a.m.
Trooper Stitt testified [that] he collected at the scene fourteen
(14) .223 caliber shells, four (4) []12 gauge shotgun shells and
one (1) [.]45 caliber shell or nineteen (19) spent casings. He
also testified [that] he found no evidence that any shots had
been fired from outside the apartment into the apartment. He
also said he found no evidence that shots had been fired into the
floor joists.
Shelby Richard Flasher testified [that] he lived in the upstairs
apartment at 1211 Mifflin and that [Ledford] was his landlord.
He said he considered [Ledford] a friend and said he also knew
Dustin Scott. On May 11 in the late afternoon (4:30/5:00),
Flasher testified he was outside his apartment on the porch to
smoke. He said he saw Jeremiah Shoop kneeling outside the
door leading to the basement. Shoop, he said, was talking
smack and trying to get [Ledford] to come out. Shoop had no
gun according to Flasher. Flasher testified that Shoop and a
companion left after fifteen (15) or twenty (20) minutes. No
gunshots were fired while they were there, he said. The
shooting started, he testified, twenty (20) minutes later. He
went back out on the porch and testified [that] Miah Shoop
he said, because it was just a mouth battle, playground talk
between Shoop and Ledford. The witness indicated [that] he
owned a dark green SUV which he always parked at the back of
the lot.
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Joshua Lemin testified for the Commonwealth. He said he
became friends with [Ledford] through Dustin Scott. He got
along, he said, with Rex Cuff.
On May 11, he testified he was with [Ledford] and Dustin [Scott]
and that Rex [Cuff] was there for a short time. He was, he said,
doing bath salts by [injecting] it in the vein. He was doing at
that time [one] pack a day. He indicated [that] he was an
addict.
Lemin related that during the shooting on May 11, he was hit in
the arm. As a consequence, he said he spent twenty-one days
at Pittsburgh UPMC, is required to wear a brace and does not
have full use of his arm.
He testified that on May 11, the first time he recalled hearing
about Jeremiah Shoop was when Shoop was outside the
apartment. He remembered one (1) phone call between
[Ledford] and Jeremiah [Shoop]. He testified [that] he heard
[Shoop] yel
shots and the fact that [Ledford] ordered the lights turned off.
He said that after the warning shots, he freaked out and wanted
a gun. [Ledford], he said, was in charge, gave orders and
handed out the guns. He picked up the Judge that was on an
end table in the living room. He was told, he said, to keep
watching the front doors as the others were in the rear of the
apartment. They kept asking, he said, if the belt moved. He
testified [that] he told them no. As he was unloading the
revolver onto the end table, he testified [that] he was shot in the
arm. He yelled for help, he said, and [Ledford] and Rex [Cuff]
responded. He was shot, he said, with the shotgun.
Lemin was clear that he never saw Jeremiah Shoop on May 11,
Rex Cuff testified for the defense. On May 11, Cuff said he went
where he found Scott. He had known Scott since they were ten
(10), he said, and on this day he indicated his friend was
terrified. [Ledford] and [Scott], he said, explained what was
going on and that Jeremiah [Shoop] was threatening to kill
them. He testified [that] they were planning to go to Ace
Hardware to acquire locks to secure the front door of the
apartment when [Shoop] showed up. In a phone call, he said,
Shoop challenged [Ledford] to come outside. [Ledford], he said,
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refused and warned Shoop that if he tried to come into the
apartment, he was armed. Cuff testified that it was common
knowledge that [Ledford] had guns. He said he heard slamming
on the door as if someone was trying to get in. [Ledford], he
said, fired a warning shot. Josh Lemin, he said, had the revolver
and fired a shot at the front door. The witness said he was
aid and called 911. He said that even after Lemin was shot he
continued to see the front door move. In this regard, he
testified [that] he grabbed the belt securing the door and could
feel someone outside pulling. He said [that] he heard someone
above, and, after the police arrived[,] told them that there was
someone upstairs. He opined that he believed [that it was
Shoop.].
Cuff denied using bath salts that day. He also recalled that
during the shooting the lights were out and that it was very dark
in the apartment. Cuff said he was scared, not paranoid. He
admitted that he never called the police although he had a cell
phone; he never saw Jeremiah Shoop that afternoon and he saw
The jury was taken to the scene of the events and given the
-14 (footnote omitted; minor
grammatical modifications made for clarity).
instruct the jury on self-
ded that the evidence did not support a
theory of self-
-80, 120. In so
sel from arguing
self-defense to the jury. Id. -
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instructions, the jury convicted Ledford of the aforementioned crimes. On
November 28, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a notice of its intention to
for the aggravated assault charge pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712. On
December 6, 2012, the trial court sentenced Ledford to f
incarceration pursuant to section 9712. The court imposed no further
penalty on the REAP count, concluding that the charge merged with the
aggravated assault count.
On December 17, 2012, Ledford filed post-sentence motions
challenging, inter alia, the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, the trial
-defense instruction, and the legality
post-sentence motions on April 30, 2013.
On May 29, 2013, Ledford filed a notice of appeal. The following day,
the trial court directed Ledford to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 20, 2013,
Ledford timely complied. On July 11, 2013, the trial court issued an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Ledford raises the following six questions for our consideration:
1. Whether the trial court erred [] in denying the motion for
judgment of acquittal challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence inasmuch as the evidence did not suffice to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt either the requisite intent of an
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accomplice or negation of justification in self-defense and in
defense of others?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
motion for new trial asserting that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence due to the corroborated testimony of
an eyewitness?
3. Whether the trial court erred in omitting to instruct on
justification in self-protection pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 505
and in defense of others pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 506, which
controlled the outcome?
4. Whether the trial court erred by imposing a five-year
mandatory minimum term pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 9712 in
that such imposition was inapplicable and illegal since
applicability was not decided by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt as an element of the crime in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and of the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the
cross-examination of Joshua Lemin, the victim, about pending
charges against Lemin out of the same incident as that in this
appeal, which excluded cross-examination was intended to
impeach Lemin for bias and credibility?
6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
photographs of wounds to Joshua Lemin, the victim, which
were not relevant and, if relevant, were inflammatory and
their evidentiary value was outweighed by unfair prejudice?
Brief for Ledford at 7-8.
For reasons set forth in more detail below, we ultimately conclude that
the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing the jury on self-defense.
Before addressing that cla
claim because, if meritorious, it would moot all of his other claims, including
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Our standard of review is well-settled:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-44 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to t
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss
or impairment of the function of any b
§
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material element of an offense when . . . it is his conscious object to engage
§
long as the facts adequately support the conclusion that he or she aided,
agreed to aid, or attempted to aid the principal in planning or committing
the offense, and acted with the intention to promote or facilitate the
Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 597 (Pa. 2007).
beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the requisite intent to cause
serious bodily injury, or with the specific intent required of an accomplice,
for aggravated assault purposes. However, aside from making this bald
assertion, Ledford offers no direct argument based upon the record as it
stands in this case. Instead, Ledford argues that self-
see Brief for Ledford at 16, and that his claim of self-
defense defeated the intent elements of aggravated assault or accomplice
liability.
-
defense principles, and the application of those principles to the facts
presented at trial. His sufficiency argument is a thinly-veiled attempt at
-defense instruction.
That argument, while preserved below and proper in this direct appeal, is
not a proper argument in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge. Our task simply is to evaluate the evidence of record, including
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any evidence that is improperly admitted, and determine whether that
evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find each of the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Markman, supra. The trial court
prohibited Ledford from arguing self-defense, and, regardless of the
propriety of that decision, relieved the Commonwealth of the burden of
disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the record that
we must review does not contain a self-defense element, and a sufficiency
challenge is not the proper venue to re-litigate that decision. Thus, we do
not consider whether the evidence demonstrated, as Ledford wishes, that he
acted in self-defense, or whether the Commonwealth disproved such an
assertion. Rather, we evaluate the record as it stands and determine
specific intent. Ledford not having presented any proper argument to the
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
We now turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying
-
review when considering the denial of jury instructions is one of deference
Commonwealth v. Baker, 24
A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Galvin,
985 A.2d 783, 798-
phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law
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is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 578 A.2d
1273, 1274 (Pa. 1990)).
It is well-
upon legal principles [that] have no applicability to the presented facts.
There must be some relationship between the law upon which an instruction
Commonwealth v.
Buksa, 655 A.2d 579, 583 (Pa. Super. 1995) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Tervalon, 345 A.2d 671, 678
entitled to an instruction on any recognized defense [that] has been
requested [and] has been made an issue in the case, and for which there
exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his or her fa
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Regarding a request
for a self- must be given upon request if
there is evidence presented, from any source, that the defendant acted in
self- Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 483 A.2d 902, 903 (Pa.
Super. 1984) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 421 A.2d 660 (Pa. 1980))
(emphasis added). Additionally, a defendant who makes such a showing
also is entitled to a charge that the Commonwealth bears the burden of
disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Rittle, 428 A.2d 168 (Pa. Super. 1981)).
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In Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 585 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Super. 1991),
we explained at length the respective obligations of both a defendant and
the trial court when a self-defense instruction is requested:
Before the issue of self-defense may be submitted to a jury for
consideration, a valid claim of self-defense must be made out as
a matter of law, and this determination must be made out as a
matter of law, and this determination must be made by the trial
judge. Such [a] claim may consist of evidence from whatever
part of his case, or conceivably, may be found in the
in chief or be elicited through cross-
Commonwealth v. Rose, 321 A.2d 880, 884
(Pa. 1974) (similarly discussing the type of evidence necessary
to place in issue a defense of intoxication). However, such
evidence from whatever source must speak to three elements for
a claim of self-
consideration.
Thus, as provided by statute and as interpreted through
our case law, to establish a defense of self-defense it must
be shown that a) the slayer was free from fault in
provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the
slaying; b) that the slayer must have reasonably believed
that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm, and that there was a necessity to use force in order
to save himself therefrom; and c) the slayer did not violate
any duty to retreat or to avoid the danger.
Commonwealth v. Myrick, 360 A.2d 598 (Pa. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Cropper, 345 A.2d 645 (Pa. 1975).
Commonwealth v. Black, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa. 1977). If
there is any evidence from whatever source that will support
these three elements then the decision as to whether the claim
is a valid one is left to the jury and the jury must be
charged properly thereon by the trial court.
Our case law makes it crystal clear that the charge of self-
defense must be given upon request where the jury would
have a possible basis for finding it. See Black, supra.
While there is no burden on the defendant to prove a claim
of self-defense, it is nevertheless required that before such
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defense is properly in issue at trial, there must be some
evidence, from whatever source, to justify such a finding.
Id. at 630. See Commonwealth v. Walley, 353 A.2d
396, 398 n.2 (Pa. 1976); Cropper, 345 A.2d at 649.
Thus, if there was evidence which would have supported
the claim of self-defense, it was for the trier of fact to pass
upon that evidence and improper for the trial judge to
exclude such consideration by refusing the charge.
Gonzales, supra; Commonwealth v. Lowe, 333 A.2d
765 (Pa. 1975).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 421 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. 1980); in
accord Commonwealth v. Bailey, 471 A.2d 551 (Pa. Super.
1984) and Commonwealth v. Maione, 554 A.2d 939 (Pa.
Super. 1989). This is so even though the evidence of self-
defense may appear to the tr
the province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence
produced. . . . The fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none
Commonwealth v. Rose, 344 A.2d 824, 826
(Pa. 1975).
Mayfield, 585 A.2d at 1070-71 (emphasis added; citations modified); see
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 420-21 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citing Mayfield for the above standards).
From these well-settled standards, three pertinent principles emerge:
(1) the defendant must present some evidence as to each of the three self-
defense elements from whatever source; (2) the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has made such a showing, but cannot evaluate the
credibility of the evidence or the likelihood of success of the defense, which
are functions reserved exclusively for the jury; and (3) once the defendant
presents evidence from whatever source on each of the three self-defense
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elements, the trial court does not have discretion to decide whether to
impose the instruction; rather, the court is legally mandated to do so.
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear that Ledford
was entitled to a self-defense instruction. Ledford first had to adduce
evidence that he was free from fault in provoking the incident which led to
the shooting of Josh Lemin. In his interview with police after the shooting,
which was recorded and played in its entirety for the jury, Ledford admitted
that he and his friends had been using bath salts on the day in question.
While doing so, for whatever reason, the party concluded that Jeremiah
Shoop was going to come and steal their remaining supply of bath salts, by
force if necessary. Notably, Ledford told the police that he received a call
from Shoop, during which Ledford warned Shoop to stay away from his
apartment and to leave them alone. That Ledford received the phone call,
and did not make it, is evidence that Ledford did not provoke the incident
but sought to prevent it. Shortly thereafter, Shoop and another person
to the police that, when Shoop approached the door, Shoop was taunting
him and requesting that Ledford come outside.3 Ledford believed that Shoop
____________________________________________
3
attempting to draw Ledford out of the apartment.
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wanted him to come outside either to assault him or to steal the bath salts.
Again, it is critical to our analysis that, according to Ledford, Shoop sought
L
interview with police, Ledford established some evidence that he did not
provoke the incident, and that it was Shoop who instigated and inflamed the
encounter by initiating contact with L
and taunting and encouraging Ledford to confront him.
Ledford also had to produce evidence that he reasonably believed that
he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. In his
interview with police, Ledford explained to the police that he and his cohort
came to fear that Shoop intended to forcibly steal their remaining bath salts.
In response to this fear, Ledford and his friends strapped the door to the
apartment shut with a belt and armed themselves with weapons to stave off
informed Cuff that Shoop had threatened to kill them. Cuff testified that
they were planning to go to the hardware store to get locks for the door,
because they feared that Shoop was going to come to the apartment. When
door and challenged Ledford to come outside. These averments, heard by
the jury, constituted some evidence that Ledford feared that Shoop
intended to hurt, or kill, Ledford and his friends. Because Shoop allegedly
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came to the apartment and challenged Ledford, there also was some
evidence to de
Lastly, Ledford was required to offer evidence that he did not violate a
duty to retreat. In Pennsylvania, a person has no duty to retreat from his
own home unless he was the initial aggressor. Commonwealth v.
Hornberger, 74 A.3d 279, 283-86 (Pa. Super. 2013). Ledford was in his
own apartment. As noted above, Ledford presented some evidence that he
was not the initial aggressor. Thus, Ledford also adduced some evidence
that he did not violate his duty to retreat.
A brief review of the notes of testimony demonstrates that Ledford
presented some evidence, from whatever source, as to each of the three
elements of self-defense. Self-defense fairly was at issue in this case, and
The trial court held that Ledford did not satisfy the second self-defense
element, that Ledford reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury, because, according to the court, there was
16. While this may be true, it misses the point. Ledford did not have to
demonstrate that unlawful force actually was used against him. He only had
to adduce evidence to demonstrate that he reasonably believed that he
faced the threat of such force. See Mayfield, supra. As we set forth above,
Ledford satisfied this burden.
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succeeded at trial. The record contains evidence that contradicts or
-defense. However, our
obligation is not to re-weigh evidence, or evaluate the potential success of
determine
mandate to instruct the jury on self-defense. We conclude that he did. The
jury should have been apprised of the elements and respective burdens
associated with a self-defense claim. The jury was denied that opportunity
in this case.
Not only did the trial court refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense,
the court also expressly prohibited Ledford from arguing self-defense to the
jury. N.T., 9/25/2012, at 80. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the
4
or that Ledford was not prejudiced by the
____________________________________________
4
Our Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of harmless error as
follows:
An error will be deemed harmless where the appellate court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not
have contributed to the verdict. If there is a reasonable
possibility that the error may have contributed to the verdict, it
is not harmless. In reaching that conclusion, the reviewing court
will find an error harmless where the uncontradicted evidence of
guilt is overwhelming, so that by comparison the error is
insignificant. The burden of establishing that the error was
harmless rests upon the Commonwealth.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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J-S07029-14
issues are moot.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for a new trial.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Mundy, J. files a Dissenting Statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/5/2014
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 214 15 (Pa. 2003).
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