Haas, M. v. Reinert, M.

J-S45031-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MICHAEL HAAS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
MARVIN REINERT :
:
: No. 1424 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered June 26, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Civil Division No(s).: 09-13193
BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JUNE 17, 2016
This case returns to us for reconsideration. In this vehicle accident
case, Appellant/Plaintiff, Michael Hass, appeals from the order entered in the
Berks County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor
of Appellee/Defendant, Marvin Reinert. Appellant challenges the court’s
discovery sanctions, which precluded him from presenting any evidence as
to liability or damages at trial. Appellee contends the instant appeal should
be quashed based upon Appellant’s late filing of his brief or his failure to file
a response to two motions for sanctions. We decline to quash the appeal.
We vacate the court’s February 25, 2014 and March 11, 2014 sanction
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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orders and the June 26, 2014 summary judgment order, and remand for the
court to fashion an amended sanction order.
The underlying vehicle accident occurred on October 18, 2007.
According to Appellant, “Appellee was operating a farm tractor which was
pulling a flat bed wagon carrying a . . . section of a corn bin/silo,” which
“took up both lanes of the two-lane roadway.” Appellant’s Brief at 9.
Appellant was driving “a motorcycle and traveling in the opposite direction,”
“had to take evasive action,” lost “control of his motorcycle and crash[ed]
onto the roadway.” Id.
Appellant commenced this negligence action against Appellee by filing
a praecipe for summons on October 19, 2009,1 and on August 19, 2010,
filed a complaint. The trial court summarized the following pertinent
procedural history:
On July 10, 2013, [Appellee] served [Appellant] a Fourth
Set of Interrogatories seeking information regarding
[Appellant’s] motorcycle experience and training. On
September 24, 2013, [Appellee] served [Appellant] a Fifth
Set of Interrogatories seeking information concerning
[Appellant’s] tax records and wage loss claim. [Appellant]
did not respond to these Interrogatories and [Appellee]
obtained Orders from this Court on December 5 and 6,
2013, directing [Appellant] to answer [Appellee’s]
Interrogatories within 20 days.
Trial Ct. Op., 11/7/14, at 1.
1
The second-year anniversary of the accident was Sunday, October 18,
2009. Thus, Appellant’s praecipe for summons, filed the following day,
Monday, was timely under the two-year statute of limitations for a
negligence action. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).
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On January 8, 2014, Appellant’s counsel, Andre Michniak, Esq.,
(“Counsel”), who was
aware [Appellant] was in violation of [the] Orders[,]
contacted counsel for [Appellee] to advise [Appellant’s]
discovery responses would be received by January 10,
2014, and requested that [Appellee] not file a Motion for
Sanctions until after January 10, 2014. [Appellant] agreed
....
On January 10, 2014, [Counsel] telephoned [Appellee]
to advise [Appellant’s] discovery responses would now be
sent on January 13, 2014, and again requested that
[Appellee] not file a Motion for Sanctions. Defense counsel
again agreed. On January 31, 2014, still having received
no response to [his] requests, [Appellee’s] counsel filed a
Motion for Sanctions, which [Appellant] did not respond to,
and this Court granted by Order dated February 25, 2014,
precluding [Appellant] from introducing any
testimony or evidence at the time of Arbitration
and/or trial on the issue of liability. [Appellee] filed a
second Motion for Sanctions, to which [Appellant] also
failed to respond, and this Court granted by Order dated
March 11, 2014, precluding [Appellee] from offering
any testimony or evidence at the time of Arbitration
and/or trial on the issue of damages.
Id. at 4 (emphases added).
In granting Appellee’s motions for sanctions, the trial court applied the
four-part test set forth in City of Phila. v. Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge No. 5, 985 A.2d 1259 (Pa. 2009) (“FOP Lodge”). It found: (1)
Appellant’s failure to respond to Appellee’s discovery requests resulted in
“substantial” prejudice to Appellee; (2) Appellant acted willfully and in bad
faith in failing to provide the requested discovery; (3) the precluded
evidence and testimony was “of the utmost importance to [Appellee’s
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case];” and (4) the court provided Counsel “ample times in the instant
action and other actions to comply with the time limits and orders issued,”
and in “numerous actions involving [Counsel,] nearly all deadlines and
orders issued by [the] Court have been willfully ignored without a credible
explanation[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 3-5.
On April 17, 2014, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. On
May 19th, Appellant filed a timely response2 and, for the first time,
acknowledged before the court the Fourth and Fifth Sets of interrogatories
by filing a motion to reconsider the orders imposing the discovery sanctions.
See R.R. at 82a-89a.3 The court denied Appellant’s motion for
reconsideration on May 21st. On June 26th, it granted Appellee’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Appellant’s compliant with prejudice.
Appellant took this timely appeal4 and complied with the court’s order to file
a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.
2
The thirtieth day after Appellee’s notice of his motion for summary
judgment was Saturday, May 17, 2014. See Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(a) (requiring
adverse party to file response to motion for summary judgment within thirty
days after service of motion). Thus, Appellant’s response, filed on Monday,
May 19th, was timely. See Pa.R.C.P. 106(b) (“Computation of Time”).
3
For the parties’ convenience, we refer to the reproduced record where
applicable.
4
Although the text of the order granting summary judgment stated a date of
June 26, 2014, it was not time-stamped as “filed” and entered on the docket
until July 21st. Notice was not given until July 25th. Appellant thus
generally had thirty days from the notice date, or until Sunday, August 24th,
to take an appeal. See Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2)(b). His notice of appeal filed
Monday, August 25th, was thus timely. See Pa.R.C.P. 106(b).
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Appellant presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to hold a hearing and in imposing the
discovery sanctions. Appellant challenges the court’s findings under the
four-part FOP Lodge test, arguing the following. First, the prejudice to
Appellee “has been minimal to none.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant was
deposed by Appellee’s counsel for 3 hours, and Appellant in total provided
800 pages of discovery. Appellee did not explain how the lack of “answers
to the six questions posed in the two sets of interrogatories” “amounted to a
‘substantial diminution’ of [his] ability to properly present his case.” Id. at
16. Second, while Appellant does not deny there was a “violation of the
discovery rules,” he maintains there was no “willfulness or bad faith in his
non-compliance.” Id. at 20. Instead, his brief contends, Counsel had
“significant family-related problems, including his being responsible for the
care of his 90-year old mother who was seriously ill with Alzheimer’s Disease
and who subsequently passed away and also having to deal with the serious
illness of another family member.”5 Id. at 19.
Third, Appellant concedes “there were several violations of discovery
deadlines based upon personal issues raised by [his] counsel.” Id.
However, Appellant alleges, “the circumstances of this case are very
different from those” in cases in which “the appellate courts have [upheld]
5
In the motion for reconsideration, Counsel stated his “deal[ing] with family
illnesses and having to care for his 90-year old mother . . . has affected
[C]ounsel in other cases.” Appellant’s Mot. for Recons., 5/19/14, at ¶ 36.
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the severest of discovery sanctions—preclusion of all evidence and testimony
on liability and damages at trial or outright dismissal.” Id. Next, Appellant
reasons the trial court could have sanctioned him by deeming his failure to
answer the Fourth Set of Interrogatories as admissions that he had no
motorcycle training. With respect to the Fifth Set of Interrogatories,
Appellant avers he gave Appellee “written authorizations for the release of
his tax records” from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and it was the
IRS who would not release certain records. Id. at 22. Appellant also claims
Counsel “orally advised” Appellee’s counsel that Appellant would not bring “a
claim for loss of future wages and/or diminution of earning capacity, and
therefore the production of any of [his] tax records was not relevant to
Appellant’s claims for damages.” Id. at 23. Appellant reasons the court
could have sanctioned him by barring any claim for past and future wage
loss or diminution of earning capacity. Accordingly, Appellant concludes, the
court’s sanctions do “not ‘fit the crime.’” Id. at 22.
Finally, Appellant complains the trial court did not hold a hearing,
develop a record, or “analyze whether [his] non-compliance occurred in light
of the [FOP Lodge] standards.” Id. at 18. Appellant contends the court’s
comments about his counsel are “very mistaken”6 and “troubling” because
6
Specifically, the brief avers:
Counsel believes that there were two prior cases involving
this trial court in which counsel did not meet discovery
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“the allegations are not a part of the record in this case[ but] cast counsel in
a very negative light.” Id. We agree that relief is due.
As a prefatory matter, we consider whether the appeal should be
quashed.7 This Court granted Appellant an extension of time within which to
file his brief. Appellant filed his brief five days after the date it was due.
Appellee filed a motion to quash the appeal due to Appellant’s late filing of
his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2188 (providing “[i]f an appellant fails to file his . . .
brief . . . within the time as extended, an appellee may move for dismissal of
the matter.”
In Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Super. 1993), this
Court quashed the appeal because the appellant’s “brief violate[d] the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure to a degree that preclude[d] us
from conducting meaningful review of his claims.” Id. at 1015. In the case
sub judice, although the brief was late, Appellant’s brief adequately complies
with Pa.R.a.P. 2111 and does not preclude meaningful appellate review.
deadlines. In one, the reason was due to a partnership
dissolution in counsel’s practice which temporarily
seriously disrupted counsel’s practice, and in the other, it
was because of the sudden death of a 19 year old family
member and the serious illnesses of counsel’s parents.
Neither of these situations could be categorized as being
“willful” or involving “bad faith.”
Appellant’s Brief at 18.
7
Appellee filed a motion to quash this appeal. A per curiam order by this
Court denied the motion without prejudice for Appellee to raise this issue
before the merits panel. See Order, 2/27/15.
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Accordingly, we decline to quash the instant appeal. See Long v. Ostroff,
854 A.2d 524, 527 (Pa. Super. 2004) (merits of appeal considered despite
party violating rules of appellate procedure where violations did not impede
review).
Generally, we review a discovery order and an order imposing
sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. St. Luke’s Hosp. of
Bethlehem v. Vivian, 99 A.3d 534, 540 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“St. Luke’s
Hosp.”). However, this Court has stated, in review of an “order granting
summary judgment [that] was premised upon a sanction order precluding
[the plaintiffs] from introducing expert testimony on the issue of [the
defendant doctor’s] malpractice:”
[W]hen a discovery sanction is imposed, the sanction must
be appropriate when compared to the violation of the
discovery rules. Presently, the sanction is tantamount to
dismissal of the action since it resulted in summary
judgment being granted based on [the plaintiffs’] inability
to present expert testimony and thereby to establish that
[the defendant doctor’s] treatment fell below the
applicable standard of care. Accordingly, we strictly
scrutinize the appropriateness of the sanction as it
produces the harshest result possible and should be
imposed only in extreme circumstances.
Steinfurth v. LaManna, 590 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations
omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4019, governing sanctions,
provides that a court “may, on motion,” enter “an order refusing to allow the
disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
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prohibiting such party from introducing in evidence designated documents,
things or testimony . . . .” Pa.R.C.P. 4019(c)(2).
In FOP Lodge, our Supreme Court stated:
[T]rial and appellate courts . . . should examine [the
following factors] before determining the general severity
and vitality of a discovery sanction: (1) the prejudice, if
any, endured by the non-offending party and the ability of
the opposing party to cure any prejudice; (2) the
noncomplying party’s willfulness or bad faith in failing to
provide the requested discovery materials; (3) the
importance of the excluded evidence in light of the failure
to provide the discovery; and (4) the number of discovery
violations by the offending party. In applying these factors
to appeals where a trial court dismissed an action for
noncompliance with a discovery order, the Superior Court
has consistently placed greater emphasis on the first two
factors: (1) the prejudice to the non-offending party and
the ability to cure that prejudice; and (2) the willfulness of
the offending party’s conduct.
FOP Lodge, 985 A.2d at 1270-71 (citations omitted).
Although the trial court did not dismiss the instant action, its sanction
orders precluded Appellant from presenting any evidence as to liability or
damages, and thus provided a basis for granting summary judgment in favor
of Appellee. Accordingly, “we strictly scrutinize the appropriateness of the
sanction” orders, and agree with the trial court that the four-part test of
FOP Lodge is appropriate. See Steinfurth, 590 A.2d at 1288.
The first and third prongs of the FOP Lodge test are the prejudice, if
any, to the non-offending party and the importance of the excluded
evidence. Id. at 1270. The trial court opined as follows. “First, the
prejudice endured by [Appellee] is substantial.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. The
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requested information—Appellant’s motorcycle experience and training and
tax records—were “vital to the preparation of a meaningful defense.” Id.
“Without this information [Appellee] cannot ascertain [Appellant’s] damages
or even whether liability may actually be attributed to” Appellee. Id.
Appellee’s interrogatories “were not overly burdensome or irrelevant,” and
“[t]o the contrary” were “standard request[s] when compared to other cases
with similar facts.” Id. Appellant “could have easily provided answers to
these interrogatories within the time provided, which he did not, thereby
forcing [Appellee] to file motions . . . resulting in the sanctions imposed and
ultimately, a grant of summary judgment for” Appellee. Id.
Preliminarily, we note Counsel failed to respond to not only the
interrogatories at issue,8 but also Appellee’s two motions to compel answers
to the interrogatories, and the two motions for sanctions. Appellant filed a
motion to reconsider the orders imposing the discovery sanctions. 9 Appellee
argues that based upon Appellant’s failure to respond to the two motions for
8
While we understand attorneys will experience family or personal issues
while litigating a matter, Counsel does not assert he initially advised the trial
court of his personal obligations or requested additional time to respond to
the interrogatories.
9
As stated above, Counsel advised the court of his family obligations and
issues in Appellant’s motion to reconsider, which was filed after Appellee’s
motion for summary judgment. See note 6, supra. On appeal, Appellant
does not address the trial court’s reasoning that “had [Counsel] taken the
time to respond to the discovery motions . . . this [c]ourt would have
scheduled a hearing and given [C]ounsel an opportunity to explain his failure
to provide discovery, but he did not.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 5.
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sanctions, Appellant waived his right to appeal. We disagree.
Pa.R.C.P. 4019 provides that “Motions for sanctions are governed by
the motion rules, Rule 208.1 et seq.” Rule 208.3(a) provides that, “the
court shall initially consider a motion without written responses or briefs” but
it “may not enter an order that grants relief to the moving party unless the
motion is presented as uncontested or the other parties to the proceeding
are given an opportunity for an argument.” See also Cove Ctr., Inc. v.
Westhafer Constr., Inc., 965 A.2d 259, 264 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding
that both Pa.R.C.P. 208.3(a) and 4019 effectively mandate oral argument or
an evidentiary hearing whenever a discovery motion is neither uncontested
nor facially meritless).
Berks Cnty. L.R. 208.2(d) provides that “[a]ny uncontested motion
shall be accompanied by a written certification to that effect by the moving
party and/or such party’s counsel.” Absent such certification, Berks Cnty.
L.R. 208.3(a) governs, and provides that a motion cannot be considered
without a written response or argument. Because the motion for sanctions
in the case sub judice did not contain a certification that it was uncontested,
there should have been at the very least a response required, an argument,
or a hearing on the motion.
However, no rule to show cause was issued and no argument or
hearing was scheduled. The trial court reasoned, “[h]ad [Counsel] taken the
time to respond to the discovery motions . . . this [c]ourt would have
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scheduled a hearing and given [C]ounsel an opportunity to explain his failure
to provide discovery, but he did not.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. We find it was
incumbent upon the trial court to provide Appellant with an opportunity to be
heard before ruling on the motion for sanctions, especially where the effect
of granting the motion for sanctions was to essentially terminate the action.
Appellee relies upon Baranowski v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 688
A.2d 207 (Pa. Super. 1997), for the proposition that a motion for
reconsideration is insufficient to preserve a challenge to the severity of
sanctions. However, we find Baranowski distinguishable as there was no
discussion of the applicable state or local rules governing discovery motions
or whether there had been compliance with those rules. In the instant case,
Appellant was not afforded the opportunity to be heard before sanctions
were imposed that made summary judgment a mere formality. The motion
for reconsideration was filed while the action was pending in the trial court
and there was no impediment to the trial court entertaining the motion.
Thus, we find the issue was raised and preserved below for purposes of
Pa.R.A.P. 302, and we decline to find waiver.
It is undisputed that, despite repeated efforts by Appellee, Appellant
failed to respond to the Fourth and Fifth Interrogatories. However, Appellant
had responded to the first three interrogatories and submitted to deposition
by Appellee. Furthermore, the Fourth Interrogatory set forth a mere four
questions, all regarding Appellant’s motorcycle experience: (1) the year,
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make, and model number of all motorcycles Appellant had ridden prior to
the accident, (2) any motorcycle training or testing taken Appellant, (3) any
training specifically on a Honda CBR900RR Firebrand motorcycle, and (4) the
number of times Appellant previously operated this model Honda
motorcycle. We disagree that the lack of this information wholly precludes
Appellee from determining or showing “whether liability may actually be
attributed to” Appellee. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3.
Furthermore, the Fifth Interrogatory was comprised of one question
and one request for documents. First, the interrogatory explained that
Appellee had subpoenaed the IRS for Appellant’s tax records, but the IRS
responded it was unable to provide all or some of the requested documents.
The interrogatory then asked Appellant to “explain why the IRS was unable
to comply with [its] subpoena,” and requested Appellant to “provide copies
of any and all documents received from the IRS in response to [Appellee’s]
subpoena.” Appellee’s Fifth Set of Interrogatories, undated, at 3. We note
Appellant’s present claim that Counsel had “orally advised” Appellee’s
counsel that Appellant would not bring “a claim for loss of future wages
and/or diminution of earning capacity, and therefore the production of any of
[his] tax records was not relevant to Appellant’s claims for damages.” Id. at
23. While this renouncement of such claims was not reduced to writing, we
likewise find the court’s preclusion of any evidence of damages—including,
for example, medical or motorcycle repair bills—is disproportionate to
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Appellant’s failure to respond to the Fifth Interrogatory.
In light of the foregoing, we vacate the court’s February 25, 2014
order precluding Appellant from presenting any evidence as to liability and
the March 11, 2014 order precluding Appellant from presenting any evidence
on the issue of damages. We remand for the trial court to enter an
amended sanction order that implements the FOP Lodge factors and the
reasoning of this memorandum. See FOP Lodge, 985 A.2d at 1270-71.
The court may hold a hearing or take other action it deems necessary.
Furthermore, we vacate the order granting summary judgment for Appellee.
Discovery sanction orders of February 25, 2014 and March 22, 2014
vacated. Summary judgment order of June 26, 2014 vacated. Case
remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Wecht, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/17/2016
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