Com. v. Talley, Q.

J-A07038-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
QUINTEZ TALLEY :
: No. 870 MDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-14-CR-0000873-2014,
CP-14-CR-0000886-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 26, 2018
Appellant, Quintez Talley, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County following
his conviction by a jury on one count of arson, one count of risking a
catastrophe, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, and one
count of institutional vandalism1 with respect to offenses he committed on
March 3, 2014, as well as one count of arson, five counts of recklessly
endangering another person, and one count of institutional vandalism 2 with
____________________________________________
118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3301, 3302, 2705, and 3307, respectively. These charges
were docketed in the lower court at number CP-14-CR-0000886-2014.
218 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3301, 2705, and 3307, respectively. These charges were
docketed in the lower court at number CP-14-CR-0000873-2014.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A07038-18
respect to offenses he committed on March 5, 2014. After a careful review,
we affirm.
The relevant facts underlying this appeal have been set forth, in part,
by the trial court as follows:
Appellant was an inmate at SCI Benner on March 3, 2014,
and March 5, 2014. On March 3, 2014, Appellant started a fire in
his cell after a disagreement with correctional officers. This fire
grew and created a large amount of smoke. Correctional officers
were forced to evacuate inmates from other cells for the inmates’
safety due to the smoke. Correctional officers also had to enter
[Appellant’s] cell, which was full of smoke, in order to extinguish
the fire. Several of the correctional officers were directed to go to
Mount Nittany Medical Center for oxygen treatment due to smoke
inhalation. The fire and smoke caused damage to [Appellant’s]
cell.
After the March 3, 2014[,] fire, Appellant was placed in
another unit within the same facility. Appellant [ ] admitted to
setting another fire in his new cell on March 5, 2014. Correctional
officers were again forced to enter his smoke-filled cell in order to
extinguish the fire and ensure Appellant’s safety. This fire caused
damage to the cell.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/20/17, at 1-2 (citations to record omitted).
With respect to the March 3, 2014, fire, the Commonwealth filed various
charges against Appellant, which were docketed at lower court number CP-
14-CR-0000886-2014, and with respect to the March 5, 2014, fire, the
Commonwealth filed various charges against Appellant, which were docketed
at lower court number CP-14-CR-0000873-2014. The charges were
consolidated and, represented by counsel, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial.
At the jury trial, “Appellant openly and willingly admitted. . .to starting
fires in his cell on March 3, 2014[,] and March 5, 2014.” Id. at 2. The jury
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convicted Appellant of the offenses indicated supra. On December 15, 2015,
Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate of five years to ten years in prison
with respect to his convictions at lower court docket number CP-14-CR-
0000886-2014, and an aggregate of eight years to sixteen years in prison with
respect to his convictions at lower court docket number CP-14-CR-0000873-
2014; the sentences to run consecutively.3 On December 18, 2015, Appellant
filed a timely, counseled post-sentence motion,4 and, following a hearing, the
trial court denied, in part, and granted, in part, the motion.5 Appellant then
filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
By order entered on July 6, 2016, this Court dismissed Appellant’s
appeal for failure to file a brief. Thereafter, on December 13, 2016, Appellant
sought the restoration of his direct appeal rights via a timely PCRA6 petition,
which the PCRA court granted on April 27, 2017. This timely, counseled appeal
followed on May 25, 2017.
____________________________________________
3The trial court informed Appellant of his post-sentence and appellate rights.
N.T., 12/15/15, at 21.
4 Therein, Appellant presented a weight of the evidence claim, a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis there was no evidence Appellant
intentionally started the fires, and a motion challenging restitution.
5 Specifically, the trial court denied all of Appellant’s requests for relief, except
that it vacated the order requiring Appellant to pay $200.00 in restitution to
Leon Lobban, an inmate.
6 Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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J-A07038-18
On June 2, 2017, the trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement, and Appellant timely complied. In his Rule 1925(b)
statement, Appellant averred the following (verbatim):
1) Was the evidence insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts of
guilty on the following offenses pertaining to the March 3,
2014, fire?
a. Arson Endangering Property, 18 Pa.C.S.
3301(c)(2)
b. Risking a Catastrophe, 18 Pa.C.S. 3302(b)
c. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.
2705 (Michael Wortsell)
d. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.
2705 (Michael Lefebvre)
e. Institutional Vandalism-Educational Facility, 18
Pa.C.S. 3307(a)(3)
2) Was the evidence insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts of
guilty on the following offenses pertaining to the March 5,
2014, fire?
a. Arson Endangering Property, 18 Pa.C.S.
3301(c)(2)
b. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.
2705 (Brian George)
c. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.
2705 (Robert Williamson)
d. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.
2705 (Bernard Karabinos)
e. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.
2705 (Gregory Buck)
f. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.
2705 (Nicholas Lieb)
g. Institutional Vandalism-Educational Facility
3) Such other issues as may be identified after review of the notes
of testimony at trial and transcripts of other proceedings.
Undersigned counsel hereby reserves the right to supplement
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J-A07038-18
his 1925(b) statement upon receipt and review of these
outstanding materials.
Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, filed 6/20/17.
Thereafter, Appellant neither supplemented nor filed a petition seeking
to supplement his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. On July 20, 2017, the trial
court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion in which it addressed, generally,
Appellant’s sufficiency claims.
In his appellate brief, Appellant avers the evidence was insufficient to
convict him on seven counts of recklessly endangering another person
(namely, seven correctional officers) as there is no evidence that any of the
correctional officers suffered serious bodily injury or that Appellant attempted
to cause serious bodily injury. He further avers the evidence was insufficient
to convict him of risking a catastrophe as the fires caused minimal damage to
the prison.7
In response to Appellant’s appellate argument, the Commonwealth
suggests that Appellant has waived his sufficiency claims. Specifically, citing
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the Commonwealth avers “Appellant has waived his
sufficiency claim[s] by filing an overbroad and generic challenge to all of his
convictions without specifying which elements he is challenging.”
____________________________________________
7Appellant presents both of his sufficiency claims in one argument section.
See Appellant’s Brief at 8-11.
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J-A07038-18
Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 (citation omitted). We agree with the
Commonwealth.
As this Court has consistently held:
If [the] [a]ppellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence
was insufficient, then the [Rule] 1925(b) statement needs to
specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was
insufficient. This Court can then analyze the element or elements
on appeal. [Where a Rule] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify
the allegedly unproven elements[,]. . .the sufficiency issue is
waived [on appeal].
Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(citation and emphasis omitted). This Court has held that “[s]uch specificity
is of particular importance in cases where, as here, the appellant was
convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa.Super. 2013).
Here, as indicated supra, in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement, Appellant listed the twelve charges for which he was convicted with
regard to the two separate fires, and he averred generally that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Appellant did not identify which
elements of the convictions he was challenging. Therefore, we conclude that
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J-A07038-18
Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claims are waived on appeal.8 See
Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257.
In his final claim, Appellant avers that his aggregate sentence for both
lower court docket numbers is excessive. Specifically, he avers that, given
the minimal damage caused by the fires, as well as the trial court’s failure to
consider adequately Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, the aggregate sentences
are excessive. Appellant’s claim presents a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of his sentences. Commonwealth v. Johnson-Daniels, 167 A.3d
17 (Pa.Super. 2017).
When an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,
we must consider his brief on this issue as a petition for permission to appeal.
See id. Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue,
[this Court conducts] a four[-]part analysis to determine: (1)
whether [A]ppellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [A]ppellant’s brief
has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
____________________________________________
8 In any event, as to the specific sufficiency claims raised by Appellant on
appeal, we agree with the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Appellant’s conviction as to risking a catastrophe with regard to the March 3,
2014, fire, as well as recklessly endangering another person (collectively
seven correctional officers) with regard to both fires. See Trial Court Opinion,
filed 7/20/17, at 4-5 (discussing the evidence presented at trial, in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, as to risking a
catastrophe); Id. at 5-6 (discussing the evidence presented at trial, in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, as to recklessly
endangering another person-seven correctional officers).
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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation
omitted).
Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; however, as the
Commonwealth argues, Appellant has not preserved his discretionary
sentencing claims. “[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a
sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim
to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an
objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth
v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa.Super. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, although Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, he
did not raise any discretionary aspects of sentencing claims therein.
Moreover, Appellant did not present an objection on this basis during his
sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we deem this issue to be waived. See id.Additionally, we conclude Appellant’s discretionary aspects of
sentencing claim is waived because he did not present the claim in his court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(b)(4)(vii)
(“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with
the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). Furthermore, Appellant
failed to include a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief,
and the Commonwealth has objected to its omission. See Commonwealth’s
Brief at 4. Accordingly, Appellant’s discretionary sentencing issue is waived
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J-A07038-18
on this basis, as well. Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 861 A.2d 304, 308
(Pa.Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/26/18
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r - Covvlt
Triqionas
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CENTRE COCINTY.:PENNSIii*ANIA,
CRIMINAL ACTION - LAW
'
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v. No. CP-14-CR-0873-2014
CP-14-CR-0886-2014
QUINTEZ TALLEY,
Defendant.
Attorney for Commonwealth: Lindsay C. Foster, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant: Steven P. Trialonas, Esquire
OPINION IN RESPONSE TO MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL
Presently before the Court is an appeal filed by Quintez Talley ("Appellant"). Appellant's
Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal contains two (2) issues while reserving the right
to supplement his statement:
1.Was the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdicts of guilty on the following
offenses pertaining to the March 3, 2014 , fire?
a. Arson Endangering Property, 18 Pa.C.S. 3301(c)(2)
b. Risking a Catastrophe, 18 Pa.C.S. 3302(b)
c. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. 2705 (Michael Wortsell)
d. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. 2705 (Michael Lefebvre)
-
e. Institutional Vandalism Educational Facility, 18 Pa. C.S. 3307(a)(3)
2. Was the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdicts of guilty on the following
offenses pertaining to the March 5, 2014 , fire?
a. Arson Endangering Property, 18 Pa.C.S. 3301(c)(2)
b. Recidessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. 2705 (Brian George)
c. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. 2705 (Robert Williamson)
d. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. 2705 (Bernard Karabinos)
e. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. 2705 (Gregory Buck)
f. Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. 2705 (Nicholas Lieb)
-
g. Institutional Vandalism Educational Facility, 18 Pa. C.S. 3307(a)(3)
The Court disagrees with Appellant's Statement for the reasons set forth belays/.
rri -(7
(11
n ----
BACKGROUND
m _
;:za rri
Appellant was an inmate at SCI Benner on March 3, 2014 and March 5, 200- r?MaRli 3,
.7:10
d-ry
2014, Appellant started a fire in his cell after a disagreement with Correctional Offit :21-5g3.
-rj
CA)
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CIO ORD OS
his fire grew and created a large amount of smoke. Id.,Tr, 98:22-99;1:3. Correctional Officers were
forced to evacuate inmates from other cells for the inmates' safety clue to the smoke. Tr. 61:147.
Correctional Officers also had to enter the cell, which was full of smoke, in order to extinguish the fire.
Tr. 99:17-100:8. Several of the Correctional Officers were directed to go to Mount Nittany Medical
Center for oxygen treatment due to smoke inhalation. Tr. 104:14-23. The fire and smoke caused damage
to the cell. Tr. 186:1-190:21.
After the March 3, 2014 fire, Appellant was placed in another unit within the same facility.
Appellant also admitted to setting another fire in his new cell on March 5, 20,14. Tr. 235:9-17.
Correctional Officers were again forced to enter his smoke filled cell in order to extinguish the fire and
ensure Appellant's safety. Tr. 153:16-156:14. This fire caused damage to the cell. Tr. 186:1-190:21. To
reiterate, the Appellant openly and willingly admitted during the trial to starting fires in his cells on
March 3, 2014 and March 5, 2014. Tr. 235:9-17, 249:15-250:19.
DISCUSSION
The standard for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well settled:
[The Court] must determine whether, viewing all the evidence at trial, as well
as all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found that each element of the
offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Both direct and circumstantial
evidence can be considered equally when assessing the sufficiency of
evidence.
Corn. v. Woodruff, 668 A.2d 1158, 1159-60 (Pa. Super. 1995). Beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require the Commonwealth to "establish guilt to a mathematical certainty." Com. v. Parker, 847 A.2d
745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Corn. v. Coon, 695 A.2d 794, 797 (Pa. Super. 1997)). Further, the
reviewing court:
[M]ay not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact -
finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
CIO RD S
regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved byithe fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact
may be drawn from the combined circumstances:
Cora v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting Corn. v Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245,
253 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations omitted)). All of the record and evidence received shall be considered
by the reviewing court, and the jury may "believe all, part or none of the evidence." Id
The statutory definition of arson endangering property reads, "A person commits a felony of the
second degree if he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or that
of another, or if he aids, counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or explosion, and if he
thereby recklessly places an inhabited building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage or
destruction. 18 Pa.C.S. §3301(c)(2). In order to convict person of arson, prosecution must establish
beyond reasonable doubt that there was a fire, that it was willfully and maliciously set, and that
defendant was guilty party. Com. v. Trafford, 459 A.2d 373, 374 (Pa. Super. 1983). A person acts
recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§302(b)(3). The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. Id.
The Appellant has admitted to setting the fires on March 3, 2014 and March 5, 2014. Tr. 235:9-
17, 249:15-250:19. Therefore, the requirements that there be a fire, it was willfully and maliciously set,
and defendant was the guilty party are all met. Based on the evidence presented, a jury could find
Appellant acted in conscious disregard to the safety of the facility, the staff, and the other inmates. The
jury could also find that starting fires in a densely inhabited facility constituted a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the Appellant's situation. Therefore, a
3
CIO 1W S
recklessly In. both. incidents. SCI Benner
jury could find beyond reasonable doubt that Appellant acted
52014., The Appellant not only put the facility in
was an inhabited facility on March 3, 2014 and March
facility on March 3, 2014 and March 5, 2014. Tr.
danger of damage but did in fact cause damage to the
intentionally started a fire recklessly placing an
186:1-190:21. Evidence was presented that Appellant
Given the evidence presented, this Court
inhabited building in danger of damage or destruction.
doubt that Appellant was guilty of Arson
concludes the jury could find beyond a reasonable
and March 5, 2014.
Endangering Property for the fires on March 3, 2014
reads, "A person is guilty of a felony of the
The statutory definition of Risking a Catastrophe
if he recklessly creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire, explosives or other
third degree
18 Pa.C.S. §3302(b). A person acts recklessly
dangerous means listed in subsection (a) of this section."
when he consciously disregards a substantial and
with respect to a material element of an offense
will result from his conduct. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
is use of dangerous means by one who consciously
§302(b)(3). "Risk" proscribed by this section
thereby unnecessarily exposes society to an
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk and
to
disaster. Corn. v. Simkins, 443 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Super. 1982). Catastrophe is intended
extraordinary
Corn v. Hughes, 364 A.2d 306, 312 (Pa. 1976).
be synonymous with widespread injury or damage.
a substantial and unjustifiable risk when he acted
As discussed above, the Appellant disregarded
a great
by starting a fire in a deAsely inhabited facility on March 3, 2014. This fire also caused
recklessly
during the
smoke can cause serious injury as discussed
deal of smoke. Tr. 98:22-99:13. Breathing in
inside of
trial. Tr. 195:6- 202:2. Furthermore, many
of the other inmates in the cellblock were locked
Tr. 61:1-17. If the fire had spread or the
inmates
their cells and had to be evacuated from the building.
fire or
suffered severe injuries or even death due to the
had not been released, many of them could have
that a jury could reasonably find the Appellant
to smoke inhalation. Therefore, this Court concludes
DO RD S
or death could
starting a fire in which widespread injury
recklessly created a risk of a catastrophe by
a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of Risking a
have occurred. A jury could find beyond
Catastrophe under 18 Pa.C.S. §3302(b).
Endangering Another Person reads, "A person commits a
The statutory definition of Recklessly
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place
misdemeanor of the second degree if he
Recklessly endangering
serious bodily injury." 18 Pa.C.S. §2705.
another person in danger of death or
(2) an actus reus some "conduct," (3)
causation
requires (1) a mens rea recklessness,
another person
result "danger," to another person, of
death or
"which places," and (4) the achievement of a particular
The mens rea for
injury. Corn. v. Trowbridge, 395 A.2d 1337, 1340 (Pa. Super. 1978).
serious bodily
is a conscious disregard of a known risk
of death or great bodily
recklessly endangering another person
Corn. v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940,
949 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Com. v.
harm to another person.
as bodily injury which
2000). "Serious bodily injury" is defined
Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 916 (Pa. Super.
or protracted loss
causes serious, permanent disfigurement,
creates a substantial risk of death or which
sustain a
member or organ. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2301. To
or impairment of the function of any bodily
of
this statute the Commonwealth must prove danger, not merely an apprehension
conviction under
Id.
395 A.2d at 1340. This requires an actual present ability to inflict halm.
danger. Trowbridge,
fires
above, Appellant recklessly acted with conscious disregard and knowingly set
As discussed
and the
cells that could have caused death or bodily harm to himself, the other inmates,
in his
throughout the
Officers. Evidence of the fires and the smoke they created was presented
Correctional
evidence
153:16-156:14. The Commonwealth presented
trial to the jury. See generally, Tr. 98:22-99:13,
The
that smoke inhalation can cause. Tr. 195:6-202:2.
concerning the bodily injury and impairment
the inmates and
Commonwealth also presented evidence
that the Correctional Officers have to protect
had fires
Officers were forced to enter the cells which
ensure their safety. Tr. 53:11-16. Correctional
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smoke. Tr. 99:17-100:8, 153 :16-156:1,4. VsEtscd on t.V..c
burning and worked in or around large amounts of
recklessly, by starting fires in his cell, placed the
evidence presented, a jury could find Appellant
fire and smoke inhalation
Officers in danger of death and serious bodily injury due to the
Correctional
could find beyond a reasonable
3, 2014 and on March 5, 2014. This Court concludes the jury
on March
Another Person under
that Appellant was guilty of all of the charges of Recklessly Endangering
doubt
18 Pa.C.S. §2705.
commits
of institutional vandalism- educational facility reads, "A person
The statutory definition
(relating to
vandalism if he knowingly desecrates, as defined in section 5509
the offense of institutional
school,
of venerated objects), vandalizes, defaces or otherwise damages any
desecration or sale
local
community center, municipal building, courthouse facility, state or
educational facility,
person acts
or vehicle or juvenile detention center." 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3307(a)(3). A
government building
element involves the nature
with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the
knowingly
nature or that such
or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
of his conduct
aware that it is
exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
circumstances
cause such a result. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §302(b)(2).
practically certain that his conduct will
down
3, 2014 incident, Appellant stated that he watched a match burn
In regards to the March
his testimony
to throw it onto the mattress. Tr. 220:3-7. Throughout the rest of
and it was a hard decision
See
to start the fire as a statement concerning his treatment as a prisoner.
he states that he wanted
This is
Appellant knew that starting a fire could damage the facility.
generally, Tr. 218:22-219:19.
The Appellant did in
his statement that he was going to "burn this bitch down". Tr. 32:17-18.
evident in
Tr. 186:1-190:21.
damage to the state correctional facility which cost $112.29 to repair.
ct cause
damaged a state building
``care, the Commonwealth presented
evidence that Appellant knowingly
all of the evidence presented, this Court concludes the jury could
s fire in his cell. Considering
6
DS
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of Institutional Vandalism. for the March '3 ,
2014 fire.
The Appellant also stated that he knowingly set another fire in his cell on March 5, 2014. Tr.
231:19-232:5. Appellant again stated he was going to "burn this bitch down". Tr. 145:15-16. This
demonstrates the Appellant's knowledge that fire has a propensity to destroy. Once again, this fire did in
fact cause damage to the state correctional facility. Tr. 186:1-190:21. Therefore, the Commonwealth
presented evidence that Appellant knowingly damaged a state building by setting a fire in his cell.
Considering all of the evidence presented, this Court concludes the jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant was guilty of Institutional Vandalism for the March 5, 2014 fire.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully requests that the jury's verdict remain
undisturbed.
BY THE COURT:
Date: July ti, 2017
a D. Grine, Judge
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