In the Interest of: J.C., a Minor

J-S44033-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: Y.C., Mother : No. 654 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree entered January 18, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court Division, No(s): CP-51-AP-0001308-2016;
CP-51-DP-0000932-2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017
Y.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed by
the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily
terminate her parental rights to her minor son, J.C. (“Child”), born in 2016,
pursuant to section 2511 of the Adoption Act, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, and
to change his permanency placement goal to adoption. We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and
procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial
Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 1-10.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court erred [sic] when it found that [DHS,] by
clear and convincing evidence[,] had met its burden to
terminate [Mother’s] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1)[,] (2), [](5) [and] (8)?
2. Did the trial court erred [sic] when it found that the
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in [] Child’s best
J-S44033-17
interests[,] and that [DHS] had met its burden pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
3. Did the trial court erred [sic] in changing the permanen[cy]
placement goal from reunification to adoption?
Brief for Mother at 3.1
In her first issue, Mother contends that the evidence did not establish,
by clear and convincing evidence, sufficient grounds to involuntarily
terminate her parental rights. Id. at 9. Mother asserts that, “from the
beginning of the case[, she] began to work on her case objectives for
visitation, housing, mental health and drug treatment before she was
incarcerated for the probation violation.” Id. at 10. Mother also asserts
that, prior to her incarceration, she “had housing with her brother and then
was able to get her own apartment.” Id. Mother claims that, after she “was
released from incarceration, she continued to work on her case objectives,
had negative drug screens[,] and was then able to visit with [Child] in
September 2016.” Id. Mother argues that the trial court “completely
discounted [her] actual work on her case objectives.” Id.
1
Mother failed to address her third issue in the argument section of her
brief. Therefore, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the
argument section of an appellant’s brief is to be “divided into as many parts
as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each
part--in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular point
treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent.”). Even if Mother had properly presented this issue, we
would have determined that it lacks merit based on our disposition of
Mother’s first two issues.
-2-
J-S44033-17
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Mother’s first issue, set forth
the relevant law, and determined that DHS had established, by clear and
convincing evidence, grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). 2 See Trial Court
Opinion, 3/24/17, at 10-13, 15. We agree with the reasoning of the trial
court, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s first issue. See id.
In her second issue, Mother contends that the evidence did not
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, sufficient grounds to determine
whether involuntarily terminating her parental rights was in Child’s best
interest. Brief for Mother at 12. Mother asserts that the caseworker had
insufficient time to observe Mother’s interactions with Child, so as “to truly
develop a comprehensive analysis of the nature of the bond between
[them.]” Id. Mother also claims that “[t]he [trial c]ourt’s visitation
restrictions on [her,] and the time that she has been incarcerated have
made it difficult for Mother to work on establishing a bond with [Child].” Id.
2
Although the trial court indicated, in its Decree, that Mother’s parental
rights had been involuntarily terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8), the trial court did not address subsection
2511(a)(8) in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. Moreover, termination under
subsection 2511(a)(8) would not have been appropriate, as 12 months had
not elapsed between the date when Child was removed from Mother’s care,
and the date of the termination Order. Nevertheless, satisfaction of any one
subsection of section 2511(a), along with consideration of subsection
2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary termination of parental rights. See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Thus,
because the trial court properly determined that involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under subsections 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5) and (b), its Order warrants affirmation.
-3-
J-S44033-17
Mother argues that, with additional time and contact with Child, she will be
able to continue to develop a significant parent-child bond with him. Id.In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Mother’s second issue, set
forth the relevant law, and determined that the issue lacks merit. See Trial
Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 14-15. We agree with the reasoning of the trial
court, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s second issue. See id.Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/31/2017
-4-
Circulated 06/29/2017 04:1 PM
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
IN THE INTEREST OF: : FAMILY COURT DIVISION
: JUVENILE BRANCH
J. C., a Minor : CP-51-AP-0001308-2016/CP-51-DP-0000932-2016
d/o/b: IIM016
Appeal of: : Superior Court No: 654 EDA 2017
Y. I. C., Mother
OPINION C:
.
INTRODUCTION
Y.I.C. ("Mother"), Appeals from the Decree and Order entered by this Court on
January 18, 2017, granting the Petition to Involuntarily Teiniinate Mother's Parental
Rights, and changing the Permanency Goal from reunification to Adoption, of her minor
son, J.C., ("Child"), (d/o/b: 101/2016). The Petition was filed by the Department of
Human Services ("DHS") on December 30, 2016, and served on Mother.
This Court held a Goal Change/Termination of Parental Rights Hearing on
January 18, 2017. After a full Hearing on the merits, this Court found that clear and
1
convincing evidence was presented to terminate the parental rights of Mother, and the
rights of unknown putative Father and change the permanency goal to Adoption. 1
In response to the Decree and Order of January 18, 2017, counsel for Mother
filed a Notice of Appeal with Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on
February 16, 2017.
STATEMENT OF MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL
In her Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Mother raises the
following issues:
1. The trial court erred when it found that the
Department of Human Services by clear and
convincing evidence had met its burden to terminate
Appellant's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8).
2. The trial court erred when it found that the
termination of Mother's parental rights was in the
Child's best interest and that the Department of
Human Services had met its burden pursuant to
§2511(b).
3. The trial court erred in changing the permanent
placement goal from reunification to adoption.
1Mother's parental rights were also involuntarily terminated on November 30, 2015 as to her two
children: 0.0., d/o/b:M11,09- CP-51-DP-0045276-2009; and R.G., d/o/b:Siaff/02-CP-51-DP-0012074-
2010. (Appeals were not filed).
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother has a history of severe drug use; lack of mental health treatment and parental
neglect of her children. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016,11"a").
On April 15, 2016, the Department of Human Services (DHS) received a General
Protective Services (GPS) Report alleging that Mother and Child had tested positive for
phencyclidine (PCP) at the time of the Child's birth on April 14, 2016. Mother stated
that she voluntarily left Interim House, where she had been receiving substance abuse
treatment, because the program was not helping her. The Report alleged that Mother left
Interim House on April 5, 2016 and that Mother's two older Children were in the process
of being adopted. The Child, J.C., was expected to be discharged from the hospital on
April 16, 2016. He weighed six pounds and 12 ounces at the time of birth. Mother had
five prenatal visits between the months of October 2015 and April 2016 at Women's Care
Center. Mother has a history of anxiety, depression, and was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder. Mother was not compliant with her mental health treatment recommendations.
It was further alleged that Mother has a criminal history and was arrested and charged
with receiving stolen property and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle on June 20,
2015. Mother refused to provide the name of the Child's Father. This Report was
determined as valid. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "b").
3
On April 18, 2016, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (OPC) for the
Child. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "c").
On April 19, 2016, the Child was discharged from Hahnemann Hospital to the care of
DHS, and was placed in the care of his Maternal Grandmother, M.C. (Exhibit "A"
Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "d").
A Shelter Care Hearing was held on April 20, 2016 before the Honorable Allan L.
Tereshko. Temporary Legal Custody was transferred to DHS. The Child was placed in
Kinship Care with Maternal Grandmother, M.C. Mother is referred to CEU for an
assessment and forthwith drug screen. (Shelter Care Order, 4/20/2016). Also on April
20, 2016, Mother was seen at the CEU and she tested positive for PCP. (Exhibit "A"
Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "f").
The identity and whereabouts of the Child's Father are unknown to DHS. (Exhibit
"A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "h").
On April 25, 2016, DHS filed a Dependent Petition for the Child. DHS determined
that there was sufficient basis to find that Aggravated Circumstances existed pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. §6302 (5), in that on November 30, 2015, the parental rights of Mother were
involuntarily teuiiinated as to her two other Children: R.G., d/o/b:M5/2002, CP-51-
4
DP -0012074-2010; and 0.0., d/o/b:IIIMIE/2009, CP-51-DP-0045276-2009. (Exhibit "A"
Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "i").
Mother's two other Children: R.G., and 0.0. have been adopted by the Children's
Maternal Grandmother, M.C. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition
for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "j").
An Adjudicatory Hearing was held on April 27, 2016, before the Honorable Allan L.
Tereshko. Legal Custody of the Child remains with DHS, and placement remains in
Kinship Care. Mother's visitation is suspended until she renders a negative drug screen.
If she renders a negative drug screen, Mother shall have liberal supervised visits with the
Child at the Agency. Mother to attend all of Child's medical appointments. Mother
referred to CEU for forthwith drug screen, assessment, and dual diagnosis, and three
randoms prior to next court date. Mother also referred to ARC for parenting and housing.
(Order of Adjudication and Disposition- Child Dependent, 4/27/2016).
On April 27, 2016, the Court found that clear and convincing evidence was presented
to establish that the alleged Aggravated Circumstances exist as to Mother. The parental
rights of Mother have been involuntarily terminated with respect to another Child.
(Aggravated Circumstances Order, 4/27/2016).
On April 27, 2016, May 4, 2016, and May 16, 2016, Mother was seen at CEU. On all
three dates, Mother tested positive for PCP. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached to
DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "m").
5
On May 16, 2016, Mother was scheduled to receive substance abuse assessment;
however, she failed to return to the CEU following her urinalysis drug screen. (Exhibit
"A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "n").
On June 9, 2016, June 22, 2016, and July 7, 2016, Mother was seen at the CEU. On
all three dates, Mother tested positive for PCP. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached
to DHS Petition for Involuntary Telinination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "o").
On July 15, 2016, Mother was incarcerated at Riverside Correctional Facility (RCF)
due to violating the terms of her probation. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached to
DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "p").
A Permanency Review Hearing was held on July 28, 2016, Honorable Allan L.
Tereshko found that Legal Custody of the Child remains with DHS. Placement of the
Child remains in Foster Care (Kinship). Child is placed with Maternal Grandmother,
M.C., in Kinship through Progressive Life. Mother is currently incarcerated in RCF,
PP#816099. Mother to the CEU for assessment, dual diagnosis and forthwith screen plus
3 randoms upon her release from prison. CUA to make outreach to Mother. Prior order
on visitation to stand. SCP to be held, Mother is to participate by phone. CUA to contact
Mother's prison counselor. (Permanency Review Order, 7/28/2016).
On August 30, 2016, CUA-TP4C held an SCP meeting. The goal for the Child was
"return to parent". The parental objectives for Mother were: 1) continue drug and
alcohol treatment; 2) continue mental health treatment; 3) follow the rules of the home
6
where she is residing; and 4) per the Court's Order, Mother is not to have visitation with
the Child until she renders negative urine drug screens. Mother failed to participate in
SCP meeting. (Exhibit "A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "r").
A Peiiiianency Review Hearing was held on October 20, 2016, before the
Honorable
Allan L. Tereshko. The Court held that Legal Custody of the Child remains with
DHS,
and placement of the Child remains in Foster Care (Kinship). Child is placed with
Maternal Grandmother, M.C., in Kinship through Progressive Life. Mother's weekly
supervised visits at the Agency to continue. Mother is referred to CEU for monitoring,
continue with dual diagnosis program and ARC. CEU report as to Mother is
incorporated by reference. (Permanency Review Order, 10/20/2016).
On November 11, 2016, CUA-TP4C held a SCP meeting. The goal for the Child was
"return to parent". The parental objectives for Mother were: 1) continue drug and
alcohol treatment; 2) continue mental health treatment; 3) per the Court's Order, Mother
is not to have visitation with the Child until she renders negative urine drug
screens, and
4) Mother to continue with ARC services. Mother participated in the
meeting. (Exhibit
"A" Statement of Facts, attached to DHS Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, filed 12/30/2016, ¶ "t").
Mother's Probation, after her guilty plea to Unauthorized Use Mother/Other Vehicles
on 5/24/2016, was REVOKED/NEW STENTENCE: 9-23 months in a
County prison
with credit for time served; re-entry eligibility; detainer lifted. (Disposition
1/10/2017,
CCP Criminal Docket- CP-51-CR-0007547-2015).
7
TERMINATION HEARING
On January 18, 2017, this Court held a Goal Change/Termination Hearing and
heard testimony only on DHS's Petition to Ten iinate Mother's Paternal Rights as to
Child, J.C. Mother was present at the hearing and represented by her attorney.
(N.T.
1/18/2017, p.4 at 18).
Counsel for DHS, Caitlin Dunston, called her first witness, Ashley Wright, Core
Case Manager, Turning Points for Children. She testified she has been the
Case Manager
since the Child was brought into care on April 18, 2016, when he was removed from
the
hospital directly to his Maternal Grandmother. The Child was born with PCP in his
system, and Mother was transient. (N.T. 1/18/2017, p.7 at 13-25).
Ms. Wright testified, Mother's objectives were established at that time, and
they
included comply with sobriety, treat for mental health, treat for drug and/or alcohol,
obtain housing, and have visitation with the Child. (N.T. 1/18/2017, p.8 at 1-20).
Regarding visitation, Mother was not to have visits with the Child unless her urine
screens were negative. Regarding drug and/or alcohol, and mental health services,
Mother was to continue to remain at Interim House, where she enrolled while she was
pregnant with the Child. She was also referred to Men and Woman of Human
Excellence, another dual-diagnosis program. Ms. Wright testified Mother did not
complete any drug/alcohol programs. (N.T. 1/18/2017, p.8 at 21-25; p.9 at 1-20).
She also noted that throughout this case, Mother had been ordered to go to
CEU
for random drug screens. Mother had positive drug screens consistently,
and produced
8
three negative drug screens in September 2016. Therefore, she was allowed to visit with
the Child during the month of September until she produced a positive drug screen for
PCP again. (N.T. 1/18/2017, p.10 at 15-25; p.11 at 1-3).
Mother received mental health services at Men and Women of Human
Excellence, where she was involved in group treatment. Mother also had services at
NHS Parkside, TOP. However, Mother was not consistent with attending mental health
services, and never completed a drug and alcohol or mental health program. (N.T.
1/18/2017, p.11 at 4-18; p.14 at 12-19).
Ms. Wright noted Mother had first been incarcerated from July to September of
2016 for a probation violation due to charges of theft. She communicated with Mother's
Probation Officer and noted that Mother has to submit to random drug screens as a
condition of probation. After that incarceration, Mother tested negative for drug screens
at CEU in September 2016, and was allowed visits with her Child. Visits were halted
when Mother tested positive for PCP in October 2016, and then was incarcerated again in
November 2016. (N.T. 1/18/2017, p.12 at 1-25; p.13 at 1-23).
Regarding Mother's housing situation, Ms. Wright testified Mother had an
apartment for a short period of time, but she was living with her brother and his wife at
that time. Ms. Wright testified that Mother is currently incarcerated and upon release,
she believes Mother is not in a position to provide a home for her Child. (N.T.
1/18/2017, p.14 at 1-11).
9
Ms. Wright testified she sees the Child twice a month at the Kinship home with
his Maternal Grandmother and his two siblings, 0.0., and R.G. The Child is bonded to
his Grandmother, and the Child looks to her for parental care and duties because he has
been with her since birth. She further opined that the Child would not suffer irreparable
harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated. She further stated it is in the Child's
best interest to be adopted because he is stable with his Grandmother, and his siblings,
and is well taken care of. She last saw the Child on 1/05/2017 and he was safe.
Progressive Life Center provides kinship services for Maternal Grandmother (N.T.
1/18/2017, p.15 at 24-25; p.16 at 1-7; p.17 at 20-25; p.18 at 1-13).
Ms. Wright testified a Father was never identified for the Child, and no one has
come forward to claim paternity. Father remains unknown for this Child. She further
testified Mother has a third Child, E.L., d/o/b: 03/19/2004, who resides with her Father,
and is not in the dependency system. (N.T. 1/18/2017, p.16 at 11-24).
Mother was next to testify. She testified she has contact with her Children by
telephone through her Mother, the Children's Grandmother. She has visited with her
Child four times recently, and that she is bonding with him. She further stated she has
signed up for both parenting classes and mental health services. (N.T. 1/18/2017, p.21 at
3-21; p.23 at 3-14).
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
When reviewing an Appeal from a Decree terminating parental rights, an
Appellate Court is limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is
supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of
law, or
10
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand.
Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, an
appellate court must accord the hearing judge's decision the same deference that it would
give to a jury verdict. The Pennsylvania Superior Court need only agree with a trial
court's decision as to any one subsection under 23 P.C.S.A. §2511 (a) in order to affirm a
termination of parental rights. In re D.A.T. 91 A.3d 197 Pa.Super.2014).
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate
Courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties
spanning multiple hearings. In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013) (citations
and quotation marks omitted) In re Adoption of C.D.R., 2015 PA Super 54, 111 A.3d
1212, 1215 (2015).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis. Initially, the focus is
on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's
conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the
second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and
11
welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of
the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional
bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of
permanently severing any such bond. In re L.M, 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super.2007)
(citations omitted). In re Adoption of C.J.J.P., 2015 PA Super 80, 114 A.3d 1046,
1049-
50 (2015). The Court need only agree with the orphans' court as to any
one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re Adoption
of
C.J.J.P., 2015 PA Super 80, 114 A.3d 1046, 1050 (2015).
Mother has three other Children: R.G., age 14, 0.0., age 8, who were removed
from her care and currently in Adoption proceedings with Maternal
Grandmother; and
E.L., age 13, who lives with her Father.
A full Hearing on the merits was held on January 18, 2017, whereupon the Court
granted the Petitions filed by DHS to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights
to
this eleven month old Child.
A. The Trial Court Properly Found the Department of Human Services
Met
Its Burden by Clear and Convincing Evidence To Terminate Mother's
Parental Rights Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 42511(a)(1), (2), and (S).'
1 1(a) General Rule.-the rights of a
parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition
filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
immediately preceding
the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parenting
claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of
the parent has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or
mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parents by the court
or under a voluntary
agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which
led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those
conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the
parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child
12
Mother's issues with mental health, drug use, and housing are substantiated
on the record by the credible testimony of Ashley Wright, Core Case Manager, for
Turning Points for Children. She testified she has been the Case Manager since the Child
was brought into care on April 18, 2016, four days after his birth, when he was
removed
from the hospital directly to his Maternal Grandmother.
The evidence is clear and convincing regarding Mother's non-compliance with
the FSP objectives. Mother consistently tested positive for PCP, and only had
negative
tests after a period of incarceration between July and September, 2016, when she
violated
her probation.
Mother was ordered to have supervised visits with her Child, only if she had
negative drug screens, and Mother only complied with this requirement after she was
incarcerated, and that was short lived because Mother again tested positive for drugs.
The evidence is also clear and convincing regarding Mother's inability to
maintain housing, and her inability to complete any program she was referred to. Based
on the evidence presented, this Court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate
Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1),(2), and (5).
within reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs
and welfare of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under voluntary
agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue
to exist and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
13
13. Trial Court Properly Found that Termination of Mother's Parental
Rights was in the Children's Best Interest and that DHS Met Its Burden
Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2511(b).3
After the Court finds that the statutory grounds for termination have been
satisfied, it must then deteiiiiine whether the termination of parental rights serves the best
interests of the children pursuant to 2511(b) In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A2d 999
(Pa.Super 2008). In terminating the rights of a parent, the Court "shall give primary
consideration to the development, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b). One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child. In re
T.S.M., 71 A3d 251 (Pa. 2013).
This Court finds credible the testimony from Ms. Wright, the Core Case Manager,
for Turning Points for Children that the Child was bonded to Maternal
Grandmother and
not to Mother. She provided the Court with credible testimony that the Child looked to
his Maternal Grandmother, not to Mother for safety, comfort and to meet all of
his daily
needs. She also opined that the Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother's
rights were terminated and that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption
would be in the best interest of the Child.
3 Other Considerations.-The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration
to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall
not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any
petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1),(6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent
to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of
the filing of the petition.
14
This Court found that Mother evidenced an incapacity to parent this Child, and
was not persuaded that Mother could or would resolve these issues in the near future.
CONCLUSION
The Court concluded:
Considering the evidence regarding the Termination
Petition against Mother, the evidence, is clear and
convincing, that Mother has failed to take any steps to
remedy the issues that brought the Child into care. The Child
was removed from her care based upon Mother having
illegal drugs in her system. The Child was in placement
shortly after that point in time. The Child has remained in
the same placement.
Mother has not taken any affiuiiiative steps to
realistically place herself in a position to parent this Child in
the future. Her history of failing to parent her other Children
supports a finding that she will be unable to parent this Child
going forward. She has not and will not be able to remedy
any of those issues.
Therefore, under 2511 (a) (1), (2), and (5), Mother's
rights are subject to termination. The parallel analysis
regarding this Child considers the evidence under 2511 (b),
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and that evidence is that the Child is well -bonded with the
caretaker, who is also the caretaker of this Child's siblings.
While Mom may have belatedly established a bond, it is
clear that it is not a parental bond. That bond exists with the
existing caretaker within the family structure that the Child
lives.
Therefore under 2511 (b), and 2511 (a) (1), (2) and
(5), Mother's rights are terminated. As a matter of law, since
there is no evidence that anyone has stepped forward to
claim paternity of this Child, nor has anyone ever entered
this Child's life as a father figure, the Father remains
unknown. Therefore, under the law, putative unknown
Father's parental rights are terminated.
(N.T., 1/18/2017, p.30 at 7-25; p.31 at 19).
For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully requests that the Decree of
January 18, 2017, terminating Mother, Y.I.C.'s Parental Rights to the Child J.C., and the
Order changing the permanency goal to Adoption be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
-CGuAtitikl4r
ALLAN L. TERESHKO, Sr. J.
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