Com. v. Vangjeli, A.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANDI VANGJELI :
:
Appellant : No. 216 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002651-2016
*****
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANDI VANGJELI :
:
Appellant : No. 217 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002655-2016
*****
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANDI VANGJELI :
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:
Appellant : No. 218 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002658-2018
*****
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANDI VANGJELI :
:
Appellant : No. 219 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004509-2016
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2019
Andi Vangjeli appeals from the judgments of sentence, entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following a nonjury trial which
consolidated four docket numbers,1 resulting in the following convictions: on
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1 Vangjeli filed a single brief, as the matters and issues across the four docket
numbers are interrelated. See Pa.R.A.P. 2138. For the same reason, we
consolidate his appeals sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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docket number 2651—terroristic threats2 and harassment;3 on docket number
2655—terroristic threats and simple assault;4 on docket number 2658—carrying
a firearm without a license,5 carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia,6
terroristic threats, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person
(REAP);7 and on docket number 4509—intimidation of a witness,8 stalking,9
harassment, and criminal use of a communication facility.10 After careful review,
we affirm in part, and vacate in part.
From 2012 until July of 2014, K.O. dated Vangjeli’s younger brother
Emiliano. K.O. discovered she was pregnant on November 5, 2014, and
suspected Emiliano was the father. The relationship fell apart after two paternity
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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706.
3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.
4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701.
5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106.
6 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108.
7 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
8 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952.
9 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1.
10 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512.
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tests confirmed otherwise. Subsequently, Vangjeli initiated a series of personal
confrontations and social media attacks against K.O. that continued into 2016.
On November 1, 2015,11 Vangjeli approached K.O. from behind at a gas
station. After a verbal exchange, Vangjeli lifted his shirt, exposing the handle
of a black gun in his waistband. K.O. feared for her safety and left. Vangjeli did
not have a license to possess a firearm. However, he lived in the same house as
Emiliano and had access to the .9mm pistol Emiliano kept under his bed.
On November 20, 2015,12 K.O. was leaving a local bar when she
encountered Vangjeli and several of his friends. After turning to walk to her car,
K.O. was interrupted by a glass bottle thrown at her head. Vangjeli then
approached K.O., tore her cross-body bag from her person and spat on her face.
Vangjeli told K.O. he wanted to hit her and attempted to do so. Though he
missed, K.O. was fearful.
On November 25, 2015,13 Vangjeli, along with a group of his friends,
approached K.O. in public and again threatened to hit her. Vangjeli struck K.O.
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11The November 1, 2015 incident forms the basis for charges filed under docket
number 2658.
12The November 20, 2015 incident forms the basis for charges filed under docket
number 2655.
13The November 25, 2015 incident forms the basis for charges filed under docket
number 2651.
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and spat on her. K.O. told Vangjeli she would go to the police if he did not leave
her alone. On December 1, K.O. filed a police report after Vangjeli posted photos
of her on his social media websites.
Beginning on December 9, 2015,14 Vangjeli published a series of Twitter
posts, calling K.O. derogatory names and openly wishing for her to suffer
physical harm. Several of these posts, made immediately prior to K.O.’s
testimony at Vangjeli’s preliminary hearing, called for K.O.’s death. Vangjeli
continued publishing tweets directed at K.O. after her testimony, often
characterized by overtly racist, misogynist, or sexually explicit content.
On March 25, 2016, K.O. encountered Vangjeli at a store, where he took
three video recordings of K.O. over her protests. She told the police the incident
made her feel as if she could encounter Vangjeli anywhere and be subject to
emotional, mental, or physical abuse. See N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 87
(recounting, at trial, that by the time this incident took place, “[Vangjeli] had
already been taken into custody and it was an ongoing matter and he sees me
in public and still continues to act the way he was. It was concerning to me that
it wasn’t going to end.”).
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14 The incidents that occurred after December 9, 2015 form the basis for charges
filed under docket number 4509.
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After a non-jury trial held on April 21, 2017, the Honorable Edward Wright
imposed a total of two to five years’ incarceration, followed by five years of
probation on October 27, 2017.15 Vangjeli filed timely post-sentence motions,
which were denied on December 8, 2017. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal under each docket number, after which he filed timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statements.
On appeal, Vangjeli challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his convictions for harassment, intimidation of a witness, criminal use of a
communication facility, terroristic threats, carrying a firearm without a license,
carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, and REAP. He also challenges the
weight of the evidence underpinning his convictions for carrying a firearm
without a license and carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia.
Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled:
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15 Judge Wright sentenced Vangeli as follows: on docket number 2651, three
years’ probation for terroristic threats, and no further penalty for harassment;
on docket number 2655, three years’ probation for terroristic threats, and two
years’ probation for simple assault; on docket number 2658, two to five years’
incarceration for carrying a firearm without a license, two years’ probation for
carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, two years’ probation for terroristic
threats, two years’ probation for simple assault, and two years’ probation for
recklessly endangering another person; and on docket number 4509, five years’
probation for intimidation of a witness, three years’ probation for stalking, one
year’s probation for harassment, and five years’ probation for criminal use of a
communication facility. His conviction for carrying a firearm without a license is
the sole basis for his sentence of incarceration. On all other convictions, Vangjeli
received sentences of probation, consecutive to his sentence of incarceration,
and concurrent to one another.
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In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the
offense. . . . When performing this review, we may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.
Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and
quotation omitted).
Vangjeli challenges his harassment conviction under docket number
2651,16 averring the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he acted with the necessary intent to harass.
The Crimes Code defines harassment, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2709. Harassment
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of harassment
when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person:
(1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other
person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the
same
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). The intent to harass “may be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 961
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16 Vangjeli’s statement of questions lists separate challenges to the sufficiency
of “the harassment charges” and the harassment charge under docket number
4509. Brief of Appellant, at 3. His argument, however, only challenges the
harassment conviction under docket number 2651, submitting no argument
whatsoever related to his harassment conviction under docket number 4509.
Id. at 19–23. His challenge to the harassment conviction under docket number
4509, therefore, is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
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(Pa. Super. 2002). Such an inference can be drawn from testimony indicating a
victim was subjected to unwanted physical contact by another. See
Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 319 (Pa. Super. 2006) (finding
valid inference of intent to harass when child grabbed by arm and dragged to
house by grown woman).
Vangjeli avers his behavior on November 25, 2015, which began with
yelling obscenities at K.O., escalated to spitting on K.O., and ultimately ended
with striking K.O, “was intended to address what was being relayed to him by
[K.O.] and not intended to annoy or harass her.” Brief of Appellant, at 22; 36-
37. He, however, offers no legal justification as to why K.O.’s alleged
provocation undermines an inference of an intent to harass drawn from clear
evidence of unwanted physical contact. Subjecting K.O to such clearly unwanted
contact provides a proper basis for inferring an intent to harass. See Blackham,
supra, at 319.
Vangjeli further submits that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a
charge for intimidation of witnesses because the Commonwealth failed to prove
that he intentionally intimidated K.O. or attempted to dissuade her from
reporting a crime or presenting testimony related to the commission of a crime.
Brief of Appellant, at 36.
The Crimes Code defines intimidation of witnesses or victims, in relevant
part, as follows:
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§ 4952. Intimidation of witnesses or victims
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if, with the intent
to or with the knowledge that his conduct will obstruct, impede,
impair, prevent or interfere with the administration of criminal
justice, he intimidates or attempts to intimidate any witness or
victim to:
(1) Refrain from informing or reporting to any law enforcement
officer, prosecuting official or judge concerning any
information, document or thing relating to the commission of
a crime.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(1). The intent requirement has been explicated as
follows:
[A]ctual intimidation of a witness is not an essential element of the
crime. The crime is committed if one, with the necessary mens rea,
‘attempts’ to intimidate a witness or victim. . . . The trier of the
facts, therefore, could find that appellant attempted to intimidate his
accuser and that he did so intending or, at least, having knowledge
that his conduct was likely to, impede, impair or interfere with the
administration of criminal justice. . . . The Commonwealth is not
required to prove mens rea by direct evidence. Frequently such
evidence is not available. In such cases, the Commonwealth may
rely on circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Collington, 615 A.2d 769, 770 (Pa. Super. 1992).
This Court, therefore, must examine whether the record supports an
inference that Vangjeli acted to interfere with “the administration of the justice
system by convincing [the victim] to withhold testimony.” Commonwealth v.
Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 48 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding defendant’s YouTube rap
video, threatening police officers scheduled to testify, furnished sufficient
evidence for inference of intent to interfere with administration of justice). There
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need not be a specific threat connecting a defendant’s behavior to a victim’s trial
testimony—the contents and timing of an action, taken in conjunction with the
surrounding circumstances, is sufficient, if believed by the finder of fact, to
permit an inference that a threat was made with the purpose of intimidating a
witness whose testimony is critical in the impending trial. See Collington,
supra at 770 (finding defendant’s letter, which did not specifically refer to
upcoming rape trial, provided sufficient basis for inferring it was sent to victim
with intent to impede justice).
Vangjeli claims, in order to sustain his conviction, this Court would need
to conclude that communicating to a victim a desire to cease prosecution
constitutes a per se violation of the law. See Brief of Appellant, at 37. This
assertion is as irrelevant as it is inapposite—not only does screaming, spitting,
and striking an individual go a great deal farther than merely communicating a
desire to cease prosecution, our case law demands no such bright line rule. See,
e.g., Collington, supra at 770.
Vangjeli further argues that evidence adduced at trial fails to suggest an
intent to prevent K.O. from testifying. See id. at 39–42 (citing absence of
threats connected to K.O.’s testimony and indirect manner in which Vangjeli’s
social media posts threatened K.O.). While we agree that Judge Wright’s Rule
1925(a) opinion cites instances of intimidation without offering a clear
connection to the conclusion that Vangeli intended to discourage K.O.’s
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participation in the legal process, we disagree with the assertion that the facts
of this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, preclude
a logical inference that Vangeli’s conduct constituted witness intimidation.17
Judge Wright’s Rule 1925(a) opinion cites Vangeli’s conduct on March 25,
2016, where he taunted K.O., recorded her on his cell phone, and referenced
the ongoing case against him. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 10–12.
However, by that time, K.O. had also previously endured Vangjeli’s calls for her
death on social media—messages which directly referenced her impending
testimony at his preliminary hearing.18 After the incident on March 25, 2016,
less than one month before trial, K.O. felt as if Vangjeli’s threatening behavior
“wasn’t going to end.” See N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 87. This unbroken pattern of
behavior, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, affords a
clear inference that Vangjeli intended to keep K.O. from testifying. Proving the
required mental state for intimidation of a witness is not an issue of whether the
defendant’s threats were clear, or whether the threats were received by the
victim in a timely fashion—the decisive question, rather, is whether the facts
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17 This court is free to affirm Vangjeli’s conviction on grounds other than those
discussed by the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592,
593 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2012).
18 In the twenty-four hours preceding Vangjeli’s preliminary hearing, K.O. was
aware of at least four posts on social media where Vanjgeli expressed his desire
for K.O.’s death in conjunction with her role as a witness. See N.T. Trial,
4/19/17, at 57–58.
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permit an inference of intent to intimidate. See Beasley, supra at 39; see
also Collington, supra at 770. Vangjeli’s statements, desirous of K.O.’s death,
in conjunction with his menacing online and in-person behavior throughout the
trial process, permit the inference that Vangjeli acted with a desire to instill fear,
so as to discourage K.O. from offering testimony.
Vangjeli also asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction
for criminal use of a communication facility because the Commonwealth failed
to prove that he used a communication facility to commit or attempt a crime
graded as a felony.
The Crimes Code defines criminal use of a communication facility as
follows:
§ 7512. Criminal use of communication facility
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the third degree
if that person uses a communication facility to commit, cause or
facilitate the commission or the attempt thereof of any crime which
constitutes a felony under this title or under the act of April 14, 1972
(P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device
and Cosmetic Act. Every instance where the communication facility
is utilized constitutes a separate offense under this section.
....
(c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term “communication
facility” means a public or private instrumentality used or useful in
the transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part, including,
but not limited to, telephone, wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photo-optical systems or the mail.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. 7512(a), (c). Under this section, therefore, the Commonwealth
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) Appellant [] knowingly and intentionally used a communication
facility; (2) Appellant [] knowingly, intentionally or recklessly
facilitated an underlying felony; and (3) the underlying felony
occurred. . . . Facilitation has been defined as any use of a
communication facility that makes easier the commission of the
underlying felony.
Commonwealth v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 382 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations omitted).
As discussed above, the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Vangjeli intentionally used the internet to voice his desire to see K.O.
dead before his preliminary hearing, and he used his cellular telephone to record
K.O. in a manner that made her feel threatened. Both are communication
facilities within the meaning of the statute. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(c). Vangjeli’s
use of these devices in a clearly threatening manner supports an inference that
he knowingly used the aforementioned communication facilities to intimidate a
witness, and we have concluded that such conduct was a felony under section
4952(a)(1). Vangjeli’s conviction for criminal use of a communication facility is,
therefore, supported by sufficient evidence.
Vangjeli asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions for terroristic threats under docket numbers 2651, 2655, and 2658
because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Vangjeli threatened, at any
point, to commit a crime of violence against K.O. Brief of Appellant, at 25–26.
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The Crimes Code defines terroristic threats, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2706. Terroristic threats
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of terroristic
threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a
threat to:
(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize
another
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth need not prove any
of the following: (1) communication of an express or specific threat,
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2016); (2)
direct communication of a threat, Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123,
127 (Pa. Super. 1995); (3) the ability to carry out a threat, Commonwealth v.
Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 1996); or (4) a belief by the person
threatened that the threat will be consummated, id. The Commonwealth must,
however, prove the following elements: 1) the defendant threatened a crime of
violence, id.; and 2) the threat was made with either the intent to terrorize, or
reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror. Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684
A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 1996). These elements are rooted in the need to
protect individuals from “the psychological distress that follows from an invasion
of another’s sense of personal security.” Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835
A.2d 720, 729 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Vangjeli’s terroristic threats conviction on docket number 2658 stems from
his actions on November 1, 2015, where he approached K.O. at a gas station,
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engaged in a verbal altercation, and lifted his shirt to expose a handgun. See
N.T. Trial, 4/21/17, at 84–85 (closing argument by Commonwealth stated, “it’s
terroristic threats and not attempted murder” because Vangjeli brandished
handgun intending to frighten K.O., not to kill her). Vangjeli argues the
November 1, 2015 incident fails to furnish a basis for terroristic threats, owing
to the absence of any evidence indicating he “said anything that could be
considered a threat.” Brief of Appellant, at 27 (emphasis added).
We find this argument unavailing. The record supports the trial court’s
finding19 that K.O “saw the black handle of a firearm in [Vangjeli’s] waistband. .
. . Therefore, it can be inferred that [Vangjeli] was attempting to intimidate [K.O]
with a firearm.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 15. On this basis, we find
the evidence supports an inference that Vangjeli threatened a crime of violence,
and that he made that threat with the intent to terrorize. See Tizer, supra.Exposing a gun to K.O., in the context of an unprompted argument,
indirectly communicated the threat that she would be shot. See in re Maloney,
636 A.2d 671, 676 (Pa. Super. 1994) (pointing gun at victim, while telling victim
to leave, suggested victim would be shot if he did not comply). Vangjeli’s
gesture—exposing a concealed gun to another individual immediately following
an argument—would naturally induce terror. His intent to terrorize, therefore,
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19 Discussed further, infra, in the context of Vangjeli’s convictions of carrying a
firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia.
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can be inferred from his actions. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 A.2d
1153, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“Intent . . . is a subjective element. . . . Generally
speaking, one is presumed to intend the normal consequences of one’s
actions.”). The Commonwealth, therefore, proved both elements required to
sustain Vangjeli’s conviction of terroristic threats under docket number 2658.
See Tizer, supra.Vangjeli’s terroristic threats conviction under docket number 2655 stems
from his actions on November 20, 2015, when Vangjeli encountered K.O at a
bar and tore her bag from her person, spat on her face, and menaced her with
a balled fist, before taking a swing at her and missing. N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at
114–17. K.O. described the encounter to the police as follows: “[Vangjeli said]
I wish I could hit you so bad with his fist balled up and [Vangjeli said] as a matter
of fact I can, and Vangjeli swung at [K.O.]” Id. at 117. Vangjeli argues that
this behavior lacks “anything . . . that could be construed as a threat.” Brief of
Appellant at 27. As previously discussed, clear physical manifestations of
violence sufficiently communicate a specific threat of violence. See Martinez,
supra; see also Kelly, supra. Viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, we find the court properly inferred Vangjeli
communicated a threat of violence with the intent to terrorize, or with reckless
disregard for the risk of terror that would result from threatening to throw a
punch at K.O. after spitting on her, and tearing her bag away.
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Vangjeli’s final conviction for terroristic threats on docket number 2651
stems from his conduct on November 25, 2015. The court stated Vangjeli
committed the crime of terroristic threats when “he stated that he had ‘nothing
to live for’ and that he would ‘knock out’ [K.O.] if she continued to look at him,”
finding this situation involved Vangjeli “directly threatening to strike [K.O.],
causing her fear.”20 Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 13–14.
Vangjeli avers the statements underpinning his conviction of terroristic
threats were made by Dan O’Connor, not Vangjeli himself, and highlights the
following testimony by K.O.:
Q. Do you know Dan O'Connor?
A. That’s his best friend.
Q. Do you know him?
A. Not personally, I know of him.
Q. Would you recognize him?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see him that night?
A. Yeah, outside.
Q. And you tell him to leave him alone and he tells you don’t look
at him or he’ll knock you out. And then you tell Detective Allen he
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20 The Rule 1925(a) Opinion addresses terroristic threats in the context of the
November 25, 2015 incident, but fails to mention Vangjeli’s other terroristic
threats convictions. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 13–14.
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has nothing to live for and nothing lose, and then he spits in your
face; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So for him to spit in your face you would have been pretty
close, wouldn't you?
A. Correct.
Q. And how come he got that close to you?
A. As we were inside in the basement of the bar there were easily
200 people there. I wasn’t sure where And[i] went after he walked
away from me, but when me and my friend went outside to the
food truck they had in the parking lot, I came in contact with
And[i] again sitting along the bar outside with his friends.
N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 120.
This testimony quoted above features vague pronouns which could lead
one to believe either that O’Connor or Vangejli made the threatening statements.
This Court is not bound by a trial court’s findings of fact which are flagrantly
contrary to the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Dunklin, 280 A.2d 629, 631
(Pa. Super. 1971) (discarding lower court’s finding of fact when interpretation of
appellee’s testimony went against “[t]he only conclusion which can be drawn
from [the] testimony”). However, short of the extraordinary, it is not the
position of this court to “reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment
for that of the fact finder.” Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 995, 1001 (Pa.
Super. 2011)
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While on direct examination, K.O. offered a clearer picture of the events
on November 25, 2015, when she stated
I proceeded to walk towards my car and the defendant and
[Vangjeli’s] friends continued to follow me. I had a cross body
bag, he ripped the bag off of me and broke it. For whatever was
going on at the bar at that time, they were already on their way.
So we stopped at the corner next to the corner store, we had
words. The defendant spit on me a few times, and then I
approached the cop, and asked him to do something and the cop
told me to just go home.
N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 35. The second statement provides a basis, in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, for inferring that Vangjeli alone made the
threatening statements to K.O. We, therefore, cannot find that Judge Wright’s
interpretation of the trial testimony was “flagrantly contrary to the evidence.”
Dunklin, supra, at 631. Vangjeli’s threat to knock K.O. out, made in close
proximity to ripping K.O.’s bag away and spitting on her, furnishes the necessary
basis for finding a threatened crime of violence and an intent to terrorize. See
Tizer, supra.Vangjeli argues that his convictions of carrying a firearm without a license
and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia rest on insufficient
evidence because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Vagnjeli was, in fact, carrying a genuine firearm as defined by the Uniform
Firearms Act.21 See Brief of Appellant, at 29.
____________________________________________
21 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101–6127.
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Possession of a firearm is an integral element of both carrying a firearm
without a license and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, which
are defined as follows:
§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license
(a) Offense defined.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who
carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a
firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place
of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully
issued license under this chapter commits a felony of the third
degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).
§ 6108. Carrying firearms on public streets or public property
in Philadelphia
No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon
the public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first
class unless:
(1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or
(2) such person is exempt from licensing under section
6106(b) of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried
without a license).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(1), (2).
Under both sections, the Commonwealth must establish that an individual
either had actual physical possession of a firearm, or had the power of control
over a firearm with the intent to exercise control. See Commonwealth v.
Carter, 450 A.2d 142, 146–47 (Pa. Super. 1982) (requiring, under section 6106,
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physical or constructive possession of firearm without license); see also
Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833–34 (Pa. 2009) (requiring,
under section 6108, possession of firearm without license in public in
Philadelphia). Possession may be shown entirely through circumstantial
evidence. Id. A witness’s assertion, if credible, is all that is needed to prove
possession of a firearm in violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, even in instances
where the police have not recovered a weapon. Commonwealth v. Robinson,
817 A.2d 1153, 1161–62 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[The victim] testified that all three
attackers possessed handguns. This is all that is necessary.”).
Both sections 6106 and 6108 prohibit individuals from possessing objects
that could be made to fire a shot. See Commonwealth v. Gainer, 7 A.3d 291,
299 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating correct question under current statutory
framework as “whether [a] pistol could be made to shoot a bullet”). Though the
statutory definition of a firearm has changed since our Supreme Court decided
Commonwealth v. Layton, 307 A.2d 843 (Pa. 1973), Layton and its progeny
still require the Commonwealth to present evidence of whether a pistol is
“capable of being converted into an object that could fire a shot.” Gainer,
supra, at 299. “A reasonable fact finder may, of course, infer operability from
an object which looks like, feels like, sounds like or is like, a firearm. Such an
inference would be reasonable without direct proof of operability.”
Commonwealth v. Layton, 307 A.2d 843, 844 (Pa. 1973) (emphasis added).
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At trial, Vangjeli contested whether the Commonwealth presented
evidence of an operable firearm. See e.g. N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 111
(questioning whether K.O. could tell difference between BB guns, water pistols,
or real firearms). K.O. asserted she knew it was a real handgun from the black
handle she saw in Vangjeli’s waistband. Id. at 112. Acting as the finder of fact,
the court credited K.O.’s testimony, specifically highlighting her description of
Vangjeli displaying “the firearm in a prominent way.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion
4/13/18, at 15–16. The court further found Vangjeli knew of and had access to
his brother’s handgun. Id. at 16. In light of the facts and relevant law, the
Commonwealth furnished a proper basis for inferring Vangjeli had access to a
firearm and possessed that firearm on a public street in Philadelphia. See
Robinson, supra at 844 (allowing testimony alone to serve as basis for finding
possession of firearm).
As the record further indicates Vangjeli lacked a valid license to possess a
firearm, N.T. Trial 4/21/17, at 4, and the incident occurred in public in the city
and county of Philadelphia, id., at 26, we find the Commonwealth provided a
sufficient basis for Vangjeli’s convictions under both sections 6106 and 6108.
Vangjeli argues that his conviction for REAP rests on insufficient evidence
because the Commonwealth failed to prove Vangjeli intentionally placed K.O. in
danger of death or serious bodily injury.
The Crimes Code defines REAP as follows:
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§ 2705. Recklessly endangering another person
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. REAP is distinguished from the firearms charges discussed
supra by the added requirement that the Commonwealth demonstrate the victim
was in actual danger. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 91, 915–16 (Pa.
Super. 2000). To sustain a conviction under this section,
[T]he Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had an actual
present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to
do so. Danger, not merely the apprehension of danger, must be
created. The mens rea for REAP is a conscious disregard of a known
risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.
Id. (citation omitted). When the charge of REAP involves a firearm, the
Commonwealth can prove the ability to inflict harm by showing either “that the
gun was loaded or the surrounding circumstances were inherently dangerous.”
Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 A.2d 709, 711 (Pa. Super. 1981); compare
Commonwealth v. Gouse, 429 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1981) (“the
pointing of an unloaded weapon, without more, does not constitute recklessly
endangering”), with Commonwealth v. Rivera, 503 A.2d 11, 12–13 (Pa.
Super. 1985) (en banc) (finding evidence sufficient for inference of ability to
inflict death or serious bodily injury without proof gun was loaded when
defendant tied victim up in her own home at gunpoint and demanded
combination to safe).
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The trial court found Vangeli’s act of raising his shirt and exposing the gun
in his waistband to K.O. was “in and of itself” enough to sustain a conviction for
REAP as “a firearm is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, and the
firearm was located where [Vangjeli] could easily access it." Rule 1925(a)
Opinion, 4/13/18, at 18. This conclusion is not borne out by the case law; the
Commonwealth must prove an actual present ability to inflict harm, not merely
the apparent ability to do so. Hopkins, supra. There is no evidence Vangjeli’s
gun was loaded, or that brandishing a gun without pointing it at K.O., in the
absence of clear, verbal threats, created a set of circumstances that would allow
this Court to infer Vangjeli possessed the ability to inflict death or serious bodily
injury. Consequently, the Commonwealth failed to prove that Vangjeli had the
“actual present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to do
so.” In re Maloney, 636 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 1994). We, therefore,
vacate Vangjeli’s judgment of sentence for REAP on docket number 2658.
Next, Vangjeli claims that the verdict on the firearms charges is against
the weight of the evidence22 because “the testimony regarding what the
complainant observed in appellant’s waistband was a firearm as defined in the
Uniform Firearms Act was inconsistent, contradictory, and convoluted given that
____________________________________________
Vangjeli preserved his weight claim by including it in his timely post-sentence
22
motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607.
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K.O. candidly admitted that she was not familiar with firearms and that what she
saw in his waistband could have been a BB gun.” Brief of Appellant, at 44.
When a defendant challenges the weight of the evidence, relief in the form
of a new trial may be granted only where the verdict shocks one’s sense of
justice. This Court reviews the trial court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on the
weight claim, not the underlying question of whether the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408
(Pa. 2003). It is not our role, as a reviewing court, to reweigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
902 A.2d 430, 449 (Pa. 2006).
As discussed supra, the evidence was sufficient to support Vangjeli’s
convictions. Moreover, the trial court, acting as the finder of fact, found credible
K.O.’s sworn testimony stating she saw the black handle of a firearm in the
waistband of Vangjeli’s pants. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 2. This
testimony, alongside evidence of Vangjeli’s access to his brother’s firearm,
provided the trial court’s basis for convicting Vangjeli under Sections 6106 and
6108. Simply put, the trial court was free to evaluate those statements and
“believe all, part of none of . . . [the] testimony.” Mitchell, supra at 902. It is
not our role, as a reviewing court, to reweigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, we find this
claim meritless.
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“If our disposition upsets the overall sentencing scheme of the trial court,
we must remand so that the court can restructure its sentence plan.”
Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted). “By contrast, if our decision does not alter the overall scheme, there
is no need for a remand.” Id. (finding no need to remand because vacating
DUI conviction did not disturb sentencing scheme where DUI sentence was
concurrent with other terms and did not increase aggregate length of
incarceration).
Here, the trial court imposed a term of probation for REAP to be served
consecutively to Vangjeli’s term of incarceration, and concurrently to the
remaining sentences of probation. Vacating the REAP conviction and its
attendant sentence does not affect the length of Vanjeli’s aggregate term of
imprisonment or the overall sentencing scheme. Hence, we conclude it is
unnecessary to remand the matter for resentencing.
Judgment of sentence vacated with respect to Vangjeli’s REAP conviction
and affirmed on all other counts.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/28/19
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