Com. v. Kompa, B.

J-S53013-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
BRADLEY KOMPA, :
:
Appellee : No. 1912 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Order entered November 1, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Washington County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-63-CR-0000898-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2014
In this appeal, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the
order of court granting the writ of habeas corpus filed by Appellee, Bradley
Kompa (“Kompa”). Following our review, we affirm.
In February 2013, Kompa was charged with making a false statement
in connection with the purchase of a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6111(g)(4)(ii). Following the preliminary hearing, the local magistrate
held the charge for trial. Kompa subsequently filed a writ for habeas corpus
and, following a hearing, the trial court granted the writ. The
Commonwealth sought reconsideration of this ruling, which the trial court
ultimately denied.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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This timely appeal follows, in which the Commonwealth asks only
whether the trial court erred in granting Kompa’s writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a
habeas corpus petition, we will not reverse the trial
court's decision absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Kohlie, [] 811 A.2d
1010[, 1013] [Pa. Super. 2002]. In order to
constitute an abuse of discretion, the record must
disclose that the trial court exercised manifestly
unreasonable judgment or based its decision on ill
will, bias or prejudice. Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Commonwealth v. Carbo, 822 A.2d 60, 63 (Pa. Super. 2003).
The purpose of a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the
finding from the preliminary hearing that the Commonwealth has prima facie
evidence that the accused has committed the crime of which he has been
accused. Carbo, 822 A.2d at 67. We have previously described the
Commonwealth’s burden in this regard as follows:
The Commonwealth's burden at a preliminary
hearing is to establish at least prima facie that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is
the one who committed it. This means that at a
preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth must show
the presence of every element necessary to
constitute each offense charged and the defendant's
complicity in each offense. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not required, nor is the criterion
to show that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
possible if the matter is returned for trial. However,
proof, which would justify a trial judge submitting
the case to the jury at the trial of the case, is
required. Inferences reasonably drawn from the
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evidence of record which would support a verdict of
guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must
be read in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth's case. Prosecutorial suspicion and
conjecture are not evidence and are unacceptable as
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Owen, 580 A.2d 412, 414 (Pa. Super. 1990).
The crime with which Kompa was charged provides that,
[a]ny person, purchaser or transferee commits a
felony of the third degree if, in connection with the
purchase, delivery or transfer of a firearm under this
chapter, he knowingly and intentionally … makes any
materially false written statement, including a
statement on any form promulgated by Federal or
State agencies[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111(g)(4)(ii).
The Commonwealth claims that Kompa made a false statement when
he answered the following question, which was contained on a form he was
required to fill out to purchase the gun: “Are you an unlawful user of or
addicted to marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, narcotic drug or any
other controlled substance?” The trial court granted Kompa’s writ upon
finding that “the Commonwealth offered no evidence that [Kompa] was
addicted to drugs or an unlawful user of drugs at the time of the purchase.”
Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/14, at 5. 1 Following our review of the record, we
agree.
1
In the trial court, there was debate about whether the salient question on
Form 4473 is intended to elicit whether the applicant is under the influence
of a controlled substance at the time he or she fills out the form, or habitual
drug use. See N.T., 4/8/13, at 8-10, 25; N.T., 8/16/13, at 3. The
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At the preliminary hearing, the only evidence offered was a federal
form (“Form 4473”) that Kompa filled out in connection with the purchase of
the handgun and the testimony of Detective Joseph Bielevicz. The evidence
of record, when considered in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, reveals the following. On July 26, 2010, Kompa purchased
a handgun at Pfronger’s Firearms in Washington County. In connection with
the purchase of the firearm, Kompa filled out the requisite state and federal
paperwork, including the Form 4473. Form 4473 contained the question,
“Are you an unlawful user of or addicted to marijuana or any depressant,
stimulant, narcotic drug or any other controlled substance?” Kompa
answered “no” to this question. In 2011, the handgun was recovered in
connection with a crime committed in Allegheny County. N.T., 4/8/13, at 4.
In the course of investigating the crime, Detective Bielevicz discovered that
Kompa was the registered owner of the firearm. N.T., 4/8/13, at 4. In
January 2012, he spoke with Kompa, who was living in Florida, by
telephone. Id. at 5, 12.2 Detective Bielevicz testified that during their
conversation, Kompa acknowledged buying the handgun and recalled filling
out the requisite paperwork. Id. at 6. The Detective further testified that
Commonwealth maintains that the question is intended to inquire about
regular drug use. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. However, as discussed
infra, we find that there was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
showing under either interpretation.
2
Detective Bielevicz did not record this call or make notes about their
conversation. N.T., 4/8/13, at 14-15.
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when he asked Kompa about his use of illegal drugs, Kompa stated that he
had been a “near constant” user of various substances since high school,
and that for a period of a year and a half, he loaned his car to various people
in exchange for heroin. Id. at 11-12.3 Detective Bielevicz asked Kompa if
he was using heroin when he bought the gun, and Kompa responded that he
“thought he was clean at the time[.]” Id. at 11. The Detective read the
question at issue from the form to Kompa and asked if he remembered how
he answered it; Kompa replied that he did not. Id. The parties stipulated
that if called, the owner of Pfronger’s would testify that “had [Kompa] been
under the influence of anything at that particular point, he would not have
sold him the firearm.” N.T., 10/25/13, at 4.
We find no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s conclusion that
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this
evidence does not establish that Kompa answered the question, “Are you an
unlawful user of or addicted to marijuana or any depressant, stimulant,
narcotic drug or any other controlled substance” falsely. Kompa admitted
that he was a “near constant” user of drugs for many years, but also stated
that he was not using drugs when he purchased the gun. “Near constant” is
not the same as “constant;” it means that there were periods of time during
which he was not using drugs. The man who sold Kompa the gun testified
that he would not have done so if Kompa appeared to be under the
3
The record does not specify when this year and a half period occurred.
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influence. Thus, the Commonwealth has not put forth any evidence that
Kompa was an addict or in a period of drug use at the time he bought the
gun, nor that he was under the influence of a controlled substance when he
filled out Form 4473. Plainly, there is no evidence from which an inference
that Kompa was an addict or using drugs at the time he filled out the Form
4473 could be drawn. Such a conclusion would be pure conjecture, and that
is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Owen, 580 A.2d at 414.
Order affirmed.
Platt, J. joins the Memorandum.
Olson, J. files a Dissenting Memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/19/2014
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