Hayes, R. v. Kutty, A.

J-A13034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RICHARD C. HAYES AND MALKO E. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
KARKENNY PENNSYLVANIA
v.
AHMED C.K. KUTTY
Appellant No. 1916 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order May 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015-002485
BEFORE: LAZARUS, OTT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2017
Appellant, Ahmed C.K. Kutty, appeals from the order entered in the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granting the petition to enforce a
settlement argument filed by Appellees, Richard C. Hayes and Malko E.
Karkenny. Appellant contends the settlement agreement was unenforceable
due to the conditional nature of the agreement and due to the application of
the statute of frauds. We affirm.
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court’s
opinions. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/16, at 1-4; Trial Ct. Op., 8/22/16, at 1-4.
In this timely appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
I. The [trial] court erred in finding the oral agreement
between the parties enforceable when the proposed
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A13034-17
agreement was conditioned upon and subject to
Appellant’s review with his tax professional/accountant
II. The [trial] court erred in failing to apply the statute of
frauds to the transfer of real estate held as real property
outside the joint venture as tenants in common
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the oral settlement agreement
that the parties entered into on the record, which was transcribed by a court
reporter, was not enforceable because the parties did not intend to be bound
by the agreement until each had the opportunity to consult with their tax
professionals or accountants. Appellant contends that this condition was
agreed to via a conversation held “off the record.”
Appellant, in his second issue, avers that the settlement agreement is
unenforceable due to the application of the statute of frauds. Appellant
argues that because the agreement was not in writing, and involved the
transfer of real property, the settlement agreement cannot be enforced.
Appellant’s issues merit no relief.
Our standard and scope of review is well settled:
The enforceability of settlement agreements is determined
according to principles of contract law. Because contract
interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound
by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of review
over questions of law is de novo and to the extent
necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as [the
appellate] court may review the entire record in making its
decision. . . . With respect to factual conclusions, we may
reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are
predicated on an error of law or unsupported by competent
evidence in the record.
-2-
J-A13034-17
Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 517-18 (Pa. Super.
2009) (citations omitted).
Further, it is beyond cavil that “[w]here a settlement agreement
contains all of the requisites for a valid contract, a court must enforce the
terms of the agreement.” Id. at 518. “This is true even if the terms of the
agreement are not yet formalized in writing.” Id.Regarding the statute of frauds, we note:
The statute of frauds directs that agreements for the
sale of real estate shall not be enforced unless they are in
writing and signed by the seller. The purpose of the
statute is to prevent perjury and fraudulent claims. The
[s]tatute of frauds does not void those oral contracts
relating to land which fail to comply with the [s]tatute’s
formal requirements. It is to be used as a shield and not
as a sword, as it was designed to prevent frauds, not to
encourage them.
Empire Properties, Inc. v. Equireal, 674 A.2d 297, 302 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Moreover, it is well settled that
“[t]he statute of frauds was intended to prevent fraud; it cannot be used as
a vehicle to avoid agreements entered in open court.” Aetna
Electroplating Co., Inc. V. Jenkins, 484 A.2d 134, 136 (Pa. Super. 1984)
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable G. Michael
Green, we conclude the trial court’s opinions comprehensively discuss and
properly dispose of the issues presented. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/16, at 4-6;
Trial Ct. Op., 8/22/16, at 5-10 (finding that (1) the settlement agreement
-3-
J-A13034-17
constituted an enforceable contract and any further correspondence
thereafter was only intended to memorialize the contract and (2) the statute
of frauds did not preclude enforcement of the settlement agreement where
the agreement was transcribed, on the record, by a court reporter, thereby
establishing clear proof of an offer, acceptance, and consideration 1).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/28/2017
1
Due to our conclusion that the trial court properly determined that the
statute of frauds was not applicable under the specific circumstances of this
case, we need not address the contention that Appellant’s real property
interest was not transferred via the settlement agreement but instead by the
terms of the joint venture agreement already in place between the parties.
-4-
Circulated 07/14/2017 12:16 PM
Circulated 07/14/2017 12:16 PM