Com. v. Wiggins, D.

J-S48018-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DEREK J. WIGGINS
Appellant No. 1759 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 7, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0003921-2012
BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2017
Appellant, Derek J. Wiggins, appeals from the October 7, 2016 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (“PCRA court”)
dismissing his petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of the
matter as follows.
Jennifer Fisher and William Cornelius met and began
dating in 2003, and in May of 2005, while both were still
teenagers, Jennifer gave birth to a daughter, H.F. Eventually,
Jennifer and William broke up and a custody agreement was put
in place.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In December of 2006, Jennifer started to date [Appellant].
Jennifer and [Appellant] married in March of 2007, and in 2009,
Jennifer gave birth to a second daughter, [E.W.] That same
year, William married, enlisted in the Army, and relocated to
Kansas. In June of 2010, Jennifer and [Appellant] purchased a
home located at 303 Banyan Circle in Lancaster. Given the
distance between their residences, Jennifer and William agreed
that H.F. would live with her mother during the school year and
spend summers with William and his wife Brandy.
In July of 2011, H.F., then six years old, traveled to
Kansas to visit William while he was on block leave from the
military. At the end of her stay, William, Brandy, and H.F. drove
back from Kansas to visit William’s mother, Michelle Windle, in
Thomasville, Pennsylvania. The family planned to stay with
Michelle for a week, then travel to Virginia to see Brandy’s
mother.
While the family was staying at Michelle’s home, H.F.
disclosed to Brandy that [Appellant], whom she referred to as
“Daddy Derek,” had been sexually abusing her. Specifically, H.F.
told Brandy that [Appellant] liked it when she put her mouth on
his penis. Shocked, Brandy asked H.F. to repeat her statements
to William. H.F. told her father that [Appellant] sexually
assaulted her in her bedroom and in the bathroom of their
home. Additionally, H.F. revealed that [Appellant] would “pee
white stuff” into toilet paper during the encounters, and that
[Appellant] put his mouth on her vagina.
After H.F. finished disclosing the abuse to her father,
William instructed Brandy to take her to talk to Michelle, who
was next door at a friend’s home preparing dinner for the family.
When confronted by Michelle, H.F. revealed, once again, that
[Appellant] made her suck on his penis. William discussed H.F.’s
statements with his mother, then contacted Jennifer and York
County Children and Youth Services (“YCCYS”).
The following day, YCCYS and the Northern Regional Police
Department responded to Michelle’s home to speak with the
family. On July 25, 2011, Detective Tricia Mazur of the Manor
Township Police received a report from YCCYS assigning her to
H.F.’s case. In order to clarify the extent of the abuse, Detective
Mazur scheduled a forensic interview for H.F. at the Lancaster
County Children’s Alliance on July 27, 2011.
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During her interview, and in subsequent testimony and
statements, H.F. revealed the details of the sexual abuse she
had endured. H.F. stated that one night, after her family moved
into the house at 303 Banyan Street, she attempted to use the
bathroom and found that [Appellant] was inside. [Appellant]
invited her to join him in the bathroom, and when she went in,
H.F. observed that he was looking at something on the
computer. [Appellant] put his computer aside and asked H.F. to
touch his penis. Although she initially resisted, H.F. complied
when [Appellant] threatened to tell Jennifer about the encounter.
[Appellant] instructed H.F. to move her hands, and eventually
her mouth, up and down over his penis. After this initial
incident, H.F. revealed that [Appellant] made her touch his penis
on numerous occasions.
Eventually, [Appellant’s] conduct escalated to include
vaginal penetration. H.F. disclosed that one evening, while her
mother was at work, [Appellant] gave her a bath. Afterwards,
[Appellant] told H.F. to go to her room to dry off. While H.F.
was still undressed, [Appellant] entered her room and told her to
lean down over the bed. [Appellant] then inserted his penis into
her vagina. [Appellant] promised H.F. that he would stop
abusing her after a family beach trip in the summer of 2011, and
asked her to remind him of his promise.
Following H.F.’s forensic interview, on August 5, 2011,
Julie Stover, a nurse practitioner and expert in child sexual
abuse, performed a physical examination of H.F. at the
Children’s Alliance. While the results of H.F.’s examination were
normal, Ms. Stover cautioned that the mucosal tissue lining the
vagina and rectum typically heals within seventy-two hours of
injury, and that visible scarring can only be observed in 5% of
cases.
As a result of H.F.’s statements, on May 17, 2012,
Detective Mazur charged [Appellant] with one count each of rape
of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child,
indecent assault, corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with
a minor. Following a three-day jury trial[1] on November 1,
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1 At trial Appellant was represented by Ronald L. Greenblatt, Esquire, and
Patricia V. Pierce, Esquire.
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2013, [Appellant] was convicted of all charges and a pre-
sentence investigation was ordered. On February 10, 2014,
[Appellant] was sentenced to a total aggregate of 10-20 years’
incarceration.
On March 7, 2014, [Appellant] filed a timely notice of
appeal to the Superior Court, and on March 28, 2014,
[Appellant] submitted his concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal. In his statement, [Appellant] claimed that [the
trial court] issued improper rulings on numerous evidentiary
issues that arose during trial, and that the [trial] court provided
the jury with incomplete instructions. The Superior Court
affirmed [Appellant’s] conviction and remanded to [the trial
court] for resentencing based on the Superior Court’s ruling in
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa. Super. 2014).
[The trial court] subsequently resentenced [Appellant] to 10-20
years’ incarceration in accordance with that opinion.
[Appellant] filed the instant PCRA petition almost one year
later. On July 11, 2016, [the trial court] issued a notice
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and [Appellant] filed an amended
motion. After a conference with counsel and consideration of the
amended motion, [the PCRA court] entered an order dismissing
the amended motion and advising [Appellant] of his rights to
appeal. After receiving [Appellant’s] notice, [the PCRA court]
issued a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925 order, [Appellant] filed a timely
statement of errors, and the Commonwealth filed a timely
response.
PCRA Court Opinion, 12/19/16, at 1-6 (internal citations and footnotes
omitted) (some capitalization omitted). The PCRA court issued a 1925(a)
opinion on December 19, 2016.
Appellant raises four issues for our review, which we repeat verbatim.
[I.] Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
amended PCRA when trial counsel failed to properly
preserve for appellate review the claim that the court erred
by failing to instruct the jury consistent with standard
criminal jury instruction 4.08(A)?
[II.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective when [they] failed to
raise the issue of the admissibility of the circumstances
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surrounding [Appellant’s] discharge from the Marines prior
to his direct testimony which resulted in the
Commonwealth introducing unfairly prejudicial
impeachment during cross examination?
[III.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective when [they] failed to
argue in the lower court and during the direct appeal that
the court’s failure to permit evidence of David S. Cornelius,
Sr.’s guilty plea to various offenses including three counts
of indecent assault of his granddaughters resulted in the
denial of [Appellant’s] right to due process and
confrontation under the Fifth, Sixth[,] and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution?
[IV.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective when they failed to
ask the victim H.F. if any adult other than the police had
spoken to her after the charges had been filed and when
they failed to cross examine her concerning the viewing of
an adult video?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).
Our scope of review in a PCRA appeal is well established.
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.
This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if
the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted). All of Appellant’s assertions of error on appeal are allegations of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. “It is well-established that counsel is
presumed effective, and a [PCRA petitioner] bears the burden of proving
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ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775,
779-80 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ligons,
971 A.2d 1125, 1137 (Pa. 2009) (additional citations omitted)).
“To prevail on an [ineffectiveness] claim, a PCRA petitioner must plead
and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the underlying legal
claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for acting or
failing to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered resulting prejudice.” Reyes-
Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 780 (citations omitted). Furthermore, in order to
prevail the petitioner must prove all three prongs of the Pierce test or the
claim fails. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa.
1987)).
Appellant’s first allegation of trial counsel ineffectiveness is counsel’s
failure to object to the trial court’s jury instructions, specifically failing to
instruct the jury consistent with standard jury instruction 4.08A, thus failing
to preserve the issue for appellate review. While Appellant is correct that
trial counsel failed to preserve this issue for direct appellate review,
Appellant’s PCRA claim fails as the underlying claim lacks merit.
Standard Jury Instructions themselves are not binding and do
not alter the discretion afforded trial courts in crafting jury
instructions; rather, as their title suggests, the instructions are
guides only. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 620 Pa. 60, 66
A.3d 253, 274-75 (2013) (citations omitted). Furthermore,
counsel is not deemed ineffective for failing to object to a jury
instruction given by the court where the instruction itself is
justifiable or not otherwise improper. See Commonwealth v.
Rainey, 593 Pa. 67, 928 A.2d 215, 243 (2007).
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Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014). On direct
appeal, we review a trial court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion
or an inaccurate statement of law. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d
736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Standard Jury Instruction 4.08A regarding impeachment or
substantive evidence-inconsistent statement reads as follows.
1. You have heard evidence that a witness, [name of
witness], made a statement on an earlier occasion that
was inconsistent with [his] [her] present testimony.
[First Alternative]
2. You may, if you choose, regard this evidence as proof of
the truth of anything that the witness said in the earlier
statement. You may also consider this evidence to help
you judge the credibility and weight of the testimony given
by the witness at this trial.
[Second Alternative]
2. You may consider this evidence for one purpose only, to
help you judge the credibility and weight of the testimony
given by the witness at this trial. You may not regard
evidence of an earlier inconsistent statement as proof of
the truth of anything said in that statement.
3. When you judge the credibility and weight of testimony,
you are deciding whether you believe the testimony and
how important you think it is.]
Pa. SSJI (Crim) § 4.08A (2016).2
In the matter sub judice the trial court issued the following instruction.
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2 Appellant requested the first alternative instruction.
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Throughout your lifetime, you’ve been deciding whether
someone who speaks to you is telling you something which is
truthful and straightforward, something upon which you can rely
upon in your own affairs. Use the experience that you’ve gained
in your everyday life as well as your own good common sense
when you go into the jury room to deliberate and in determining
the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony.
As the sole judges of the facts, you must decide the
truthfulness and accuracy of each witness’ testimony and decide
whether to believe all or part or none of that testimony. The
following are some examples of factors which you may try and
consider when judging the credibility and deciding whether or
not to believe the testimony. Was the witness able to see, hear,
or know the things about which they testified? How well could
the witness remember and describe the things about which they
testified? Was the ability of the witness to see, hear, know,
remember or describe affected by youth or old age or by any
physical, mental or intellectual deficiency or impairment? Did
the witness testify in a convincing manner? Did the witness
have any interest in the outcome of the case, or any bias,
prejudice or other motive that might affect the witness’
testimony? How well does the testimony of the witness square
with the other evidence in the case, including the testimony of
the other witnesses?
While you’re judging the credibility of each witness, you’re
likely to be judging the credibility of the other witnesses and
evidence. If there’s a real irreconcilable conflict, it is up to you
to decide which, if any, conflicting testimony or evidence to
believe. As the sole judges of credibility and facts, you, the jury,
are responsible to give the testimony of every witness and all
the other evidence whatever credibility and weight you think it
deserves.
N.T. Jury Trial, 11/1/13, at 647-48. Moreover, the trial court added the
following instruction shortly thereafter.
You may also take into consideration the interest, if any,
which a witness may have had in the outcome of the case. It
does not necessarily follow that because a person has a direct
interest in what the verdict might be, that that person will
willfully falsify any part of their testimony. Nevertheless, if an
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interested party takes the stand and testifies, that interest, if
any is a factor for you to take into consideration, along with all
the other circumstances, in determining what weight you should
place upon the testimony.
Where there is a conflict in testimony, you, the jury, have
the duty of deciding which testimony to believe, but you should
first try to reconcile, that is, fit together, any conflicts in the
testimony if it can be done fairly and accurately. Discrepancies
and conflicts between the testimony of different witnesses may
or may not cause you to disbelieve some or all of their
testimony. Remember, two or more persons witnessing an
incident may see or hear it happen differently. Also, it’s not
uncommon for a witness to be innocently mistaken in his or her
recollection of how something happened. If you cannot reconcile
a conflict in the testimony, it is up for you to decide which
testimony, if any, to believe and which to reject as untrue or
inaccurate.
In making the decision to consider whether the conflict – in
making this decision, consider whether the conflict involves a
matter of importance or merely some detail, and whether the
conflict is brought about by an innocent mistake or intentional
falsehood. You should also keep in mind all the other factors
which I’ve already discussed with you in deciding whether or not
to believe a witness.
If you conclude that a witness deliberately testified falsely
about a manner which could affect the outcome of the trial, then
you may, if you wish, for that reason alone, choose to disbelieve
the rest of the witness’ testimony; however, you’re not required
to do so for this reason. It is entirely possible that the witness
testified falsely and intentionally in one respect but truthfully
about anything else. If that is the situation, then you may
accept that part of the witness’ testimony which is truthful and
which you believe, and you may reject that part which is false
and not worthy of belief.
Id. at 651-52.
As discussed above, a trial court has broad discretion in crafting jury
instructions. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 754. Moreover, “[i]n reviewing a
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challenged jury instruction, an appellate court must consider the entire
charge as a whole, not merely isolated fragments, to ascertain whether the
instruction fairly conveys the legal principles at issue.” Commonwealth v.
King, 721 A.2d 763, 779 (Pa. 1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 683
A.2d 1181, 1196 (Pa. 1996)). Upon review of the jury instructions issued in
the matter sub judice, it is clear that the trial court properly instructed the
jury regarding the law; thus, the trial court did not commit an abuse of
discretion. As the underlying claim lacks merit, trial counsel did not provide
ineffective assistance of counsel when they failed to object to the jury
instructions. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 648 A.2d 563 (Pa. Super.
1994) (“Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to assert a
baseless claim.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Cook, 557 A.2d 421, 425 (Pa.
Super. 1989)). Appellant’s first claim fails.
Appellant’s second claim alleges trial counsel was ineffective when
they introduced evidence of Appellant’s honorable military discharge, which
opened the door to questions regarding the conditions of his discharge.3
Appellant asserts that this is tantamount to trial counsel who introduced a
defendant’s otherwise inadmissible criminal convictions, and thus constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 23; see
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3 Appellant was honorably discharged from the military; however, his
discharge contained conditions that dropped him a paygrade and that he
was not permitted to reenlist.
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Commonwealth v. Moore, 715 A.2d 448, 452 (Pa. Super. 1998).
Appellant argues that trial counsel should have filed a motion in limine to
determine whether the trial court would permit testimony regarding the
honorable discharge and its conditions prior to asking Appellant about such
discharge.
On appeal, a petitioner must adequately discuss all three factors of the
‘Pierce test,’ including prejudice. Reyes-Rodriguez, supra. Appellant’s
claim was not waived, it lacks merit. Trial counsel raised the issue prior to
introducing the testimony during the trial. See N.T Jury Trial, 10/29/13, at
35-37. After raising the issue, the court deferred an evidentiary ruling.4
When the Commonwealth attempted to rebut the testimony, trial counsel
again objected. See N.T Jury Trial, 10/31/13, at 542-43.5 “To demonstrate
prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is ‘a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error or omission, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’” Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 887
(Pa. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d 1067, 1084 (Pa.
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4 The trial court stated that “I’m going to have to see how that plays out
then, see what the exact testimony is.” N.T. Jury Trial, 10/29/13, at 37.
5 Moreover, it appears that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for
introducing the evidence because it introduced evidence that Appellant was
honorably discharged from military service. The introduction of evidence
that there were conditions on his honorable discharge could only soften the
net positive impact of this character evidence.
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2006), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Jones, 951 A.2d
294 (Pa. 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984))). The possible prejudice in the matter is that the jury learned that
Appellant’s honorable discharge included conditions that otherwise might not
be included in a standard honorable discharge. In light of the overwhelming
evidence in this matter, namely five days of testimony, there is no
reasonable probability that discovering Appellant’s honorable discharge had
conditions, regarding reenlistment, would have changed the result of the
proceeding. Appellant’s claim fails.
Next, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because they
failed to raise a constitutional argument for the introduction of David
Cornelius, Sr.’s,6 guilty pleas, without convictions,7 to three counts of
indecent assault involving a granddaughter. Trial counsel previously raised
the issue of admissibility of such evidence at trial and on direct appeal;
however, the claim lacked merit. See Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 440
MDA 2014, unpublished memorandum at 6 (Pa. Super. filed June 9, 2015).
For purposes of obtaining PCRA relief, an issue must not have been
previously litigated. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). An issue is previously
litigated if “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had
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6 David Cornelius, Sr., was the great-grandfather of the victim.
7 David Cornelius, Sr., died before sentencing, thus the charges were nolle
prossed.
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review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue[.]” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). Moreover, “an ‘appellant cannot obtain post-
conviction review of claims previously litigated on appeal by challenging
ineffective assistance of prior counsel and presenting new theories of relief
to support previously litigated claims.’” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855
A.2d 682, 697 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Beasley, 678 A.2d
773, 778 (Pa. 1996)).
The relevant inquiry when determining whether a PCRA
petitioner is properly asserting a new and distinct issue, rather
than simply re-labeling and reasserting a previously litigated
one, is whether the ineffectiveness claim constitutes a “discrete
legal ground or merely an alternative theory in support of the
same underlying issue that was raised on direct appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 943 A.d 940, 944-45 (Pa. 2008) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 570 (Pa. 2005)). It is apparent
that Appellant is attempting to reassert a previously litigated claim, that the
evidence of David Cornelius, Sr., should have been admitted into evidence.
Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief under the PCRA as it was previously
litigated. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2).
Lastly, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately cross-examine the victim. Counsel’s brief is bereft of discussion
regarding any prejudice or reasonable basis of counsel’s decision regarding
the cross-examination of the victim; thus, Appellant’s claim is waived. See
Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 780 (“[O]n appeal, a petitioner must
adequately discuss all three factors of the “Pierce test,” or the appellate
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court will reject the claim”). Even if the claim was not waived it lacks merit.
Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to cross-examine the victim
regarding an adult video she viewed while living in North Carolina.
Appellant’s trial counsel questioned the victim extensively regarding adult
videos. See N.T. Jury Trial, 10/29/13, at 135-37, 141-44. Thus, this claim
is without merit.
Finally, Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to cross-examine the
victim regarding what she told adults other than police officers. This claim is
meritless as counsel repeatedly asked the victim about what she told others.
See N.T. Jury Trial 10/29/13, at 122-24, 129, 146-47, 149, 151-57, 159,
163. Thus, Appellant’s claim is meritless.
All of Appellant’s claims are either waived, meritless, or both. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/16/2017
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