Brittain v. Hope Enterprises Foundation Inc.

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2017 PA Super 148PATRICIA BRITTAIN A.K.A., PATRICIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MAINES, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE OF BARBARA ANN MAINES
Appellant
v.
HOPE ENTERPRISES FOUNDATION
INCORPORATED, AND/OR HOPE
ENTERPRISE INC., AND/OR WILLIAM
BIRT, AND/OR HEATHER PETERS
AND/OR SELECTIVE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA
Appellees No. 875 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order April 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division at No: 10467-CV-2010
PATRICIA BRITTAIN A.K.A., PATRICIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MAINES, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE OF BARBARA ANN MAINES
Appellant
v.
HOPE ENTERPRISES FOUNDATION
INCORPORATED, AND/OR HOPE
ENTERPRISE INC., AND/OR WILLIAM
BIRT, AND/OR HEATHER PETERS
AND/OR SELECTIVE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA
Appellees No. 950 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
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Civil Division at No: 10467-CV-2010
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
OPINION BY STABILE, J. FILED MAY 17, 2017
In these consolidated appeals, Patricia Brittain, a.k.a. Patricia Maines
(“Brittain” or “Appellant”), as Administrator of the Estate of Barbara Ann
Maines, appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne
County entered April 21, 2015, finding that Brittain was not entitled to a new
trial limited to a determination of punitive damages,1 and from the judgment
entered on April 30, 2015. Brittain argues that the trial court erred in failing
to hold a new trial limited to the award of punitive damages assessed
against Appellee, Hope Enterprises Incorporated (“Hope”), and in failing to
calculate and include post-judgment interest for compensatory damages
from the date of the jury’s verdict. Appellees, Hope and William Birt
(“Birt”), did not file cross-appeals. However, on July 27, 2015, they filed an
“Emergency Application to Remand to the Trial Court for Hearing on Newly-
Discovered Evidence Regarding Possible Fraud on the Court with Regard to
Plaintiff’s Wrongful Death Claim” (“Emergency Application”). After careful
review, we remand for the trial court to decide the issues raised in the
Emergency Application.
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Brittain’s appeal from the April 21 order is an interlocutory appeal by
permission. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 1311(b).
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By way of background, on October 15, 2012, a jury returned a verdict
in this wrongful death and survival action2 stemming from the death of 31-
year old Barbara Ann Maines (“Barbara”), a resident of a Hope group home
who suffered from cerebral palsy and was unable to speak or walk. Barbara
was a passenger in a van operated by Hope employee Birt that collided with
a vehicle operated by Appellee, Heather Peters (“Peters”).3 Barbara
subsequently died from a lacerated liver that was not timely reported. The
jury found Hope and Birt negligent and awarded Appellant, in her capacity as
administrator of the Barbara’s estate, a total of $3,018,628.86 in damages.
The award consisted of $2,018,628.86 in wrongful death damages for
medical bills, funeral expenses, and loss of services, to benefit Sharon
Moyer—represented to be Barbara’s mother, and $1,000,000 for survival
damages to Barbara’s estate. The jury also awarded $100,000 in punitive
damages against Hope only. After appeal to and remand from this Court, we
directed the trial court to conduct proceedings to determine the amount of
delay damages to which Appellant was entitled.
On April 21, 2015, a hearing was held before the trial court at which
time the court anticipated wrapping up pending matters to calculate delay
damages in accord with our directive. N.T., Hearing, 4/21/15, at 2.
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2
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8301 (wrongful death) and 8302 (survival).
3
Prior to trial, Peters’ insurance carrier tendered Peters’ $15,000 liability
limits. The jury did not attribute any negligence to Peters.
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Instead, Appellant’s counsel argued that Appellant still was entitled to a new
trial limited to the issue of punitive damages. The trial court disagreed, did
not proceed to calculate delay damages, and certified for appeal the issue of
whether Appellant was entitled to a new trial on delay damages as a
controlling issue of law.
Immediately after that hearing, Appellant’s counsel apparently hand
wrote a praecipe directing the prothonotary to enter judgment in favor of
Brittain and Barbara in their individual capacities, despite the fact that the
verdict was entered only in favor of the estate and Brittain as administrator
of the estate. Id. at 64. Appellant’s praecipe also requested that judgment
be entered against two nonparties to this suit, Selective Insurance Company
of America (“Selective”) and the Hope Foundation, Inc. (“Hope Foundation”).
N.T., Hearing, 4/28/15, at 3-4.
Selective posted the appeal bond from the judgment entered in this
case. Id. at 10-11. In accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1734(c), liability against
a surety may be enforced on application in the lower court. The record does
not reflect that Appellant made any such application before entering
judgment against Selective. It is not clear on what basis Appellant filed
judgment against the Hope Foundation. Appellees’ counsel filed motions to
strike these judgments.
On April 28, 2015, the trial court reconvened the hearing to entertain
Appellees’ motion to strike the judgments and to consider the assessment of
delay damages. Id. at 2. At the hearing, Appellees represented that they
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were prepared to make payment on the judgment once it was properly
entered. Id. at 17. Appellees asked to pay the judgment into court and
requested a hearing regarding distribution to establish the proper parties to
the case, in an effort to avoid future issues claiming they made payment to
the wrong entities. Id. at 17-18. Appellant’s counsel strenuously objected,
pointing out to the court that only he and his clients would be payees on the
check. Id. at 21-22. He explained he would put the money into his trust
account and file appropriate paperwork in the county where the estate was
raised and where a judge would decide distribution. Id. In response, the
trial court explained it was obligated to determine the amount of delay
damages under this Court’s remand order. The court would then decide
what to do with counsel’s information. Id. at 25.
After discussing delay damages, the trial court asked Appellees’
counsel if there was a legitimate concern as to whether the money would be
paid out wrongfully. Id. at 30. In response, counsel for Appellees
presented the petition for probate and grant of letters filed in Columbia
County, reflecting that Brittain was Barbara’s sister, despite
acknowledgement by Appellant’s counsel during trial in Luzerne County that
Brittain was Barbara’s aunt. Id. at 30, Exhibit 2. Appellees’ counsel then
explained that Barbara’s mother, Sharon Moyer, had renounced her right to
administer Barbara’s estate because she was not competent. Id. at 31.
Barbara’s siblings likewise renounced. Id. Counsel explained that although
Sharon Moyer was not competent, there was no evidence that a legal
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guardian had been appointed for her. Id. Therefore, it was not clear how
money from Barbara’s estate would be distributed. Id. Counsel further
explained that during trial Sharon Moyer was identified as Barbara’s
biological mother, yet was identified in the application for letters of
administration as Barbara’s sister. Id. at 34. Additionally, Marcella
Rheppard and Leslie Gross were identified as Barbara’s sisters in the
application for letters of administration, yet they were her aunts. Id.
Edward Maines, apparently Barbara’s uncle, likewise was represented as her
brother in the application for letters of administration. Id. The trial court
found these revelations to be shocking. Id.
In response, Appellant’s counsel admitted there was an error in the
application for letters of administration, but regardless, represented to the
court that he would not distribute any money without an order from the
Columbia County Court where Barbara’s estate was opened. Id. at 35-36.
It was counsel’s opinion that the trial court had no jurisdiction to decide
where the money went, and he would seek an order from the Columbia
County Court directing distribution of Barbara’s estate. Id. at 36.
The trial court stated that no court in this Commonwealth would allow
issuance of a check under circumstances where letters may have been
fraudulently or improvidently granted. Id. at 37. It was the trial court’s
opinion that the Columbia County Court was the tribunal to review the
propriety of Brittain’s appointment as administrator and to direct disposition
of the verdict proceeds. However, the court noted it would be careless for
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the trial court to simply have the money paid over to the administrator. Id.
at 37, 40-41. Appellant’s counsel strenuously objected once again to the
trial court not ordering that the money be paid and represented that not a
single cent of the money would be paid until there was a further order of
court. Id. at 41-42. The trial court reiterated its concern with the estate,
and noted that if Sharon Moyer is the only biological heir as mother of
the decedent, she would be entitled to the entire wrongful death award.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the court indicated that with
respect to an estate, a personal representative must act on its behalf and
any judgment would have to be payable to the personal representative and
not to the estate itself. Id. at 44-45.
Following a recess, there were extensive discussions and arguments
on delay damages and post-judgment interest. Id. at 45-60. The trial court
then announced what it would order by way of judgment. First, the trial
court struck the judgments entered against Selective and the Hope
Foundation as having been inappropriately entered and having been entered
while a motion for delay damages was outstanding. Id. at 63. The court
likewise struck the individual judgments. Id. at 64. It then ordered that
“judgment be entered in favor of Patricia Brittain, a.k.a. Patricia Maines,
administrator of the estate of Barbara Ann Maines, plaintiff, and against
Hope Enterprises, Inc. and William Birt, defendants, in the initial amount of
$3,018,628.87.” Id. at 65. The court added delay damages calculated at
$157,463.04, for a total judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the
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defendants in the amount of $3,176,091.90, plus interest and costs. Id.
Further, the trial court ordered that “judgment be entered in favor of Patricia
Brittain, a.k.a. Patricia Maines, administrator of the estate of Barbara Ann
Maines, plaintiff, and against Hope Enterprises, Inc. in the amount of
$100,000 constituting the punitive damages award plus interest and costs as
permitted by law.”4 Id. at 66. The court then indicated it knew of no
authority that would allow the judgment to be paid into court, as this was
not an interpleader action. Id. The court deferred to the jurisdiction of the
Columbia County Court to review the matters that had been raised, and
indicated there was nothing to prevent a judgment debtor from seeking
emergency consideration of matters of great concern before the proper
tribunal. Id. at 66-67.
Appellees’ counsel once again voiced his concern about making
payment directly to plaintiffs after which the court encouraged counsel to
include a stipulation with regard to payment of the judgment monies. Id. at
70. Ultimately, Appellant’s counsel indicated that he would not agree to any
stipulation and would file that day a writ of execution and would take proper
appeals. Id. at 74. In response, Appellees’ counsel requested, based upon
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4
The jury slip awarding punitive damages is silent as to whether these
damages were awarded in connection with the wrongful death action, the
survival action, or both. We presume these damages were awarded in
connection with the survival action, as Pennsylvania does not permit the
award of punitive damages in a wrongful death action. See Harvey v.
Hassinger, 461 A.2d 814, 815-816 (Pa. Super. 1983).
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the comments by Appellant’s counsel, a brief stay of execution to resolve the
matter. Id. at 75. Appellant’s counsel reconfirmed that he would execute
on the judgments as soon as he left court that day. Id. At that point, the
trial court indicated it would enter its order that afternoon and would decide
whether counsel had to come in for an emergency motion for stay. Id. at
76. The trial court explained it had tried to create a framework as an
accommodation on how monies would be paid. However, if the parties were
not able to come to terms, the court would not order payment, since that
would set off a whole other series of issues. Id. The trial court again
encouraged counsel to revisit the matter and announced its availability in
chambers should counsel reach an accord. Id.
At no time during the April 21 or April 28, 2015 hearings did the issue
ever arise, nor did the facts suggest, that Sharon Moyer—represented at trial
to be Barbara’s biological mother—was not legally entitled to bring or
recover on a wrongful death action as Barbara’s parent.
The trial court’s April 28, 2015 orders were entered on the trial court
docket on April 30, 2015. Brittain filed appeals from both the April 21 and
April 30 orders challenging the denial of a new trial on punitive damages and
the failure of the trial court to calculate and include in the judgment post-
judgment interest.
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On July 27, 2015, Appellees filed in this Court their Emergency
Application. On July 29, we issued an order providing seven days for
Appellant to respond. Appellant timely filed an answer on August 5, 2015.5
In their Emergency Application, Appellees represented that they had
discovered evidence strongly suggesting that Brittain misrepresented
material facts in her application for letters of administration that, if proven,
would establish that none of Barbara’s living family members—including
Sharon Moyer, identified by Brittain at trial to be Barbara’s mother—had
legal standing to assert a wrongful death claim under Pennsylvania’s
wrongful death statute. Emergency Application at ¶ 3. More specifically,
Appellees represented that after the initial discrepancies were found and
brought to the trial court’s attention, they further discovered in reviewing
documents filed in the Orphan’s Court in Snyder County that Barbara had
been legally adopted by her maternal grandmother, Madeline Maines,
thereby terminating Sharon Moyer’s parental rights. Emergency Application
at ¶ 25. October 2000 documents from the Snyder County Orphan’s Court
indicated that Barbara was adjudicated incapacitated and that her sister,
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5
Prior to Appellees’ filing of the Emergency Application, Appellant was
represented by Michael J. Pisanchyn, Jr., Esquire. On July 31, 2015, Howard
J. Bashman, Esquire, entered his appearance as co-counsel for Appellant,
and subsequently filed the August 5, 2015 answer as well as Appellant’s
brief.
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Brittain, was appointed her legal guardian. These documents further
confirmed that Barbara was not capable of providing “services” to anyone,
including her then legal parent, Madeline Maines. Emergency Application at
¶¶ 26, 28. Appellees argue that because Barbara had no spouse or children
at the time of her death and because her parent Madeline Maines was
deceased, no one had standing to recover the $2,000,000 in wrongful death
damages. Appellees contended that if these facts were correct, the entire
wrongful death and survival verdict and judgment must be set aside.6
Emergency Application at ¶ 41.
Even more troubling is Appellees’ averment that on April 30, 2015, two
days after their court hearing, Brittain’s counsel, Michael J. Pisanchyn, Jr.,
filed a “Petition to Distribute Funds” with the Court of Common Pleas of
Columbia County, Emergency Application at ¶ 36,7 and took a 48% fee
before depositing the judgment proceeds with the Columbia County Court of
Common Pleas. Emergency Application at ¶ 36, n. 11. This is problematic
on many levels. First, it appears counsel took these fees before securing
court approval. Further, it is not clear whether these fees were paid only for
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6
Appellees maintain that much of the testimony in the wrongful death action
influenced damages awarded in the survival action. We offer no opinion as
to that argument, leaving that issue for the trial court upon remand.
7
It is not clear whether counsel’s representation to the trial court, pledging
that no funds would be distributed without a court order, was subject to an
agreeable stipulation.
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the wrongful death damages or for both wrongful death and survival
damages. If there is merit to Appellees’ Emergency Application, it is
uncertain whether counsel is entitled to any fees. Moreover, as Appellees
aver, it is questionable whether Brittain or her counsel advised the Columbia
County Orphans’ Court that Sharon Moyer’s parental rights were terminated
by virtue of her legal adoption by Madeline Maines, even though it is alleged
Brittain and her family members were uniquely aware of this familial history.
Emergency Application at ¶ 39.
Citing Hornick v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 165 A. 36, 37 (Pa. 1933),
Appellees argue that this newly-discovered evidence entitles them to a new
trial. They contend this evidence was discovered after trial, it could not
have been obtained at trial by reasonable diligence, it is not cumulative or
offered to impeach credibility, and it will likely compel a different result. If
Appellees’ averments are confirmed, they assert, their Emergency
Application has substantial merit and this Court should remand this matter
to the trial court to consider this after-discovered evidence.
Appellant counters that we should deny Appellees’ application and
address the issues raised in Appellant’s brief. She claims Appellees have
waived any challenge to Appellant’s capacity to sue because they failed to
assert a challenge by preliminary objection or in answer to Appellant’s
complaint. Appellant’s Answer in Opposition, 8/5/15, at 2 (citing Drake
Mfg. Co. v. Polyflow, Inc., 109 A.3d 250, 257-58 (Pa. Super. 2015)).
Further, she argues Appellees raised questions about Barbara’s familial
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relationships at the April 28, 2015 hearing but did not file an appeal or
cross-appeal from the April 30, 2015 orders entered following the hearing.
Id. Appellant also complains that the “alleged ‘possible fraud’” Appellees
complain of “is not the type of fraud that is sufficient to reopen a judgment
based on supposedly newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 9-10 (citing and
quoting Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 504 A.2d 335, 337 (Pa. Super.
1986)).
With regard to the lack of a cross-appeal, we acknowledge that
Appellees requested during the April 28, 2015 proceeding that the court
conduct a hearing. However, the request was made in reference to the
demand by Appellant’s counsel that payment be made to Appellant, because
it was not clear if a legal guardian had been appointed to receive funds on
behalf of Sharon Moyer, the wrongful death beneficiary. N.T., Hearing,
4/28/15, at 31. This is far different from the contention now being raised in
Appellees’ Emergency Application that, based upon after-discovered
evidence, Sharon Moyer was not Barbara’s legal parent and, therefore,
Appellant was not entitled to bring a wrongful death action on her behalf.8
If, as Appellees contend, this after-discovered evidence became known to
them only after the April 28 hearing, then they in fact are entitled to have
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8
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301(b), which provides in relevant part that “the right
of action [for wrongful death] created by this section shall exist only for the
benefit of the spouse, children or parents of the deceased.”
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the trial court hold a hearing on their Emergency Application. The lack of a
cross appeal does not defeat their application.
We also reject Appellant’s suggestion that the alleged possible fraud is
not the type of fraud warranting reopening a judgment. As Appellees’
correctly recognize, our Supreme Court has held that “[c]ourts, when
appealed to, will prevent the triumph of fraud, and, where a judgment has
been obligated by fraud, no court will permit its records and processes to be
the instruments of infamy.” Appellees’ Brief at 16 (quoting Sallada v.
Mock, 121 A. 54, 55 (Pa. 1923)). See also Commonwealth v. Harper,
890 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“courts simply will not countenance
fraud, and when a decision is obtained through its use, the court retains the
inherent power to rescind that decision”).
Appellant argues that only “‘extrinsic’ fraud, and not ‘intrinsic’ fraud,
can be used to reopen an otherwise final judgment.” Appellant’s Reply Brief
at 23 (citing McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co., 110 A. 366 (Pa. 1920)).
While Appellant accurately states the law, we disagree with her assertion
that the fraud alleged by Appellees does not constitute extrinsic fraud. As
our Supreme Court explained in McEvoy:
By the expression ‘extrinsic or collateral fraud’ is meant some
act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented a fair
submission of the controversy. . . . Where the alleged perjury
relates to a question upon which there was a conflict, and it was
necessary for the court to determine the truth or falsity of the
testimony, the fraud is intrinsic, and is concluded by the
judgment, unless there be a showing that the jurisdiction of the
court has been imposed upon, or that by some fraudulent act of
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the prevailing party the other has been deprived of an
opportunity for a fair trial.
Id. at 368. See also Black's Law Dictionary 686 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
“extrinsic fraud” as “[d]eception that is collateral to the issues being
considered in the case; intentional misrepresentation or deceptive behavior
outside the transaction itself (whether a contract or a lawsuit), depriving one
party of informed consent or full participation”). Further,
Extrinsic fraud operates, not upon the matter pertaining to the
judgment, but the manner in which it is procured[.]
In 34 Corpus Juris, 282, it is stated that “fraud practiced upon
the court is always ground for vacating the judgment, as where
the court is deceived or misled as to the material circumstances,
or its process is abused, resulting in the rendition of a judgment
which would not have been given if the whole conduct of the
case had been fair.”
Willetts v. Willetts, 96 Pa. Super. 198, 206 (Pa. Super. 1929) (citation
omitted).
In her Amended Complaint, Appellant represented that Sharon Moyer
was Barbara’s mother. Amended Complaint at ¶ 3. Sharon Moyer testified
as if she were Barbara’s mother and offered no hint that Barbara had been
adopted by Madeline Maines. As Appellees observe, “In pleadings,
testimony and briefs in the trial court and this court, [Appellant] referred to
Sharon Moyer as [Barbara’s] mother.” Appellees’ Brief at 17 (with footnote
8, identifying instances at trial referring to Sharon Moyer as Barbara’s
mother). The status of Sharon Moyer as Barbara’s mother, and her standing
to pursue a wrongful death claim, was collateral to the issue being
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considered in the underlying action. Appellant’s conduct in misrepresenting
Sharon Moyer’s status prevented a fair submission of the controversy
because her parental rights had in fact been terminated, stripping her of
standing to pursue a wrongful death action. See, e.g., E.T.S. v. S.L.H., 54
A.3d 880, 883 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[a] decree of adoption terminates forever
all relations between a child and his biological parents and severs the child
entirely from its own family tree and engrafts it upon its new parentage.”).
Further, there was no conflict in the testimony offered by Sharon Moyer or
her siblings, including Appellant, with regard to the relationship between
Barbara and Sharon Moyer that required the court to determine the truth or
falsity of the testimony. In fact, there was no question as to the
relationship. As the trial judge observed, “[T]he [c]ourt’s clear recollection
was that [Sharon Moyer] was identified as the biological mother of the
decedent.” N.T., Hearing, 4/28/15, at 34. Therefore, we reject Appellant’s
assertion that any “possible fraud” was intrinsic. See McEvoy, 110 A. at
368.
Also supporting our conclusion that the fraud was extrinsic is the fact
Appellant changed course in her Columbia County Petition for Distribution
where she represented to that court that Sharon Moyer was Barbara’s
“biological mother.” Petition for Distribution, 4/30/15, at ¶¶ 2, 20, 24. That
Sharon Moyer was Barbara’s biological mother has no legal significance in
light of the fact Barbara was adopted by the now-deceased Madeline Maines,
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Sharon Moyer’s mother. E.T.S. v. S.L.H., supra. By stating a “fact” that
has no legal consequence, it appears Appellant is attempting to conceal the
fact that no one, including Sharon Moyer, had legal standing to pursue the
wrongful death action, the proceeds of which are a subject of the petition to
distribute.
We conclude that knowingly maintaining a wrongful death action on
behalf of someone for whom that right of action does not exist prevents a
fair submission of the controversy and constitutes fraud on the court that
warrants setting aside the judgment wrongly obtained. Further, for reasons
already explained, we reject the argument that Appellees waived a challenge
to Appellant’s capacity to sue on procedural grounds.
Based on Appellees’ Emergency Application, we find that a remand is
warranted. However, this matter is complicated by the fact that, according
to the Emergency Application, Appellant’s counsel already has filed a petition
for distribution before the Columbia County Orphan’s Court, where Barbara’s
estate has been opened. It is not known whether Appellees are entitled to
notice of those proceedings, if they have been given notice, whether they
are participating in those proceedings, or whether they would be permitted
to intervene. The question therefore arises whether the orphans’ court or
the trial court has jurisdiction over the questions relating to distribution or
standing in this wrongful death and survival action.
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While the jurisdiction of the orphans’ court is mandatory with respect
to certain matters, that court may also exercise jurisdiction over other
matters where there are substantial questions concerning anything within its
mandatory jurisdiction. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 711, 712. It is clear that the
orphans’ court must approve any settlement or compromise of a survival
action. Moore v. Gates, 580 A.2d 1138, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1990) (en banc).
If a lawsuit has been filed, however, then court approval of a survival action
can be obtained either in the orphans’ court or in any other court in which
the action is pending. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b). On the other hand, where
the only heirs entitled to recover for the wrongful death of a decedent are
competent adults, they may settle their claims without court approval. Id.
In this case, where a wrongful death and survival action has been tried
to verdict, either the trial court or the orphans’ court may consider issues
relating to distribution of the judgment proceeds or standing. While either
the orphans’ court or trial court may pass upon the distribution of the
judgment proceeds in a wrongful death and survival action, it is known that
local rules of court commonly direct which division of court is to hear these
matters, typically dependent upon whether the matters have been settled or
tried to verdict. In this case, as stated, distribution and resolution of issues
raised by Appellees may be heard in either the trial court or the orphans’
court.
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Again, this matter is somewhat complicated because appeals are
currently pending from orders of the trial court in Luzerne County and,
according to the Emergency Application, a petition for distribution has been
filed with the Orphans’ Court of Columbia County. It would appear that
presently we have two courts involved in a matter with overlapping issues.
For sake of order and judicial efficiency, these proceedings need to be
coordinated. Since the matters raised by the Appellees’ Emergency
Application go to the core of the trial proceedings, it would make sense that
the trial court decide the application. If Appellees’ Emergency Application
proves meritorious, action affecting the judgments would be required by the
trial court that would, in turn, necessarily affect the proceedings before the
orphans’ court. It would seem that the orphans’ court should stay any
distribution proceedings pending the outcome of any after-discovered
evidence proceedings before the trial court.
Appellees’ Emergency Application granted as outlined above. Case
remanded for further proceedings before the trial court consistent with this
Opinion. In light of our disposition, we decline to reach the issues raised by
Appellant. In the event the trial court determines there is no merit to
Appellees’ Emergency Application, Appellant may reassert her issues before
this Court.
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Appellees’ Emergency Application granted. Case remanded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/17/2017
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