Com. v. Theisen, C.

J-S39005-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHARLES THEISEN,
Appellant No. 703 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-02-CR-0012533-2014
CP-02-CR-0013588-2014
CP-02-CR-0014997-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 4, 2017
Appellant, Charles Theisen, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
an aggregate term of 20½-41 years’ incarceration, imposed following his
conviction for two counts of robbery, and several individual counts of
aggravated assault, theft, receiving stolen property, and related offenses.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion
without a hearing, and without issuing a contemporaneous statement of the
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant also contends that
the trial court utilized an impermissible sentencing factor by considering the
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S39005-17
testimony of the investigating officer, who was not a victim, during the
sentencing hearing. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:
On October 8, 2014, Daniel Eisel was driving his
mother's car, a 1994 Buick Century[,] on Hazeldell Street
when he decided to stop and get something to eat. Eisel
parked the car across the street from 2210 Hazeldell
Street and although he had locked the doors, the driver's
window and front seat passenger window were left open …
approximately one inch. When he returned from eating,
that car was no longer there. Later that day, Gloria
Wolowski completed her shopping in the Town Square
complex located in Brentwood. She went to her car,
placed her purse on the driver's seat and then proceeded
to place her groceries in the trunk of her car. She then
noticed an unknown white male, approximately thirty
years of age, wearing a Steeler jersey with facial hair with
a thin build, driving an older blue car which pulled up next
to her car, striking her vehicle with his mirror. The driver
of that car never got out of the vehicle and apparently slid
across the seat, opened her door and grabbed her purse.
Wolowski observed this and then ran to the other car and
got ahold of her purse and was fighting to get it back when
the driver started to speed away causing her to violently
fall to the pavement. This theft was witnessed by Greg
Mondry and Wes Stabler, who ran to Wolowski's aid.
Mondry got a good look at the actor and gave basically the
same description as Wolowski did to the police. Wolowski
was transported to St. Clair Hospital to be treated for a
fractured scapula, fractured rib, lacerations, swelling and
bruising on her left knee and right wrist. Wolowski was
seventy-three years old at the time of this robbery.
On August 9, 2014, Donna Gall had just completed her
shopping at the Giant Eagle located at Parkway Center Mall
in Green[ Tree], Pennsylvania, and was placing her
groceries in her car when she noticed that a vehicle had
pulled extremely close to her driver's side door with [h]is
driver's side door and attempted to grab her purse from
her arm. The driver of the other car never exited his
vehicle and Gall struggled with this individual, refusing to
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give her purse when he had to speed away, causing Gall to
get tangled in her purse and having to run alongside the
speeding automobile for approximately ten feet. Gall then
fell to the ground and the purse was ripped from her.
Green[ Tree] Police were able to obtain a video of the
vehicle that was used during the robbery and it revealed
that Easel's stolen vehicle, the 1994 Buick Century, was
used during the commission of this robbery. Gall
described the driver as being in his late twenties, thin
build, medium height, and wearing a black shirt and had
dark hair and also had facial hair. Gall suffered injuries to
both of her knees in addition to several bruises and
contusions. She believed that her life was in danger. Gall
was sixty-four years old at the time of this robbery. Later
on August 9, 2014, Soon Ja Hong was walking along
Noblestown Road when she heard the engine of a speeding
vehicle approach her. Hong observed an older blue vehicle
pull up to her at an extremely close range and grab her
purse that was hanging from her arm. The driver of the
car grabbed her purse and Hong and the driver proceeded
to struggle over this purse, however, he was unable to get
the purse from her and then sped away. Hong described
the individual who attempted to take her purse as … being
a white male of thin build and medium height. She also
described the car used in this attempted robbery as an
older blue Buick.
After Easel's vehicle had been stolen on August 8, 2014,
the police put out a description of that vehicle in an
attempt to locate it. On August 20, 2014, Pittsburgh Police
received an anonymous phone call saying that a blue Buick
Century was parked outside of 338 Sweetbriar Street. The
police then went to that address and noticed that the car
was parked with all of its windows down. The police set up
surveillance to see who would attempt to drive that car
and they then saw an individual wearing a Steeler jersey
approach the vehicle. That individual got into that vehicle
and was attempting to leave when the police pulled in,
blocking his exit. The driver of this vehicle was then
identified as [Appellant]. When he was questioned by the
police [Appellant] said he just received that vehicle from
another individual and that he could not have committed
these robberies since he was in the hospital and was
treated for fractures of both of his heels. When
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[Appellant] was arrested he had casts on both legs up to
his shins. [Appellant] told the police that he had stolen
this car on Paul Street in Mt. Washington on August 17 and
wondered what took the police so long to get him. When
he was questioned about his injuries, he said that he had
fallen off of a roof and went to the hospital on August 1
and then signed himself out on August 10 and went to
another hospital on that date and stayed there until being
released on August 15. The police got a search warrant
for [Appellant]'s medical records and determined that
[Appellant] signed off on a release against medical advice
on August 6, 2014, when he left Mercy Hospital.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/27/17, at 6-9.
Appellant was charged in four separate criminal complaints for the
above actions, one for each of his victims, all of which resulted in
convictions. However, only three of those cases went to trial and are now
part of the instant appeal: CP-02-CR-0012533-2014 (“12533-2014”), CP-02-
CR-0013588-2014 (“13588-2014”), and CP-02-CR-0014997-2014 (“14997-
2014”). In the fourth case, CP-02-CR-0012344-2014, Appellant pled guilty
to receiving stolen property and two motor vehicle offenses on April 18,
2016. The trial court notes that the fourth case was not part of the instant
appeal. TCO at 3. Moreover, the specific offenses charged in each of the
first three cases are not germane to the two issues raised in this appeal.
The relevant procedural history of these cases is as follows. After the
Commonwealth charged him in the above matters, Appellant filed a motion
to suppress any in-court identification testimony by eyewitnesses, including
the victims in this case, on the basis that they were shown a photo array by
police which he maintains was unduly suggestive. See Motion to Suppress
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Identification, 6/19/15, at 3. The trial court denied the motion by order
dated June 26, 2015, without having held a suppression hearing. See
Order, 6/26/15, at 1 (single page). The trial court did not issue any
contemporaneous statement summarizing its factual findings or conclusions
of law regarding the suppression issue.1 A hybrid jury/nonjury trial began
October 8, 2015, before The Honorable David R. Cashman. Appellant was
found guilty of all the offenses before the jury, and Judge Cashman found
him guilty of all the charged summary offenses.
On January 12, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant at 12533-
2014 to 18-36 months’ incarceration and 4 years’ probation for receiving
stolen property; at 13588-2014 to 90-180 months’ incarceration and 10
years’ probation for robbery, 90-180 months’ incarceration and 5 years’
probation for aggravated assault, and 18-36 months’ incarceration and 5
years’ probation for theft; and at 14997-2014 to 30-60 months’
incarceration and 5 years’ probation for robbery. “All of the periods of
incarceration were to run consecutive[ly] to each other and all of the
period[s] of probation were to run concurrent[ly] with each other.” TCO at
5. Accordingly, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 20½-41
years’ incarceration, to be followed by 10 years’ probation. Appellant filed
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1
While not contemporaneous to its decision to deny Appellant’s suppression
motion, the trial court set forth its factual findings and legal conclusions
regarding the suppression issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
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timely post-sentence motions, which were denied following a hearing on
April 18, 2016.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 12, 2016, and timely
filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on August 5, 2016. The
trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 27, 2017. Appellant now
presents the following questions for our review:
Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in denying [A]ppellant's motion
to suppress evidence without first holding a hearing as required
by the rules of criminal procedure?
Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in allowing a Detective of the
Pittsburgh Police Department to testify at sentencing in violation
of the statutory rules governing impact statements?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant’s first claim concerns the trial court’s decision to rule on his
suppression motion without a hearing. Appellant contends that the court’s
decision was a blatant violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 and, as such, requires
this Court to vacate his sentence and remand for a suppression hearing.
The Commonwealth argues that no suppression hearing was necessary
under the circumstances of this case, and therefore no error occurred.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(A) The defendant's attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented,
may make a motion to the court to suppress any evidence
alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant's
rights.
…
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(D) The motion shall state specifically and with particularity the
evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression,
and the facts and events in support thereof.
(E) A hearing shall be scheduled in accordance with Rule 577
(Procedures Following Filing of Motion). A hearing may be either
prior to or at trial, and shall afford the attorney for the
Commonwealth a reasonable opportunity for investigation. The
judge shall enter such interim order as may be appropriate in
the interests of justice and the expeditious disposition of criminal
cases.
(F) The hearing, either before or at trial, ordinarily shall be held
in open court. The hearing shall be held outside the presence of
the jury. In all cases, the court may make such order concerning
publicity of the proceedings as it deems appropriate under Rules
110 and 111.
(G) A record shall be made of all evidence adduced at the
hearing.
(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence and of establishing that the challenged
evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights.
The defendant may testify at such hearing, and if the defendant
does testify, the defendant does not thereby waive the right to
remain silent during trial.
(I) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall enter on
the record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions
of law as to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of
the defendant's rights, or in violation of these rules or any
statute, and shall make an order granting or denying the relief
sought.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 (emphasis added).
“Rules of Criminal Procedure do not establish, create, or define crimes,
offenses or ordinances authorizing incarceration, fine, or other penalty;
hence, Rules of Criminal Procedure are not ‘penal provisions’ and are not
subject to strict construction.” Commonwealth v. Wamsher, 577 A.2d
595, 600 (Pa. Super. 1990). Instead, we interpret the rules of criminal
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procedure under the guidance of Pa.R.Crim.P. 101, which provides as
follows:
(A) These rules are intended to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding.
(B) These rules shall be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay.
(C) To the extent practicable, these rules shall be construed in
consonance with the rules of statutory construction.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 101.
Instantly, Appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to hold a
hearing on his suppression motion was a violation of an “absolute” rule of
criminal procedure, Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(E), “without regard for the party that
benefits from the decision.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant also contends
that the trial court violated a similarly strict requirement of the rules by
failing to issue a statement of “of findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I).
The trial court states:
In [Appellant]'s motion to suppress the photo array
identification, he makes no claim that the police engaged in any
type of activity or comment which was designed to influence the
ultimate result of his identification. The only claims of
suggestiveness are the photographs of themselves. In this
regard, [Appellant] has suggested … he stands out because he is
the only one wearing a Steeler[s] tee-shirt, he is the only one
[who] is not looking directly into the camera, and he is the only
one [who] was not in the center of his picture. In light of the
claims asserted by [Appellant], there was no need to hold a
hearing to elicit testimony as to [the] three claims asserted by
[Appellant]. [Appellant]'s motion also contained numerous
citations to the case law applicable to claims of suggestiveness
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of photo arrays. The only thing that needed to be done was for
this [c]ourt to review the photographs to make a determination
as to whether or not the photographs were selected in such a
manner as to cause [Appellant]'s photograph to stand out
against the others.
TCO at 13-14. The Commonwealth agrees with the trial court’s justification
for not holding a suppression hearing under the facts of this case.
In his brief, Appellant provides no response to the trial court’s
rationale for not holding a suppression hearing, other than to essentially
assert that he is automatically entitled to relief because of the apparent
violations of the mandates of Rule 581(E) and (I). Appellant attempts to
support his claim by citing Commonwealth v. Micklos, 672 A.2d 796 (Pa.
Super. 1996), and Commonwealth v. Long, 753 A.2d 272 (Pa. Super.
2000). The Commonwealth argues that these cases demonstrate, to the
contrary, a case-by-case approach to whether relief should be granted when
a Rule 581 violation occurs, and that the circumstances of the instant case
are not analogous to the circumstances at issue in Micklos and Long, where
this Court provided relief for Rule 581 violations.
However, we decline to reach these questions after our review of the
record in this case. Here, Appellant filed his suppression motion on June 19,
2015, and the trial court issued the order denying the motion on June 26,
2015. Appellant’s trial then began on October 8, 2015. At no point between
the trial court’s order denying the suppression motion, and the
commencement of trial, a period of 111 days, did Appellant object to, or
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otherwise seek reconsideration of, the trial court’s order denying suppression
on the basis that the court had failed to adhere to Rule 581(E) and/or (I).
“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Here, Appellant did not raise
the claim before the trial court until after trial, when he filed post-sentence
motions raising the matter on January 22, 2016, 210 days after the order
denying suppression was issued. Most importantly, Appellant did not object
when it became clear that the trial court had decided the motion without a
hearing and without issuing a contemporaneous statement to support that
ruling. While Appellant’s substantive suppression claim was preserved by
the filing of his suppression motion,2 that motion clearly did not raise or
address the procedural claims he makes now with regard to the trial court’s
failure to conform to the dictates of Rule 581. Even assuming that the trial
erred by failing to strictly adhere to Rule 581(E) and (I), 3 Appellant’s failure
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2
To be absolutely clear, the issue concerning the underlying merit of
Appellant’s suppression claim – the ostensibly unduly suggestive nature of
the photo array – was not waived by his failure to seek reconsideration or
otherwise object to the procedural defects in the court’s treatment of his
suppression motion. However, Appellant has not presented this Court with
any such claims in this appeal.
3
While we are somewhat troubled by the trial court’s failure to hold a
hearing without it having been expressly waived by the parties, and
although we are even more troubled by the court’s failure to issue a
contemporaneous statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law with
its suppression decision, we expressly decline to determine whether these
actions were clearly erroneous in the context and circumstances of this case.
Moreover, Appellant has not even attempted to demonstrate or argue how
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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to issue a timely objection, or seek reconsideration of the suppression ruling
on the basis of the trial court’s procedural errors, deprived the trial court of
the opportunity to rectify any potential errors with respect to Rule 581(E)
and (I) in a timely fashion.
As this Court stated in Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super.
1995):
[I]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party
must make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate
stage of the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to
timely object to a basic and fundamental error, such as an
erroneous jury instruction, will result in waiver of that issue.
On appeal, the Superior Court will not consider a claim which
was not called to the trial court's attention at a time when any
error committed could have been corrected. The principle
rationale underlying the waiver rule is that when an error is
pointed out to the trial court, the court then has an opportunity
to correct the error. By specifically objecting to any obvious
error, the trial court can quickly and easily correct the problem
and prevent the need for a new trial. Additionally, the appellate
court should not be required to waste judicial resources
correcting a problem that the trial court could have easily
corrected if it had been given the opportunity to avoid the
necessity of granting a new trial.
Hill, 665 A.2d at 515-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has waived his first issue by
failing to raise it in the trial court in a timely fashion.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
he was prejudiced by those decisions if, indeed, such a demonstration is
required. What is clear to us, however, is that the trial court was never
afforded the opportunity to correct such errors in a timely fashion, while
acting under the belief that its actions were permissible under the law.
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Next, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it permitted the
Commonwealth to present the testimony of Detective Dawn Mecurio during
his sentencing hearing. Appellant asserts that that the detective’s testimony
was impermissible since she was not a victim in this case. This claim
concerns the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do
not entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth
v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether
appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super.
2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006)
(internal citations omitted). Objections to the discretionary
aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not raised
at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence
imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.
Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d 599 (2003).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial
question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007).
A substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances
a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
which underlie the sentencing process.” Sierra, supra at 912-
13.
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As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court
does not accept bald assertions of sentencing errors.
Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super.
2006). An appellant must articulate the reasons the sentencing
court's actions violated the sentencing code. Id.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his claim
by objecting at the sentencing hearing, and by raising it in a post-sentence
motion. However, he has failed to provide this Court with a Rule 2119(f)
statement in his brief, and he has not set forth any argument in his brief
that this claim presents a substantial question for our review. When an
appellant “has not included a Rule 2119(f) statement and the appellee has
not objected, this Court may ignore the omission and determine if there is a
substantial question that the sentence imposed was not appropriate….”
Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Instantly, the Commonwealth has not objected to Appellant’s failure to
include a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, and we determine that
Appellant’s claim presents a substantial question for our review. See
Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(holding reliance on an improper sentencing factor raises a substantial
question permitting review). Accordingly, we now turn to the merits of
Appellant’s sentencing claim.
At Appellant’s sentencing hearing, and following a victim impact
statement of Gloria Wolowski, the Commonwealth called Detective Mecurio
to testify. Appellant objected, arguing that “she was not a victim in this
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case.” N.T. Sentencing, 1/12/16, at 8. The substance of Detective
Mecurio’s testimony was as follows:
I've been on with the City for over nine years. I've
interviewed a lot of criminals. Most of them, by the time you
catch up to them[,] after the fact[, they] show a little bit of
remorse. In this case that didn't happen. When we interviewed
[Appellant], weeks later, you know, he referred to these women
as mother fuckers -- and old mother fuckers, actually. [He
s]howed no remorse [for] what he did to these women.
He picked women middle-aged or older. Could have been
any one of our mothers, grandmothers, sisters. He kind of
snickered through some of the interview. I just never seen [sic]
that kind of behavior from anyone that I've interviewed in my
past; and even later, on [the] jail tape, in jail, months later he
referred to them as mother fuckers on the jail tape.
I don't believe that [Appellant] is sorry for what he did;
and I just hope that you consider today how big of a -- I want to
say that he's very dangerous to society, and I hope that you
consider that today, after he displayed this reckless behavior
over and over and over, again, towards these older women….
Id. at 9-10.
Appellant asserts that this testimony was not permitted pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 9738, which governs victim impact statements. That provision
provides, in its entirety, as follows:
(a) General rule.--Notwithstanding any other statute, rule or
provision of law to the contrary, in the trial of a defendant
accused of an offense, including an offense subject to sentence
under section 9711 (relating to sentencing procedure for murder
of the first degree), a court shall not order the exclusion of any
victim of the offense from the trial on the basis that the victim
may, during the sentencing phase of the proceedings:
(1) make a victim impact statement or present any victim
impact information in relation to the sentence to be
imposed on the defendant; or
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(2) testify as to the effect of the offense on the victim or
the family of the victim.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section, the term “victim” shall
mean a “victim” as defined in:
(1) section 103 of the act of November 24, 1998 (P.L. 882,
No. 111),1 known as the Crime Victims Act; or
(2) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3001 (relating to definitions).
1
18 P.S. § 11.103.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9738.
“Victim” is defined by 18 P.S. § 11.103 as follows:
(1) A direct victim.
(2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct victim,
except when the parent or legal guardian of the child is the
alleged offender.
(3) A minor child who is a material witness to any of the
following crimes and offenses under 18 Pa.C.S. (relating to
crimes and offenses) committed or attempted against a member
of the child's family:
Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide).
Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).
Section 3121 (relating to rape).
(4) A family member of a homicide victim, including stepbrothers
or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a fiance, one of
whom is to be identified to receive communication as provided
for in this act, except where the family member is the alleged
offender.
18 P.S. § 11.103.
Based on these provisions, Appellant contends that:
As written, the law offers very little room for anyone who
is not either a direct victim or a family member of the victim to
testify. The law allows non-victims to offer statements only
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when they are closely related to a deceased victim, or else the
minor witness to a crime. It does not permit statements by
police or investigators.
Appellant’s Brief at 16.
The Commonwealth argues that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9738 does not serve to
prohibit any testimony, by anyone, at any time. Even if it did, however, the
Commonwealth contends that Detective Mecurio’s testimony was not
presented to the trial court as a victim impact statement, nor did the
Commonwealth claim the detective was a victim. The Commonwealth
argues that her testimony was nevertheless relevant to the trial court’s
contemplation of “legitimate” considerations “under the Sentencing Code:
[A]ppellant’s demonstrated character and amenability to rehabilitation, and
the impact of [A]ppellant’s behavior on the community at large.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 26.
We agree with the Commonwealth. Nothing in our reading of Section
9738 purports to restrict who may testify at sentencing, or at any other
stage of criminal proceedings. To the contrary, the statute dictates that a
court shall not exclude a victim from testifying at trial, on the basis that they
might subsequently make a victim impact statement at sentencing. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9738(a)(1). Appellant’s interpretation of the statute as placing
restrictions on who may testify at sentencing is irrational. Moreover,
Appellant has not cited any other legal authority which would serve to
prohibit Detective Mecurio’s testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that
Appellant’s second claim lacks merit.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.
Judge Strassburger files a concurring memorandum in which Judge
Bowes joins.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/4/2017
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