Com. v. Taft, R.

J. S58007/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
RANDY TAFT, : No. 169 MDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, January 29, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
Criminal Division at No. CP-59-CR-0000152-1987
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 13, 2017
Randy Taft appeals from the order entered January 29, 2016,
dismissing his serial PCRA1 petition as untimely filed. We affirm.
The facts of this case were set forth in a prior memorandum of this
court as follows:
On April 10, 1987, the bodies of Sherry Russell
and her infant son, David C. Russell, were found
along the driveway outside the family residence.
Sherry Russell had been viciously attacked and her
injuries included contusions, cuts, puncture wounds,
slashes and lacerations. Her skull had been
fractured and she had multiple stab wounds to vital
parts of her body. David C. Russell suffered from a
blunt impact to his head and his death was caused
by drowning. On April 15, 1987, appellant was
arrested and charged with two counts of homicide for
the deaths. Appellant was arraigned and pled not
guilty on May 18, 1987. Motions for suppression of
1 Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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evidence were filed and a suppression hearing was
held on October 1, 1987. The motion was denied by
opinion and order of January 14, 1988.
Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere
to the two counts of homicide on April 18, 1988.
After a lengthy colloquy by the court and a written
colloquy signed by the appellant, the court accepted
the plea. The court then conducted a degree of guilt
hearing and found the appellant guilty of murder in
the first degree with respect to Sherry Russell and
murder in the third degree with respect to David C.
Russell. Appellant was sentenced to consecutive
terms of life imprisonment for murder in the first
degree and ten to twenty years for murder in the
third degree.
Commonwealth v. Taft, No. 641 Harrisburg 1992, unpublished
memorandum at 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed Sept. 1, 1993).
Appellant has filed numerous PCRA petitions, all of which were
dismissed. Appellant filed the current petition on January 26, 2015, alleging
previously unknown exculpatory facts in the form of a November 26, 2014
letter from the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) concerning
improper practices by certain FBI laboratory examiners, including
FBI Examiner Michael Malone who performed laboratory work in appellant’s
case. The November 26, 2014 letter informed appellant that Mr. Malone’s
work and testimony has been criticized by some courts and independent
scientists hired by the FBI to review his work.
In a second letter to Tioga County District Attorney Krista Deats, dated
June 25, 2015, the DOJ advised that it had reviewed laboratory reports and
testimony by FBI laboratory examiners in cases involving microscopic hair
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comparison analysis. The DOJ determined that a report regarding
microscopic hair comparison analysis containing erroneous statements was
used in appellant’s case. The DOJ found that the microscopic hair laboratory
comparison analysis report presented in this case included statements that
“exceeded the limits of science,” including that Mr. Malone stated or implied
that the evidentiary hair could be associated with a specific individual to the
exclusion of all others or provided a likelihood that the questioned hair
originated from a particular source. In his September 4, 1987 report,
Mr. Malone examined a pubic hair from the crime scene and determined
that, “This hair exhibits the same individual microscopic characteristics as
the pubic hairs of [appellant] and, accordingly, is consistent with having
originated from [appellant].” (Amended petition for post-conviction relief,
8/24/15, Exhibit F at 7; docket #16.)
Following receipt of the June 25, 2015 letter, appellant filed an
amended PCRA petition on August 24, 2015. Appellant’s petition was
dismissed on January 29, 2016, following Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice.
Apparently, appellant was not provided with a copy of the order, and no
appeal was filed; however, on January 6, 2017, appellant’s right to appeal
the January 29 order was reinstated nunc pro tunc, and this appeal
followed. Appellant was not ordered to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); however, on
May 12, 2017, the PCRA court filed a supplemental opinion.
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Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
I. Was [appellant]’s PCRA petition timely under
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), when the claims
in his petition were based on new facts
contained in two letters from the United States
[DOJ] that were unknown to him and could not
have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence, and his petition was filed within
sixty (60) days of the date the claim could
have been presented?
II. Did [appellant]’s PCRA petition establish a
strong prima facie showing to demonstrate
that a miscarriage of justice may have
occurred, so that he is entitled to relief through
a second or subsequent PCRA?
Appellant’s brief at 2.
The standard of review for an order denying
post-conviction relief is limited to whether the record
supports the PCRA court’s determination, and
whether that decision is free of legal error. The
PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless
there is no support for the findings in the certified
record. Furthermore, a petitioner is not entitled to a
PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court
can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine
issue concerning any material fact and the petitioner
is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and
no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 945 A.2d 185, 188 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 956 A.2d 433 (Pa. 2008), quoting Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1040 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has
jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 508,
837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (2003). The most recent
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amendments to the PCRA, effective January 16,
1996, provide a PCRA petition, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of
the date the underlying judgment becomes final.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v.
Bretz, 830 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2003);
Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714, 717
(Pa.Super. 2000). A judgment is deemed final “at
the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2010).
The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness
provisions in the PCRA allow for very limited
circumstances under which the late filing of a
petition will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
To invoke an exception, a petition must allege and
prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously
was the result of interference by
government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of
the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right
that was recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the
time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “As such, when a
PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the
expiration of direct review, or not eligible for one of
the three limited exceptions, or entitled to one of the
exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date
that the claim could have been first brought, the trial
court has no power to address the substantive merits
of a petitioner’s PCRA claims.” Commonwealth v.
Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 77, 753 A.2d 780, 783
(2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Id. at 1079-1080.
The timeliness exception set forth in
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to
demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which
he based his petition and could not have learned
those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 395, 930
A.2d 1264, 1271 (2007). Due diligence demands
that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect
his own interests. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768
A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa.Super. 2001). A petitioner
must explain why he could not have obtained the
new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323,
330-31, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (2001); Commonwealth
v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 29, 731 A.2d 581, 590
(1999). This rule is strictly enforced. See Vega,
supra at 718.
Id. at 1080.
There are three exceptions under which a facially untimely PCRA
petition may still be considered. Appellant attempts to invoke the previously
unknown facts exception to the time restrictions of the PCRA, enumerated in
Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). Once a timeliness exception is met:
[t]o obtain relief based upon newly-discovered
[facts] under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish
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that: (1) the evidence has been discovered after
trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior
to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the
evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used
solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely
compel a different verdict.
Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (Pa. 2004), citing
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 94 (Pa. 1998) (additional
citation omitted).2
Appellant argues that the information relating to Mr. Malone was not
available earlier. (Appellant’s brief at 8.) However, appellant knew at least
as early as 1999 that practices at the FBI crime laboratory had been called
into question, including hair and fiber analysis. The November 26, 2014 DOJ
letter referenced a July 2014 Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) report
entitled “An Assessment of the 1996 [DOJ] Task Force Review of the FBI
Laboratory,” which was an exhaustive review of FBI laboratory practices.
The 1996 task force released an April 1997 OIG report entitled “The FBI
Laboratory: An Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged
2 We recognize that appellant pled nolo contendere rather than choosing to
go to trial. Ordinarily, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere waives all
defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction, legality of the sentence, and
the validity of the plea. Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d 1267,
1271 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “A plea of nolo contendere
should be treated the same as a guilty plea in terms of its effect upon a
particular case.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 506 A.2d 420, 422
(Pa.Super. 1986) (citations omitted). However, in Commonwealth v.
Peoples, 319 A.2d 679 (Pa. 1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that a newly-discovered facts claim is available to a defendant who pleads
guilty or nolo contendere.
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Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases.” This April 1997 OIG
report was forwarded to appellant and his counsel by the Tioga County
district attorney’s office on May 12, 1998. (Commonwealth’s brief at 4.) In
that letter, appellant was informed that an FBI examiner who performed
analysis in his case was named in the report. The July 2014 OIG review
found further issues and inconsistencies with the FBI laboratory, including
the work of Mr. Malone.
Furthermore, on December 27, 1999, the district attorney’s office
forwarded to appellant an independent case review by Dr. Cathryn L. Levine
of the hair and fiber evidence examined by Mr. Malone in appellant’s case.
So, appellant was put on notice in 1999 at the latest that there were
systemic problems at the FBI laboratory, including with Mr. Malone who
examined the hair and fiber evidence in appellant’s case. In fact, the
November 26, 2014 DOJ letter referenced both the 1997 OIG report and the
1999 independent case review:
We have confirmed that you or your counsel
previously received notice of the 1997 OIG Report
from the prosecutor’s office responsible for the
prosecution at issue, or that you or your counsel
otherwise became aware of the criticisms. We have
also confirmed that an Independent Scientific Review
was conducted in your case and the results were
provided to you or your counsel.
PCRA petition, 1/26/15, Exhibit A; docket #8. Yet, appellant waited
15 years before raising this issue. Thus, appellant cannot establish the
new-facts exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements.
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Moreover, appellant pled nolo contendere and there was no trial.
Mr. Malone never testified, and his 1987 report was never introduced into
evidence. Appellant complains that Mr. Malone’s expert report was a
significant factor in his decision to take a plea. (Appellant’s brief at 9.)
However, in reality, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming, and
appellant conceded as much at the plea hearing. (Commonwealth’s brief at
7-8; notes of testimony, 4/18/88 at 13-14.) There was other physical
evidence placing appellant at the crime scene, recent injuries to appellant’s
face, as well as circumstantial evidence including appellant’s false
statements concerning his whereabouts at the time of the victims’ murders.
(Id.) Therefore, we agree with the PCRA court that the inadmissibility of
Mr. Malone’s report would not have compelled a different verdict. (PCRA
court opinion, 5/12/17 at 2-3.) It is unlikely that appellant’s decision to
plead nolo contendere hinged on Mr. Malone’s expert report.
For these reasons, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing appellant’s
serial PCRA petition without a hearing as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/13/2017
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