Com. v. Manning-Ruffin, D.

J-A24019-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
DEONTA MANNING-RUFFIN, :
:
Appellant : No. 2835 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of September 4, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012734-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2015
I agree with the Majority’s resolution of Appellant’s first two issues.
However, I believe we should rule upon Appellant’s final issue for the sake of
judicial economy, as the trial judge otherwise may impose a similar sentence
at Appellant’s resentencing hearing.
I would hold that a sentence of total confinement based upon the
trivial technical violations present in this case constitutes an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carver, 923 A.2d 495, 498 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (“Technical violations can support revocation and a sentence of
incarceration when such violations are flagrant and indicate an inability to
reform.”); Commonwealth v. Ballard, 814 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Pa. Super.
2003) (“The record in the instant case is devoid of any finding by the court
that revocation of Appellant's probation was predicated on his ‘willful or
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A24019-15
flagrant disrespect’ of the terms of his probation, that revocation was
necessary to ‘vindicate the authority of the court,’ or that Appellant’s
conduct in failing to report evidenced a likelihood that he would commit
another crime if not imprisoned.”). If the two trivial technical violations are
sufficient to warrant total confinement in order to vindicate the authority of
the court, then any violation would be sufficient, and the exception would
have swallowed the rule.
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