Com. v. Shrieves, J.

J-S64027-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES H. SHRIEVES
Appellant No. 346 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-36-CR-0003090-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2015
James Shrieves appeals the January 21, 2015 judgment of sentence.
We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history of
this case:
On June 1, 2013, at approximately 5:15 a.m., Officer [Thomas]
Cole of the Lancaster City Police Department responded to a
cardiac arrest call at [Shrieves’] residence. Upon arrival, Officer
Cole went to the second floor where [Shrieves’] fiancée, [Anika]
Munoz, was located and observed EMTs attempting to revive her
using CPR. Another officer at the scene, Officer Berry,[1]
interviewed [Shrieves] to obtain basic information and
information about the incident. During the conversation,
[Shrieves] appeared concerned, but he was coherent and able to
answer all of the officer’s questions and convey pertinent
medical information about Ms. Munoz. Eventually, medical
personnel decided that Ms. Munoz would be transported to
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Officer Berry’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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Lancaster General Hospital, and she was put into an ambulance.
At that point, the EMTs asked [Shrieves] to gather all of Ms.
Munoz’ medications.
[Shrieves] took a plastic bag, went into the bedroom, opened a
cabinet, and began gathering pill bottles for Ms. Munoz. At this
point, Officer Cole was about three feet behind [Shrieves] in the
second floor bedroom. While [Shrieves] was gathering the pill
bottles, Officer Cole observed a small black and silver scale
inside the medicine cabinet. [Shrieves] was advised that the
ambulance would not wait for him, and that he would have to
leave soon if he wanted to ride in the ambulance. [Shrieves]
then walked over to a small nightstand to reach a smaller shelf
behind it and picked up a large baggie containing multiple
smaller baggies containing white objects inside of them. Officer
Cole was about two or three feet away and was able to observe
[Shrieves’] actions and the baggie. Officer Berry was standing
right next to [Shrieves] and [Shrieves] grabbed the baggie and
closed his hand around it, concealing the entire bag except for a
small portion. Officer Cole asked [Shrieves] what was in his
hand, and [Shrieves] immediately dropped the bag into a purse
in front of him and picked up a set of keys. He told Officer Cole
that he just had keys in his hand.
Officer Cole then looked into the purse, which was open, and
saw the baggie lying right on top of the contents of the purse.
Based on the officer’s twelve years of experience, he believed
the bag contained cocaine. Officer Cole recovered the bag,
confirmed that there were twenty-one individually packed
smaller bags, and searched [Shrieves] for any other contraband.
[Shrieves] asserted that neither he nor Ms. Munoz used crack
cocaine or cocaine. Given the circumstances of Ms. Munoz’
medical condition, [Shrieves] was not placed under arrest, but
rather allowed to go to the hospital to be with his fiancée and
her family. Officer Cole then waited at [Shrieves’] residence to
secure the scene until Officer [Andrew] Nauman arrived.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 2/12/2014, at 1-3 (citations to the certified
record omitted; minor modifications for clarity).
Officer Cole went back to the police station, taking the bag of
suspected cocaine with him, and Officer Nauman proceeded to secure the
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residence. Detective Kurtis Miller met Shrieves at Lancaster General
Hospital and spoke with him in a private conference room. Shrieves gave
Detective Miller written consent to search his residence.
Detective Miller went to Shrieves’ home and informed Officer Nauman
that Shrieves had given him consent to search the premises. Officer
Nauman began searching Shrieves’ bedroom and discovered a Glock .40-
caliber handgun in a dresser drawer. At that point, he and Detective Miller
stopped the search and obtained a warrant to continue searching the home.
In addition to the firearm, Detective Miller found ammunition and multiple
pieces of drug paraphernalia throughout the home. He also learned that the
Glock found in Shrieves’ dresser had been reported stolen.
On June 3, 2013, Shrieves was arrested and charged with possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of drug
paraphernalia, persons not to possess firearms, and receiving stolen
property.2 On September 10, 2013, Shrieves filed a motion to suppress the
physical evidence seized from his home. Therein, Shrieves argued, inter
alia, that Officer Cole illegally seized baggies of crack cocaine from Shrieves’
residence on June 1, 2013. Following a hearing, the trial court denied
Shrieves’ suppression motion on February 12, 2014.
After the trial court, sua sponte, severed the persons not to possess
firearms count from the information, Shrieves proceeded to a jury trial on
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2
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), and 780-113(a)(32); 18 Pa.C.S.
§§ 6105(a)(1), and 3925, respectively.
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that charge alone on November 12, 2014. On November 13, 2014, the jury
found Shrieves guilty of persons not to possess a firearm. Shrieves then
proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining charges. On January 21, 2015,
the trial court found Shrieves guilty of PWID and possession of drug
paraphernalia. On that same day, the trial court sentenced Shrieves to four
to eight years’ imprisonment for persons not to possess a firearm and
eighteen to thirty-six months’ imprisonment for PWID, which the trial court
imposed concurrently.
On February 20, 2015, Shrieves filed a notice of appeal. On March 10,
2015, the trial court ordered Shrieves to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Shrieves timely
complied. On April 17, 2015, the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion.
Shrieves presents one issue for our consideration:
Did police exceed their right to enter Shrieves’ residence
pursuant to a 9-1-1 call for medical assistance after they
discovered the emergency was being handled by EMTs, and
unlawfully remain there after the ambulance had transported the
patient; thus, were [sic] contraband observed when police
entered Shrieves’ bedroom, and evidence seized pursuant to a
consent search the fruit[s] of police illegally entering and
remaining in the residence, and should this evidence have been
suppressed?
Brief for Shrieves at 4 (minor modifications for clarity).
In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a
suppression motion, we are limited to determining whether the
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the
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Commonwealth prevailed in the suppression court, we may
consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when
read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by
those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). Our scope of review in suppression matters includes only the
suppression hearing record, and excludes any evidence elicited at trial. See
In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013).
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that “searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). To resolve this case, we must discuss
two such exceptions.
The first exception, the emergency aid exception, applies when “police
reasonably believe that someone within a residence is in need of immediate
aid.” Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 795 (Pa. 2009); see also
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches
when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate
aid.”). The rationale for this exception is that “[t]he need to protect or
preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be
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otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at
392 (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.
1963)).
The second exception to the Fourth Amendment that is applicable in
this case, the plain view doctrine, permits police to seize an object without a
warrant when: “(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point;
(2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and
(3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.” Commonwealth
v. Miller, 56 A.3d 424, 429 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v.
Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc)). Because the doctrine
requires police to be lawfully present in an area when they observe the
contraband, the plain view “exception” perhaps is best understood not as an
exception to the Fourth Amendment at all. The plain view doctrine merely
acts as an extension of some other justification, which gave the police a
“lawful right of access” to the object in the first instance. See
Commonwealth v. Graham, 721 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. 1998) (“[U]nder
the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not seize contraband in plain view
unless a prior justification provided the officer a lawful ‘right of access to the
item.’”). Thus, although the case sub judice implicates the plain view
doctrine, we first must determine whether the emergency aid exception
justified Officer Cole’s presence in Shrieves’ home at the time of the seizure.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the emergency aid
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in Mincey. In
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that case, an undercover police officer arranged to purchase heroin at an
apartment, and arrived with nine additional plainclothes officers. The lead
officer slipped into the apartment and quickly moved into the bedroom. The
other officers heard a “rapid volley of shots,” and saw the lead officer
collapse onto the floor. Id. at 387. He died a few hours later.
After the shooting, the officers performed a cursory search for
additional victims, but refrained from any further investigation. They found
four other injured persons in the apartment, and requested emergency
assistance. Within ten minutes, homicide detectives arrived and undertook
an “exhaustive and intrusive” warrantless search of the apartment, which
lasted four days. Id. at 389. The detectives opened drawers, closets, and
cabinets, and inspected their contents; they emptied clothing pockets; they
dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors; they pulled up sections of
the carpet and removed them. The detectives closely examined and
inventoried every item in the apartment. They seized over 200 items.
The Mincey Court began by acknowledging that “the Fourth
Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and
searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of
immediate aid.” Id. at 392. Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that a
warrantless search “must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation.’” Id. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1968)). In refusing to apply the emergency aid exception under these
circumstances, the Court emphasized that the first team of officers had
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already located all of the victims in the apartment before the homicide
detectives had even arrived to begin their search. The Court explained that
the four-day search, which included ripping up carpets, could “hardly be
rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency
search.” Id. at 393.
There can be little doubt that the facts of the case sub judice warrant
application of the emergency aid exception. The relevant inquiry is “whether
there was an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical
assistance was needed, or persons were in danger[.]” Commonwealth v.
Potts, 73 A.3d 1275, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Michigan v. Fisher,
558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009)). Shrieves does not dispute that his 911 call,
wherein he reported that his fiancée had suffered cardiac arrest, gave the
police an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance
was needed. See Brief for Shrieves at 17. Instead, Shrieves argues that,
once “Ms. Munoz was removed to the ambulance, there was no longer any
basis for the police to remain in the residence while [Shrieves] collected Ms.
Munoz’ medication.” Id. We disagree.
The question of whether Ms. Munoz’ medical emergency had dissipated
before Officer Cole observed Shrieves attempting to conceal baggies of crack
cocaine is crucial to resolving this case. If Officer Cole’s presence in the
home was no longer justified by the emergency aid exception, then the plain
view doctrine does not apply. See Mincey, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)
(“[T]he police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course
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of their legitimate emergency activities.”); Graham, 721 A.2d at 1079
(“[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not seize contraband in
plain view unless a prior justification provided the officer a lawful ‘right of
access to the item.’”).
A warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation. As to what may be done
by the police or other public authorities once they are inside the
premises, this must be assessed upon a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the type of emergency which appeared to be
present. . . . The officer’s post-entry conduct must be carefully
limited to achieving the objective which justified the entry—the
officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain
whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that
assistance.
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a) (5th ed. 2012) (footnotes
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the medical emergency had not yet dissipated when Officer
Cole observed in plain view Shrieves attempting to conceal baggies of crack
cocaine. While the EMTs attempted to resuscitate Ms. Munoz in the
bedroom, Shrieves spoke with police in the hallway. He relayed to the police
Ms. Munoz’ basic demographic information, her symptoms, her medical
history, and the name of her physician. As the EMTs moved Ms. Munoz out
to the ambulance, one of them asked Officer Cole and Shrieves about Ms.
Munoz’ current prescriptions. Shrieves said that he would gather Ms. Munoz’
medication bottles. Officer Cole followed Shrieves into the bedroom and told
him that he needed to hurry if he wanted to go to the hospital in the
ambulance. When Officer Cole saw Shrieves discard crack cocaine, he asked
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Shrieves “if Ms. Munoz, by chance, used drugs at all.” Notes of Testimony,
12/6/2013, at 16. Officer Cole told Shrieves that “it was important for [the]
EMTs to know” if Ms. Munoz had used any controlled substances, and that it
would help them treat her. Id. Officer Cole did not arrest Shrieves at that
time.
When responding to emergencies such as this one, police, fire, and
medical personnel must act swiftly and efficiently. It is reasonable to expect
that EMTs might depend upon responding police officers to collect vital
information needed to accurately diagnose and treat the patient. That is
exactly what happened in this case. Unlike in Mincey, supra, where the
police undertook an exhaustive warrantless search, which lasted four days,
Officer Cole’s conduct was limited to assisting the EMTs during a medical
emergency. Accordingly, we reject Shrieves’ argument that Officer Cole was
not legally present in Shrieves’ bedroom when he seized the crack cocaine.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2015
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