Com. v. Neal, A.

J-S29025-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
ALLEN NEAL
Appellant No. 2462 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated July 11, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000225-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2017
Appellant Allen Neal appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
after he was convicted of two counts of indecent assault.1 We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for imposition of a twenty-five year registration
requirement under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10–9799.41 (SORNA).
The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
[Appellant] and the victim, Karina Zelaya-Betancourt, had
been best friends for approximately six or seven years prior to
this incident, which occurred in the early morning hours on
December 14, 2014. Following a night out, [Appellant], the
victim, and several friends went to the victim’s apartment to
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(1) (without complainant’s consent) and (a)(4)
(unconscious complainant).
J-S29025-17
continue the party. As the party died down, most of the guests
left until only [Appellant], the victim, and the victim’s friend,
Amanda Belen, remained. The victim went to sleep in her
daughter’s bedroom[2] because Ms. Belen had already gone to
sleep in her room. [Appellant], after checking in on the victim,
went to sleep on the living room couch.
At approximately 8:00 a.m., the victim was awoken by a
“pain anally and I saw [Appellant] over me and I just told him to
get off of me.” She testified that she had been sleeping on her
stomach and that her pajama pants and underwear had been
pulled down. [Appellant] was mostly clothed but the victim “saw
him like tuck himself back in before he got off of me” and
“walked to the living room.” On cross-examination, the victim
conceded that she did not actually see [Appellant]’s penis.
Following the assault, the victim felt wetness on her buttocks
area. She went into the bathroom, wiped the area with baby
wipes, and discovered that she was bleeding from her anus.
Some of the bloody wipes were flushed down the toilet, but
several others were thrown into the trashcan. . . .
After wiping herself off, the victim went into her bedroom,
where Amanda Belen had been sleeping until she was awoken
after hearing the victim yell at [Appellant]. The victim then
called another friend, who lived close by and had been present
the night before, to escort [Appellant] out of the apartment.
[Appellant] complied without incident.
Subsequently, the victim was taken to Pocono Medical Center
and the police were called. At the hospital, the victim was
examined by Rose Reyes, R.N., a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
(SANE). During the examination, the victim provided a
statement to Nurse Reyes and Detective Robert Miller of the
Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department (PMRPD).
Nurse Reyes, who qualified as an expert SANE nurse, testified
that, at the beginning of the examination, the victim was crying
and recounted the facts summarized above. During the
interview portion of the examination, the victim completed a
____________________________________________
2
The victim’s daughter was not in the apartment that night.
-2-
J-S29025-17
questionnaire, which asked various questions, including one
central to this appeal: whether the victim had consensual sex in
the previous five days. On the questionnaire, the victim
responded that she had not. . . .
During her physical examination of the victim, Nurse Reyes
discovered “tearing in the anal area. It was mostly toward the 5
and 8 o’clock area. There was tiny little skin tears with a little
tiny bit of bleeding more so to the 5:00 and 6:00 area.” Nurse
Reyes opined that these tears were consistent with trauma.
Nurse Reyes took swabs of the victim’s mouth, anus, and
vagina, which were provided to the police.
Trial Ct. Op., 10/5/16, at 2-4 (citations to the record omitted).
Appellant was arrested and taken to police headquarters, where, after
being given Miranda3 warnings, he provided a recorded interview. After the
interview, police went to Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt’s apartment and collected
evidence, including the bloody wipes in the trashcan. The evidence gathered
by Nurse Reyes and the police, together with a DNA swab from Appellant,
was sent to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab for testing and analysis.
Trial Ct. Op. at 4.
Appellant was charged with rape of an unconscious victim, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, two counts of aggravated
indecent assault, and two counts of indecent assault. A jury was selected on
April 5, 2016, and the evidentiary portion of Appellant’s trial began on
April 18, 2016. Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Prior to the evidentiary portion of the
trial, the Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to play the recorded
____________________________________________
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-3-
J-S29025-17
interview Appellant had given to the police. Citing the Rape Shield Law, 18
Pa.C.S. § 3104,4 the Commonwealth sought to redact references Appellant
had made during the interview to Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt’s alleged sexual
encounter with another male the night before the incident in this case.
Appellant objected to the redaction, and the court reserved ruling on the
issue until more context was provided as the trial progressed. Trial Ct. Op.
at 5.
Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt testified and was cross-examined about the
statement she gave at the hospital; she confirmed that she had checked a
box to indicate that she had not had consensual sex in the five days
preceding the incident. Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4. The Commonwealth’s DNA
expert later testified that the DNA of three individuals – Appellant, Ms.
Zelaya-Betancourt, and an unidentified person – was present on the wipes.
Further, analysis of Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt’s rectal swab did not reveal
Appellant’s DNA but did reveal male DNA that was not Appellant’s. Id. at 4-
5.
At the end of the first day of testimony, the trial court addressed
whether Appellant’s allegation that Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt had sex with
another man the night before the incident should be redacted from
Appellant’s statement to the police. Appellant argued that the inconsistency
____________________________________________
4
As discussed in greater detail later in this memorandum, the Rape Shield
Law places limits on the admissibility of evidence regarding past sexual
conduct of a sexual assault victim.
-4-
J-S29025-17
between Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt’s assertion that she had not had sex in the
five days preceding the incident and the DNA expert’s testimony regarding
the presence of a third person’s DNA created an issue as to Ms. Zelaya-
Betancourt’s credibility. Trial Ct. Op. at 6. Appellant contended that this
credibility issue allowed him to introduce the portion of his statement about
Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt’s prior sexual encounter, notwithstanding the
prohibition in the Rape Shield Law. The trial court did not make a ruling at
that time, and requested that the parties conduct additional research on the
issue. The next morning, Appellant withdrew his objection to the redaction.
The redacted version of the interview was played for the jury.
After the Commonwealth rested, Appellant called Arthur Young as a
DNA expert. As the trial court explained:
In large measure, Mr. Young agreed with the police analysts,
including their conclusion that the bloody wipes most likely
contained the DNA of [Appellant], the victim, and an unknown
person. Mr. Young also agreed that the DNA analysis of the
rectal swab revealed the presence of male DNA that was not
contributed by [Appellant].
Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7 (citations to the record omitted).
Appellant then stated he would be recalling Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt,
and the court held a sidebar. The Commonwealth asked for an offer of
proof. Appellant responded that due to testimony regarding the DNA of a
third person and Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt’s statement that she had not had
sex in the five days preceding the incident, “the credibility of a witness is
now in play.” N.T., 4/19/16, at 157. Appellant sought to ask Ms. Zelaya-
-5-
J-S29025-17
Betancourt why the DNA of a third person was found on the rectal swab. Id.
at 156. The Commonwealth responded that Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt had
already been asked whether she had sex in the five days preceding the
incident; the presence of a third person’s DNA did not mean that Ms. Zelaya-
Betancourt had sex with the third person; Appellant’s proposed line of
questioning was prohibited by the substance of the Rape Shield Law; and
Appellant failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Rape
Shield Law. Id. at 157-58.
The trial court ruled that Appellant could not ask Ms. Zelaya-
Betancourt about having sex with anyone else, but could call Ms. Zelaya-
Betancourt to testify regarding matters not covered by the Rape Shield Law.
The court reasoned that (1) Appellant had not satisfied the procedural
requirements of the Rape Shield Law by filing a timely written motion; and
(2) credibility as a general concept did not trump the Rape Shield Law. N.T.,
4/19/16, at 159-60. After the trial court announced its ruling, Appellant
decided not to call Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt.
On April 20, 2016, the jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of
indecent assault. The jury found Appellant not guilty of all other charges.
On July 11, 2016, the trial court imposed a sentence of twelve to sixty
months’ incarceration. Appellant was classified as a Tier III sex offender
under Section 9799.14(d)(16) of SORNA, which meant that he would be
subject to a lifetime registration requirement. Section 9799.14(d)(16)
-6-
J-S29025-17
provides for a Tier III classification if an offender has had “[t]wo or more
convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9799.14(d)(16). On August 4, 2016, Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal.
In this appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, as stated in his
brief:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion under the 6th Amendment
confrontation clause of [the] United States Constitution where
[the] victim claims sexual assault of her rectum by [Appellant]
and [a] rectal swab of [the] victim shows the presence of a male
contributor not that of [A]ppellant and [A]ppellant wishes to
question [the] victim as to her credibility and possible motive for
bias?
Whether [Appellant] is subject to Tier III lifetime Megan’s Law[5]
Registration.
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Appellant’s Confrontation Claim
Appellant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
precluding him from questioning Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt regarding the
alleged inconsistency between her statement that she had not had
consensual sex in the five days preceding the incident and the presence of
another person’s DNA on her rectal swab. Appellant contends that this line
of questioning related to Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt’s credibility and was not
precluded under the Rape Shield Law.
____________________________________________
5
“Megan’s Law was the predecessor statute to SORNA.” Commonwealth
v. Evans, 138 A.3d 28, 30 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016).
-7-
J-S29025-17
In Commonwealth v. Burns, we stated:
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence of the
sexual history of a sexual abuse complainant will be reversed
only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse
of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in
reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the
judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence or
the record, discretion is abused.
988 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (citations and quotation
marks omitted), appeal denied, 8 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2010). Whether a
defendant has been denied the right to confront a witness under the
Confrontation Clause is a question of law which we review de novo. See
Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 530 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2662 (2014).
The trial court denied Appellant’s request to question Ms. Zelaya-
Betancourt in light of the Rape Shield Law, which provides:
§ 3104. Evidence of victim’s sexual conduct
(a) General rule.—Evidence of specific instances of the alleged
victim’s past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged
victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the
alleged victim’s past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in
prosecutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged
victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of
the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise
admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.
(b) Evidentiary proceedings.—A defendant who proposes to
offer evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct
pursuant to subsection (a) shall file a written motion and offer of
proof at the time of trial. If, at the time of trial, the court
determines that the motion and offer of proof are sufficient on
their faces, the court shall order an in camera hearing and shall
-8-
J-S29025-17
make findings on the record as to the relevance and admissibility
of the proposed evidence pursuant to the standards set forth in
subsection (a).
18 Pa.C.S. § 3104. This Court has explained:
The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a trial from
shifting its focus from the culpability of the accused toward the
virtue and chastity of the victim. The Rape Shield Law is
intended to exclude irrelevant and abusive inquiries regarding
prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants.
Burns, 988 A.2d at 689 (footnote and citations omitted).
With regard to the procedural requirements of the Rape Shield Law,
“[w]e have repeatedly stated that a defendant who desires to introduce
evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct must file a written motion and
make a specific offer of proof prior to trial. We will presume that the
legislature intended ‘shall’ to be mandatory in the statute at hand.” Burns,
988 A.2d at 690-91 (citations omitted).
Substantively, “the Rape Shield law will bow to a defendant’s right to
confront and cross-examine when a specific proffer demonstrates that the
proposed inquiry is intended to elicit relevant evidence, which is more
probative than prejudicial, and which is not cumulative of other evidence
available without encroaching upon Rape Shield Law protections.”
Commonwealth v. Nieves, 582 A.2d 341, 347 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeal
denied, 600 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1991). “If the offer of proof shows only that
others in addition to the defendant had sexual contact with the victim, but
does not show how the evidence would exonerate the defendant, evidence of
-9-
J-S29025-17
prior sexual activity is inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law.”
Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235, 1242-43 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citations omitted).
After careful review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the opinion
by the Honorable Jonathan Mark, we conclude that Appellant’s first issue
merits no relief. The trial court’s opinion comprehensively discusses and
properly disposes of this issue. See Trial Ct. Op. at 12-15 (explaining (1)
Appellant failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Rape
Shield Law; (2) “the evidence [Appellant] sought to introduce to address
credibility was heard by the jury, albeit without reference to the alleged
sexual encounter with a man the night before, through the testimony of the
victim and the reports and testimony of the experts”; and (3) Appellant’s
general credibility argument was insufficient to trump the Rape Shield Law).
With respect to Appellant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right
to confront Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt through cross-examination, we note that
the trial court did not preclude Appellant from recalling Ms. Zelaya-
Betancourt as a witness. Rather, the court merely applied the Rape Shield
Law’s restrictions on the admissibility of evidence of past sexual conduct in
limiting the questions that Appellant could ask if he questioned Ms. Zelaya-
Betancourt; Appellant was free to confront Ms. Zelaya-Betancourt through
other areas of questioning, but elected not to do so once the trial court
made clear that his questioning had to conform to the Rape Shield Law’s
- 10 -
J-S29025-17
requirements. Enforcement of rules regarding the admissibility of evidence
is not a violation of the constitutional right to confront witnesses. See
Commonwealth v. Quartman, 458 A.2d 994, 996 (Pa. Super. 1983) (“The
fundamental right to confront witnesses often gives way . . . to certain
evidentiary principles.”). Appellant therefore is not entitled to relief on this
issue.
SORNA Registration Period
In his second issue, Appellant argues that, in light of recent guidance
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, he should be classified as a Tier II
offender, rather than a Tier III offender, under SORNA. The Commonwealth
and the trial court both agree with Appellant’s position. See Trial Ct. Op. at
15-17; Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.
We also agree. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Lutz–Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2016), was issued
on August 15, 2016, after the trial court in this case classified Appellant as a
Tier III offender. The Supreme Court in Lutz–Morrison held that Section
9799.14(d)(16) of SORNA “requires an act, a conviction, and a subsequent
act to trigger lifetime registration for multiple offenses otherwise subject to a
fifteen- or twenty-five-year period of registration.” Lutz–Morrison, 143
A.3d at 895 (citation omitted). Appellant was convicted of two counts of
indecent assault in this case, but his conduct did not involve an act, a
conviction, and a subsequent act within the meaning of Lutz-Morrison. As
- 11 -
J-S29025-17
the trial court explained, Appellant’s “Indecent Assault convictions arose
from a single act that was [Appellant]’s initial act for registration purposes.
Accordingly we agree that [Appellant] is not subject to lifetime registration
under SORNA.” Trial Ct. Op. at 16.
The most serious crime of which Appellant was convicted was indecent
assault of an unconscious person, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4), a Tier II offense.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 16; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(c)(1.3). Appellant’s
registration period should therefore be twenty-five years. See Trial Ct. Op.
at 16; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(2). Accordingly, with the benefit of the
Supreme Court’s recent statutory construction, and because the
Commonwealth also conceded Appellant is due relief, we vacate the lifetime
registration portion of Appellant’s sentence and remand for imposition of a
twenty-five year registration requirement under SORNA.
In sum, we vacate the lifetime registration portion of Appellant’s
sentence and remand for imposition of a twenty-five year registration
requirement under SORNA. In all other respects, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence is affirmed. Because we affirm in part based on the trial court’s
opinion, the parties are instructed to attach a copy of the trial court’s
October 5, 2016 opinion to any future filing referencing this Court’s decision.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the memorandum.
Judge Lazarus notes dissent.
- 12 -
J-S29025-17
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/11/2017
- 13 -
Circulated 08/17/2017 03:20 PM
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-TI-IIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 225 CRIMINAL 2015
v.
APPEAL DOCKET NO.
2462 EDA 2016
ALLEN NEAL, JR,
Defendant
OPINION IN SUPPORT QF ORDERPU_RSUANT IO Pa. R.A.P.1925(aj
Defendant fi~ed an appeal from the judgment of sentence ordering him to serve
one to five years' imprisonment and c!assifyrng him as a Tier Ill sexual offender based
on his jury trial conviction of two counts of Indecent Assault. On appeal, Defendant
alleqes that vvr-3 erred by: 1) "deny! n9 him the ability" to recall the victim on his side of
the case; and 2) classifying him. as a Tier !II sexual offender under the Sexual Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §9799.10 et. seq. Regarding
the offender classification, Defendant suggests that if the conviction is upheld he should
be classified as a 'Tier-·I offender subject to ten year registration."
For the following reasons, Defendant's first assignment of error lacks merit As to
the sex offender classification claim, we agree that the intervening change in the law
referenced in Defendant's Rule 1925(b) statement requires that Defendant be
reclassified. However, he should be reclassified as a Tier II twenty-five year registrant
rather than as a Tier I offender.
1
\ I
BACKGROUND
Defendant was arrested and charged with Rape of an unconscious person,
Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with an unconscious person, Sexual Assault,
Aggravated Indecent Assault of an unconscious person, Aggravated Indecent Assault
without consent, Indecent Assault of an unconscious person, and Indecent assault
without consent. A jury was selected on April 5, 20i6. The evidentiary portion of trial
commenced on April 18, 2016. On April 20, 2016, the jury convicted Defendant of
Indecent Assault of an unconscious person and Indecent Assault without consent
Defendant was acquitted of the other charges.
The facts and procedural history relevant to Defendant's first assignment of error
were brought out during trial. In summary:
Defendant and the victim, Karina Zelaya-Betancourt, had been best friends for
approximately six or seven years pnor to this incident, which occurred in the early
morning hours on December 14, 20'!4. Following a night out, Defendant, the victim, and
several friends went to the victim's apartment to continue the party. As the party die1d
down, most of the guests left until only Defendant, the victim, and the victim's friend,
Amanda Belen, remained. The victim went to sleep in her daughter's bedroom because
Ms. Belen had already gone to sleep in her room. Defendant, after checking in on the
victim, went to sleep on the Irving room couch. (N.T. 4/18/2016, pp. 64-65).
At approximately 8:00 a.m., the victim was awoken by a "pain anally and I saw
[Defendant] over me and I just told him to get off of me." Id. She testified that she had
been sleeping on her stomach and that her pajama pants and underwear had been
pulled down. Defendant was mostly clothed but the victim "saw him like tuck himself
2
back in before he got off of me" and "walked to the living room." (N.T., 4/18/2016, pp.
65-66). On cross-examination, the victim conceded that she did not actually see
Defendant's penis. (N.T., 4/18/2016, p. 111).
Following the assault, the victim felt wetness on her buttocks area. She went into
the bathroom, wiped the area with baby wipes, and discovered that she was bleeding
from her anus. Some of the bloody wipes were flushed down the toilet, but several
others were thrown into the trashcan. The wipes in the trashcan were later recovered by
investigators.
After wiping herself off, the victim went into her bedroom, where Amanda Belen
had been sleeping until she was awoken after hearing the victim yell at Defendant. The
victim then called another friend, who lived close by and had been present the night
before, to escort Defendant out of the apartment. (N.T., 4/18/2016, pp. 66-70).
Defendant complied without incident.
Subsequently, the. victim was taken to Pocono Medical Center and the police
were called. At the hospital, the victim was examined by Rose Reyes, R. N., a Sexual
Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE). During the examination, the victim provided a
statement to Nurse Reyes and Detective Robert Miller of the Pocono Mountain Regional
Police Department (PMRPD). (N.T., 4/18/2016, p. 70).
Nurse Reyes, who qualified as an expert SANE nurse, testified that, at the
beginning of the examination, the victim was crying and recounted the facts
summarized above. During the interview portion of the examination, the victim
completed a questionnaire, which asked various questions, including one central to this
appeal: whether the victim had consensual sex in the previous five days. On the
3
questionnaire, the victim responded that she had not. (N.T., 4/18/2016, p. 119). On
cross-examination, defense counsel went over the form with the victim, and the victim
confirmed that she had checked the box accordingly_. Id.
During her physical examination of the victim, Nurse Reyes discovered "tearing
in the anal area. It was mostly toward the 5 and 8 o'clock area. There was tiny little skin
tears with a little tiny bit of bleeding more so to the 5:0b and 6:00 area." (N: T.,
4/18/2016, p. 161). Nurse Reyes opined that these tears were consistent with trauma. 1--
(N.T., 4/18/2016, p. 171). Nurse Reyes took swabs of.the victim's mouth, anus, and
vagina, which were provided to the police.
After the SANE examination was completed, Defendant was arrested and taken
to PMRPD headquarters, where he was Mirandized and questioned by Detective Miller
in a recorded interview. (N.T., 4/19/2016, pp. 6-18). After conducting the interview,
Detective Miller and several PMRPD officers went to the victim's residence to collect
evidence. They took _photographs of the bedroom and the trashcan, gathered several
items of clothing, and collected the bloody wipes from the trashcan. (N.T., 4/19/2016,
pp. 18-21).
The evidence gathered by Nurse Reyes and the police, together with a buccal
DNA swab of Defendant, was sent to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab for
testing and analysis. At trial, the Commonwealth called a seroloqist.and a forensic DNA
analyst from the Crime Lab to testify about their analyses and testing of the evidence.
For clarity's sake, the rectal swab and. the bloody wipes are the pieces of
evidence that are relevant to this appeal. The DNA analyst testified that the DNA of
three individuals - the victim, Defendant, and an unidentified person - was found on the
.4
wipes. Specifically, he stated that testing of the wipes revealed "[a] partial DNA profile
that was consistent with a mixture of at least three individuals [] [] from the non-sperm-,___~
portion of the tissue." (N.T., 4/18/2016, p. 216). As to the likelihood that the DNA found
on the wipes came from the victim and Defendant, the analyst stated: -----············-······-·
[t]he results that I obtained stated that it was 4. 7 tredecillion times
more likely in the Caucasian population, 120 duodecillion times
more likely in the African American popu!atimram:f-19 duodecillion
times more Hkely in the Hispanic population that [the victim] and
[Deferidant's] DN.t.. was present in this mixture than not
(N.T., 4/18/2016, p. 219).
The. DNA analyst also performed a ONA analysis on the victim's rectal swab,
which revealed the presence of male DNA. However, the DNA did not belong· to
Defendant. {N.T.i4/1a/201E.tp.. 2'24f.
Aft.er the CriiT,e Lab analysts. testified, aredacted version of the recorded
interview Detective ivrnk~r conducted witi1 l:.kifF.mdant was played. Redaction occurred
f> after consultation · between the Court and counsel for both parties which included
.. . . ' ' . .
discussion of Rape Shield. Law issues that are the same as, or at least similar to, the .. ,I
· issues implicated by Defendant's first assignment of error. I
Prior to the evidentiary portion of trial, the Cornmonwealth gave notice that it
intended to play the recorded interview .. However, citing the Rape Shield Law, 1 f;
Pa.C.S.A. Section 3104. the Commonwealth sought to redact references made by
-~-. ;
Defendant to the victim's alleged sexual encounter with an unknown male the night
before the incident that gave rise to this case. Defendant objected to redaction and we
reserved ruling on the Issue until more context was provided as the trial unfolded and
developed.
5
After the first day of trial, we discussed the issue with the parties on the record
after the jury had been excused. Defense counsel argued that
So you know now we have this statement where no - and yet we
have this evidence that came in today from the Commonwealth's
witnesses; it wasn't my evidence Your Honor it was their evidence
okay which said that their swab - their DNA swab was - three
people on there. Not just [Defendant] but [the victim] and also a
third so I think it goes to the credibility as to what's on that DNA
swab and whether or not she had relations the night before.
(N.T., 4/18/2016, p. 244). We expressed an initial belief that the evidence would be
inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law, but instructed the parties to research and be
prepared to argue, the issue in more detail the next morning to assist us in making a
final ruling. However, the following morning, defense counsel withdrew his objection
with respect to redacting this portion of the transcript. (N.T., 4/19/2016, p. 4).
Accordingly, the redacted version of the recording was played.
After the Commonwealth rested, Defendant called Arthur Young, a scientist who
r qualified as an expert ·Jn the fields of serology, forensic DNA analysis, and Y-STR
! analysis. Prior to trial, Mr. Young reviewed the reports generated by the serologist and
the forensic DNA analyst from the Pennsylvania State Police. Additionally, he was
present and heard the majority of the trial testimony. He testified in detail regarding
serology and DNA analyses, the reports prepared by the State Police serologist and
DNA analyst, the tests used by the police, and how the tests can produce false
positives. In large measure, Mr. Young agreed with the police analysts, including their
conclusion that the bloody wipes most likely contained the DNA of Defendant, the
victim, and an unknown person. Mr. Young also agreed that the DNA analysis of the
6
rectal swab revealed the presence of male DNA that was not contributed by Defendant.
(N.T., 4/19/2016, pp. 103-04,108-09).
Counsel for Defendant then announced that he would be recalling the victim. At
that point, the Commonwealth asked for and was granted a sidebar outside ofthe jury's
hearing. After a very lengthy discussion, we ruled that Defendant could recall the victim
but would not be permitted to question her regarding the alleged sexual encounter with
the unknown male, as this evidence was prohibited by the Rape Shield Law. (N.T.,
4/19/2016, pp. 155--71 ). It ts this ruling that forms the basis of Defendant's first
assignment of error.
During the sidebar, the Commonwealth asked for an offer of proof as to why
Defendant wanted to recall the victim. Defendant's attorney responded that:
Our offer of proof is that we're calling [the victim] because we
believe that there is a serious question as to credibility regarding
this third person. VVfJ think we've established that there is a third
person. VVe've estanhshed it not only in the first set of DNA swabs
that were submitted to the crime [lab]; but also to the second set of
DNA swabs that wers submitted to the crime lab. So there is a third
person.
r In the first set of DNA swabs for the rectal we have a male; an
unidentified male .and that came· from the rectal swab. So we
believe at this particular point - and we're going to call her and
question her regarding as to why that is the case:
I think it goes to her credibility. She testified under oath that she
didn't have· any other relations for five rh~ys preceding, okay; and
although the district attorney might want to characterize this as
Rape Shieldl did)ook up the law last night and I do believe that the
credibility of a witness is now in play and I think we've established
certainly prima fade evidence that there is a third person that's
been involved in this woman's life and I don't believe she told the -
truth.
(N.T., 4/19/2016,.pp.1.59-57). The assistant ~,strict attorney argued that the question of
whether or not the victim. had had sex in the prevlous-five days had been asked and
answered, that the presence of DNA on the rectal swab did not mean that semen was
present, and that such questioning is prohibited by the Rape Shield Law. Addltlonall» ',,--.+----
he pointed out that the Rape Shield law nas notice. requirements which were not met in
this case. (N.T., 4/19/20i6, pp.157-58).
After hearing the arguments of both attorneys and noting that this issue should
have been raised earlier, either pretrial or during the mmning-when we had set aside
time to hear argument on redaction of the recording and application of the Rape Shield
Law, we articulated the reasons for our ruling:
Well, here's the thing; procedurally I still think if you want to get into
Rape Shield then there is a procedural component to this and I
indicated yesterday both before and after the cross-examination
you're ta!krng about that the procedure hadn't been met and it still
hasn't been. There's no written motion and no timely motion.
Second, with respect to credibility, I think it's pretty clear that in
genera! you. can properly ask a witness questions that would go to
credibility and judging the veracity of his or her testimony; however,
in the context of Rape Shield just credibility by itself I have to
disagree with [D~fendant]. As a general concept it doesn't· trump
the Rape Shield Law. It has to be sornethinq with respect to motive,
bias, those typesof things.
So had there been any indication for example that [the victim's] 1
...,. boyfriend came back from Vegas early and saw [Defendant] in the
place and that she might have cried rape because she got caught
with someone else in her house; that might be a whole different
story. Then you have the constitutional issues and you have her
credibility, etc.; but just to say that I .want to ask her about
something that has to do with sex because she just said she didn't
have it; that's just a back door attempt around the Rape Shield law
and that's not required as far as the cases I've seen.
Having said all that, I'm not sure l can necessarily preclude the
witness because I think there are questions that can legitimately be
asked that might not implicate the Rape Shield Law; but if you're
asking me if you can ask her ff she had - to talk about sex or
someone else having sex, absolutely not.
8
(N.T., 4/19/2016, pp.159-60).
We subsequently gave counsel for Defendant the opportunity to refine his offer of
proof, his arguments, and the scope of the questions he wanted to ask and the subjects
..
about which he wanted to inquire. For reasons stated on the record, we did not modify
our ruling. (N.T., 4/19/2016, pp. 160-71).
Defeneant--ane-his-att0mey-t1ltimately-eleeted-not-t0-:-recall the victim .1 Instead, on
the third morning of trial, after several defense exhibits that were admitted, the defense
rested. The jury then found Defendant guilty of two counts of Indecent Assault.
On July 11, 2016, we sentenced Defendant to incarceration of twelve to sixty
months. In accordance with the holding and rationale of our Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Mero/fa, 909 A.2d 337 (Pa. Super. 2006), which we determined was
at the time the controlling precedent, we classified Defendant as a Tier Ill sex offender
and required that he register under SORNA for life. As noted, Defendant's second
assignment
.
of error takes
.~:. issue with the SO RNA classification.
DISCUS ION
1. DefeDdant's First Assignm~nt of Error Lacks. Merit as the Court Did Nq!
Improperly Preclude Defendant from Recalling the Victim
In his first assignment of error, Defendant alleges that:
the trial court abused its discretion AND committed reversible error
when it denied [Defendant] the ability to recall the victim in this
matter after the Commonwealth rested, AND appellant laid an
1
After the victim testified at trial, the Commonwealth asked that she be excused. Counsel for Defendant objected
and indicated that the victim was under his subpoena as wellas the Commonwealth's. We told the victim that she
was not excused from her subpoenas. We allowed the victim to leave the Courtroom and the Courthouse, but
instructed that she must provide contact information and be available on relatively short notice for recall. (N.T.,
4/18/2016, p. 140). Thus, the victim was available for recall.
9
evidentiary foundation, wherein, the victim's credlbillty was at issue
regarding the physical location of her claimed assault:
Victim claimed she woke up bleedlng from her anus. DNA evidence
provided by the Commonwealth demonstrated that male DNA was
not [Defendant's]. Rather, the 'rectal swab taken from the victim's
anus during her rape examination demonstrated that the DNA
located on the swab was another male's DNA. Denial of
[Defendant] to to [sic] question the victim as to her credibility as to
this vital and material point was an abuse of discretion by the trial
court judge becaue . [sicJ it denied Defendant. his right to
confrontation under Artide~-Secttun-0- of the -PennsylvaAia---------
Constitution and 6111 Amendment "Of the United States Constitution's . ..... -
confrontation clause, and thereby denied (Defendant] of a fair trial
AND liberty without due process of. law under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
(Defendant's 1925(b) 'Statement, filed 8/25/2016). Put simply, and reading. this
assignment of error to include omitted references, Defendant believes that he should
have had the opportunity to question the victim as to why another male's DNA was
found on the rectal swab lf,as indicated ·011 a hospital form, she had not had consensual
sex wrthin the previ ous fiva d:ay -- anotaer attempt tc delve into her alleged encounter
with a man the night before the incident. Defendant's belief and the assignment of error
to which the belief gave rise lack merit.
The Rape Shield Law provides, in pertinent part
(a) General rule. ···· Evidence of specuic instances of the alleged
victim's · past· sexual conduct, opinion. evidence of the alleqed
victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged
victim's past sexustconduct shall not.be admissible in prosecutions
under this chapter except evidence of the alleged victim's past
sexual· conduct .with the -defendant where consent of the alleged
victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible
pursuantto the rules of evidence.
(b) Evidentiary proceedings .. -- A defendant who proposes to offer
evidence of the aileged victim's past sexual conduct· pursuant to
subsection (a). shall file a written motion and offer of proof at the.
time of triaL·.!f, atthetime of trial, the court determines that the
10
motion.and offer of proof are sufficient on their faces, the court shall
order an in camera hearing and shall make findings on the record
as to .the relevance and admissibility of the proposed evidence
pursuant to the standards set forth in subsection (a). -··-
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104.
The bar to evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct is not absolute and is
subject to certain statutory and constitutional exceptions. The lone statutory exception,
included in the language of Section 3104(a); allows evide-nce of the victim's past sexual
conduct with the defendant when consent of the victim is at issue. That exception is
clearly not applicable to this case. See Commonwealth v. Al/burn, 721 A.2d 363, 367
(Pa. Super. 1998).'
With respect to the constitutional exceptions, our Supreme Court has held the
law does not prohibit relevant evidence that "directly negates the act of intercourse with
which a defendant is charged." Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa.
1983). See also Commonwealth v. Widmer, 667 A.2d 215, 216 (Pa. Super. 1995). The
f.r :
'·
Rape Shield Law may· r{cit be used to exclude relevant evidence showing a witness' bias
or attacking credibility. Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. Super. 1985).
"Evidence tending to directly exculpate the accused by showing that the alleged victim
is biased and thus has a motive to lie, fabricate, or seek retribution is admissible at trial."
Commonwealth v. Guy, 686 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa. Super. 1996). If the offer of proof only
shows that others in addition to the defendant had sexual contact with the victim, but
does not show how the evidence would exonerate the defendant, evidence· of prior
sexual activity is inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law. Commonwealth v. Fink, 791
A.2d 1235, (Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Durst, 559 A.2d 504 (Pa. 1989).
)
In sexual assault cases, trial courts are frequently called upon to interpret an
apply the Rape Shield Law. Rulings on the admissibility of evidence of the sexual
history of a sexual assault complainant will be reversed only where there has been a
clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Al/burn, 721 A.2d 363, 366- (12a. Super.:
1998). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. Id. An abuse of
discretion occurs where the record shows that the trial court, in reaching a conclusion,
overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable
manner or as the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. Id.
In this case, we orally summarized our reasons for issuing the challenged ruling
on the record. (N.T. 4/19/2016, pp.159-60 and 160-71). We incorporate our on-record
statements into this opinion by reference. For the most part, the rationale we previously
articulated suffices to address Defendant's first assignment of error and to demonstrate
that our ruling was not an abuse of discretion. To what we said before, we add the law
cited above and the following:
First, Defendant's assignment of error is inaccurate and misleading. We did not,
as the assignment implies, preclude Defendant from recalling the victim. On- the
contrary, our ruling was quite clear that Defendant would be· permitted to recall the
victim, but that the subject matter about which he would be permitted to inquire would
be limited in accordance with the Rape Shield Law. (N.T. 4/19/2016, pp.159-60).
Second, Defendant's attempt to delve into areas limited or precluded by the
Rape Shield Law was procedurally defective. Under Section 3104(b), Defendantwas
required to file a written motion in addition to the offer of proof. When Defendant made;
his oral motion et trial, we indicated that this procedural prerequisite had not been met.
(N.T. 4/19/2016, pp. 159-60). By itself, this failure is fatal to Defendant's claim. See
Commonwealth v. Beltz, 829 A.2d 680; 684 (Pa. Super. 2003). This is especially true in
this case since Defendant and his attorney became aware of the information needed to
file the required motion - presence of the DNA of an unknown male on the· rectal swab,
the victim's answer on-tt.le-£AN~ q1;1esti0nA-air:<~-Fe~aFElin§-€0Aser:1st1al-sexual activity.
and Defendant's assertionthatthe victim had sexual contact with a man the night
before - through documents provided in discovery, expert reports, and Defendant's
personal observations and knowledge long beforetrial. Simply, Defendant had ample.] __
. opportunity to file a timely written motion. He did not.
Third, the evidence Defendant sought to introduce to address- credibility was
heard by the jury, albeit without reference to the alleged sexual encounter with a man
the night before, through the testimony of the victim and the reports and testimony of
the experts. Specific,?.!ly, the Jury heard the victsn's denial of sexual activity within the
previous five days and about the presence. of an unknown male's DNA on the rectal
swab. Our ruling did not preclude Defendant from eliciting or arguing this evidence or ·
,. . _.using it to attack the victim's credibility. !n fact, in his closing, counsel for Defendant
highlighted and arqued this evidence. (N.T., 4/20/2016, pp. 16-17).
Fourth, Defendant's sote reason for recalling the victim was his belief that her
general credibility had been called into question based on the response she provided on
the questionnaire. .According to Defendant, this "credibility issue" constitutes an
exception to the Rape Shield Law. However, numerous cases have held that such
evidence, asserting that others in addition to Defendant had sexual contact with victim:
is inadmissible and not relevant See Durst, 559 A.2d at 506 ("Inasmuch as Appellee's
13
offer of proof tends only to show that others in addition to Appellee had sexual contact
with the victim rather than showing how this testimony would exonerate him, Appellee
has not satisfied his burden of showing that the absent testimony would have been
helpful in establishing his innocence."). See also Commonwealth v. Reefer, 573 A.2d
1153, 1154 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that such evidence is properly excluded on
grounds of relevancy),
Finally, along similar lines, as we noted on the record, Defendant's offer of proof
did not allege or contain any indication that the victim had motive to lie or bias that was
.. specific to Defendant. Without a more specific proffer, defendant's general credibility
argument is simply not enough to trump the Rape Shield Law. In this regard; a quick
reading of BlcJck could lead to the belief that a victim's past sexual conduct may be
admissible if it brings credibility into question. However, subsequent appellate cases
clarify and teach that a general credibility attack is simply not enough to trump the Rape
Shield Law. In this regard, the Superior Court has clarified that inquiries attacking the
. victim's credibility are sufficient to pierce the Rape Shield Law "only where the victim's
I
1,; : .. credibility was allegedly affected by bias against or hostility·toward the defendant, or the
!
victim had a motive to seek retribution." Commonwealth v. Boyles, 595 A.2d 1180 (Pa.
Super. 1991); Compare Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609, 620 (Pa. Super. 1990)
and Commonwealth v. Erie, 521 A.2d 464, 467-69 (Pa. Super. 1987), allocatur denied,
538 A.2d 875 (1988) (following Black) with Commonwealth v. Reefer, 573 A.2d 1153,
1154 (Pa. Super. 1990) and Commonwealth v. Nenninger, 519 A.2d 433, 437 (Pa.
Super. 1986) and Commonwealth v. Dear, 492 A.2d 714, 719-20 (Pa. Super. 1985) and
Commonwealth v. Coia, 492 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. Super. 1985) (distinguishing Black).
14
In Reefer, for example, the appellant sought to introduce wltnesa.testlmony
regarding the prior sexual conduct of the victim (and of. her mother) for impeachment
purposes. In addition to finding the proffered testimony irrelevant, the court noted the
appellant's failure to "connect the alleged sexual activity involving the excluded defense
witnesses with a motive for hostility by the victim, or his mother, against him." Reefer
supra at 1154. The court went on to contrast Reefer with Black, a case in which the
excluded evidence "concerned the defendant's ability to cross-examine the .
1,
prosecutrix/victim about her incestuous relationship with her · brother, who had been
driven from the home for that reason by the defendant." Id. In Black, this evidence was
admissible but it is clear that the proffer in that case laid a foundation for bias and
motive. Here, Defendant's offer of proof did not allege orcontain any indication that the
victim had a specific motive to lie or bias towards Defendant. Without a more specific
proffer, Defendant's general credlblhty argument was simply insufficient to trump the
Rape Shield Law.
2. Defendr,3nt Should Be Classified as a Tier II Offender and Required to R@ist91
Under SORNA fQLTwenty-Five Years
As noted, we classified Defendant as a Tier Ill sex offender in accordance with.
Commonwealth v. Mero!Ja, supra; the controlling authority at the time, which he!d that
an offender who is convicted of multiple index sex offenses in a single incident and-case
is required to register as a sex offender for life. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court subsequently decided Commonwealth v. Lutz .. Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa; 2019)
and AS. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2016) which changed the law.
Specifically, the Supreme Court ctarified that, "the statute [42 Pa. C.S./.\..
§9799.14(d)(16)] requires an act, a conviction, and a subsequent act to trigger lifetime
15
registration for multiple offenses otherwise subject to a fifteen- or twenty-five-yea,_-__,_____
period of registration." Lutz-Morrison, 143 A3d at __ .
In this case, .theJncecent Assaultconvictions. arose. f[Om_a_sJogle._ac_t__Jhat_wa~
Defendant's initial act for registration purposes. Accordingly, we agree that Defendant.is __ ~--~--
not subject to lifetime registration under SORNA. However; -we- disagree -with
Defendant's contention that he shoulo be classified as a "Tier-I offender subject to ten
year registration." (Defendant's Rule 1H25(b) Statement, filed August 25, 2016, p. 2).2
h SORNA contains' a system in which the crimes that are subject to registration
!
\
f
requirements are divided into three tiers. 42 Pa. C>S.A. § 9799-;14.Personsconvict~.d \9f
rI
I
a Tier J, II, or. IU offense are subject to SORNA's registration requirements for fifteen
f-
ii'",
years, twenty-five years, and life, respectively. 42 Pa C.S.A. §9799.15. Defendant was
convicted of indecent Assault without consent under 18 Pa. C.S.A §3126(a)(1) and
Indecent Assault of an unconscious. person under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §3126(a)(4). Indecent.
Assault under sub-section (a)(1) is a Tier I offense. However, Indecent Assault under
sub-section (a)(4) is a Tier Ii offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799. 14(c)(1.3). Accordingly, we
believe that Defendant should be reclassified as a Tier II offender and required to
I:
register and report under SORNA for twenty-tivevears. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799. 15(a){2).
In spite of reaching this conclusion. we do not believe we can at this time amend the
judgment of sentence to reclassify Defendant Specifically, we believe that this appeal
divests us of jurisdiction to make the change. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) and 1701(b)(3):
see also Commonwealth v Tabb, 207 A.2d 884 (Pa. 1965). If the judgment of sentence
is affirmed, and if the Superior Court agrees that Defendant is entitled to be reclassified
2
Under SORN A, the fourth version of Megan's Law in Pennsylvania, there is no ten year registration period. The
ten year registration requested in Defendant's Rule 1925(b) statement is apparently a reference to the third iteration
of Megan's Law, which did include a ten year period for some index crimes, that SORNA repealed and replaced.
16
)
as a Tier II offender, we will amend the judgement of sentence once the appeal is
decided and all appellate courts relinquish jurisdiction.
In sum, for the reasons stated on the record during trial as well as those
articulated in this opinion, the challenged evidentiary ruling was proper under the facts
and the law. Therefore, Defendant's first assignment of error lacks merit. However, due
to the intervening change in the law, Defendant should be reclassified as a Tier II
offender. Accordingly, we believe that the convictions should be affirmed, the
I- classification of Defendant as a Tier Ill offender should be reversed, and the case
· should be remanded for the entry of an order reclassifying Defendant as a Tier II
offender subject to SORNA registration for twenty-five years.
DATE: October 4, 2016
U(
r-..:>
-~ .......
C::.7
ar» ;~-:,
cc: Superior Courtof Pennsylvania c::::, -·i- .
· Jonathan Mark,-.J. ~
:;ti
(;':, rn
;;rj
-i
Bradley Weidenbaum, Esq. 0 .;;:.,;;
rn u, 0
District Attorney 0 -'-,·\
0
,.c: 0
-,·
---~
::P
:3
0
c:
-l
::;o
·-< I-" H
I-" (J)
-0
J> C)
en
17