Com. v. Ingraham, J.

J-S37004-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES JOHN INGRAHAM
Appellant No. 1919 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered November 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at Nos: CP-06-CR-0002228-2013, CP-06-CR-0002516-
2009, CP-06-CR-0002226-2013
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2017
Appellant, James John Ingraham, appeals from the November 3, 2016
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, dismissing his
petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.
The underlying factual and procedural background is undisputed.
Appellant was convicted of multiple crimes, as a result of raping several
young girls, including his biological daughter. Following the entry of a plea
agreement, Appellant was sentenced as follows: (1) Docket number 2516-
2009: On October 30, 2009, Appellant was sentenced to 8 to 16 years’
imprisonment, followed by 15 years’ probation; (2) Docket number 2226-
2013: On June 10, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to 8 to 16 years’
imprisonment, followed by 15 years’ probation, to be served consecutively to
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the sentence imposed at docket number 2516-2009; Docket number 2228-
2013: On June 10, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to 8 to 16 years’
imprisonment, followed by 15 years’ probation, to be served concurrently
with the sentence imposed at docket number 2226-2013. Appellant did not
appeal any of his sentences.
On June 1, 2015, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his first.
After appointing counsel, the PCRA court granted counsel’s petition for
withdrawal, and, on November 3, 2016, dismissed Appellant’s first PCRA
petition as untimely. This appeal followed.
As discussed below, Appellant does not establish the timeliness of the
instant petition. Appellant merely argues the merits of his petition. For the
reasons stated below, we conclude Appellant’s PCRA petition is untimely and
therefore he is not entitled to a review of the merits of his petition.
“[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its
conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). All PCRA
petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within
one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an exception to
timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “The PCRA’s time
restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition is
untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the
petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to
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address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d
520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (first alteration in original) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). As timeliness is separate and distinct from the
merits of Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this
PCRA petition is timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d
306, 310 (Pa. 2008) (consideration of Brady claim separate from
consideration of its timeliness). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA
petition must be met, even if the underlying claim is a challenge to the
legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 60
(Pa. 2007) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within
the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the
exceptions thereto”) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223
(Pa. 1999)).
As noted, Appellant does not specifically address the timeliness of the
underlying PCRA petition. He seems to imply that because he is challenging
the legality of his sentence under Alleyne,1 the challenge is not subject to
time restrictions. Alleyne, however, is of no help to Appellant. It is well-
established that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases, like the
instant one, pending on collateral review. See Commonwealth v.
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1
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (holding that a jury
must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact increasing a mandatory
minimum sentence).
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Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 819-20 (Pa. 2016). Additionally, as the PCRA
court noted, Alleyne is not applicable here because Appellant was not
sentenced to mandatory minimum sentences. Alleyne, supra. Finally, to
insure that the PCRA timeliness requirements were met, Appellant should
have filed the instant petition within 60 days of Alleyne. See Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(2). He did not.2 Accordingly, because Alleyne does not provide
any support for Appellant’s timeliness argument, we must conclude that the
PCRA court correctly found the instant petition untimely.3 Because the
instant petition is untimely, we cannot review the merits of Appellant’s
contentions. See Chester, supra (courts have no jurisdiction to review the
merits of an untimely PCRA petition); Fahy, 737 A.2d at 224 (same).
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2
Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013. Appellant filed the instant PCRA
petition on June 1, 2015.
3
Appellant’s conviction at Docket number 2516-2009 became final at the
expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal, i.e., November 30, 2009.
Accordingly, Appellant had one year from that date to file a timely PCRA
petition (i.e., November 30, 2010). Appellant’s convictions at Docket
numbers 2226-2013 and 2228-2013 became final at the expiration of the
time for filing a direct appeal, i.e., July 10, 2013. Accordingly, Appellant had
one year from that date to file a timely PCRA petition (i.e., July 10, 2014).
Appellant filed the underlying PCRA on June 1, 2015. The petition is clearly
facially untimely. Additionally, as explained, Appellant failed to prove any of
the exceptions apply. The instant PCRA petition is therefore untimely.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/2017
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