Com. v. Wright, S.

J-S62006-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHAWN WRIGHT :
:
Appellant : No. 249 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Orders of January 2, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005223-2015,
CP-51-CR-0006553-2015, CP-51-CR-0006554-2015,
CP-51-CR-0013452-2011, CP-51-CR-0016419-2009
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 20, 2018
Shawn Wright appeals from the orders,1 entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon
careful review, we affirm.
The PCRA court set forth the procedural history of this matter as follows:
On December 22, 2016, [Wright] filed a pro se petition pursuant
to the [PCRA]. The petition pertained to [five separate docket
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1 Wright was convicted at five separate docket numbers. Although he filed a
single PCRA petition, in dismissing the petition, the PCRA court issued five
separate orders—one at each docket number. Wright filed a single notice of
appeal as to all five orders. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185
A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court prospectively held that, where an
appeal arises from more than one lower court docket, separate notices of
appeal must be filed for each docket number. However, because the notice
of appeal in this matter was filed prior to the Court’s June 1, 2018 decision in
Walker, we need not quash the appeal.
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numbers]. With respect to those cases, on March 21, 2016,
[Wright] appeared before this [c]ourt and entered [] negotiated
guilty pleas to aggravated assault, graded as a felony of the first
degree, criminal conspiracy, and possession of a firearm
prohibited as of CP-51-CR-0006553-2015[;] aggravated assault,
graded as a felony of the first degree, as of CP-51-CR-0006554-
2015[;] and possession of a firearm prohibited as of CP-51-CR-
0005223-2015, in exchange for which he received a negotiated
aggregate sentence of seven to twenty years’ incarceration.
With regard to the other two cases[,] CP-51-CR-0013452-2011
and CP-51-CR-0016419-2009, [Wright] appeared before the
Honorable Roxanne Covington of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County on December 28, 2011, and entered
negotiated guilty pleas in both cases to charges of possession of
a controlled substance with intent to deliver (hereinafter PWID)
and possession of a controlled substance[,] for which he received
concurrent negotiated sentences of eleven and one-half to twenty-
three months’ incarceration[,] followed by three years’ reporting
probation in both cases[.] Subsequent thereto, [Wright] was
accused of violating his probation in both of these matters. Both
cases were later adopted by this [c]ourt after Judge Covington
relinquished jurisdiction for purposes of having this [c]ourt
convene a violation of probation hearing in those matters. This
[c]ourt held that hearing on March 21, 2016, the same day the
guilty plea hearing was held in the other cases. At the conclusion
of the hearing, this [c]ourt revoked probation in both cases and
imposed two new sentences of three to eight years’ incarceration
on the PWID charges, which sentences were ordered to run
concurrently with each other and with the sentence of seven to
twenty years’ incarceration imposed in the [other] matters.
PCRA Court Opinion, 1/23/18, at 1-2.
Wright did not appeal any of his judgments of sentence. Instead, on
December 22, 2016, he filed the instant PCRA petition. The PCRA court
appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley2 “no-merit” letter on August
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2Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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24, 2017, as well as a motion to withdraw as counsel. On August 29, 2017,
the court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Wright’s petition pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, to which Wright submitted multiple pro se responses. In
one response, Wright indicated that he had not received a copy of counsel’s
no-merit letter. Wright ultimately received the no-merit letter on September
18, 2017. Brief of Appellant, at 10. By order dated September 26, 2017, the
PCRA court granted Wright until October 27, 2017, to file a response to the
court’s Rule 907 notice. Thereafter, Wright filed responses and counsel filed
a supplemental Turner/Finley no-merit letter, addressing an additional issue
Wright raised in one of his pro se filings. On January 2, 2018, the PCRA court
issued an order dismissing Wright’s petition and granting counsel’s motion to
withdraw. This pro se appeal follows, in which Wright raises the following
issues, verbatim, for our review:
1. Did the PCRA court err when it issued two [b]oilerplate
[n]otices [i]ntending to [d]ismiss, where the PCRA court merely
adopted PCRA [c]ounsel’s [n]o-[m]erit letter without
independently reviewing the record and giving adequate reasons
as to why [Wright’s] claims were without arguable merit, etc.?
2. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it stated that PCRA [c]ounsel
deemed [Wright’s] claims as meritless, when in fact, PCRA
[c]ounsel ONLY stated that the prejudice prong was not met in
PCRA [c]ounsel’s [s]upplemental [n]o-[m]erit letter, etc.?
3. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it permitted PCRA [c]ounsel to
withdraw after PCRA [c]ounsel failed to file an amended PCRA
[p]etition even though PCRA counsel proved that [Wright’s]
[d]ouble [j]eopardy claim had merit in PCRA counsel’s
[s]upplemental [n]o-[m]erit letter; and where PCRA counsel failed
to properly address each and every claim which [Wright]
attempted to raise and have reviewed by the PCRA [c]ourt thereby
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making PCRA counsel’s [n]o-[m]erit letter legally deficient and
incomplete, etc.?
4. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that [Wright] was
not prejudiced, and suffered no harm as a result of PCRA counsel
failing to provide [Wright] with a copy of PCRA counsel’s [n]o-
[m]erit letter in a timely manner, etc.?
5. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that [p]lea counsel
was not ineffective for failing to object to the [s]tatutory
[m]aximum sentences and argue for lesser sentences, although
[p]lea counsel sought lesser sentences on other grounds, etc.?
6. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that PCRA counsel
was not ineffective for telling [Wright] that there was no possible
way to receive any lesser sentences, either resulting from a loss
of trial, a better plea deal, or an [o]pen [p]lea, etc.?
7. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that [p]lea counsel
was not ineffective for failing to inform [Wright] that a mandatory
[d]eadly [w]eapon [e]nhancement was structured into [Wright’s]
negotiated plea, where [Wright] would not have agreed to such a
negotiated plea had [he] been properly informed, etc.?
8. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it allowed PCRA counsel to
consult with [Wright’s] [p]lea counsel off the record concerning
[Wright’s] claims, when an [e]videntiary [h]earing should have
been held to determine if [p]lea counsel was ineffective or not, as
that is the appropriate way to adjudicate [Wright’s] claims which
have arguable merit, etc.?
9. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that [Wright’s]
sentences for [a]ggravated [a]ssault did not violate the [d]ouble
[j]eopardy clause and Campana[3] [r]ule, etc.?
10. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that [Wright’s]
sentence for [a]ggravated [a]ssault and [c]onspiracy [to commit]
[a]ggravated [a]ssault were not illegally imposed in accordance
with 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 9714, etc.?
11. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that [Wright’s]
sentences for illegal firearm possession were not illegally imposed
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3Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S.
808 (1973) (Campana I ), on remand, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S.
969 (1974) (Campana II ).
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in accordance with an unconstitutional mandatory minimum
statute, 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 9712, etc.?
12. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that adequate
reasons were stated on [Wright’s] [g]uideline [s]entencing
[f]orms for sentencing [him] outside of the guidelines and in the
aggravated range, although the [s]entencing [c]ourt merely
adopted the Commonwealth’s reasons for the sentences imposed,
etc.?
13. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that the
[s]entencing [c]ourt stated adequate reasons on the record for
sentencing [Wright] in the aggravated range for [a]ggravated
[a]ssault, and outside of the guideline range altogether for
[c]onspiracy [to commit] [a]ggravated [a]ssault, etc.?
14. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it determined that the
[s]entencing [c]ourt did not have to proffer reasons on the record
for failing to order a [p]re-[s]entence [i]nvestigation [r]eport,
etc.?
Brief of Appellant, at 2-5 (renumbered for ease of disposition).
We begin by noting our standard of review in this matter.
On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review
calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is
supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA court’s
findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
findings in the certified record. The PCRA court’s factual
determinations are entitled to deference, but its legal
determinations are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal
citations omitted).
Wright first claims that the PCRA court erred when it issued two
“boilerplate” notices of intent to dismiss. Wright asserts that the PCRA court
should have independently reviewed the record and provided adequate
reasons as to why his claims were meritless. He is entitled to no relief.
Rule 907 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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(1) the judge shall promptly review the petition, any answer by
the attorney for the Commonwealth, and other matters of record
relating to the defendant’s claim(s). If the judge is satisfied from
this review that there are no genuine issues concerning any
material fact and that the defendant is not entitled to post-
conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served by any
further proceedings, the judge shall give notice to the parties of
the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the notice
the reasons for the dismissal. The defendant may respond to the
proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice. The
judge thereafter shall order the petition dismissed, grant leave to
file an amended petition, or direct that the proceedings continue.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).
Here, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice in which it informed
Wright that “[y]our attorney has determined that the issues in your pro se
Post Conviction Relief Act petition are without merit. Counsel’s letter pursuant
to [Turner/Finley] is attached.” Rule 907 Notice, 11/28/17. In
Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2011), this Court
deemed such a notice satisfactory. In that case, the PCRA court issued a Rule
907 notice indicating its intent to dismiss the appellant’s PCRA petition “for
the reasons discussed in counsel’s no-merit letter[.]” Id. at 1246. There,
counsel’s no-merit letter “discussed at length the fact Appellant’s claims
presented in his pro se PCRA petition were waived by virtue of the fact he pled
guilty and failed to file a timely direct appeal in which the substantive claims
could have been presented.” Id. Those reasons mirrored the reasons
provided in support of the PCRA court’s order dismissing Ousley’s petition.
Likewise, here, the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice specifically referenced
counsel’s no-merit letter, which it attached as an exhibit to the Rule 907
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notice. In its opinion, the PCRA court independently reviewed the record,
addressed the issues raised by Wright in his pro se filings, and concluded that
Wright’s claims were meritless.
The cases cited by Wright are inapposite. Two of those cases,
Commonwealth v. Feighery, 661 A.2d 437 (Pa. Super. 1995), and
Commonwealth v. Morris, 684 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1996), involve scenarios in
which the PCRA failed altogether to issue notices of intent to dismiss. Neither
Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1999), nor
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 462 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super. 1993), address issues
concerning notices of intent to dismiss. In Commonwealth v. Rush, 838
A.2d 651 (Pa. 2003), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517 (Pa.
2001), the PCRA court’s notices gave no indication whatsoever of the reasons
for dismissal. In light of the foregoing, Wright’s first claim is meritless.
Wright’s next claim involves the manner in which PCRA counsel and the
PCRA court addressed the numerous claims of ineffectiveness of counsel
raised in his pro se PCRA petiton. Specifically, Wright argues that the PCRA
court erred in denying him a hearing because, in evaluating Wright’s claims in
his no-merit letter, PCRA counsel did not reach the merits of each prong of
the ineffectiveness test and, instead, concluded only that Wright was not
entitled to relief because he could not prove prejudice. Because Wright
incorrectly construes the three-part test for ineffectiveness, his claim is
without merit.
When an ineffectiveness claim is raised,
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a PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place. Counsel is presumed effective,
and to rebut that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that
such deficiency prejudiced him. In Pennsylvania, we have refined
the Strickland[4] performance and prejudice test into a three-part
inquiry. Thus, to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must
show that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3)
the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result. If a petitioner
fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction
petition is not absolute. Commonwealth v. Granberry, 644 A.2d 204, 208
(Pa. Super. 1994). “A PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing if the
petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in
either the record or from other evidence.” Id.Here, PCRA counsel reviewed each of Wright’s ineffectiveness claims
and concluded that none of the underlying claims was meritorious and, thus,
Wright suffered no prejudice. The PCRA court, after performing an
independent review, agreed with counsel’s assessments. Because an
ineffectiveness claim fails if the petitioner is unable to prove any one of the
three prongs of the ineffectiveness test, Spotz, supra, once counsel and the
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4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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court concluded that one prong was not satisfied, it was unnecessary to
address the remaining prongs. Wright’s claims lacked merit and had no
support in the record. Thus, the court acted within its discretion in dismissing
his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Granberry, supra.
Next, Wright claims that the PCRA court erred in permitting PCRA
counsel to withdraw where counsel failed to properly address every claim
Wright raised in his pro se petition, in particular, a double jeopardy claim.
This claim is meritless. First, counsel did, in fact, address Wright’s double
jeopardy claim in the supplemental Turner/Finley letter filed on November
28, 2017. Second, in his appellate brief, Wright fails to specify which other
claims he believes PCRA counsel failed to address in his no-merit letters. “It
is not this Court’s responsibility to comb through the record seeking the factual
underpinnings of Appellant’s claim.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d
298, 306 (Pa. Super. 2017). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (“If reference is made to
. . . any . . . matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth . . .
a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears.”).
See also Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d 387, 393 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(“When an allegation is unsupported by any citation to the record, such that
this Court is prevented from assessing this issue and determining whether
error exists, the allegation is waived for purposes of appeal.”). Accordingly,
Wright has waived review of the remainder of this undeveloped claim.
Next, Wright asserts that the PCRA court erred when it determined that
Wright was not prejudiced by the fact that PCRA counsel failed to provide him
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a copy of counsel’s no-merit letter in a timely manner. This claim is patently
meritless.
Here, counsel was apparently provided with an incorrect inmate number
for Wright. As a result, Wright did not initially receive a copy of the no-merit
letter sent to him by counsel. However, after Wright contacted the PCRA court
to inform it of this fact, the court ensured that Wright received a copy of the
letter. Wright concedes that he did, in fact, receive the letter on September
18, 2017. See Brief of Appellant, at 10. Thereafter, on September 26, 2017,
the PCRA court issued an order granting Wright an extension, until October
27, 2017, to respond to the court’s Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss. Thus,
Wright had 39 days to respond to counsel’s no-merit letter, which is 19 days
more than required under Rule 907. As Wright cannot establish that he was
prejudiced by the delay, he is entitled to no relief.
We address Wright’s next two claims together. These claims involve the
alleged ineffectiveness of plea counsel for (1) failing to argue at sentencing
that Wright should receive less than the statutory maximum sentence, and
(2) advising Wright that there was no possible way to receive a lesser
sentence. Wright’s claims are belied by the record.
In order to invalidate a plea on the basis of ineffectiveness of counsel,
a petitioner must plead and prove that the ineffectiveness caused an
involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth v. D'Collanfield, 805 A.2d
1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2002). When the record clearly demonstrates that a
guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it becomes evident that the
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defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness
of the plea is established. Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922
(Pa. Super. 2001). At a minimum, a plea colloquy must inform a defendant
of: (1) the nature of the charges; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) the
right to be tried by a jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the
permissible range of sentences; and (6) the fact that the judge is not bound
by the terms of any plea agreement. Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d
1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2008). During the course of a plea colloquy, a
defendant has a duty to answer questions truthfully and cannot later assert
that he lied under oath. Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa.
Super. 2007).
Based on the record before us, Wright is unable to demonstrate that his
plea was involuntary. At Wright’s guilty plea/sentencing hearing, the court
engaged in a colloquy with Wright in which it discussed the above
requirements. See generally, N.T. Guilty Plea/Sentencing, 3/21/16. Most
relevant to this claim, the court advised Wright that, if convicted at trial, he
faced a maximum aggregate sentence of 50 years. Id. at 4. Wright indicated
his understanding of that fact, as well as of the fact that, as a result of the
negotiated plea agreement, he would receive an aggregate sentence of 7 to
20 years. Id. Wright affirmed that no other promises or threats had been
made to him and that his current probation would be affected by his plea. Id.
at 7. He acknowledged that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation,
id., and that he had read and signed the written guilty plea colloquies. Id. at
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7-8. In signing the written colloquies, Wright affirmed that no one had
promised him anything or threatened or forced him to plead guilty. Written
Plea Colloquy, 3/21/16, at 1. He also acknowledged the possible maximum
sentences and the agreed-upon aggregate sentence recommendation. Id.
Finally, Wright acknowledged that he had had sufficient time to confer with
his attorney and that the decision to plead guilty was his alone. Id. at 3.
In light of the statements made by Wright on the record at his guilty
plea/sentencing hearing, as well as in his written colloquies, it is readily
apparent that his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently and
was not the result of any alleged promises made by counsel. Moreover,
because the plea was negotiated and Wright agreed to the terms of his
sentence, Wright’s counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to argue
for a lesser term of incarceration at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, these
claims are meritless.
Wright next asserts that the PCRA court erred when it allowed PCRA
counsel to consult with Wright’s plea counsel off the record5 concerning
Wright’s claims, rather than holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if
plea counsel was ineffective. He is entitled to no relief.
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5 In his initial no-merit letter, PCRA counsel stated that his “extensive and
intensive review” of Wright’s case included a review of “[Wright’s] pro se PCRA
petition, several letters of correspondence, the docketing history and entries,
petitioner’s court summary, guilty plea colloquies, sentencing notes of
testimony and in-person conversations with trial counsel[.]” Turner/Finley
No-Merit Letter, 8/24/17 at 1 (emphasis added).
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Wright cites no case law or other authority supporting his contention
that it is improper or incorrect for PCRA counsel to interview plea counsel
regarding a petitioner’s claims of ineffectiveness. Indeed, as the
Commonwealth notes in its brief, “a zealous PCRA advocate likely should
contact [plea] counsel in an independent attempt to determine the validity of
potential claims.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11. Wright does not suggest any
basis to conclude that PCRA counsel’s communications with plea counsel in
any way impeded his independent review of the record. Moreover, PCRA
counsel, the PCRA court, and this Court have concluded that Wright’s claims
of plea counsel’s ineffectiveness are all without merit. Accordingly, he is
unable to establish prejudice and is entitled to no relief.
Wright next claims that the PCRA court erred when it determined that
his sentences for aggravated assault did not violate double jeopardy, the rule
set forth in Campana I and Campana II,6 and Pa.R.Crim.P. 505. Double
jeopardy claims “implicate the fundamental legal authority of the court to
impose the sentence that it did” and, therefore, challenge the legality of the
sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa.
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6 In Campana I, our Supreme Court designed a rule of compulsory joinder
requiring a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges
against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode. See
Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177 (Pa. 1983). In the interim between
Campana I and Campana II, the legislature enacted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110,
precluding the subsequent prosecution of charges not joined as prescribed.
See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 455 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1983).
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Super. 2007). As such, his claim is cognizable under the PCRA. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
Under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, the Commonwealth is prohibited from
prosecuting a defendant based on its former prosecution of the defendant if
the following four-part test is met:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction;
(2) the current prosecution must be based on the same criminal
conduct or have arisen from the same criminal episode as the
former prosecution; (3) the prosecutor must have been aware of
the current charges before the commencement of the trial for the
former charges; and (4) the current charges and the former
charges must be within the jurisdiction of a single court.
Commonwealth v. Shull, 811 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2002), quoting
Commonwealth v. Failor, 770 A.2d 310, 314 (Pa. 2001).
Additionally, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 505 provides in
relevant part:
(B) When more than one offense is alleged to have been
committed by one person arising from the same incident, the
issuing authority shall accept only one complaint, and shall docket
the matter as a single case.
...
(C) Upon application by any interested person and proof that any
provision of paragraphs (A) or (B) was violated, a judge may order
forfeiture of all additional costs of the issuing authority accrued by
reason of such violation, and thereafter such costs shall not be
taxed in the case.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 505(B) and (C). Our Supreme Court has held that a court cannot
remedy a violation of Rule 505(B) with dismissal. Commonwealth v. Tome,
398 A.2d 1369, 1372 (Pa. 1979). Rather, the only remedy is relief from the
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additional costs incurred from defending the second action separately.
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 560 A.2d 165, 173 (Pa. Super. 1989).
Here, Wright was not subjected to multiple prosecutions arising from
the same criminal episode. Rather, he simultaneously entered guilty pleas to
charges at multiple docket numbers. As the PCRA court notes, had Wright not
pled guilty, “both indictments would certainly have been joined for trial and
been tried together.” PCRA Court Opinion, at 8. However, because Wright
entered a global plea as to all indictments, any double jeopardy claim under
section 110 or Rule 505 is rendered moot.7
Wright’s next two claims assert that his sentences were illegal.
Specifically, he claims that his sentences for aggravated assault and
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault were illegal under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9714 (mandatory minimum sentences for second and subsequent offenses)
and that his sentences for persons not to possess firearms were illegal as
unconstitutional mandatory minimums under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 (mandatory
minimum sentences for offenses committed with firearms). Wright is entitled
to no relief. The sentences he received were not imposed pursuant to either
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7 With regard to Rule 505, Wright attempts to argue that he was subjected to
the payment of court costs and fees twice, although he does not specify what
duplicated costs he incurred. In any event, Rule 505 provides relief from
“additional costs incurred from defending the second action separately.”
Snyder, supra (emphasis added). Wright was not compelled to defend a
second action separately and, therefore, is entitled to no relief.
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section 9714 or section 9712. Rather, they were negotiated sentences
imposed in conjunction with a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.
In addition, all sentences were within the statutory limits.8
Wright’s final three claims challenge the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. In particular, Wright asserts that the court did not state adequate
reasons on the record for his sentences and did not provide its reasons for
dispensing with a pre-sentence investigation report. Requests for relief with
respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not cognizable under
the PCRA.9 Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Super.
2007). Accordingly, Wright is entitled to no relief on these claims.
Orders affirmed.
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8 The statutory maximum sentence for aggravated assault (F1), 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(1), is 20 years. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1). Wright was sentenced
to two concurrent terms of 7 to 20 years’ imprisonment for his aggravated
assault convictions. The statutory maximum sentence for possession of
firearm by person prohibited (F2), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a), is 10 years. See
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a.1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(2). Wright was sentenced to
two terms of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration for his two convictions of that crime.
9 While our Court has held that claims implicating the discretionary aspects of
sentencing raised in the context of an ineffectiveness claim are cognizable
under the PCRA, see Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 860 A.2d 1032, 1036
(Pa. Super. 2004), reversed in part on other grounds, 912 A.2d 827 (Pa.
2006), here, Wright has not asserted ineffectiveness.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/20/18
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