Com. v. Stones, A.

J-A12016-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ADRIAN J. STONES :
:
Appellant : No. 957 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 22, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-SA-0001370-2020
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: MAY 20, 2022
Adrian J. Stones (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the judgment of
sentence of a $25 fine, plus costs, imposed in the Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas, following his summary conviction of trespass by motor
vehicle.1 On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) his actions were insufficient to
establish a violation of the summary offense; (2) the police officer who issued
the citation acted outside his jurisdiction, and (3) the officer had no probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to stop him. For the reasons below, we affirm.
On September 26, 2020, Appellant was issued a citation for trespass by
motor vehicle. After he was found guilty in magisterial district court, Appellant
filed an appeal for a trial de novo in the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3717(a).
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The trial court summarized the testimony presented at Appellant’s July 21,
2021, trial de novo as follows:
Officer Mark Slivka, of the North Versailles Police Department,
testified that on the afternoon of September 26, 2020, he was
patrolling property owned by the Norfolk Southern Railroad
Company [(the Railroad)], when he saw [Appellant’s box] truck
drive into the railroad yard, past secured and gated areas, to an
area where there are only railroad tracks and a roadway to the
tracks. He issued [Appellant] a citation after learning from
railroad personnel that [Appellant] was not authorized to be on
the property. Special Agent Gabe Pediconi, a railroad police officer
. . ., testified that only railroad-owned vehicles are permitted on
railroad property, unless there is permission from a supervisor or
manager, which had not been given to [Appellant]. [He further
explained that because he was “quite a distance away” at the time
Officer Slivka called him, he told the officer to “just cite [Appellant]
for vehicle trespassing.” N.T., 7/21/21, at 11-12).]
[Appellant] testified that his property abuts the railroad
property and is thirty yards from where he was stopped. He
explained that he uses the railroad property to get in and out of
South Trafford, as do many other residents, as it is the only
available route for oversized trucks.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/1/21, at 1-2. At the conclusion of trial, the court found
Appellant guilty and imposed a $25 fine, plus costs. See N.T., 7/21/21, at
24. This timely appeal follows.2
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2 On September 3, 2021, Appellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal in compliance with the trial
court’s prior directive. See Order, 8/18/21. We note, however, that the court
issued an amended order that same day, September 3rd, providing Appellant
with 21 days to file a Rule 1925(b) statement “after the transcripts are filed
with the Department of Court Records.” Amended Order, 9/3/21 (emphasis
omitted). Appellant did not file a supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement.
Thus, he is bound by the claims raised in his September 3rd statement.
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Appellant purports to raise five issues on appeal:
1) Did the [trial court] base its order and finding of guilt for
vehicular trespass on sufficient evidence that [Appellant]
knowingly operated a motor vehicle on private real property in
violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3717?
2) Did the [trial court] have sufficient evidence to find Appellant
guilty of vehicular trespass under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3717(a)
where the road or pathway in dispute is a public right-of-way
provided for decades by [the Railroad] and otherwise has been
used as an easement by necessity by residents living in South
Trafford because a Railroad Company bridge prevents
deliveries by oversized trucks from entering into and out of
South Trafford?
3) Did the [trial court] err in finding [Appellant] guilty even though
he did not operate a motor vehicle on clearly marked, barred
or secured property when he was ticketed for vehicular
trespass?
4) Did North Versailles police officer, Mark Slivka, act outside his
jurisdiction by ticketing Appellant for vehicular trespass?
5) Was [Appellant] subject to [an] unconstitutional search and
seizure, or otherwise did the Commonwealth prosecute
[Appellant] for vagrancy or other laws that have been deemed
unconstitutional?
Appellant’s Brief at 3-6.
Appellant’s first three issues — which he addresses together in his brief
— challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of
trespass by motor vehicle. Appellant maintains the Railroad does not dispute
the fact that “the roadway in question . . . has been used by the public for
decades as a public right-of-way,” and Special Agent Pediconi admitted he
“would not be aware of all the deeds and rights-of-way that the Railroad . . .
has made with other parties[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 12, 14. Moreover,
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Appellants insists that Stewart Street — which provides the “only means of
ingress and egress into South Trafford” — passes under a “Railway bridge”
that has a 12-foot clearance. Id. at 12. Thus, Appellant maintains, the height
clearance of the bridge “prevent[s] deliveries and other commerce to the
residents and public who live or work in South Trafford.” Id. at 13. He argues
that the Railroad has permitted use of the right-of-way because it would be
“very costly” to rebuild the bridge. Id. Appellant further emphasizes as
“significant” the fact that the roadway where he was ticketed is “not secured,
gated or identified as a private road” and that he “posed no threat of criminal
activity.” Id. at 14.
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction of
a summary traffic offense is well-settled:
We view [the] evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Commonwealth. The evidence need not preclude every possibility
of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence presented. Only where the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact
can be drawn from the combined circumstances[,] is a defendant
entitled to relief. We do not re-weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. As the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence is one of law, we consider the evidence
de novo.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 552–53 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Appellant was convicted of violating Section 3717 of the Motor Vehicle
Code, which provides, in relevant part:
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It is unlawful for a person to knowingly operate a motor vehicle
on private real property other than a private road or driveway
without consent of the owner or lessor of the real property.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3717(a). Here, there is no dispute that Appellant was operating
his motor vehicle on the day in question. What he challenges, however, is the
court’s determination that he knowingly did so without the consent of the
owner.
In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the trial court emphasized that Appellant
presented no documentation supporting his averment that the roadway is
“titled as a right-of-way in public records[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3.
Furthermore, the court found that the fact Appellant, and purportedly other
South Trafford residents, regularly use the road was not a defense. Id. at 3.
Nor did the court find significant the fact that the road contained no signage
designating it as a private roadway, or any barriers blocking public access.
Id. Indeed, the trial court concluded:
[Appellant] did not have the consent of [the Railroad] to drive on
its property. Further, he knew he was driving on railroad property,
and admitted doing so regularly.
Id. The court found these facts sufficient to support the verdict. We agree.
Special Agent Pediconi testified that “[o]nly railroad-owned vehicles are
allowed to be on railroad property unless there’s permission from a supervisor
or manager[.]” N.T. at 12. He testified that Appellant was not a railroad
employee and had no permission to drive on the roadway. Id. Further,
Special Agent Pediconi specifically denied Appellant’s claim that the residents
of South Trafford had an agreement with the Railroad to use the roadway:
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[T]here are no agreements. It does not exist. It doesn’t stand.
That’s the wishes of the community to use it as an egress. They
have their own driveway to their house. The property abuts up
against many properties across the three states I work in. If they
choose to use it, that’s their risk of getting caught. . . .
Id. at 23.
Appellant conceded he had no explicit agreement with the Railroad
permitting him to use the roadway in question. Indeed, when asked if he had
any “type of easement agreement[,]” Appellant replied, “I don’t think anyone
has one” and confirmed he had no “legal documents from the railroad[.]” N.T.
at 18-19. Further, when confronted with the fact that he had no “agreement”
with the Railroad to drive on its private roadway, Appellant simply stated,
“Neither do any of the other residents of South Trafford.” Id. at 20. Thus,
Appellant rests his argument on the fact that South Trafford residents have
used the roadway in the past, and not upon any consent provided by the
Railroad. Accordingly, we agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant “knowingly
operate[d] a motor vehicle on private real property [owned by the Railroad]
without consent” of the Railroad.” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3717(a). Thus, his first
claim fails.
Next, Appellant contends North Versailles Police Officer Slivka “acted
outside his jurisdiction by ticketing [Appellant] for vehicular trespass.”
Appellant’s Brief at 15. He maintains the trial transcript clearly demonstrates
Officer Slivka was “policing on behalf of the Railway Company” when he issued
the citation at the directive of Special Agent Pediconi. Id. at 15-16.
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The trial court found this claim waived because Appellant did not raise
it below. Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.2. We agree. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not
raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.”).
Nevertheless, we note that Appellant’s jurisdictional argument misses
the mark. Officer Slivka testified that the railroad police — particularly Special
Agent Pediconi — have the “same jurisdiction in [their] town.” N.T. at 6.
Appellant does not dispute the fact that the roadway is located within North
Versailles Township. Rather, he asserts the officer was “policing on behalf” of
the Railroad. Appellant’s Brief at 15. He misconstrues the testimony. Officer
Slivka explained he was patrolling the Railroad property because they “have
problems” with illegal dumping in that area. N.T. at 5, 9. After observing
Appellant’s truck on the private roadway, he contacted Special Agent Pediconi
to determine whether Appellant had permission to use the roadway. When
the agent confirmed Appellant did not have such permission, Officer Slivka
acted within his proper authority by citing Appellant for a summary offense
that he witnessed within North Versailles Township.
Lastly, Appellant argues Officer Slivka did not have “probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to detain” him. Appellant’s Brief at 17. He emphasizes
that the officer observed him drive his truck past the secured area, and “made
no effort to determine if [the] area along the railroad tracks was subject to a
right-of-way.” Id. Moreover, Appellant insists a reasonable person would not
believe he “had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.”
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Id. Thus, he contends he was subject to an unlawful Terry3 stop. Id. at 16-
17.
Appellant misunderstands the law surrounding traffic stops.4 As our
Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa.
2008):
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures. A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. The key question in determining if a seizure is
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment is if it is reasonable.
A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few specifically established,
well-delineated exceptions. One exception allows police to briefly
detain individuals for an investigation, maintain the status
quo, and if appropriate, conduct a frisk for weapons when there is
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The Fourth
Amendment does not prevent police from stopping and
questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a
violation of traffic laws, even if it is a minor offense.
Id. at 112–13 (citations and footnote omitted).
Here, Officer Slivka testified that before he stopped Appellant’s truck —
which he suspected was not a Railroad-owned vehicle — he “ran the
registration plates, which came back as a Trafford address.” N.T. at 6. He
then stopped Appellant, who was unable to provide the officer with any
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3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4 The fact that Appellant is proceeding pro se “confers [upon him] no special
benefit[.]” Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super.
2018) (citation omitted). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent
himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his
lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Id. (citation omitted).
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authority permitting him to drive on the private roadway. After confirming
this information with Special Agent Pediconi, Officer Slivka properly cited
Appellant for trespass by motor vehicle. Under these facts, Appellant was not
subject to an unlawful search or seizure.
Thus, concluding there is no merit to any of Appellant’s claims on appeal,
we affirm the judgment of sentence.5
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Murray joins the Memorandum.
Judge Colins Concurs in the Result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/20/2022
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5 As the trial court commented at the conclusion of the trial de novo,
Appellant’s best recourse may be to “get together with the rest of the
neighbors and try to work something out with the railroad” to obtain some
type of “civil recourse.” N.T. at 25. However, continuing to trespass without
permission will result in additional fines.
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