Com. v. Campfield, T.

J-S12014-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TAMIKA CAMPFIELD :
:
Appellant : No. 2155 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 27, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007269-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 25, 2022
Appellant, Tamika Campfield, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
one year probation, imposed after a jury convicted her of possessing an
instrument of crime (“PIC”), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). On appeal, Appellant solely
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her conviction. After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of Appellant’s case, as follows:
The Complainant, Thurlonda Cogdell (“Ms. Cogdell”), testified
that, on August 16, 2018, she pulled her car onto the block where
she lives, parked her car, and, got out. (N.T.[,] 3/3/20[, at] 28-
29.) After Ms. Cogdell got out of her car, Appellant began yelling
“very aggressively” at her. (Id.) Ms. Cogdell told Appellant not
to speak to her in that manner. (Id.) Then[,] Appellant’s
boyfriend, Jerry Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”), had words with Ms.
Cogdell. (Id. [at] 29[.]) Mr. Johnson followed Ms. Cogdell
towards her house threatening to blow it up. (Id. [at] 31-32.)
Ms. Cogdell went into her house and called her sister because she
was “scared to death.” (Id. [at] 32.)
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Approximately twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes later, Ms.
Cogdell was sitting on the top step of her porch when Appellant,
an older woman, a young lady, and Mr. Johnson approached her.
(Id. [at] 32-34.) Appellant was wielding a brown wooden baseball
bat and gestured as if she was going to hit Ms. Cogdell with it.8
(Id.) Then the younger lady hit Ms. Cogdell in the face, and they
began to tussle. (Id. [at] 34.) Appellant, the older lady, and Mr.
Johnson aggressively pushed Ms. Cogdell to the ground. (Id.)
While Ms. Cogdell was on the ground, Appellant hit her in the leg
with the baseball bat. (Id. [at] 35.)
8 Mr. Johnson[,] who was called to testify by Appellant, also
testified that Appellant brought a baseball bat out of his
house but claimed she only stood on his porch with it. (Id.
[at] 87-88 and 90.)
After Appellant hit Ms. Cogdell in the leg with the baseball bat, Mr.
Johnson took money from Ms. Cogdell. (Id.) Ms. Cogdell tried to
stand up but instantly collapsed. (Id.) She tried to stand up again
and fell again. (Id.) Ms. Cogdell crawled back into her house and
called her sister. (Id.)
After Ms. Cogdell’s sister arrived, they called the police. (Id.)
When police arrive, Ms. Cogdell told police what happened. (Id.
[at] 36.) Thereafter, Ms. Cogdell was taken to the hospital by her
sister. (Id.) After Ms. Cogdell was released from the hospital,
she went back to the police district and was told to come back
another day. (Id.) Ms. Cogdell returned to the police district on
August 20, 2018. (Id.)
A day or two after the attack, Ms. Cogdell went to Presbyterian
[H]ospital because of the swelling and instability in her leg. (Id.
[at] 39.) Thereafter, Ms. Cogdell went to Pennsylvania [H]ospital
and met with an orthopedic doctor who told her she had a
complete tear through the ACL that required a high tibial
osteotomy and a reconstruction of her ACL. (Id.) Ms. Cogdell
was in the hospital for about four days after the surgery and
requires more surgery to remove two metal plates. (Id. [at] 39-
40.)
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 11/24/21, at 2-3.
Based on these facts, Appellant was charged with PIC, as well as
aggravated assault, conspiracy, simple assault, recklessly endangering
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another person (REAP), robbery, and theft by unlawful taking. At the
conclusion of her jury trial on March 4, 2020, she was convicted of PIC, but
acquitted of aggravated assault, conspiracy, simple assault, and REAP. The
charges of robbery and theft by unlawful taking were nolle prossed. “After
the jury returned its verdict, Appellant made a Motion Notwithstanding the
Verdict ‘because [the jury] found [Appellant] not guilty of the underlying
crimes.’” Id. at 1 (citing N.T., 3/4/20, at 41). The court denied that motion,
and Appellant’s case proceeded to sentencing on November 4, 2020. On that
date, the court imposed one year of probation for Appellant’s PIC conviction.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and she also complied with the
trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. The court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on
November 24, 2021. Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review:
1. Whether the evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable
inferences derived from the evidentiary record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is
sufficient to establish all elements of [PIC] … beyond a reasonable
doubt?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
To begin, we note our standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
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finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreno, supra at 136.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Regarding a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction for PIC, this Court has explained:
To convict an individual of PIC, “the Commonwealth has the
burden of proving two elements: (1) possession of an object that
is an instrument of crime and (2) intent to use the object for a
criminal purpose.” In the Interest of A.V., 48 A.3d 1251, 1253
(Pa. Super. 2012); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). “[T]he actor’s
criminal purpose … provides the touchstone of his liability” for
the PIC offense, and “[s]uch purpose may be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the possession.” Commonwealth v.
Andrews, … 768 A.2d 309, 317-18 ([Pa.] 2001) (citation
omitted). Criminal intent to support a PIC conviction cannot be
inferred where the defendant used the instrument solely for self-
defense. In the Interest of A.C., 763 A.2d 889, 891 (Pa. Super.
2000); see also Commonwealth v. Watson, … 431 A.2d 949,
953 ([Pa.] 1981) (reversing conviction for possession of a
concealed weapon, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(b), where the Court
determined that the defendant committed the underlying killing in
self-defense).
Commonwealth v. Brockington, 230 A.3d 1209, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2020).
Here, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
elements of PIC because “[c]riminal intent to support a PIC conviction cannot
be inferred where the defendant used the instrument solely for self-defense.”
Appellant’s Brief at 15 n.9 (citing, inter alia, In the Interest of A.C., 763
A.2d 889, 891 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Appellant elaborates that, in this case,
the jury was free to believe either that (i) [Appellant] remained
on the porch while holding the bat, possibly in self-defense mode,
or (ii) she attacked the victim in question. Apparently, they
concluded that she did not so attack the victim when they
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rendered a not guilty verdict for aggravated assault, conspiracy,
simple assault, and [REAP]. Given these facts, and inferences to
be drawn therefrom, no reasonable or rational fact[-]finder could
have voted to convict on the PIC charge in question.
Id. at 15-16 (unnecessary capitalization, punctuation, and footnotes omitted).
Appellant’s argument is unconvincing. Initially, she did not explain what
evidence she presented to show that she acted in self-defense, or argue how
the Commonwealth failed to disprove her assertion of self-defense. Instead,
Appellant solely asks us to speculate that the jury’s acquittals must mean that
they found she acted in self-defense. However, as the trial court astutely
observes,
[i]t does not matter that the [j]ury acquitted Appellant of the
remaining charges [except for PIC]. “Federal and Pennsylvania
courts alike have long recognized that [j]ury acquittals may not
be interpreted as specific factual findings with regard to the
evidence, as an acquittal does not definitively establish that the
[j]ury was not convinced of a defendant’s guilt. Rather, it has
been the understanding of federal courts as well as the courts of
this Commonwealth that an acquittal may merely show lenity on
the [j]ury’s behalf, or that ‘the verdict may have been the result
of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the [j]ury.’”
Com[monwealth] v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1246 ([Pa.] 2014)
(citing United States v. Dunn, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932)[)].
Here, the [j]ury’s decision to acquit Appellant of the other charges
could have been a reflection of the [j]ury[’s] showing Appellant
mercy or leniency[,] or simply a mistake. Regardless, speculation
into the rationale employed by the [j]ury to arrive at its acquittal
is inappropriate. “[T]he United States Supreme Court has
instructed that courts may not make factual findings regarding
[j]ury acquittals and, thus, cannot ‘upset’ verdicts by ‘speculation
or inquiry into such matters.’” Moore[, 103 A.3d] at [1246]
(citing Dunn[, 284 U.S.] at 394). In Moore, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted that it has “rejected the notion that an
acquittal may be interpreted as a specific finding of innocence,[”]
and noted, [“]consistent with Dunn, that ‘[t]he most that can be
said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the
acquittal or the conviction[,] the [j]ury did not speak their real
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conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced
of the defendant’s guilt.’” Id. at [1247] (citations omitted). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently embraced “the
principle that juries may reach inconsistent verdicts, along with its
corollary that we may not interpret a [j]ury acquittal as a specific
factual finding with regard to the evidence.” Id. at [1247] (citing
Commonwealth v. (John) Reed, … 326 A.2d 356, 358 n. 2
([Pa.] 1974) (logical inconsistency in [the] defendant’s conviction
of second-degree murder and aggravated robbery and acquittal of
conspiracy did not justify a reversal); Commonwealth v.
Strand, … 347 A.2d 675, 676 ([Pa.] 1975) (upholding [the]
defendant’s second-degree murder conviction for shooting and
killing her victim despite the fact that she was acquitted of all
VUFA charges associated with her use of that firearm);
Commonwealth v. Tallon, 387 A.2d 77, 82-83 ([Pa.] 1978)
(opinion in support of affirmance) (upholding [the] defendant’s
voluntary manslaughter and robbery convictions even though the
defendant was acquitted of felony murder); Commonwealth v.
Gravely, … 404 A.2d 1296, 1301 ([Pa.] 1979) (plurality)
(declining to reverse [the] defendant’s second-degree murder
conviction, which [the] defendant claimed was inconsistent with
[j]ury’s inability to reach a verdict with respect to his rape charge,
based upon longstanding principle permitting inconsistent
verdicts); [Commonwealth v.] Campbell, 651 A.2d [1096,]
1101 [(Pa. 1994)] (applying Dunn and Powell to approve
inconsistent verdicts reached as to multiple defendants charged
with conspiracy in a joint trial); Commonwealth v. Weston, …
749 A.2d 458, 463 ([Pa.] 2000) (concluding that, where [the]
defendant asserted he acted in self-defense and was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter rather than murder, the defendant’s
voluntary manslaughter conviction did not negate the criminal
intent necessary to sustain his PIC conviction). More recently, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “held that the defendant’s robbery
acquittal did not necessitate vacating his second-degree murder
conviction, despite the fact that the verdicts appeared
inconsistent, reaffirming ‘the longstanding and well-established
principle that consistency in a verdict is not required’ and [its]
refusal ‘to speculate upon the nature of the [j]ury’s
deliberations.’” Moore[, 103 A.3d at [1247] (citing
Com[monwealth] v. Miller, 35 A.3d 1206[,] 1213 ([Pa.]
2012))[.]
Accordingly, relying upon the long-standing and well-established
principle that consistency in a verdict is not required, Appellant’s
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acquittal of the [a]ggravated [a]ssault, [c]onspiracy, [simple
a]ssault, and [REAP] charges does not necessitate vacatur of the
[PIC] conviction.
TCO at 6-8.
We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. Thus, we reject Appellant’s
speculative argument that the jury’s acquitting her on all charges except PIC
means that it found she acted in self-defense. We also concur with the court’s
conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of PIC.
Namely,
[a]fter Appellant got into a verbal altercation with Ms. Cogdell,
Appellant retrieved a wooden baseball bat from her boyfriend’s
house. Appellant approached Ms. Cogdell with the baseball bat,
her boyfriend, and[] two other women, while gesturing as if she
was going to hit Ms. Cogdell with it. While Ms. Cogdell was on the
ground being attacked by the younger woman, Appellant hit her
in the leg with the baseball bat.
Id. at 5 (citations to the record omitted). This evidence proved that Appellant
possessed the bat with the intent to use it for a criminal purpose, thus
constituting PIC. See Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280, 1282-
85 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding that Magliocco committed PIC when he
swung a baseball bat over his head while threatening to kill the victims).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/25/2022
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