Com. v. Ashford, A.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
AILEAF ASHFORD :
:
Appellant : No. 1017 EDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 30, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0502211-1999
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 7, 2022
Aileaf Ashford (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing as
untimely his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On August 23, 2000, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder,
and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. This Court affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence on December 29, 2001, and on May 2, 2002,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Ashford, 792 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super. 2001) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied 798 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 2002).
Appellant filed three unsuccessful petitions seeking post-conviction
relief. See Commonwealth Brief at 5-6 (detailing procedural history). On
August 31, 2020, Appellant pro se filed the instant petition, his fourth, seeking
relief based on newly discovered facts from a trial witness, Rykeith Sullivan
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(Sullivan). On March 29, 2021, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to
dismiss the petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court dismissed
the petition without a hearing on April 30, 2021. Appellant timely appealed.
Appellant presents the following issues for review:
1. DID THE COURT ERR OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT [APPELLANT] DID NOT MEET THE THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENTS TO INVOKE THE PCRA COURT’S
JURISDICTION?
2. DID THE COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S PETITION
FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE POST CONVICTION RELIEF ACT
AS UNTIMELY AND WITHOUT A HEARING?
3. DOES EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE PROVE A
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE OR DUE PROCESS VIOLATION HAS
OCCURRED?
Appellant’s Brief at 8 (unnumbered).
Our review the PCRA court’s order “is limited to examining whether the
PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and
whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d
1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Like the PCRA court, we must consider the timeliness of Appellant’s
petition. The timeliness of a PCRA petition implicates jurisdiction, and no court
has jurisdiction to hear an untimely petition. Commonwealth v. Williams,
35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa. Super. 2011). Any PCRA petition, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Judgment is final “at
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the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A §
9545(b)(3); Commonwealth v. Pollard, 911 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Super.
2006). To meet an exception to the time requirement, a petitioner must plead
and prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition attempting to invoke an
exception must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Appellant agrees his petition is untimely, but claims he met the
exception of proving newly discovered facts. See Appellant’s Brief at 12
(stating PCRA court “misapplied the newly discovered fact exception . . .
leading to an erroneous dismissal of PCRA petition as untimely.”).
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To obtain relief based on newly discovered facts, Appellant must
establish his proffered evidence “(1) could not have been obtained prior to the
conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the
credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a
new trial were granted.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa.
2008) (citation omitted).
Appellant contends he received exculpatory evidence from Sullivan, who
was approximately 12 years old when he testified at Appellant’s trial as a
rebuttal witness for the Commonwealth. Appellant explains that he learned
about the evidence when he was
transferred to SCI-Smithfield on September 4, 2019, and within
days of his being there, on September 8, 2019, an inmate [] told
[A]ppellant that he spoke to Sullivan on the phone, and that
Sullivan told [him] he had wrote [A]ppellant a letter, and to tell
[A]ppellant to call him (Sullivan).
Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant claims he contacted Sullivan, who wrote him
“a letter and subsequent affidavit, stating that he was coerced to give that
fabricated testimony by the victim’s sister.” Id. at 10. Appellant asserts he
did not learn of the new facts until after he
arrived at SCI-Smithfield on September 4, 2019. So despite any
date on the affidavit/statement, it is timely filed if done by or
before September 4, 2020. That burden was met when appellant
submitted his petition on August 31, 2020.
Id. at 17. Appellant maintains Sullivan’s letter and affidavit constitute
“admissions of fabrications.” Id. at 16.
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Conversely, the Commonwealth argues Appellant “failed to explain why
he was unable to ascertain the supposed new information over the last twenty
years with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth Brief at 8. In
addition, the Commonwealth emphasizes “Sullivan did not state in either the
letter or affidavit that his testimony at trial was false in any way[.]” Id. at 10
(footnote omitted). Finally, the Commonwealth argues Appellant “failed to
explain how any theoretical contradiction in Sullivan’s trial testimony would
have entitled him to relief,” given the “ample evidence proving Appellant’s
guilt.” Id. at 12. We agree.
Sullivan’s letter to Appellant is not dated. Pertinently, Sullivan
apologizes for testifying at trial and states:
I didn’t want to testify at your trial, I was forced to by my family
(babysitter). I was told what to say, the D.A. had to know I didn’t
know what happened and had to know or help prep me because I
was super young and never really saw anything that had anything
to your case [sic], plus I was nervous & was informed to ball up
my fist to hide the nervousness.
***
I was told investigators w[ere] looking for me about your case, I
just never got back with them. Basically I was told a bad guy
would walk free if I didn’t go to court. At the time I had no idea
what was going on.
PCRA Petition, 8/31/20, Letter at 1 (undated).
In the affidavit, Sullivan swears:
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I am not claiming that anyone is innocent because I do not
know Ali,1 nor was I there or know of any murder of [the victim].
I am simply trying to correct a wrong that may have been done.
I remember being groomed in a side room, being told what
to say if I was nervous and what to do to hide my nervousness. I
was told to ball my fist as tight as I could.
What I don’t remember is ever being present to any murders
to this day, let alone the guy in the neighborhood that would pay
me to pick up his food on store runs as a kid.2
I truly am sorry if I have caused or was part [of] causing
any wrong, but I am willing and available to testify to these facts
if, and or when I am called.
PCRA Petition, 8/31/20, Affidavit at 1 (undated) (footnotes added).
The PCRA court determined Appellant failed to establish he raised the
newly discovered fact exception within one year as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(2). The PCRA court explained:
[Appellant] indicated in his PCRA petition that Sullivan wrote him
a letter in September 2019 stating the reasons for his alleged false
testimony. However, Petitioner did not give a precise date of
when he discovered said information. Rather, in his [Rule] 907
response, he implored this [c]ourt to use the postmarked date on
the envelope Sullivan’s letter was mailed in. The envelope
[Appellant] referenced was postmarked May 11, 2020 and
addressed to an inmate by the name of Cleo McKinney - NF 7199.
Furthermore, [Appellant] again did not state the precise date that
he received the affidavit, and the date of when he discovered the
alleged new facts, but rather again requested this [c]ourt use the
postmarked envelope presumably the affidavit was mailed in to
determine when he discovered this allegedly new information.
The postmark on the envelope referenced was dated for December
____________________________________________
1 As indicated by his salutation to “Ali” at the top of the letter, Sullivan is
referring to Appellant, whose given name is Aileaf.
2 Sullivan appears to be referencing the victim.
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21, 2019, again this did not give this [c]ourt any indication as to
when [Appellant] initially learned of the new information.
[Appellant], therefore, did not demonstrate that he raised [it]
within the one year of the date that he could have presented it.
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/10/21, at 4 (citations omitted).
The record supports the above reasoning. In addition, the record
supports the PCRA court’s findings, in the alternative, with respect to
Appellant’s claims of newly discovered facts. The PCRA court stated:
Even if [Appellant] had satisfied his burden of proving that
he raised his claim within one year of discovering the new
information, he still would have failed to invoke the newly
discovered fact exception. During [] trial, Sullivan testified
[Appellant] came to his home and confessed to shooting the
[victim]. At no point during his trial testimony did Sullivan allege
to be a witness to the homicide. In his affidavit, Sullivan again
stated that he was not present at the scene. He confirmed “I am
not claiming that anyone was innocent because I do not know Ali,
nor was I there or knew of any murder of Shelton [sic] ... I
remember being groomed in a sick3 room, being told what to
say if I was nervous and what to do to hide my
nervousness.” Sullivan did not elaborate as to what he was
told to say to help dissipate his nervousness during testimony.
Similarly, in his letter Sullivan neither recanted nor contradicted
his trial testimony. Rather, he affirmed that he was not at the
scene of the crime. He continued to say “I was told what to say,
the D.A. had to know I didn’t know what happened and had to
know or help prep me because I was super young and really never
saw anything that had anything to [do with] your case, plus I was
nervous...” Sullivan did not elaborate in either his letter or his
affidavit on the communication that took place between him and
the [C]ommonwealth. More importantly, in neither document did
he state that he fabricated his testimony during trial. Rather,
Sullivan appeared to be describing what steps were taken to make
____________________________________________
3 As indicated above, we read Sullivan’s handwriting as stating he was
“groomed in a ‘side’ room.” PCRA Petition, 8/31/20, Affidavit at 1 (undated).
The distinction between “sick” and “side” does not impact our analysis or
disposition.
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him comfortable to testify in court as a presumably nervous child
witness.
Id. at 4-5 (bold emphasis in original, citations omitted).
Furthermore, the record reveals ample evidence of Appellant’s guilt,
including testimony from an eyewitness who stated he saw Appellant argue
with the victim about whether Appellant could sell drugs from the victim’s
“corner,” and later saw Appellant fire multiple shots at the victim before
fleeing. Appellant is not entitled to relief because it is unlikely a new trial
would result in a different verdict. See Pagan, supra.
For the above reasons, we discern no error by the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Jones, A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted) (“There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a
PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that no
genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.”); see
also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(2).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/7/2022
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