Monsour, R. v. S&T Bank

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ROY C. MONSOUR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
S&T BANK : No. 1432 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered November 12, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at
No(s): 408 of 2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JUNE 8, 2022
Roy C. Monsour appeals, pro se, the November 12, 2021 order granting
summary judgment in favor of S&T Bank (“the Bank”). We affirm.
On February 9, 2021, the Bank filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure
alleging, inter alia, that Appellant defaulted on a promissory note (“note”) and
mortgage on a commercial property in favor of the Bank in the specified
amount of $495,000. Specifically, the Bank alleged that Appellant failed to
pay the monthly installments of principal and interests on the note. The Bank
attached the note and mortgage to the complaint as Exhibit A and Exhibit B,
respectively, and asserted that it provided Appellant the required notices
pursuant to the Mortgage Assistance Act of 1983. Furthermore, the Bank
outlined the outstanding principal, interest, and late charges, and requested
judgment in the amount of $442,659.31.
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Appellant did not file an answer to the complaint. Instead, he filed a
counterclaim and motion to dismiss, which neither admitted nor denied the
mortgage default, the amount owing, or any other pertinent fact. Rather than
answer the factual averments in the complaint, Appellant asserted his own
counterclaim for monetary damages based upon a purported breach of a trust
that was not relevant to the mortgage foreclosure action. The Bank’s reply to
the counterclaim denied all of the pertinent allegations.
Thereafter, the Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which
asserted that Appellant’s response, “completely failed[ed] to admit or deny
the . . . relevant material facts set forth in [the c]omplaint as is required
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure [1029(a) and (b)].”
Motion for Summary Judgment, 4/14/21, at 1-2. The trial court summarized
the subsequent procedural history as follows:
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion was set
for July 22, 2021. [Appellant] did not timely respond to the
summary judgment motion. Both parties filed various motions to
be heard prior to the argument. [Appellant] filed a motion to
compel discovery along with two pleadings entitled “Second
Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss with prejudice” and “Motion
for Excusable Negligence.” [The Bank] filed a motion to quash a
subpoena for attendance at the oral argument, along with a
motion to strike [Appellant’s] second counterclaim . . . and to
dismiss his counterclaims with prejudice.
Prior to the argument on summary judgment, the [c]ourt
ruled on the parties’ various motions. [The court granted the
Bank’s motion to strike and request to quash the subpoena, and
dismissed Appellant’s counterclaims.] Regarding [Appellant’s]
request for “excusable negligence[,]” the [c]ourt considered
[Appellant’s] pro se status and provided [Appellant] . . . additional
time to respond to the summary judgment motion[.] All other
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portions of the motion, as well as [Appellant’s] motion to compel
were denied by order dated July 22, 2021. Upon the receipt and
consideration of all relevant filings, [the trial c]ourt entered
summary judgment for [the Bank] on November 12, 2021. .
Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/22, 1-2.
As to the basis for granting summary judgment, the court first noted
that, “In an action for mortgage foreclosure, the entry of summary judgment
is proper if the mortgagors admit that the mortgage is in default, that they
have failed to pay interest on the obligation, and that the recorded mortgage
is in the specified amount.” Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054,
1057 (Pa.Super. 1998).
Thereafter, the court reasoned that Appellant did not contest that: (1)
the loan is in default; (2) he has not continued to pay interest on the
obligation; and (3) that the recorded mortgage was in a specific amount. Id.
at 3-4. Moreover, the court found that Appellant failed to raise a defense to
the complaint or provide anything that would raise a genuine issue of material
fact precluding summary judgment. Id. at 4. Hence, it concluded, the Bank
“has met the standard for summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure
action.” Id. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant complied with the trial court’s directive to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
However, Appellant’s eight-page Rule 1925(b) statement asserted eleven
complaints, many of which included enumerated sub-issues, relating to, inter
alia, the purported breach of trust, “Appellant’s Status and Standing as
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Beneficiary and Private American/Pennsylvanian in esse [sic] and sui juris[,]”
bias, prejudice, and “material irregularity”, and the “mandatory requirements
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) per Title 12 of the United
States Code, § 1831n(a), Financial Standards Board Publications, Security and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulations, IRS, the Federal Reserve Bank
Regulations and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).” Rule 1925(b)
Statement at 1-8.
At the outset, we address whether these various claims are preserved
for our review.1 An appellant waives all matters for review where he identifies
an excessive number of issues in the concise statement. See Jones v. Jones,
878 A.2d 86 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding that a seven-page, twenty-nine issue
statement resulted in waiver). Similarly, we may also find waiver where a
concise statement is too vague. See In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa.Super.
2013) (“When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that
is not enough for meaningful review.” (citation omitted)). While Rule
1925(b)(4)(iv) provides that the sheer number of issues is not sufficient
grounds to find waiver “[w]here non-redundant, non-frivolous issues are set
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1 Appellant reiterates several of these allegations among the twenty-nine
issues that he lists in his brief as the statement of the questions involved. See
Appellant’s brief at 6-9. In this vein, Appellant’s brief is defective insofar as
it fails to present any lucid legal argument. Instead, consistent with his Rule
1925(b) statement, Appellant alleges various arguments that are irrelevant to
the propriety of the court’s entry of summary judgment in the mortgage
foreclosure action.
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forth in an appropriately concise manner[,]” that concession does not negate
the requirement that the Rule 1925 statement facilitate appellate review. See
Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 401 (Pa.Super. 2004) (holding that “[b]y
raising an outrageous number of issues” in a Rule 1925(b) statement, an
appellant impedes the trial court’s ability to prepare an opinion addressing the
issues on appeal, thereby effectively precluding appellate review). As outlined
supra, Appellant’s litany of irrelevant complaints hinders our review.
Instantly, the trial court stated that the Rule 1925 Statement “was
neither concise nor coherent.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/22, at 4. Critically,
the court observed that Appellant made “no attempt to even address the
straightforward standard for summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure
action or t[he trial c]ourt’s application thereof.” Id. at 4-5. The court
continued, “Instead, [Appellant’s] Statement of Errors once again recites out-
of-context and irrelevant law and repeats the illogical claim that somehow [the
Bank] owes him . . . money.” Id. at 5.
Our review of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement confirms the trial
court’s description. Appellant’s status as a pro se litigant does not entitle him
to any special deference. Indeed, “[a]ny layperson choosing to represent
[herself] in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the
risk that [her] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [her] undoing.”
See Branch Banking & Tr. v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa.Super.
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2006). It is beyond cavil that this Court will not act as appellate counsel.
Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1165 (Pa.Super. 1996).
Nowhere in the rambling, disjointed Rule 1925(b) statement does
Appellant assert any allegations of error regarding the salient issues, namely
the court’s application of Cunningham v. Williams, supra, and its decision
to enter summary judgment on the basis of that analysis. Accordingly, we
conclude that, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), Appellant waived review
of this appellate claims.
As Appellant’s noncompliant Rule 1925(b) statement failed to preserve
any basis for this Court to disturb the order granting summary judgment in
the foreclosure action, we affirm it.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/8/2022
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