Com. v. Beckett, J.

J-S22013-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES NOAH BECKETT : No. 122 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered December 24, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004756-2019
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JUNE 24, 2022
In this appeal brought by the Commonwealth, we are asked to review
whether the trial court properly concluded that a state trooper lacked probable
cause to arrest James Noah Beckett for driving under the influence of alcohol
(“DUI”). After careful review, we conclude the trial court erred. We therefore
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On April 27, 2019, at approximately 3:15 a.m., Pennsylvania State
Police Trooper Joshua Porter observed a Mazda CX5 travelling northbound on
I-81 in Dauphin County. Trooper Porter indicated that, as he followed Beckett
for 2.4 miles, he observed Beckett drive over the white fog line on multiple
occasions. Trooper Porter stopped Beckett and eventually performed three
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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field sobriety tests and a portable breathalyzer test. At the conclusion of these
tests, Trooper Porter placed Beckett under arrest and had Beckett submit a
blood sample for chemical analysis. Ultimately, Trooper Porter charged
Beckett with driving under the influence (general impairment), careless
driving, and disregarding traffic lanes.
Beckett filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress evidence.
The trial court held a hearing on July 27, 2020. Thereafter, the parties filed
memoranda of law. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the trial court
concluded that Trooper Porter had probable cause to stop Beckett and charge
him with crossing the fog line in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1). However,
the court granted suppression of the results of the chemical blood test
concluding Trooper Porter lacked probable cause to arrest Beckett for DUI.
The Commonwealth then filed this timely appeal.1
We begin our review by noting a relatively unusual circumstance. The
trial court here issued a split decision. While it suppressed the results of the
blood draw due to its conclusion that Trooper Porter lacked probable cause to
arrest Beckett for DUI, it nevertheless found that Trooper Porter had probable
cause to stop Beckett and charge him with a traffic violation under 75
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1 The Commonwealth has certified, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 311(d), the trial court’s order granting the suppression of evidence
substantially handicaps the prosecution of this case. Commonwealth’s Brief at
1. Therefore, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), this Court has jurisdiction to hear
this appeal from the trial court’s interlocutory order, even though the order
did not terminate the prosecution.
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Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1). Due to this split decision, Beckett, as appellee, raises
arguments asking us to affirm the trial court’s order on a basis that the trial
court explicitly rejected: that Trooper Porter lacked probable cause for the
traffic stop.
Normally, Beckett would have no opportunity to have this Court review,
before trial, the trial court’s conclusion that the stop was justified. See
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 221 A.2d 115, 116 (Pa. 1966) (holding that a
criminal defendant may not appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress).
This would be true even if Beckett had filed a cross-appeal. Commonwealth
v. Slaton, 556 A.2d 1343, 1353 (Pa. Super. 1989) (en banc).
Here, however, Beckett did not file a cross-appeal. Instead, he asks us
to reverse the trial court’s conclusion on the legality of the traffic stop through
the guise of our power to affirm the trial court “on any basis.” In re Jacobs,
15 A.3d 509, n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that this Court may affirm an
order on any basis). We decline Beckett’s invitation to circumvent our Rules
of Appellate Procedure to review the trial court’s explicit conclusion that
Trooper Porter had probable cause to pull Beckett over. We therefore review
only the trial court’s conclusion that Trooper Porter lacked probable cause to
arrest Beckett for DUI.
The Commonwealth argues that the trooper’s observations were
sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Beckett for DUI. When
reviewing an order granting a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, “we
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are bound by that court’s factual findings to the extent that they are supported
by the record, and we consider only the evidence offered by the defendant,
as well as any portion of the Commonwealth’s evidence which remains
uncontradicted, when read in the context of the entire record.”
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1048 (Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted). “Our review of the legal conclusions which have been drawn from
such evidence, however, is de novo, and, consequently, we are not bound by
the legal conclusions of the lower courts.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover,
our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary
record that was created at the suppression hearing. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d
1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).
Further, Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 provides that “[t]he Commonwealth shall
have the burden ... of establishing that the challenged evidence was not
obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).
Specifically, the Commonwealth has the burden of “establish[ing] by a
preponderance of the evidence that the evidence was properly obtained.”
Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted).
In order to arrest Beckett for DUI, Trooper Porter was required to have
probable cause to believe Beckett was impaired to an extent that he could not
safely drive. “Probable cause is made out when the facts and circumstances
which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of
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which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or
is committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931
(Pa. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Probable cause “does not involve
certainties, but rather the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent [persons] act.” Commonwealth v. Salter,
121 A.3d 987, 995 (Pa. Super. 2015) (brackets in original).
Here, Trooper Porter did not base his conclusion on any single factor.
Instead, he considered the totality of the circumstances. See N.T., 7/27/20
at 25. First, we have Trooper Porter’s account of his observation prior to
executing the traffic stop:
As I was traveling north I observed [Beckett’s] Mazda to drive
over the solid right white line there on the right side of the
roadway. They drove over the solid white line. I maneuvered
behind them just to continue observing, and while following them,
for approximately 2.4 miles, I watched the vehicle drive over the
shoulder multiple times.
N.T., 7/27/20, at 7. On cross-examination, Trooper Porter indicated that he
saw Beckett drive over the white line on three occasions, each time by varying
amounts. Id. at 24.
The Commonwealth also played a portion of the audio and video
recording from the motor vehicle recorder (“MVR”) on Trooper Porter’s vehicle
and admitted the entire recording into evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit
1. The recording depicts the initial pursuit and stop of Beckett’s Mazda, the
field sobriety tests conducted by Trooper Porter, Trooper Porter’s
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administration of a portable breath test (“PBT”), and Beckett’s arrest at the
scene.
The trial court made the following observations regarding the events
leading to the stop of the vehicle as they appeared on the MVR:
This [c]ourt’s review of the MVR revealed three (3) instances of
drifting. One (1) of those instances was significant enough to raise
some level of concern for a reasonable officer in that the vehicle’s
two (2) right-hand tires briefly crossed the fog line. Still, the
infraction was brief and [Beckett] self-corrected quickly and easily
without jerky movements. … The other two (2) instances of
alleged “swerving” were of such a slight nature as to be
insignificant to this analysis.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/21, at 2.
After pulling Beckett over, Trooper Porter noticed an odor of alcohol on
Beckett’s breath. See N.T., 7/27/20, at 26. When questioned, Beckett initially
admitted to only having a single drink that night. See id., at 27. During the
subsequent testing, however, Beckett admitted to having “about three”
drinks. Id.
Both Beckett and the trial court focus extensively on the subsequent
physical impairment testing administered by Trooper Porter. To the extent the
trial court weighed the evidence presented to it and determined that the
results of these physical tests were inconclusive, we see no reason to override
the court’s determination. Both Trooper Porter and the prosecutor
acknowledged that the physical testing was not perfectly administered. See,
e.g., id., at 29 (Trooper Porter acknowledging he missed a step in assessing
Beckett’s ability to use his eyes to follow a moving object), 30 (Trooper Porter
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acknowledging he may not have waited for the suggested amount of time in
performing the nystagmus test); see also Appellant’s Brief, at 18 (conceding
the nystagmus test was performed improperly); Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/21,
at 4-5 (observing that the walk and turn test revealed only one “clue,” out of
eight possible clues, that indicated Beckett was intoxicated, and the one-
legged stand test similarly revealed only one clue out of four possible clues).
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Trooper Porter administered a PBT on
Beckett, with a result that was above the legal limit. See N.T., 7/27/20, at
31. The trial court explicitly disregarded this result by concluding that Trooper
Porter did not possess sufficient reasonable suspicion to perform the test. See
Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/21, at 5, n.6. We disagree. Reasonable suspicion is
defined as a standard that is less stringent than probable cause: an officer
need only be able to identify “specific and articulable facts” that raise an
inference of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95
(Pa. 2011). Here, Trooper Porter was able to point to his observations of
Beckett’s erratic driving, combined with the odor of alcohol on Beckett’s
breath, Beckett’s admission to having been drinking, and Beckett’s slurred
speech, see N.T., 7/27/20, at 11, to support his suspicion that Beckett had
been driving while impaired. Under these circumstances, we conclude Trooper
Porter had sufficient reasonable suspicion to request a chemical breath test.
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Once the chemical breath test corroborated Trooper Porter’s suspicions,2
Trooper Porter possessed probable cause to arrest Beckett for DUI. As a result,
we conclude the trial court erred in suppressing the results of the chemical
blood test. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/24/2022
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2 The chemical breath test does not represent conclusive proof of Beckett’s
blood alcohol level. However, the breath test is intended to assist an officer in
determining whether there is probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI. See
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(k) (“The sole purpose of this preliminary breath test is
to assist the officer in determining whether or not the person should be placed
under arrest.”).
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