In the Interest of: H.P., Appeal of: H.S.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: H.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.S., MOTHER :
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: No. 771 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered June 27, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000221-2021
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 14, 2022
Appellant, H.S. (“Mother”), appeals from the June 27, 2022 order, as
amended, in the Court of Common of Pleas of Allegheny County, involuntarily
terminating her parental rights to her daughter, H.P. (“Child”), born in April
2020.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The factual and procedural history relevant to this appeal are as follows.
The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Family (“CYF”) has been
involved with this family since 2002, at which time Mother was a delinquent
minor, who admitted to drug and alcohol and mental health issues. N.T.,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1Pursuant to the same order, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of Child’s father, R.S. (“Father”). Father did not file a separate
appeal, and he is not a participating party to the instant appeal.
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4/22/22, at 15. Between 2002 and 2013, Mother had four children, none of
whom are currently in her care. Id. at 14. During that time, CYF was involved
with the family on multiple occasions primarily due to concerns of drug and
alcohol use. Id. at 16. In June 2015, Mother’s parental rights to one of the
four children were involuntarily terminated. Id. at 14.
In April 2020, CYF received a referral that Child was born nine-and-a-
half weeks early, and Mother admitted to relapsing on cocaine due to stress
from domestic violence with Father, whom she married in June 2019. Id. at
13-14, 17. CYF verified that Mother and Father were in “treatment” and closed
its investigation.2 Id. at 17. Child remained in the hospital’s neonatal
intensive care unit (“NICU”) until she was discharged to Mother on May 27,
2020. Id. at 18.
On May 26, 2020, CYF received a referral based on a report that Father
had physically and sexually abused Mother. Id. at 17. As a result, Father
was arrested the next day, on May 27, 2020, and was not released until
October 26, 2021.3 Id. at 18.
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2 It is unclear from the record what particular treatment Mother was engaged
in at that time. N.T., 4/22/22, at 17.
3 Father was convicted of recklessly endangering another person and
sentenced to confinement for a minimum of nine months and a maximum of
eighteen months at Allegheny County Jail. He was also sentenced to probation
for two years. CYF Ex. 5, Order of Sentence, 10/6/21.
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On June 23, 2020, the City of Clairton Police Department received a
report of a woman “swinging her baby around in a carriage” at a gas station.
Id. at 6. Officer Jodi Leitzell arrived at the gas station and observed Mother
getting out of her vehicle. Id. at 5, 7. Mother appeared to be under the
influence as she was running in circles, back and forth, and bending over to
seemingly pick up items that were not on the ground. Id. at 8. Officer Leitzell
saw heroin in plain sight in Mother’s vehicle, and she saw Child in an
unrestrained baby carriage inside the vehicle. Id. at 8-9. Mother was arrested
and released later that day. Id. at 8, 19. The criminal court ordered no
contact between Mother and Child, which remained in effect until August 20,
2020.4 Id at 8, 19, 25.
On June 24, 2020, CYF obtained emergency custody of Child and placed
her with foster parents, D.H. and C.R. (“Foster Parents”). Id. at 20. Child
has since remained in the care of Foster Parents. Id. at 34.
On July 14, 2020, the court adjudicated Child dependent. CYF Ex. 6,
Order of Adjudication, 7/14/20, at 1. The court ordered Mother to participate
in domestic violence counseling, comply with random urine drug screens, and
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4Mother was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”), driving
under the influence (“DUI”), and intentional possession of a controlled
substance. Under the EWOC count, Mother was sentenced to eighteen months
of probation supervised by Allegheny County. Under the DUI count, the trial
court sentenced her to six months of probation and time served of ten days.
The court further ordered, inter alia, a drug and alcohol evaluation, drug
screening, and safe driving school. CYF Ex. 4, Order of Sentence, 5/6/21.
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continue drug and alcohol treatment. Id. at 2-3. The court ordered that once
the criminal court’s no contact order is lifted, Mother is to have supervised
visits with Child. Id. at 2.
The court held regular permanency review hearings throughout the
dependency case. CYF Ex. 6. On September 8, 2020, the court found
aggravated circumstances existed as to Mother because her parental rights
were involuntarily terminated with respect to another child. CYF Ex. 6,
Aggravated Circumstances Order, 9/8/20. The court ordered that reasonable
efforts to reunify Child with Mother were to continue. Id.
On August 29, 2020, Mother became incarcerated on charges related to
the June 23, 2020 incident.5 N.T., 4/22/22, at 20. Mother remained in prison
until March 31, 2021. Id. at 21. During her incarceration, Mother participated
in “a few” virtual visits with Child via videoconference. Id. at 26. Once
released from prison, Mother was court-ordered to have supervised visits with
Child at the CYF office or as arranged by the caregiver. CYF Ex. 6, Permanency
Review Order, 3/18/21.
On October 14, 2021, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother and Father’s parental rights to Child. Between December 28, 2021,
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5 From what we can discern from the record, Mother was incarcerated based
on the charges of EWOC, DUI, and intentional possession of a controlled
substance, stemming from the June 23, 2020 incident. As part of her criminal
sentence, Mother received credit for time served at the Allegheny County Jail
from August 29, 2020, through September 7, 2020. CYF Ex. 3, Order of
Sentence, 5/6/21.
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and February 8, 2022, while the petition was pending, Mother was offered one
hour of unsupervised visitation per week in addition to her supervised visits
with Child. N.T., 4/22/22, at 26, 45. On February 8, 2022, Mother’s visits
reverted to being fully supervised because she failed to attend her random
drug screens. Id. at 27. Mother missed eight visits in January and February
2022, and she missed three visits in March and April 2022. Id. at 27-28.
The orphans’ court conducted a hearing on the petition on April 22,
2022, when Child was two years old. Child was represented by a guardian ad
litem (“GAL”).6 CYF presented the testimony of: Jodie Leitzell, a police officer
with the City of Clairton Police Department; Cassandra Guthrie, CYF
caseworker; Patricia Pepe, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist; and Tarraca
Jackson, a supervisor with the Allegheny County Health Department’s (“Health
Department”) drug and alcohol screening office. The parties stipulated Dr.
Pepe as an expert in child and forensic psychology. Dr. Pepe conducted
Mother’s psychological evaluation and her interactional evaluation with Child
in August 2021, as well as Foster Parents’ psychological evaluations and their
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6 Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to
her young age, the court did not appoint separate legal counsel for Child. See
In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding that “if the preferred
outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very
young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal
interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section
2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is satisfied).
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interactional evaluations with Child in August 2021 and February 2022.
Mother testified on her own behalf.
Ms. Guthrie testified that Child underwent “an assessment at the
Children’s Developmental Center, which recommended that she work with
Alliance for Infants.” N.T., 4/22/22, at 32. Ms. Guthrie testified that Alliance
for Infants recommended developmental and occupational therapy for Child.
Id. Ms. Guthrie explained that these services are implemented at Child’s
daycare three times per month, and at Child’s foster home once a month. Id.
at 33.
By order dated April 22, 2022, and entered on June 27, 2022, as
amended, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8).7 On June 28, 2022,
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The
trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion dated July 26, 2022.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:
1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?
2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of
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7 The court amended the termination order entered on May 31, 2022, to
correct a typographical error. Specifically, the court omitted 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(3) and included 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).
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proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination
of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 8.
We note the well-settled standard of review. “In cases concerning the
involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a
determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by
competent evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa.
2021). When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by
the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where
the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate
court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error
of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591
(Pa. 2021).
“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support
an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to
trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.
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In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must
balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs
for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.
Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences
for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. As such, the law of
this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory
grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,
255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds
describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary
termination.” Id.; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). In evaluating
whether the petitioner proved grounds under Section 2511(a), the trial court
must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or best
interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa. Super.
2021). If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court
then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b), which focuses on the
child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
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Instantly, we analyze the orphans’ court’s involuntary termination order
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b):8
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
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8 This Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in
addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental
rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
Therefore, we need not review Mother’s argument with respect to Section
2511(a)(5) and (8).
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In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting In re
Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citation
omitted)). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of
Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re
N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011)). As such, “[a] parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (quoting In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
In In re Adoption of S.P., supra, our Supreme Court addressed the
relevance of incarceration in termination decisions under Section 2511(a)(2).
The S.P. Court held that “incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a
determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist
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under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent
due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence and that causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be
remedied.” 47 A.3d at 828.
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that the trial court
“must . . . discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” In re
C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further,
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent.
In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010). Our Supreme Court
explained, “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must
also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether
they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
The Court directed that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to
Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in
mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court observed, “[c]hildren are young for a
scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy
development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is
catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
We begin with Mother’s first issue on appeal wherein she argues there
was insufficient evidence to show that Mother had continued incapacity to
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provide essential parental care for Child or that the incapacity have not or will
not be remedied by Mother. Mother’s Brief at 22. Mother asserts that she
participated in dual diagnosis treatment, intimate partner violence treatment,
random drug screens; completed parenting classes; and attended supervised
visitation. Id. at 23. Mother further asserts that she is no longer in a
relationship with Father. Id. at 26. We do not find Mother’s argument
persuasive.
The record demonstrates that Mother participated in a dual diagnosis
treatment at the Mon Yough program from April to October 2021. N.T.,
4/22/22, at 93-95, 97. She attended intimate partner violence treatment at
the Women’s Center and Shelter from May 13 to August 12, 2021, and
successfully completed the program. Id. at 39. Mother appeared for random
drug screens at the Health Department between June 29 through December
10, 2021, except for one “no show” on November 26, 2021. CYF Ex. 3, at 2.
Mother also completed the Arsenal Parenting Program. N.T., 4/22/22, at 29.
The orphans’ court acknowledged that Mother participated in the above
programs. Orphan’s Court Opinion at 11-14. The court, however, found that
Mother failed to satisfy her mental health, drug and alcohol, and domestic
violence goals, and the court noted that it “does not believe that [Mother]
possesses the ability to parent the [C]hild safely and effectively.” Id. at 13.
The court explained that “Mother’s ability to comply with her goals for
approximately six months did not persuade this [c]ourt that she can perform
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the actions necessary to assume parental responsibilities.” Id. at 14. The
record supports the orphans’ court’s finding.
With respect to Mother’s mental health, Dr. Pepe performed a
psychological evaluation of Mother on August 25, 2021, and diagnosed her
with the following: history of substance dependence, specifically crack cocaine
and opioid use disorder; persistent depressive disorder; and history of anti-
social personality disorder. N.T., 4/22/22, at 55; CYF Ex. 2, Psychological
Evaluation Report, 8/19/21 & 8/25/21, at 11. Dr. Pepe explained that a
personality disorder involves a “dysfunction with cognition” and a “repetition
of dysfunctional behaviors.” N.T., 4/22/22, at 57. She noted that the
condition is pervasive, “all-encompassing,” and “very stagnant or difficult to
change.” Id. Dr. Pepe elaborated that a personality disorder can affect
parenting, noting that depending on the type of personality disorder, there is
“instability” and “confusion,” and “the child does not have the love and
stability needed for positive growth.” Id. 58-59.
Dr. Pepe noted that Mother has a guarded prognosis and poor judgment.
Id. at 56; CYF Ex. 2, Psychological Evaluation Report, 8/19/21 & 8/25/21, at
11, 13. Dr. Pepe testified that it is “important to have somebody [that is]
aware of those dynamics to work with the individual, and really needs to be
involved with intensive treatment for a long period of time.” N.T., 4/22/22,
at 57. Dr. Pepe recommended that Mother complete an evaluation and enter
an “intensive outpatient program,” or, “at the very least, individual
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psychotherapy on a weekly basis with a therapist that [has] experience with
personality disorders.” Id.
Mother, however, did not engage in the recommended level of treatment
to address her mental health. Around the time of Dr. Pepe’s August 2021
evaluation, Mother was participating in mental health treatment on a monthly
basis through Mon Yough’s dual diagnosis program. Id. at 59. Dr. Pepe did
not believe that monthly treatment was sufficient for Mother and
recommended a more intensive level of treatment. Id. at 59, 78-79. Dr.
Pepe testified that Mother “had a lot of psychological issues” and that it was
“very important that [Mother] address those issues in depth to maintain
stability.” Id. at 79. Although Mother testified that she subsequently
increased her mental health treatment sessions from monthly to bi-weekly,
there is no evidence that Mother participated in treatment at the level
recommended by Dr. Pepe. Id. at 57, 97. Additionally, the CYF caseworker
Ms. Guthrie testified that she asked Mother if she was currently in mental
health treatment, but Mother did not provide her with a response. Id. at 24-
25. The orphans’ court properly determined that “Mother has not
meaningfully engaged in mental health treatment” nor has she provided CYF
with “documentation that she has been addressing this goal.” Orphans’ Court
Opinion at 12.
In addition to Mother’s mental health, the orphans’ court noted that
Mother “struggled with substance abuse issues for most of her life.” Id. at
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11. The court further noted “there is no indication that she has been living a
clean and sober lifestyle.” Id. The testimonial evidence supports the court’s
finding as follows. On direct examination, Mother testified: “I know I suffer
from a drug addiction, like, and believe me, I wish everyday [sic] I didn’t, you
know.” N.T., 4/22/22, at 101. Dr. Pepe testified that at the time of the August
2021 evaluation, Mother had been out in the community for only a couple of
months, and given Mother’s extensive substance use history, “it was vital that
[Mother] continue drug screens and various treatment modalities.” Id. at 62.
The record shows that Mother did not consistently engage in drug and
alcohol treatment. Mother testified that after she was released from prison,
she attended a dual diagnosis program at Mon Yough from April to October
2021. Id. at 93-95, 97. The orphans’ court credited Mother’s testimony that
she graduated from Mon Yough’s drug and alcohol treatment program in
October 2021, and stated that “Mother should be commended for her
successful completion of the Mon Yough program.” Orphans’ Court Opinion at
11; N.T., 4/22/22, at 94-95. The court, however, also noted Mother did not
pursue any aftercare treatment after leaving Mon Yough. Orphans’ Court
Opinion at 11; N.T., 4/22/22, at 94-95. Mother testified that she re-engaged
in drug and alcohol treatment only “a couple of weeks” prior to the April 22,
2022 hearing. N.T., 4/22/22, at 95. While Mother expressly acknowledges
that she suffers from drug addiction, Id. at 101, there is no evidence in the
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record showing that Mother engaged in drug and alcohol treatment between
November 2021, through March 2022. Id. at 104.
Moreover, Mother had not complied with random drug screens between
January and late March 2022. The orphans’ court noted that Mother was
largely compliant with random screens in 2021, but she only attended three
out of fifteen random drug screens at the Health Department in 2022.9
Orphans’ Court Opinion at 11; N.T., 4/22/22, at 83. The record shows that
after attending a screen on December 10, 2021, Mother did not appear for
another screen until March 24, 2022. N.T., 4/22/22, at 85; CYF Ex. 3.
Mother asserts that she is currently on federal probation, and she meets
with her federal probation officer and submits a urine screen once a month.10
Mother’s Brief at 23. However, there is no indication in the record that the
screens for her probation are random. N.T., 4/22/22, at 92. Notably, Mother
admitted that she did not appear for the random drug screens conducted at
the Health Department. Id. at 104. Thus, Mother’s lack of consistent
engagement in drug and alcohol treatment and random drug screens further
demonstrate her repeated and continued incapacity that caused Child to be
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9The three screens that Mother attended in 2022 were on March 24, April 7,
and April 13, 2022. N.T., 4/22/22, at 83-84. The results were negative. Id.
10 As noted in Dr. Pepe’s psychological evaluation report, Mother has a federal
offense for Social Security fraud. CYF Ex. 2, Psychological Evaluation Report,
8/19/21 & 8/25/21, at 10.
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without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for her well-
being.
Regarding the objective to address domestic violence concerns, the
orphans’ court noted that “[d]omestic violence was another important goal for
Mother as she had been victimized by Father for several years.” Orphans’
Court Opinion at 12. Dr. Pepe testified that Mother was a victim of physical
and sexual abuse perpetrated by Father, and Father admitted to being
physically aggressive with Mother. N.T., 4/22/22, at 56. The abuse resulted
in Mother’s hospitalization and Father’s seventeen-month incarceration. Id.
Mother asserts that she participated in the domestic violence treatment,
is no longer in a relationship with Father, and intends to file for divorce.
Mother’s Brief at 23, 26. The orphans’ court considered Mother’s completion
of domestic violence therapy at the Women’s Center and Shelter, but noted
that Mother continued her relationship with Father after his release from
prison in October 2021. Orphans’ Court Opinion at 12; N.T., 4/22/22, at 46,
48. The record shows that after Father’s release from prison, Mother became
more inconsistent with her visits with Child, and she stopped attending drug
screens between January and March 2022. N.T., 4/22/22, at 27-28, 47, 85;
CYF Ex. 3. Specifically, Mother missed approximately eleven visits with Child
between January and April 2022. N.T., 4/22/22, at 28. Mother offered CYF
various medical reasons for missing some of these visits. Id. at 28-29.
However, when CYF requested Mother to sign releases, Mother declined. Id.
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at 29. Mother then admitted to CYF caseworker Ms. Guthrie that she was not
completing her court goals because “[F]ather was being very controlling and
not letting [M]other leave the home.” Id. at 30. While Mother testified that
she ended her relationship with Father “weeks” before the April 2022 hearing
and wants to get a divorce, Father informed CYF that he and Mother are still
in a relationship. Id. 30, 103.
Mother’s decision to resume a relationship with Father was concerning
for CYF and Dr. Pepe. Ms. Guthrie testified that Mother and Father’s continued
relationship is “extremely concerning” due to their IPV or domestic violence
history. Id. at 30. Dr. Pepe testified that if Mother were to reunify with
Father, it “would really put the [C]hild in danger.” Id. at 56. Dr. Pepe
explained:
[O]ne of the highest risk factors for child abuse is domestic
violence. And, also, she was not exhibiting the care she would
need for her own welfare and availability to her [C]hild, and so I
have concerns about her judgment. And also, . . . , the history of
multiple arrests and drug use so, . . . , I was concerned about her
judgment.
Id. at 56-57. In light of Mother’s continued relationship with Father even after
completing domestic violence counseling, the orphans’ court noted that “there
is no evidence to suggest that [Mother] used any of the tools or resources
available to her to leave an incredibly volatile relationship plagued by physical
violence.” Orphans’ Court Opinion at 13.
The record amply supports the orphans’ court decision to terminate
Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). As discussed above,
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Mother’s refusal to consistently participate with substance abuse treatment
and random drug screens, her lack of engagement in the recommended level
of mental health services, and her decision to resume a relationship with
Father reflect a repeated and continued incapacity that caused Child to be
without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for her
physical or mental well-being. Further, the conditions and causes of the
incapacity cannot or will not be remedied by Mother. We conclude that the
orphans’ court was well within its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
With respect to her second issue, Mother argues the orphans’ court
erred in proceeding to the Section 2511(b) analysis and concluding that
termination would best meet the needs and welfare of Child. Mother’s Brief
at 29. Mother notes that she visited Child in her home and at the CYF office.
Id. She relies on Dr. Pepe’s testimony that, during the interactional
evaluation, Child did not fuss when Mother changed Child’s diaper, and that
Mother responded to Child’s needs and exhibited positive and appropriate
parenting skills. Id. We disagree.
The orphans’ court properly found that “[Child] did not have a necessary
or beneficial bond with Mother.” Orphans’ Court Opinion at 15. Dr. Pepe, who
conducted an interactional evaluation with Child and Mother in August 2021,
testified that Mother “was, in general, consistently exhibiting positive and
appropriate parenting skills,” and “seemed to have a good understanding of
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the [C]hild’s development.” N.T., 4/22/22, at 60. Dr. Pepe testified that
although Child was familiar with Mother, Child did not have a primary
attachment with Mother, and “she did not exhibit bonded behaviors toward
her [M]other.” Id. at 61. For example, Dr. Pepe observed that Child “was
much more serious” with Mother and did not exhibit happiness. Id. at 60-61.
The orphans’ court properly noted that Child is bonded with Foster
Parents. Orphans’ Court Opinion at 15. Dr. Pepe testified that Child is
“exceptionally bonded” with Foster Parents, and “she would be at high risk for
disruption of her current developmental functioning” if she were to be
removed from Foster Parents. N.T., 4/22/22, at 67. Dr. Pepe testified if
removed from Foster Parents, Child “could regress developmentally,” and
could develop childhood depression or an attachment disorder “if that primary
bond is broken.” Id. She further testified that Child “is in need of
permanency” and is “very attached in her current home.” Id. Dr. Pepe noted
that Child’s “current foster home would be a very positive permanent
placement.” Id. at 68. While Dr. Pepe testified that she observed Child
become emotionally upset when Foster Parents tried to change Child’s diapers,
Dr. Pepe believed that Child was “doing it for attention with her [F]oster
[P]arents.” Id. at 61.
Additionally, CYF caseworker Ms. Guthrie testified that termination of
parental rights would meet Child’s needs and welfare. Id. at 34. Ms. Guthrie
noted Child has been out of her parents’ care since she was two months old.
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Id. Ms. Guthrie testified that Child is doing well in Foster Parents’ home, and
she has all of her needs met. Id. She further testified that Child has a
“genuine bond” with Foster Parents. Id. Ms. Guthrie stated that she observed
“spontaneous affection” by Child to Foster Parents, and Child refers to Foster
Parents as “mama” and “dada.” Id. at 33. Ms. Guthrie also noted that
terminating the parental rights would not be detrimental to Child due to her
“strong bond” with Foster Parents and the length of time she has been in their
home. Id. at 34-35.
As the orphans’ court found, Child’s needs are met by Foster Parents.
Orphans’ Court Opinion at 15. Ms. Guthrie testified that Child receives
developmental and occupational therapy through Alliance for Infants. N.T.,
4/22/22, at 32. Ms. Guthrie testified that Foster Parents have engaged Child
in the appropriate programs, and Child receives services on a weekly basis.
Id. at 33. She testified that Foster Parents provide for Child’s emotional and
developmental needs, and they provide her with safety and stability. Id.; see
In re A.S., 11 A.3d at 483. Ms. Guthrie also testified that Mother cannot
provide for Child’s safety and stability due to Mother’s “own drug and alcohol
needs and concerns with IPV.” N.T., 4/22/22, at 34.
Thus, the orphans’ court properly determined that termination of
Mother’s parental rights best suits the needs and welfare of Child. Orphans’
Court Opinion at 14-16. We discern no error or abuse of discretion with the
court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(b).
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Based on our review of the record, we discern no error or abuse of
discretion by the court in terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/14/2022
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