In the Int. of: R.S.C., Appeal of: E.J.

J-S59001-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.S.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.J., FATHER : No. 1076 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000978-2016,
CP-51-DP-0001922-2015, FID: 51-FN-000440-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 19, 2018
Appellant, E.J. (“Father”) appeals from the decree, entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Family Court, which granted the
petitions of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) for
involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to R.S.C. (“Child”) and to
change the permanency goal to adoption. We affirm.
The trial court opinion fully sets forth the relevant facts and procedural
history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to restate them.1
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1 Throughout Child’s placement and during the termination proceedings, the
same attorney-GAL represented Child’s interests. Because Child has been in
foster care since four months after his birth, was not in Father’s care before
placement, and was less than three years old at the time of the termination
proceedings, we can presume, absent any evidence in the record to the
contrary, that there was no conflict between Child’s best interests and his legal
interests. See In Re: T.S., ___ A.3d ___, 2018 WL 4001825 (filed August
J-S59001-18
Father raises these issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. §
2511(A)(1)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. §
2511(A)(2)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. §
2511(A)(5)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. §
2511(A)(8)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING, UNDER
23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(B), THAT TERMINATION OF
[FATHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS BEST SERVES [CHILD]’S
DEVELOPMENTAL, PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL NEEDS AND
WELFARE?
(Father’s Brief at 5).2
Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
____________________________________________
22, 2018) (holding appointment of second counsel for children, in contested
termination proceedings, is not required to represent separate legal interests
of children, where children’s legal interests and best interests do not diverge;
due to their young age (less than three years old), presumption exists that
children were too young to express subjective preferred outcome of
termination proceedings; therefore attorney-GAL could fulfill statutory
mandate for appointment of counsel and represent both best interests and
legal interests of children).
2 Father did not challenge the goal change order on appeal.
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order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof
is on the party seeking termination to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191[-92] (Pa.Super.
2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165
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(2008)).
DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental
rights to Child on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
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parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). “Parental rights
may be involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a)
is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.”
In re Z.P., supra at 1117.
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have his… rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d
1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
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a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association
with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a
place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his…ability, even in difficult circumstances. A
parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with his…physical and
emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his…child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his…parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper
parenting and fulfillment of his…potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” Id. at 856.
Importantly, neither Section 2511(a) nor Section 2511(b) requires the
court to consider, at the termination stage, whether an agency made
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reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with his child before the agency
petitioned for termination of the parent’s parental rights. In re D.C.D., 629
Pa. 325, 342, 105 A.3d 662, 672 (2014). Nothing in the statute prohibits the
court from granting a petition to terminate parental rights under Section 2511,
even if the agency failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification. Id. at
346, 105 A.3d at 675.
After a thorough review of the record, the brief of the parties, the
applicable law, and the comprehensive opinion of the Honorable Allan L.
Tereshko, Sr. J., we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The court’s
opinion fully discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. (See
Family Court Opinion, filed May 10, 2018, at 2-25) (finding: (1-4) court
terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and
(a)(2), and limits discussion of Section 2511(a) to those sections; clear and
convincing evidence showed Father failed and refused to perform parental
duties, failed to address conditions that brought Child into placement, and
lacks capacity to provide adequate care, control, and stable environment
necessary for Child; Child was four months old when he came into DHS’ care
in July 2015, after Mother was arrested, leaving Child in the care of his
fourteen-year old sibling; Mother’s parental rights were terminated on June
28, 2017; Father failed to meet, or provide documentation that he had met,
his Single Case Plan (“SCP”) objectives to participate in mental health therapy,
participate in domestic violence counseling, obtain employment, secure
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housing appropriate for Child, and participate in programming to encourage
sobriety and to maintain sobriety; credible testimony revealed Child cried
during visits with Father and clung to caregiver when Father attempted to hold
Child; after visits with Father, Child regressed and displayed disruptive
behavior at foster home; Child’s behavior improved after Father’s visitation
ceased in December 2017; Parenting Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”), dated May
9, 2017, indicated Father failed to present with capacity to provide
permanency and safety to Child; PCE identified serious concerns, including
inappropriate housing, non-compliance with mental health treatment and
domestic violence classes, failure to make himself available to Community
Umbrella Agency−Turning Points for Children (“CUA−TP4C”), and his history
of substance abuse; record demonstrates Father cannot or will not remedy
conditions which brought Child under supervision and will be unable to fulfill
parental responsibilities for Child in reasonable future; Father is not in position
to care for Child or provide for Child’s present and future need for essential
parental care and control necessary for Child’s well-being; further, court found
DHS testimony credible and Father’s testimony incredible; Father is unable
and unwilling to parent Child; court found clear and convincing evidence to
satisfy 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (a)(2); (5) regarding Section 2511(b),
adoption will best serve Child’s interests, given serious concerns over Father’s
unstable living situation and Father’s effect on Child’s behavior during visits;
Child is thriving in care of foster parent; Child is not bonded to Father but is
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bonded to foster parent; Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s
parental rights were terminated; Child has been in foster care for thirty-two
months, and adoption will serve Child’s best interests and need for
permanency). The record supports the court’s termination decision under
Section 2511(a)(1), (a)(2) and (b), based on parental incapacity and the best
interests of Child. See In re Z.P., supra. Therefore, we have no need to
disturb it. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating
Father’s parental rights to Child.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/19/18
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s: Circulated 10/03/2018 10:53 AM
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPIIlA COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
IN THE INTEREST OF: : FAlVIILY COURT DIVISION
: JUVENILE BRANCH-DEPENDENCY
R.S.C., a Minor : CP-51-AP-0000978-2016/CP-51-DP-0001922-2�
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13
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate
Courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
•
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties
spanning multiple hearings. In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013) (citations
and quotation marks omitted) In re Adoption of C.D.R., 2015 Pa. Super. 54, 111 A.3d
1212, 1215 (2015).
Involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § § 2101-2938. As the party petitioning for termination of parental rights,
DHS "must prove the statutory criteria for that termination by at least clear and
convincing evidence." In re T.R., 465 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. 1983). Clear and convincing
evidence is defined as "testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue." Matter of Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203-04 (Pa.1989).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis. Initially, the focus is
on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 251l(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's
conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the
14
second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 251 l(b): determination of the needs and .
welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of
the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of
permanently severing any such bond. In re L.M, 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super.2007)
(citations omitted). In re Adoption of C.J.J.P., 2015 Pa. Super. 80, 114 A.3d 1046, 1049-
50 (2015). The Court need only agree with the orphans1 court as to any one subsection of
Section 251 l(a), as well as Section 251 l(b), in order to affirm. In re Adoption of
C.J.J.P., 2015 Pa. Super. 80, 114 A.3d 1046, 1050 (2015).
This Child came to the attention ofDHS on July 9, 2015, when R.S.C.'s Mother,
T .C., was arrested and charged with simple assault and recklessly endangering another
person (REAP). The complainant in the criminal matter was identified as E.J., RS.C.'s
Father. Mother was subsequently incarcerated at Riverside Correctional Facility (RCF).
On July 11, 2015, DHS visited Mother's residence and met with R.S.C.'s 14 year old
f\
4
sibling,
J. who confirmed that Mother had been arrested and that she had been
caring for the Child. On July 11, 2015, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody
(OPC) for the Child and placed him in a Foster Care Home through Community
Umbrella Agency (CUA)-Tuming Points for Children (TP4C). Mother's parental rights
were terminated by this Court on June 28, 2017, and Mother did not appeal. The Child is
3 years old and currently remains in placement through Turning Points for Children.
15
The Trial Court Properly Found that DHS had met its Burden by Clear and
Convincing Evidence to Terminate Father's Parental Rights Pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(l), and (2) 1
The focus of termination proceedings is on the conduct of the parent. To satisfy
23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(l), the moving party must produce clear and convincing
evidence of conduct sustained for at least the six months period prior to the filing of the
petition, which reveals a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or a
failure to perform parental duties. In Re: C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super.2000).
23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2) focuses on the Child and his/her present and future need for
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his/her physical or mental
well-being. In Re: C.A. W, 683 A.2d 911 (Pa.Super,1996)
In his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Father alleges the
court erred when it involuntarily terminated his parental rights because DRS had not met
1 l(a) General Ruie.-the rights ofa parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition
filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period ofat least six months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose ofrelinquishing parenting
claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parents by the court or under a voluntary
agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those
conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the
parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
within reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under voluntary
agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date ofremoval or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
16
its burden by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to 23 PaC.S.A. §2511 (a)(l),
(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8). This Court terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) (1) and (2) only, and therefore, will only address those sections in
this opinion.
This Court found clear and convincing evidence that Father failed and refused to
perform parental duties, failed to address the conditions which brought the Child into
placement, and lacks the capacity to adequately provide care and control and a stable
environment necessary for this three year old Child.
This Court relied on the credible testimony of Patrice Garvey, CUA Supervisor,
Turning Points for Children. Ms. Garvey testified the Child, who was 4 months old at the
time, came into DHS care in July 2015 when he was removed from the care of his 14
year old sibling, A"' . Mother had been arrested and the Children were alone in the
home. She also noted that on June 28, 2017, Mother, T.T.C., parental rights were
terminated by the Court and Father's rights were not terminated and the Court decided to
give Father an opportunity to build a relationship with his son.
Ms. Garvey testified credibly and convincingly regarding the Single Case Plan
(SCP) objectives, which incorporated the recommendations made on Father's Parent
Capacity Evaluation, which was completed on 5/09/2017. Father was ordered to
participate in mental health therapy, and he enrolled at The Wedge. She noted that Father
attended only two sessions and did not provide her with any documentation of his
participation in therapy since November of 2017. She further testified that another
objective in the SCP was for Father to participate in domestic violence counseling, and he
has failed to participate, nor has he provided any documentation of this type of therapy.
17
Another objective for Father was for him to obtain employment. Father had previously
been employed at a dental office, however, in November 2017, he told her he did not
work there anymore. She referred Father to ARC for job training, where Father did
attend and complete the initial program but Father refused to attend subsequent programs.
Later, Father told her he was working as a Certified Nurse Assistant (CNA), however, he
never provided documentation, such as pay stubs. She further stated, Father told her he
was making money by selling cigarettes.
Ms. Garvey testified that another objective was for Father to obtain suitable
housing, and Father reported to her he resided with his girlfriend at 2110 Garnet Street.
He noted that his g�lfriend has five children and this house lacked space and was not
appropriate for his son. She referred Father to Royal Management for financial
assistance in finding housing. He never provided confirmation that he followed up with
that referral, and stated Father decided he wants to wait for the PHA housing program.
Regarding visitation, Ms. Garvey testified that visitation was suspended in
December 2017. Prior to that, Father had been given court ordered visitation one day per
week, which was then increased to two days per week. Between June 2017 and
December 2017, Father missed about 5 of approximately 18 visits. In December 2017,
Ms. Garvey testified she was very concerned because the Child was crying a lot during
visits and not bonding with Father. Father began taking pictures of the Child's genitals
and made allegations that his Child was being molested by the caregiver because the
person was gay. DHS investigated the allegations by Father, and did not have any
concerns regarding possible abuse by the caregiver. She noted that the Child would cry
and hang onto the caregiver when Father attempted to hold him. After the visits with
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Father, the Child would have disruptive behaviors at the Foster Home, including biting,
hitting and night terrors. Since the visitation with Father ceased in December 2017, she
has observed the Child and noted that his behavior has changed. He is friendly, hugged
her and she held him on her lap. He showed her his toys, his clothes and room. The
Child's behavior with the other Children in the Foster Home has also improved. Lastly,
Ms. Garvey testified another objective for Father was to attend The Wedge for aftercare
for sobriety, and check in periodically to maintain his sobriety. Father has not provided
any documentation to prove he has complied with this recommendation. She opined that
the Child was not bonded to Father and was bonded to his Foster Care Parent, who the
Child seeks for all of his needs, for safety and permanency.
This Court relied on credible, clear and convincing evidence from Ms. Garvey
regarding Father's failure to perform parental duties, and inability to remedy the
conditions which led to the Child's removal and placement. The Court also relied on the
Parenting Capacity Evaluation dated 5/09/2017, which stated that Father failed to present
with the capacity to provide permanency and safety to the Child. The concerns that the
PCE identified, including, inappropriate housing, non-compliance with mental health
treatment, non-compliance with domestic violence classes, failure to make himself
available to CUA-TP4C, as well as his history of substance abuse, have not been
addressed by Father.
This Court is not persuaded that Father can or will remedy the conditions which
brought the Child into court supervision. Nor is the Court persuaded that Father will be
able to fulfill his parental responsibilities for this Child in the future. The reality is Father
is not in a position to take care of this Child. He is not in a position to provide for the
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Child's present and future need for essential parental care, and control that is necessary
for this Child's physical and mental well-being. Based on the evidence presented, this
Court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a) (1) and (2).
Trial Court Properly Found that Termination of Father's Parental Rights was in
the Child's Best Interest and that DHS Met Its Burden Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§25ll(b).2
After the Court finds that the statutory grounds for termination have been
satisfied, it must then determine whether the termination of parental rights serves the best
interests of the children pursuant to 251 l(b) In re Adoption of C.L.G ., 956 A2d 999
(Pa.Super 2008). In terminating the rights of a parent, the Court "shall give primary
consideration to the development, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251l(b). One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child. In re
T.S.M., 71 A3d 251 (Pa. 2013).
Father alleges in his Concise Statement of the Matters Complained of on Appeal
that this Court abused its discretion and committed legal error in terminating Father's
parental rights because DHS did not present competent evidence regarding the nature of
2 Other Considerations.-The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration
to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall
not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any
petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(l),(6) or {8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent
to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of
the filing of the petition.
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11
the bond between Father and the Child in order to assess the best interest of the Child.
This Court disagrees with Father's allegation.
This Court found the Case Manager, Ms. Garvey, provided credible, persuasive
testimony regarding the Child's physical and emotional needs and best interests. She
opined that it would be in the Child's best interest to be adopted because she had
concerns regarding Father's unstable living situation and Father's effect on the Child's
behavior and demeanor during visits. She noted that when visits with Father were
suspended, the Child was happier and had less behavioral issues. The Child is thriving in
the care of the Foster Parent. He is not bonded to Father, and in fact, the Child is bonded
to his Foster Parent. She opined the Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Father's
parental rights were terminated. The Child has been in care for thirty-two months, and it
is in his best interest to obtain permanency through adoption. Therefore, this Court
found that credible, clear and convincing testimony was provided that the Child would
not suffer irreparable harm if Father's rights were terminated and that termination of
Father's parental rights and adoption would be in the Child's best interest.
This Court also finds Father's testimony not credible in many aspects. Father
testified he completed all of the SCP objectives, however, did not offer proof. He
testified that although he does not have a home for the Child, he wants the Court to assign
his parental duties to his sister, who has never presented herself to this Court. This Court
:finds that Father is not ready, willing nor able to parent this Child, and finds his
testimony not credible.
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CONCLUSION
At the conclusion of the Hearing, the Court stated:
I go back to the June hearing, in which I terminated the
Mother's parental rights, and I did not terminate Father's
parental rights because I believed, at that time, that Father
made an impassioned plea that he was ready, willing and
able to cure all the defects that then existed, and wanted an
opportunity to cure all those defects.
And the Court was moved by the plea, and decided at that
time not to terminate his rights. But let's review what has
been done in the interim.
And with respect to improving the Father's parental
relationship with the Child and to putting himself in a
position to parent this Child, his ability to cure any of those
issues and his, in fact, accomplishments in curing those
issues are almost non-existent.
Father talks a great game, but when it comes down to
substantiating the facts as to compliance and as to resolving
and remediating any of the issues that brought the child into
care, he's done almost nothing.
He comes into court and makes the bold assertions that,
although he doesn't have a home for the child and could
not be in a position now to parent this child or be ready,
willing and able to parent this child, he wants to assume the
role of Family Court Judge and assign the child to his
relatives.
The very proposition that he's not able to care for this
child, now, yet wants someone else to care for the child,
suggested he does not have the ability to parent this child,
nor does have a parental relationship, nor is he really
willing to do the things that are necessary to establish a
parental relationship.
The issue that he presents to the Court is, "I can't really
care for the child myself, but I want my sister to care for
the child." And let's look at that proposition. I don't think
22
the Court has ever met his sister. I don't think the sister has
ever entered this courtroom before and asked to be
considered as a foster care placement. I looked at all my
notes in this case, since I had it from the beginning, and I
see nothing about another caretaker entering the picture.
But the critical issue here is that Father not being able to
substantiate all of the things that he's-he thinks he did,
because it hasn't even been expressly stated that he has
accomplished and remediated all the issues. He thinks he
remediated all the issues. The two documents that he
attempted to enter into evidence are not admissible because
they're not self-authenticating.
Despite the fact that he knew all of these outstanding goals
and issues to be accomplished, he walks in with no
evidence, and walks in with just a promise that someday
he's going to get himself together and get his game
together, and maybe then he'll be able to parent this child.
Fortunately, the law is different, and the Supreme Court has
enunciated a very articulate test for this type of situation,
and it simply is that, notwithstanding the profession of the
Father's love or affection for the child, it's not about the
father, it's about the child. And a child cannot simply be
put on hold to wait for the father to tighten up his end
game, and in the hope that maybe someday he'll think
about parenting this child and be serious about trying to
resolve the impediments to returning this child to his care.
That has not been done, despite the fact that the child is
now in care for over 33 months. And, throughout that
whole period of time, the child has been in the care of the
foster family with whom this child was placed' at the
beginning of this case.
What is lacking here is the connection between the child
and the Father, and the connection does not exist because
Father has done nothing to become a parent to this child.
He says he's been saving money in the hopes of one day
getting his own residence, yet all during this period of time,
the child has been in care and subsidized by taxpayers. I
heard no evidence that Father contributed one penny, out of
all the thousands that he saved, to the welfare of the child.
23
But putting aside the monetary and the financial aspects of
it, what's most important is the human aspects of it, and
that is that the child has a relationship with its foster family.
That relationship is one of parent and child. The Father
does not have a relationship with the child. There is no
parental relationship. The child refuses to recognize -,t . .:.r:
as his parent. In fact, any contact with f$, :r, -·
traumatizes this child to the effect that, at the hearing in
December, I suspended Father's visitation. All of the goals
he says he's accomplished-no proof. His testimony is not
credible.
When I'm balancing the credibility of the witnesses, I find
that the case worker who has been, up until recently, the
long-term and only case worker on the case, to be more
credible, more believable, in all of the testimony on any of
the issues that are contested by Father. The child was not
in Father's care when the child was brought into custody
and care, so that I don't have to address the issues of
251 l(a)(5) and (8), but I focus on 251 l(a)(l) and (2), and
find that, based upon those sections, Father has failed to
remedy the issues that brought the child into care, will not
be in a position to remedy those issues going forward.
Now, with respect to the issue of irreparable harm if the
Father's rights were terminated, the Court finds that there is
no parental relationship between Father and Child, such
that there would be no harm in terminating something that
doesn't exist. And, viewing it from the other side of the
lens, the evidence clearly supports a finding that there is a
bond between the Child and his foster care parents, and that
severing or changing that relationship would be against the
best interest of the Child.
In review, Father's rights are terminated based upon
2511 (a)(l) and (2) and 2511 (b ). Having previously
terminated the Mother's parental rights, we are now in a
position to move and change the goal to adoption for
R.S.C.
(N.T, 3/13/2018, p. 60 at 2-25; p. 61 at 1-25; p.62 at 1-25;
p.63 at 1-25; p.64 at 1-25; p.65 at 1-25; p.66 at 1-5).
24
For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully requests that the Decree and ·
Order of March 13, 2018, terminating Father, E.J.'s Parental Rights to the Child, R.S.C.,
and Changing the Permanency Goal to Adoption, be AFFIR.i\IBD.
BY THE COURT:
ALLAN L. TERESHKO, Sr. J.
� 10-rllr-. l.0\ i
DATE
25
,'Cl -�
CERTIFCATE OF SERV ...d
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION has been
served upon the following parties by the manner as designated:
Family Court Delivery Mail Box
Daniel Silver, Esquire
1845 Walnut Street, Ste. 1199
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant, Father, E.J.
Lue B. Frierson, Esquire
2333 St. Albans Pl.
Philadelphia, PA 19146
Counsel for Child, R.S.C.
Elizabeth Holbrook Blass, Esq., ACS
City of Phila Law Dept.
1515 Arch Street, l 61h floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for DHS
Andre Martino, Esq.
7435 Sprague Street
Philadelphia, PA 19119
Guardian Ad Litem for Child, R.S.C.
Shanese Ivette Johnson, Esq.
230 S. Broad St., Ste. 1501
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Mother, T.T.
���:1"�
ALLAN L. TERESHKO, Sr. J.
�-\C·2.ol8
DATE