In the Int. of: R.C., Appeal of: R.C.

J-S15001-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER :
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: No. 2406 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0002718-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.E.L.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER :
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: No. 2407 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000352-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER :
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: No. 2408 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000108-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.L.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
J-S15001-22
:
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APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER :
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: No. 2409 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000353-2019
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 19, 2022
Appellant R.C. (Father) appeals from the decrees1 granting the petitions
filed by the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (DHS) and
involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor children, R.E.L.-C.
(born July 2013) and D.M.L.-C. (born January 2018) (collectively, the
____________________________________________
1 Father also appealed from the orders changing the Children’s permanency
goals from reunification to adoption. See Notices of Appeal, 11/22/21.
However, on appeal, he does not discuss the permanency goal change in his
statement of questions presented on appeal or in his argument section.
Accordingly, Father has abandoned this issue for purposes of appeal. See
Allied Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Roth, 222 A.3d 422, 424 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(stating that “[a]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the
appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived” (citation omitted)).
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Children).2,3 Father argues that the trial court erred in concluding that DHS
presented clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of his
parental rights. We affirm.
The family came to the attention of DHS on October 9, 2017, when DHS
received a General Protective Services (GPS) report and three Child Protective
Services (CPS) reports regarding R.E.L.-C. and Sibling. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
10/1/19, at 16; 9/17/21, at 166-68. The GPS report alleged that Sibling,
while in an outpatient psychiatric program, had written a note accusing her
stepfather of rape, and further accused her stepfather and mother of abuse.4
N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 117; also Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The
report further alleged that Father had physically abused Sibling and had a
history of sexual violence against another minor female child. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
9/17/21, at 166-68; see also Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
____________________________________________
2 R.E.L.-C. and D.M.L.-C. are the biological children of Father and V.L.
(Mother), and the Children have an older half-sister, R.L. (Sibling), who is
Mother’s biological child and Father’s stepchild. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/23/22, at
1; Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A; N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 11-12,
9/17/21, at 56-57. Sibling has a separate dependency matter and is not a
subject of the instant appeal. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 11-12, 134. Sibling
is in the permanent legal custody of another caretaker. Id.3 Mother’s parental rights to the Children were terminated on the same date.
Mother filed separate appeals from the goal change orders and the termination
decrees, which we will address in a separate memorandum.
4 Mother later informed Dr. Erica Williams, a forensic evaluator, that “stepdad”
referred to another former paramour of Mother’s, not Father. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
10/1/19, at 116-18; 9/17/21, at 62-63.
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The CPS reports alleged that Father was registered as a Tier III sex
offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)5,6
and that despite being aware of his status, Mother left Sibling unsupervised in
Father’s care. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 9/17/21, at 166-68; see also Goal Change
Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Following a DHS investigation, both Mother and Father
were indicated. Id.The second CPS report alleged that Mother permitted a family friend to
reside in the home and spend time alone with Sibling despite the fact that he
was a convicted sex offender. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The third
CPS report alleged that Mother left R.E.L.-C. unsupervised in the care of that
family friend. Id. Mother admitted to the allegations in both the second and
third CPS reports, and they were indicated as to Mother. Id.During the course of their investigation, DHS interviewed both Mother
and Father. Mother admitted that her former paramour molested her oldest
adult child and that she left Sibling unsupervised at home with Father while
she was at work. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Father admitted that
he was a registered sex offender and agreed to stay at a separate location
during the DHS investigation. Id.____________________________________________
5 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
6The record reflects that Father was convicted of indecent assault, indecent
assault – complainant less than thirteen years of age, unlawful contact with a
minor, and sexual assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(1), 3126(a)(7), 6318,
and 3124.1, respectively. As a result, he was subject to lifetime registration
under SORNA.
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DHS met with Sibling and both parents on October 11, 2017. See Goal
Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Mother admitted that she was aware of Father’s
prior convictions, but she denied the allegations of domestic violence. Id.
Sibling stated that she and R.E.L.-C. were left alone with Father. Id. Father
informed DHS that Mother permitted Sibling to go to the home of her former
paramour who had molested Mother’s eldest child. Id. Father admitted that
he failed to inform the Pennsylvania State Police that Sibling lived in the home
in which Father had registered his residency in accordance with SORNA. See
Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. He claimed he “did not know” the conditions
of being a registered sex offender. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
That same day, DHS obtained orders of protective custody (OPC) for
R.E.L.-C. and Sibling and placed them in the care of their maternal
grandmother. Id. The trial court adjudicated R.E.L.-C. and Sibling dependent
on October 20, 2017. See Order of Adjudication, 10/20/17, at 1-2; Goal
Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The trial court found aggravated circumstances
as to Father and ordered that no reasonable efforts were to be made to reunify
R.E.L.-C. and Father. See Aggravated Circumstances Order, 10/20/17, at 1-
2. The trial court suspended Father’s visitation with both R.E.L.-C. and Sibling
and issued a stay-away order as to Sibling. See Order of Adjudication,
10/20/17, at 1-2. The court referred R.E.L.-C. for early intervention services
and a psychological evaluation. Id. On October 27, 2017, R.E.L.-C. and
Sibling were placed in kinship care with their maternal aunt, C.L. (Maternal
Aunt). See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
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On November 8, 2017, DHS received a supplemental CPS report alleging
that another note had been found in Sibling’s diary stating that she had been
sexually abused. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Sibling’s family stated
that they believed that Sibling had been sexually abused by Mother’s former
paramour, that Mother had a history of entering into cohabitating relationships
with registered sex offenders and perpetrators of sexual abuse, that Mother’s
eldest child had also been sexually abused, and that Mother had exposed
Sibling to three or four separate sex offenders. Id.
On November 9, 2017, the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) held a
single case plan meeting (SCP) to establish SCP objectives for Mother and
Father. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Father was to complete sex
offender services through the Joseph J. Peters Institute (JJPI) and comply with
all court orders. Id.
In January 2018, Mother gave birth to D.M.L.-C. See Goal Change Pet.,
5/9/19, Ex. A. On January 12, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review
hearing and ordered DHS to obtain an OPC and place D.M.L.-C. in care. See
Perm. Rev. Order, 1/12/18, at 1. Father was permitted to have supervised
visitation with the Children and ordered to complete a parenting capacity
evaluation (PCE). Id. DHS obtained the OPC on January 15, 2018, and placed
D.M.L.-C. with R.E.L.-C. and Sibling in the care of their maternal aunt. See
Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
On January 24, 2018, the trial court adjudicated D.M.L.-C. dependent.
See Adjudication of Dependency, 1/24/18, at 1-2. The trial court ordered a
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second SCP to address Father’s visitation and to obtain further information
regarding his sex offender registration. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
If appropriate, the trial court indicated that it would allow Father line-of-sight,
line-of-hearing, supervised visitation at DHS. Id.
On April 6, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review hearing and
noted that Father had been allowed supervised visitation with the Children.
See Perm. Rev. Order, 4/6/18, at 1-2. On May 16, 2018, CUA held the SCP
meeting. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The Children’s goals were
identified as reunification with concurrent goals of placement with a relative.
Id. Both parents’ objectives remained the same. Id. On June 26, 2018, the
trial court held a permanency review hearing and determined that Father was
substantially compliant with his permanency plan, but aggravated
circumstances still existed in D.M.L.-C.’s case. See Perm. Rev. Order,
6/26/18, at 1-2.
On November 8, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review hearing
and found that Father was substantially compliant with his permanency plan.
See Perm. Rev. Order, 11/8/18, at 1-3. Specifically, the court noted that
Father had completed his PCE and was awaiting the written PCE report with
recommendations. Id. The trial court ordered Father to sign releases for his
psychiatric records and to provide written confirmation of employment in
addition to correspondence from the owner of his residence authorizing CUA
to conduct a home assessment and clearances. Id.
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In November 2018, Erica Williams, Psy.D., and Samantha Peterson, MA,
completed the PCE report. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 76-104. Dr. Williams
diagnosed Father with pedophilic disorder and noted that Father admitted to
having a long-standing attraction to female children. Id. Although Father
reported that he was attending treatment, he did not provide records of his
treatment. Id. Father was dismissive of safety concerns and his own risk of
harm to Sibling. Id. The report concluded that Father did not have the ability
to provide safety and/or permanency to either the Children or to Sibling. Id.
On January 17, 2019, the trial court held a permanency review hearing
and determined that Father was moderately compliant with his permanency
plan. Perm. Rev. Order, 1/17/19, at 1-2. Father’s visitation was modified to
weekly supervised visits, and Sibling was not to attend. Id. The trial court
stated that Father could either provide CUA with all treatment plans and
mental health records or that the trial court would refer him to Behavioral
Health Services (BHS) for consultations and evaluations. Id. Additionally,
the trial court ordered Father to remain up to date with his SORNA registration
requirements and referred him to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for drug
screens. Id.
On February 14, 2019, CUA revised the SCP. See Goal Change Pet.,
5/9/19, Ex. A. At that time, the Children’s primary goal was identified as
adoption, with a concurrent goal of reunification. Id. Father’s objectives were
as follows: comply with his visitation, sign all releases necessary for case
management, comply with the no-contact order as to Sibling, comply with his
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drug screens, comply with his PCE and subsequent recommendations, provide
progress reports from his therapist, attend psychotherapy, provide CUA with
his address and comply with a home inspection, provide a letter documenting
his residence and utilities. Id.
On May 8, 2019, DHS filed petitions to change the Children’s
permanency goal to adoption and seeking involuntary termination of Father’s
parental rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8),
(a)(11), and (b). See Pet. for Involuntary Term., 5/9/19, at1-7; Pet. for Goal
Change, 5/9/19, at 1-7, Ex. A.
The petitions detailed Father’s criminal history, convictions, and status
as a Tier III sex offender registration. DHS averred that, pursuant to Child
Protective Services Law B.1 § vii, Father was not permitted to be around
children under the age of eighteen while unsupervised. DHS also noted that
at that time, R.E.L.-C. had been in care approximately nineteen months and
D.M.L.-C. had been in care approximately sixteen months.
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The trial court conducted evidentiary hearings on October 1, 2019,
September 17, 2021, and November 17, 2021.7,8 DHS presented testimony
from forensic evaluator Dr. Erica Williams, CUA permanency worker Allison
Serge, CUA case supervisor Andrew Lemon, CUA case manager Tarnjif Kaur,
and Mother. Father presented testimony from his therapist, Dean Dickson.
At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial court terminated Father’s
parental rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8),
(a)(11), and (b),9 and changed the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.
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7 At the first hearing on October 1, 2019, the court heard evidence from two
witnesses. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 2-174. At the subsequent hearing
on November 6, 2019, Mother’s first attorney asked the trial court to vacate
his appointment due to a conflict with Mother. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/6/19, at
3. The trial court granted the request and continued the hearing on counsel’s
behalf. Id. at 5. Although the evidentiary hearings were postponed multiple
times during the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court held regular status
review and permanency hearings.
8 Meredith Marie Rogers, Esq. served as the Children’s guardian ad litem
throughout the proceedings. Attorney Rogers argued that terminating
Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
11/17/21, at 108-09. Mario D’Adamo III, Esq., served as the Children’s legal
counsel during the termination proceedings, and appeared at the hearing on
their behalf. Id.; see also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa.
2020). Attorney Adamo testified that he met with the Children on three
separate occasions, and that at his latest visit, R.E.L.-C. and D.M.L.-C.
appeared well-bonded with their caregiver (the Children’s Maternal Aunt) and
viewed her as a maternal figure. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/17/21, at 96.
9 DHS filed the petitions to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), (a)(11), and (b). At the
conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court explicitly terminated
Father’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8) and (b). The
following exchange took place:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Father timely appealed and simultaneously filed concise statements of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial
court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Father’s claims.
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:
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[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Did the [c]ourt—
THE COURT: Act 10—
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: --[make] a finding as to [F]ather as to
2511(a)(11). That was the additional ground, because – parent
is required –
THE COURT: Did you actually—
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: To register as a sex offender.
THE COURT: -- file that in the petition?
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. So, that would be (a)(11)?
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And the Act 101 notice is to be provided to the
parents . . . .
N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/17/21, at 120-21. Although the decree terminates
Father’s rights pursuant to Sections (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b), it also
addresses Father’s SORNA registration requirements and notes that further
evidentiary findings were placed upon the record. Father, DHS, and the trial
court discuss their analysis pursuant to Section 2511(a)(11) and Father
challenged the trial court’s determination concerning Section 2511(a)(11) in
his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On this
record, it is apparent that the trial court included Section 2511(a)(11) in its
termination of Father’s parental rights and that all parties had notice thereof.
As noted herein, we may affirm based on any subsection of 2511(a). In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) where Father presented evidence that he
has remedied his situation by maintaining housing, working,
and mental health counseling, and has the present capacity to
care for [the C]hildren?
2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) where evidence was provided to establish
that [the Children were] removed from the care of [Father] and
Father is now capable of caring for [the C]hildren?
3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) where evidence was presented to show
that Father is now capable of caring for [the C]hildren after he
completed his parenting capacity evaluation, secured and
maintained housing and employment, and continues in his
mental health treatment programs?
4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11) where evidence was presented to show
that Father does not have any restrictions on unsupervised
contact with his children and continues in his mental health
treatment program?
5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) where evidence was presented that
established the Children had a close bond with their father and
they had lived with their father for the first part of their lives.
Additionally, Father maintained that bond by visiting with his
children.
Father’s Brief at 7 (formatting altered).
We begin by stating our standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
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or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted and formatting
altered). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
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concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note
that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section
2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental
rights. B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
Section 2511(a)(11)
Father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(11) based on the fact that he is a registered sex
offender. Father’s Brief at 18. Father asserts that “while termination under
this subsection is discretionary, it is not warranted in this case” because Father
has “completed his probation and has had no other arrests of any kind.” Id.Father also claims that he “is permitted to have unsupervised contact with
children, including his own children” and that he “is not a risk for re-offense.”
Id. at 18-19. Father asserts that at the time of his arrest, he had been living
with his children and was “an appropriate father” to them. Finally, he claims
that the case arose from “allegations of an older sibling which had nothing to
do with Father.” Id. at 19.
Section 2511(a)(11) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
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(11) The parent is required to register as a sexual offender
under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of
sexual offenders) or I (relating to continued registration of
sexual offenders)[fn1] or to register with a sexual offender
registry in another jurisdiction or foreign country.
[fn1] 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 et seq., 9799.51 et seq.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11).
The language of the statute provides that, when the parent is required
to register as a sexual offender, the court may terminate the parent’s rights.
See id. Therefore, when that condition is met, the court’s decision on
termination is discretionary. See Lorino v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.,
266 A.3d 487, 493 (Pa. 2021) (noting that the term “may” connote an act that
is permissive, but not required). Additionally, Section 2511(a)(11) does not
mandate further inquiry into the parents’ actions. The sole condition is that
the parent is required to register as a sexual offender under SORNA. 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11). See, e.g., Interest of Z.F.G., 684 WDA 2021, 2022
WL 34288, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 4, 2022) (unpublished mem.)10
(concluding that termination was appropriate because the evidence
established that the father was a registered sex offender and stating that the
father could not challenge the validity of the underlying convictions and
registrations in the termination proceeding).
Here, the trial court observed:
____________________________________________
10 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (authorizing citation of non-precedential decisions of
this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value only).
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It is undisputed that Father is required to register as a sexual
offender under [SORNA]. Indeed, Father’s own exhibit is his
[Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)] background check
information including his criminal record. Father’s Exhibit 1 lists
convictions for unlawful contact with minors, indecent assault, and
corruption of minors, resulting from a guilty plea. The Exhibit also
explains that Father is a lifetime registrant, with the registry
expiration date listed as “nonexp,” or no expiration. DHS Exhibit
3 and Child Advocate Exhibit 2 are both Father’s [SORNA] registry.
DHS Exhibit 9 includes criminal court documentation signed by
Father acknowledging his reporting requirements under 42
Pa.C.S. Ch. 97, as well as the criminal complaint initiating his case
with an affidavit of probable cause describing Father’s confession.
Father himself reported to Dr. Williams during his PCE his status
as a [sex] offender. Father has an admitted attraction to
underage girls, acknowledged by his own therapist. Even Mother
admitted and acknowledged Father’s attraction to young girls and
the safety concern it presents for [the] Children. Mother
specifically stated that “Father is a danger to [her] kids.”
Trial Ct. Op., 1/23/21, at 23 (citations omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we find no error or abuse of discretion
by the trial court in terminating Father’s parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(11). As noted previously, Father’s status as a sex offender is a
sufficient basis to warrant termination of his parental rights under Section
2511(a)(1). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11). Further, contrary to Father’s
claims, the record establishes that he is at risk of re-offense, he is not capable
of providing safety or permanency to the Children, and he failed to attend
appropriate psychotherapy to address his diagnosis for pedophilic disorder
because Dr. Dickson’s therapy was not adequate for that purpose. N.T. Term.
Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 83, 103-04, 110. Dr. Williams, whose testimony the trial
court found credible, testified that Father’s therapist committed errors,
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including administering the Static-99R test incorrectly and failing to rely on
additional sources of information, and that those errors were so serious that
any data provided by Mr. Dickson was invalid. Id. at 24, 48-52, 96-98, 105-
107.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children under Section
2511(a)(11) and no relief is due.
Section 2511(b)
Father also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
termination was proper under Section 2511(b). In support, Father argues
that the Children lived with him for the first part of their lives and that they
had a bond with Father. Father’s Brief at 19. Father further asserts that he
consistently attended his supervised visits and that his parental bond with the
Children continued because of these visits. Id. at 19-20. Therefore, Father
concludes that the trial court erred in finding that termination was in the
Children’s best interest. Id.
Section 2511(b) states in relevant part:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. . . .
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
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“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under
Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” In re
C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). This Court
has explained:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations
omitted and formatting altered). “Common sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-
adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citation omitted).
“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent
and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond
analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular
case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted). The question is whether the bond between the parent and the child
“is the one worth saving or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable
harm to” the child. Id. at 764. “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal
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bonding evaluation” and caseworkers may offer their opinions and evaluations
of the bond. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citation omitted).
In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),
“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are
young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their
healthy development quickly. When courts fail, . . . the result, all too often,
is catastrophically maladjusted children.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269. Finally, we
reiterate that the court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. In re
N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Here, the trial court explained that although Father consistently visited
with the Children, the interactions during those visits were “very minimal.”
N.T. Hr’g, 9/17/21, at 221-22. While Father plays with the Children, he cannot
redirect them, and he spends more time on his phone than he does ensuring
that the Children are properly supervised. Id. Further, rather than turning
to Father for comfort when they are scared, hurt, sick or upset, the Children
turn to Maternal Aunt. Id. at 226. The Children do not have any negative
reaction when their visits with Father end. Id. at 214. In contrast, the
Children share a positive bond with Maternal Aunt and view her as their
primary caregiver. Id. at 192-195, 227. D.M.L.-C. in particular has a strong
parent-child bond with Maternal Aunt. Id. Additionally, both DHS
caseworkers testified that the Children could not be safely returned to Father’s
custody, that it would not cause irreparable harm to either Child to terminate
Father’s parental rights, and that adoption was in the Children’s best interests.
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Id. at 223-224. Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that the
Children do not have a healthy parental bond with Father and that it was in
the Children’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. See Trial
Ct. Op. at 23-26.
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The record supports the trial
court’s conclusion that there was no beneficial bond between the Children and
Father, that Maternal Aunt fulfills a parental role for the Children, and that
there would be no irreparable harm to either Child if Father’s parental rights
were terminated. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. Likewise, the record supports
the trial court’s determination that the termination of Father’s parental rights
served the best interests of the Children. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009-10.
Therefore, Father is not entitled to relief.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. See T.S.M.,
71 A.3d at 267. Accordingly, we affirm.
Orders and decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/19/2022
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