In the Int. of: R.L.-C., Appeal of: V.L.

J-S15002-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.L.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: V.L., MOTHER :
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: No. 12 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0002718-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.E.L.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: V.L., MOTHER :
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: No. 13 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000352-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: V.L., MOTHER :
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: No. 14 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000108-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.L.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
J-S15002-22
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APPEAL OF: V.L., MOTHER :
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: No. 15 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000353-2019
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 19, 2022
Appellant V.L. (Mother) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions
filed by the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (DHS) to
involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her minor children, R.E.L.-C.
(born July 2013) and D.M.L.-C. (born January 2018) (collectively, the
Children), and the orders changing the Children’s permanency goals to
adoption.1,2 Mother argues that the trial court erred in concluding that DHS
presented clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of her
parental rights. We affirm.
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1 R.E.L.-C. and D.M.L.-C. are the biological children of Mother and R.C.
(Father), and the Children have an older half-sister, R.L. (Sibling), who is
Mother’s biological child and Father’s stepchild. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/23/22, at
1; Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A; N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 11-12,
9/17/21, at 56-57. Sibling has a separate dependency matter and is not
included in the instant appeal. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 11-12, 134. She
is in the permanent legal custody of another caretaker. Id.
2Father’s parental rights to the Children were terminated on the same date.
Father filed separate appeals from the goal change orders and the termination
decrees, which we will address in a separate memorandum.
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The family came to the attention of DHS on October 9, 2017, when DHS
received a General Protective Services (GPS) report and three Child Protective
Services (CPS) reports regarding R.E.L.-C. and Sibling. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
10/1/19, at 16; 9/17/21, at 166-68. The GPS report alleged that Sibling,
while in an outpatient psychiatric program, had written a note accusing her
stepfather of rape, and further accused her stepfather and mother of abuse.3
N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 117; also Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The
report further alleged that Father had physically abused Sibling and had a
history of sexual violence against another minor female child. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
9/17/21, at 166-68; see also Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
The CPS reports alleged that Father was registered as a Tier III sex
offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)4,5
and that despite being aware of his status, Mother left Sibling unsupervised in
Father’s care. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 9/17/21, at 166-68; see also Goal Change
Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Following a DHS investigation, both Mother and Father
were indicated. Id.
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3Mother later informed Dr. Erica Williams, a forensic evaluator, that “stepdad”
referred to another former paramour of Mother’s, not Father. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
10/1/19, at 116-18; 9/17/21, at 62-63.
4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
5The record reflects that Father was convicted of indecent assault, indecent
assault – complainant less than thirteen years of age, unlawful contact with a
minor, and sexual assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(1), 3126(a)(7), 6318,
and 3124.1, respectively. As a result, he was subject to lifetime registration
under SORNA.
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The second CPS report alleged that Mother permitted a family friend to
reside in the home and spend time alone with Sibling despite the fact that he
was a convicted sex offender. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The third
CPS report alleged that Mother left R.E.L.-C. unsupervised in the care of that
family friend. Id. Mother admitted to the allegations in both the second and
third CPS reports, and they were indicated as to Mother. Id.
During the course of their investigation, DHS interviewed both Mother
and Father. Mother admitted that her former paramour molested her oldest
adult child and that she left Sibling unsupervised at home with Father while
she was at work. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Father admitted that
he was a registered sex offender and agreed to stay at a separate location
during the DHS investigation. Id.
DHS met with Sibling and both parents on October 11, 2017. See Goal
Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Mother admitted that she was aware of Father’s
prior convictions, but she denied the allegations of domestic violence. Id.
Sibling stated that she and R.E.L.-C. were left alone with Father. Id. Father
informed DHS that Mother permitted Sibling to go to the home of her former
paramour who had molested Mother’s eldest child. Id. Father admitted that
he failed to inform the Pennsylvania State Police that Sibling lived in the home
in which Father had registered his residency in accordance with SORNA. See
Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. However, Father claimed that he “did not
know” the conditions of being a registered sex offender. See Goal Change
Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
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That same day, DHS obtained orders of protective custody (OPC) for
R.E.L.-C. and Sibling and placed them in the care of their maternal
grandmother. Id. The trial court adjudicated R.E.L.-C. and Sibling dependent
on October 20, 2017. See Order of Adjudication, 10/20/17, at 1-2; Goal
Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The trial court found aggravated circumstances
as to Father and ordered that no reasonable efforts were to be made to reunify
R.E.L.-C. and Father. See Aggravated Circumstances Order, 10/20/17, at 1-
2. The trial court suspended Father’s visitation with both R.E.L.-C. and Sibling
and issued a stay-away order as to Sibling. See Order of Adjudication,
10/20/17, at 1-2. The court referred R.E.L.-C. for early intervention services
and a psychological evaluation. Id. On October 27, 2017, R.E.L.-C. and
Sibling were placed in kinship care with their maternal aunt, C.L. (Maternal
Aunt). See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
On November 8, 2017, DHS received a supplemental CPS report alleging
that another note had been found in Sibling’s diary stating that she had been
sexually abused. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Sibling’s family stated
that they believed that Sibling had been sexually abused by Mother’s former
paramour, that Mother had a history of entering into cohabitating relationships
with registered sex offenders and perpetrators of sexual abuse, that Mother’s
eldest child had also been sexually abused, and that Mother had exposed
Sibling to three or four separate sex offenders. Id.
On November 9, 2017, the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) held a
single case plan meeting (SCP) to establish SCP objectives for Mother and
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Father. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Mother was to comply with her
Parenting Capacity Evaluation (PCE) referral, comply with parenting classes,
attend a psychological evaluation, attend Achieving Reunification Center
(ARC) for all services, and comply with her visitation schedule. Id.
On November 25, 2017, DHS received a written psychological evaluation
of Mother that was conducted by Daniel J. Potoczniak, Ph.D., ABPP. See Goal
Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Dr. Potoczniak diagnosed Mother with adjustment
disorder with anxiety and generalized anxiety disorder. Id. He recommended
that Mother participate in weekly outpatient therapy and comply with DHS’s
recommendations. Id.
In January 2018, Mother gave birth to D.M.L.-C. See Goal Change Pet.,
5/9/19, Ex. A. On January 12, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review
hearing and ordered DHS to obtain an OPC and place D.M.L.-C. in care. See
Perm. Rev. Order, 1/12/18, at 1. Mother’s visits with the Children remained
supervised at the Agency, and she was ordered to have no unsupervised
contact with R.E.L.-C. Id. DHS obtained the OPC on January 15, 2018, and
placed D.M.L.-C. with R.E.L.-C. and Sibling in the care of their Maternal Aunt.
See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
On January 24, 2018, the trial court adjudicated D.M.L.-C. dependent.
See Adjudication of Dependency, 1/24/18, at 1-2. The trial court ordered a
second SCP to address Father’s visitation and to obtain further information
regarding his sex offender registration. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
Mother’s visitation with both of the Children remained supervised at DHS. Id.
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On April 6, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review hearing and
found that Mother was substantially compliant with her permanency plan. See
Perm. Rev. Order, 4/6/18, at 1-2. However, her visitation with both Children
remained supervised line-of-sight. Id.
On May 16, 2018, CUA held the SCP meeting. See Goal Change Pet.,
5/9/19, Ex. A. The Children’s goals were identified as reunification with
concurrent goals of placement with a relative. Id. Both parents’ objectives
remained the same. Id. On June 26, 2018, the trial court held a permanency
review hearing and determined that Mother was substantially compliant with
her permanency plan but ordered Mother’s therapist to provide a treatment
plan and referred Mother for a psychiatric evaluation. See Perm. Rev. Order,
6/26/18, at 1-2.
On October 25, 2018, CUA revised the SCP. See Goal Change Pet.,
5/9/19, Ex. A. The Children’s goals remained the same, and Mother’s
objectives were to comply with her PCE and all recommendations, her
psychiatric evaluation and all recommendations, SAGE, parenting classes, and
her court-ordered visitation. Id. The plan additionally recommended that
Mother attend weekly therapy through People Acting to Help (PATH) and allow
a home inspection. Id.
On November 8, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review hearing
and found that Mother was substantially compliant with her permanency plan.
See Perm. Rev. Order, 11/8/18, at 1-3. Specifically, the court noted that
Mother had completed her PCE. Id. The court ordered CUA to obtain Mother’s
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psychiatric evaluation and implement recommendations from the PCE. Id.
Mother graduated to supervised visits in the community and was ordered to
provide CUA with verification of employment and housing. Id.
Erica Williams, Psy.D., and Samantha Peterson, MA, completed the PCE
report in June of 2018. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 113-14. Although Dr.
Williams deferred a diagnosis to a later date, she concluded that Mother did
not have the capacity to provide safety and permanency to either the Children
or to Sibling. Id. at 115. Dr. Williams recommended that Mother continue
mental health therapy to help her deal with unresolved childhood issues, adult
relationships, and the sexual abuse that she experienced as a child. Id. at
126-40. The report emphasized that Mother needed to understand the impact
that her behavior and choices had on her children and the role she played in
their placement. Id. Additionally, Mother was directed to complete a detailed
psychiatric evaluation in order to obtain a differential diagnosis and determine
whether medication management was appropriate. Id. Finally, Mother was
directed to develop a safe, sustainable plan for childcare for time when she
was at work or otherwise unavailable. Id.
On January 17, 2019, the trial court held a permanency review hearing
and determined that Mother was fully compliant with her permanency plan.
See Perm. Rev. Order, 1/17/19, at 1-2. Mother’s visitation remained weekly
and supervised. Id. The court ordered PATH to release all Mother’s treatment
plans and progress notes to CUA. Id.
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On February 14, 2019, CUA revised the SCP. See Goal Change Pet.,
5/9/19, Ex. A. At that time, the Children’s primary goal was identified as
adoption, with a concurrent goal of reunification. Id. Mother’s objectives
remained the same. Id.
On May 8, 2019, DHS filed petitions to change Children’s permanency
goal to adoption and seeking involuntary termination of Mother’s parental
rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b).
See Pet. for Involuntary Term., 5/9/19, at 1-7; Pet. for Goal Change, 5/9/19,
at 1-7, Ex. A.
The petitions detailed Father’s criminal history, convictions, and sex
offender status, as well as Mother’s actions and inactions which had resulted
in the Children being exposed to multiple sex offenders. DHS also noted that
at that time, R.E.L.-C. had been in care approximately nineteen months and
D.M.L.-C. had been in care approximately sixteen months.
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The trial court conducted evidentiary hearings on October 1, 2019,
September 17, 2021, and November 17, 2021.6,7 DHS presented testimony
from forensic evaluator Dr. Erica Williams, CUA permanency worker Allison
Serge, CUA case supervisor Andrew Lemon, CUA case manager Tarnjif Kaur,
and Mother. Father presented testimony from his therapist, Dean Dickson.
At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial court terminated Mother’s
parental rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8),
and (b), and changed the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.
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6 Mother has been represented by three separate attorneys during the course
of the instant proceedings. Mother’s first attorney appeared at the October 1,
2019 hearing and cross-examined two witnesses. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19,
at 2-174. At the subsequent hearing on November 6, 2019, Mother’s first
attorney asked the trial court to vacate his appointment due to a conflict with
Mother. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/6/19, at 3. The trial court granted the request,
appointed new counsel (Mother’s second attorney) and continued the trial so
that new counsel could familiarize himself with the case. Id. at 5. Although
the evidentiary hearings were postponed multiple times during the COVID-19
pandemic, the trial court held regular status review and permanency hearings.
Mother’s second attorney represented her until December 20, 2021, when he
requested that the trial court to vacate his appointment. The trial court
granted second counsel’s request and appointed new counsel (Mother’s
current counsel).
7 Meredith Marie Rogers, Esq. served as the Children’s guardian ad litem
throughout the proceedings. Attorney Rogers argued that terminating
Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. N.T. Term. Hr’g,
11/17/21, at 108-09. Mario D’Adamo III, Esq., served as the Children’s legal
counsel during the termination proceedings, and appeared at the hearing on
their behalf. Id.; see also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa.
2020). Attorney Adamo testified that he met with the Children on three
separate occasions, and that at his latest visit, R.E.L.-C. and D.M.L.-C.
appeared well-bonded with their caregiver (the Children’s Maternal Aunt) and
viewed her as a maternal figure. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/17/21, at 96.
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Mother timely appealed and simultaneously filed concise statements of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial
court issued a responsive opinion addressing Mother’s claims.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [trial court err] and/or abuse its discretion by denying
Mother’s motion that the trial court find that the petitions
before the court were stale?
2. Did the [trial court err] and/or abuse its discretion by denying
Mother’s request for a new trial after new counsel had been
appointed by the court midway through the trial?
3. Did the [trial court] rule in error that [DHS] met its burden of
proof that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated?
4. Did the [trial court err] and/or abuse its discretion in
determining that there was not a sufficient [parent/child] bond
and that [the Children] would suffer no irreparable harm upon
termination of Mother’s parental rights?
5. Did the [trial court err] under [the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §
6351, and 55 Pa.Code § 3130.74] in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42
U.S.C. § 671 et seq., because the goal change to adoption was
[not] the disposition best suited to the safety, protection,
physical, mental, and moral welfare of the Child[ren]?
Mother’s Brief at 7-8 (formatting altered).
Staleness of Petitions
In Mother’s first issue, she claims that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying her motion to dismiss the goal change and termination
matters because the petitions were stale. Mother’s Brief at 12. In support,
she argues that because it took two years and six months since the filing of
the petitions for the hearings to be completed, the facts and circumstances of
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the case “could have changed.” Id. at 12-13. Therefore, Mother argues that
the trial court should have dismissed both matters and ordered DHS to file
new petitions. However, Mother does not cite any legal authority to support
her claim.
This Court has held that “[w]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”
In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted); see
also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the argument section of appellate brief
shall contain discussion of issues raised therein and citation to pertinent legal
authorities). Here, because Mother failed to cite any legal authority to support
her staleness claim, this issue is waived. See W.H., 25 A.3d at 339 n.3.
In any event, even if we declined to find waiver, we would agree with
the trial court that Mother is not entitled to relief on this issue.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:
The record reflects that when the TPR/goal change petitions were
filed on or about May 8, 2019, [the Children] had been in
continuous DHS care for approximately nineteen and sixteen
months respectively. The trial court started the TPR/goal change
trial on October 1, 2019, a reasonable period of time after
petitions were filed. The record further established that the trial
court diligently attempted and scheduled trial dates to continue
the trial without prejudicing any of the parties or the permanency
of [the] Children. However, due to Mother filing various motions
and requesting continuances in the middle of the trial and the
COVID-19 pandemic severely impacting court operations, the trial
court was not able to resume an in-person trial until September
17, 2021. The trial court continued to do status and review
hearings for the Children’s safety via advanced technology
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through the time court operations were curtailed by the COVID-
19 pandemic. The trial court was very deferential to ensure that
Mother and her attorneys had the needed time to present
evidence and testimony since it recognized that sufficient time for
the proceedings is of the utmost importance in TPR/goal change
matters because issues in these proceedings are often complex
and long-standing, and impact the constitutional rights of parents.
Mother’s former counsel, when making the oral motion, only
argued that the trial court should find the petitions were stale and
restart the TPR/goal change trial. Mother’s former counsel
presented no legislative or case law or reasoning for such a
request. Furthermore, in a termination trial, the trial court must
evaluate the testimony on the record given as it exists at the time
of trial, regardless of when the petitions were filed . . . Taking all
of the circumstances into consideration, the trial court saw no
necessity to find the petitions stale and did not abuse its discretion
denying Mother’s oral motion.
Trial Ct. Op. at 14-15 (some formatting altered).
We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. Therefore, even if properly
preserved, Mother would not be entitled to relief on this claim.
Motion for Mistrial
In her second issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in denying her motion for a mistrial. By way of
background to this claim, we reiterate that the trial court continued the
proceedings on November 6, 2019, after Mother’s first attorney moved to
withdraw in the middle of the hearing. However, the second hearing did not
occur until September 17, 2021, twenty-two months later. At that hearing,
Mother’s second attorney made an oral motion for a mistrial, arguing that the
trial court’s lengthy continuance prejudiced Mother, and suggesting that
Mother’s first attorney had been ineffective in questioning Dr. Williams. N.T.
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Term. Hr’g, 9/17/21, at 11-12. Although the court denied Mother’s motion,
the court allowed Mother’s second attorney to recall and cross-examine Dr.
Williams regarding the basis for Mother’s parental incapacity. Id. at 21-40.
On appeal, Mother contends that the trial court should have granted her
request for a new trial because her second attorney could not provide effective
representation after taking over a case in which previous counsel had
participated. Mother’s Brief at 17. Mother argues that, with regard to the
testimony of Dr. Williams, “both attorneys could have taken different
approaches into objections, questions, on cross-examination, [and] rebuttal
testimony.” Id. at 18. Mother concludes that no hardship would have
occurred if a new trial had been granted. Id. at 18-19.
Our standard of review of a court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is as
follows:
A motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court. A
mistrial upon motion of one of the parties is required only when
an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to
deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. It is within the
trial court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant was
prejudiced by the incident that is the basis of a motion for a
mistrial. On appeal, our standard of review is whether the trial
court abused that discretion.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 225 A.3d 883, 890 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations
omitted).
Here, although Mother claims that her second attorney was ineffective,
she has failed to identify in the record where counsel could have taken a
different approach to objections, questions, cross-examination, or rebuttal
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testimony. Similarly, Mother argues that her second attorney should have
conducted his examination of Dr. Williams differently, but she does not explain
how in her argument. Therefore, we conclude that Mother has waived this
claim for purposes of appeal.8 See W.H., 25 A.3d at 339 n.3; Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a).
Termination of Parental Rights
We now turn to Mother’s arguments concerning termination decrees and
goal change orders. We begin by stating our standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted and formatting
altered). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
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8 In any event, the record reflects that, outside of COVID-19-related court
closures, the vast majority of the continuances were caused by Mother and
her attorneys. See Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (citations omitted). Mother’s second
attorney was afforded multiple continuances to prepare for trial, and was
allowed to re-examine Dr. Williams. Id. Therefore, we find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s denial of Mother’s mistrial motion and conclude that,
even if she had properly preserved this issue, Mother would not be entitled to
relief. See Bennett, 225 A.3d at 890.
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resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note
that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section
2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental
rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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Section 2511(a)(2)
Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother’s Brief at 19. In support, she asserts
that she was attempting to remedy the situation that had resulted in the
Children’s placement. Id. Specifically, Mother notes that she ended her
relationship with Father, was compliant with her SCP objectives, completed
parenting programs, and was attending weekly therapy. Id. at 19-23. Mother
also states that she was no longer living with any registered sex offenders.
Id. at 25. Therefore, Mother concludes that she was able and willing to rectify
her parental incapacity. Id.
Section 2511(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
To satisfy the requirements of [Section] 2511(a)(2), the moving
party must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. The
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grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct,
but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Further, this Court has explained:
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied,
are not limited to affirmative misconduct.
Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a
parent’s refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but instead
emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2)
should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a
stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy
of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This is
particularly so where disruption of the family has already occurred
and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.
Thus, while sincere efforts to perform parental duties, can
preserve parental rights under subsection (a)(1), those same
efforts may be insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under
subsection (a)(2). Parents are required to make diligent efforts
toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period
of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted and
formatting altered).
Additionally, this Court has stressed that “a child’s life cannot be held in
abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities.” Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (citation omitted and formatting altered).
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Here, the trial court provided a thorough discussion of the evidence
presented at the termination hearings. See Trial Ct. Op. at 15-29. Briefly,
the trial court explained that although Mother had completed some parenting
classes, she needed to complete additional parenting classes before she would
be able to care for the Children. Id. at 16-18. The court also noted that
although Mother testified that she attended therapy, she did not sign the
necessary consents and releases, or provide proof of her attendance. Id. at
25-27. Further, while Mother did provide evidence of her employment and
current lifestyle, the trial court remained concerned that she worked and lived
near Father and still intended to co-parent with him. Id. at 17-18.
Additionally, there were concerns that Mother was coaching the Children to be
hostile to caseworkers, and that she had not complied with the trial court’s
orders to keep Father from contacting Sibling. Id. at 18-20. Although Mother
had undergone a PCE, she was not compliant with the report’s
recommendations. Id. at 23-25. Mother still did not seem to recognize the
safety concerns inherent in exposing the Children to sex offenders. Id.
The trial court then explained:
The CUA case manager testified that safety threats with respect
to Mother “continue to exist today.” Dr. Williams also stated that
her concerns regarding Mother’s ability to provide safety and
permanency to [the] Children continued to exist. Dr. Williams
testified that without specific intervention and change, Mother’s
incapacity to provide safety and permanency would be ongoing
and enduring. While Mother has been found substantially
compliant at various hearings throughout the life of this case, by
the time the termination trial finished, there were still significant
concerns about Mother’s ability to safely parent [the] Children.
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Mother completed some of her SCP objectives, but she did not
complete the critical recommendations of her PCE. Mother refused
or declined to comply with signing releases for CUA to verify
whether Mother was attending trauma therapy consistently
weekly and if it was appropriate. The trial court found the
testimony of DHS’s witnesses forthcoming and credible. Given the
testimony and exhibits entered into evidence, the trial court found
clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s rights to [the]
Children under [Section] 2511(a)(2). Mother had ample
opportunity to put herself in a position to adequately parent and
care for [the] Children, but her repeated and continued incapacity
has not been mitigated. Mother is unable to meet [the] Children’s
basic needs. Mother has demonstrated an unwillingness to
remedy the causes of her incapacity to parent in order to provide
[the] Children with the essential parental care, control, or
subsistence necessary for their physical and mental well-being.
Trial Ct. Op. at 28 (citations omitted).
Following our review, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are
supported by competent, clear, and convincing evidence in the record, and we
find no error in the court’s legal conclusions. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s
parental rights to Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See C.M.K., 203
A.3d at 262. Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief.
Section 2511(b)
Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination was
appropriate under Section 2511(b). Mother’s Brief at 33-48. Specifically,
Mother argues that the court did not properly address the parent-child bond
or give enough weight to the evidence regarding Mother’s visitation with the
Children. Id. at 33, 41-42. Mother additionally contends that there was no
evidence that R.E.L.-C. wanted to be adopted. Id.
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Section 2511(b) states in relevant part:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. . . .
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under
Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” In re
C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). This Court
has explained:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations
omitted and formatting altered). “Common sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-
adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citation omitted).
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“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent
and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond
analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular
case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted). The question is whether the bond between the parent and the child
“is the one worth saving or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable
harm to” the child. Id. at 764. “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal
bonding evaluation” and caseworkers may offer their opinions and evaluations
of the bond. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citation omitted).
In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),
“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are
young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their
healthy development quickly. When courts fail, . . . the result, all too often,
is catastrophically maladjusted children.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269. Finally, we
reiterate that the court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. In re
N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Here, the trial court explained:
Mother’s testimony suggests a bond between her and at least
[R.E.L.-C.,] but it is not a healthy bond. Mother has been
compliant with visitation with [the] Children, but she has not been
attentive to their behavioral needs, nor do [the] Children present
with a healthy parental bond with Mother. [D.M.L.-C.] has been
in his placement since he was a newborn and has known no other
home. It would be detrimental to remove either [one of the]
Children from their placement with Maternal Aunt. The CUA case
manager testified that visitation should remain supervised, as it
has throughout the life of this case. The Children attend visits
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with Mother, and recognize her. However, Mother has not
assumed her responsibility to develop a real bond and not just a
casual relationship. The record has established that Mother’s
unwillingness to complete all her SCP objectives, particularly her
mental health objectives, comprehend her role in the Children
coming into care, the safety risk that Father poses, her lack of
protective capacity, and her lack of cooperation with CUA’s
assistance has compromised her ability to bring safety and
stability to the Children. Mother has an affirmative duty to put
herself in a position to develop a real bond. Mother does not have
an existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship with either Child
to be preserved. Because there is not a beneficial bond to
preserve, it is in [the] Children’s best interest to terminate
Mother’s parental rights and be freed for adoption. There will be
no irreparable harm to either Child if Mother’s parental rights are
terminated. DHS’s witnesses were credible. The record
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that termination
would not sever an existing and beneficial relationship between
Mother and Children. The trial court also appointed TPR legal
counsel for [the] Children for termination purposes. Children’s
TPR counsel met with [the] Children on three occasions. TPR
counsel reported to the court that both Children appear “very well
bonded with their caregiver” and both “see[] her as a mother
figure.”
Trial Ct. Op. at 43-44 (citations omitted).
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The record supports the trial
court’s conclusion that there was no beneficial bond between the Children and
Mother, that Maternal Aunt fulfills a parental role for the Children, and that
there would be no irreparable harm to either Child if Mother’s parental rights
were terminated. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the termination of Mother’s
parental rights would best serve the Children’s developmental, physical, and
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emotional needs and welfare. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009-10. Therefore,
Mother is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Permanency Goal Change
In her final issue, Mother purports to challenge the trial court’s orders
changing the Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother’s Brief at 8. In
support, Mother reiterates the same arguments that she raised concerning the
termination of her parental rights and the effect of severing her bond with the
Children. Id. at 46. However, Mother does not cite any legal authority
supporting her challenge to the permanency goal changes nor has she
developed her argument to address the goal change other than to state her
opposition to it in a boilerplate manner. Accordingly, we conclude that Mother
has waived this claim. See W.H., 25 A.3d at 339 n.3 (stating that a party’s
failure to develop a claim may result in waiver); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Therefore,
Mother is not entitled to relief on this issue. Further, even if Mother’s claim
was not waived, we agree with the trial court’s reasoning concerning the
permanency goal changes and conclude that no relief is due.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. See T.S.M.,
71 A.3d at 267. Further, Mother failed to preserve her challenges to the
permanency goal change orders. See W.H., 25 A.3d at 339 n.3. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Orders and decrees affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/19/2022
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