Com. v. Steele, C.

J-S22032-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHARLES KENNETH STEELE,
Appellant No. 1016 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 24, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-21-CR-0002244-2015
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2017
Appellant, Charles Kenneth Steele, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his jury conviction of burglary and related
charges.1 Appellant challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. (See Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/16,
at 2-4). Therefore, we have no reason to restate them at length here.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
This was a second trial. In the previous trial, the jury could not reach a
unanimous verdict, and the trial court declared a mistrial. (See Order,
1/29/16).
J-S22032-17
For the convenience of the reader, we note briefly that Appellant was
convicted of the theft of money from “Trades Cars and Trucks,” the used car
dealership where his long-time paramour and co-conspirator, Sue Ellen
Leonhard, worked. Ms. Leonhard had a key to the office and knew where
her employer kept cash between bank deposits.
Ms. Leonhard claimed that even though she initially agreed to
cooperate in the burglary, and entered the premises (twice) with Appellant,
she had a change of heart and left. Later, about five that morning,
Appellant called her by cell phone. He confirmed he had stolen the money,
and promised to meet Leonhard in a few days to divide the proceeds of the
theft.
A few days later, her employer discovered the cash was missing.
Leonhard denied any knowledge, and tried to cover up the burglary by
replacing some of the missing cash with her own funds. Nevertheless, she
was fired. She lied repeatedly to the police, until she finally agreed to
cooperate. Even then her explanations of certain details were still
inconsistent.
Leonhard admitted at trial that she had four previous crimen falsi
convictions. She conceded that she had lied repeatedly to police when they
began to investigate this theft. She acknowledged that she hoped for
consideration from the District Attorney’s office for her cooperation, but
denied that she had been promised any specific benefit.
-2-
J-S22032-17
On March 23, 2016, the jury convicted Appellant of burglary,2 criminal
conspiracy (burglary),3 criminal trespass,4 and theft by unlawful taking.5
The court imposed an aggregate sentence of not less than nine months nor
more than twenty-three months’ incarceration. The trial court denied
Appellant’s motion for a new trial, which challenged the weight of the
evidence. (See Order, 6/09/16). This timely appeal followed.6
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s motion for a new trial challenging the verdict as
against the weight of the evidence as the co-defendant’s
testimony at trial was not credible?
II. Was the evidence insufficient to support guilty verdicts
where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant entered Trades Cars and Trucks, conspired
with another to enter Trades Cars and Trucks for the purpose of
committing a theft, or unlawfully took any money from Trades
Cars and Trucks?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 7) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
____________________________________________
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(4).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503.
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921.
6
Appellant filed a court-ordered statement of errors, on July 18, 2016. The
trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 11, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
-3-
J-S22032-17
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court we conclude
that there is no merit to the issues Appellant has raised on appeal. The trial
court opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. (See Trial Court
Opinion, 8/11/16, at 5-10) (concluding: (1) conviction was not against
weight of evidence where jury was informed of co-defendant’s past crimes
and inconsistent statements, but still found her to be credible; jury was free
to believe all, some or none of evidence; jury’s verdict did not shock
conscience of court; and (2) viewed in light most favorable to
Commonwealth as verdict winner, evidence presented to jury, including
testimony of co-conspirator Leonhard (and her husband) as corroborated by
cell telephone records placing Appellant in vicinity of business office around
time of theft, was sufficient to support guilty verdict).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.7
____________________________________________
7
Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s boilerplate
assertion of generic insufficiency was inadequate to identify which elements
of multiple charges were allegedly not proven. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 7).
Moreover, we add that Appellant’s claim that co-defendant Leonhard was
“wholly unbelievable” is not a challenge to sufficiency, but a variation on his
weight claim. (Appellant’s Brief, at 17). See Commonwealth v. Griffin,
65 A.3d 932, 939 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013)
(claim defendant was wrongly identified as perpetrator of crimes based on
“unbelievable identification testimony” went to credibility and weight, not
sufficiency, of evidence).
-4-
J-S22032-17
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/16/2017
-5-
Cl1C\llated 04120/2017 05:08 PU
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: CP-21 -CR - 2244 -2015
v. : CHARGES: (1) BURGLARY
(2) CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY·
BURGLARY
(3) CRIMINAL TRESPASS
(4) THEFT BY UNLAWFUi,_
CHARLES KENNETH STEELE TAKING ,, • '
.,
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925(al
!-· ..,,....
-
,..., :::.,'
.:,
.-·
Ebert, J., August 11, 2016 -
. '
·-.)
-·'
In this post-trial appeal, Appellant challenges his conviction on the charges of
burglary, criminal conspiracy· burglary, criminal trespass and theft by unlawful taking.
Trial was held on March 21-23, 2016, and the jury's verdict of guilty on all counts was
entered on March 23, 2016. This Opinion is written pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant's bases for appeal are as follows:
1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion for a New
Trial challenging the verdict as against the weight of the evidence as the co-
defendant's testimony at trial was not credible.
2. The evidence was insufficient to support guilty verdicts for the above
captioned charges as the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant entered Trades Cars and Trucks, conspired
with another to enter Trades Cars and Trucks for the purpose of committing a
theft, or unlawfully took any money from Trades Cars and Trucks.
1
Statement of Facts
Co-Defendant, Sue Ellen Leonhard, testified at trial that she was engaged in a
long-term, extramarital affair with Appellant.1 Co-Defendant testified that, following their
rendezvous on the evening of June 06, 2015, Appellant proposed that they enter co-
Defendant's place of employment, Trades Cars and Trucks.2 The purpose of entering
the business was to steal approximately $10,000,3 which represented the business's
cash transactions during the preceding two weeks.4 Co-Defendant testified that she
knew where the money was kept on-premises,5 and had access to the keys to the
building.6 Co-Defendant further testified that she was reluctant to steal from her
employer and risk losing her job.7
Appellant and co-Defendant waited until approximately 1 :00 A.M. on June 07,
8
2015, before driving to Trades Cars and Trucks and parking a short distance away.
After arriving at the dealership, Appellant and co-Defendant noticed that a nearby bar
was still open, and that an individual that was standing in front of the bar had a clear line
of sight to Trades Cars and Trucks. 9 Appellant and co-Defendant feigned interest in the
vehicles displayed on the lot, then decided to leave after noting that there was too much
activity in the area to successfully break into the car dealership."? At approximately 3:00
1
Notes of Testimony, In Re: Jury Trial, 67-68, March 22, 2016 (Hereinafter, N.T. _ of March_, 2016).
2
N.T. 63 of March 22, 2016.
3
N.T. 82 of March 22, 2016.
4
N.T. 52 of March 22, 2016.
5
N.T. 89 of March 22, 2016.
6
N .T. 88 of March 22, 2016.
7
N.T. 90-91 of March 22, 2016.
8
N.T. 83-84 of March 22, 2016.
9
N.T. 84-86 of March 22, 2016.
10 l!i.
2
A.M., Appellant and co-Defendant returned to the car dealership and were successful in
entering the premises through use of a key kept hidden in the mailbox. 11
After entering the business. co-Defendant testified that she developed cold feet
and refused to be complicit in the theft. 12 Appellant brought co-Defendant back to her
vehicle at approximately 3:45 A.M., and promised that he would complete the theft on
his own." At approximately 5:00 A.M., co-Defendant received a call from Appellant,
infonming her that the theft was successful and that Appellant would meet her in a few
days to divide the proceeds of the theft." Cellular telephone records provided by T-
Mobile indicated Appellant's presence within the cellular coverage zone providing
service to Trades Cars and Trucks at the approximate time of the second break-in.••
On June 08, 2015, co-Defendant arrived al work to discover that the office was
ransacked.16 the exterior door unlocked and the key that had been hidden in the
mailbox was missing." Co-Defendant attempted to cover up the crime to the best of her
11
abilities. That included replacing approximately $6,000 of the stolen funds using her
personal money" and replacing the missing key on June 09, 2015.20 The theft was
detected on June 10, 2015, and suspicion quickly fell on co-Defendant.21 who was
22
promptly fired from her job. Prior to her scheduled interview with the New Cumberland
u N. T. 88 of March '2, 2016.
"~ Note 7, .Bl.Ra·
u N.T. 91 of Match 22, 2016.
u N.T. 93 of March 22., 2016 (lndtQting lhal the phone caN WI$ plaud at approxlmat~ly S:07 A.M, on Sunday, lune
07, 20151.
u ill. Nolt 38, infri.
1•
N.T. 95-96 of March 22, 2016.
11
N.T. 95, lOOofMarch 22, 2016,
14
N.T. 96 of Match 22, 2016.
>, Id,
» N.T. 10(>-101 of March 22, 2016.
21
N.T. 102 of March 22, 2016; }CC also N.T. 40of M.irch 21. 2016.
3
_ Police Department on June 12, 2015, Appellant called co-Defendant and asked her to
accept sole responsibility for the crime.23 Co-Defendant refused, and named Appellant
to the police investigators. The police contacted Appellant, who had returned to Texas,
and informed him that a warrant had been issued for his arrest and that the police
wished to speak with. him in connection to the break-in.24 Appellant returned to
Pennsylvania and was interviewed regarding the break-in and any knowledge he
possessed of same. 25
The matter proceeded to trial, where Appellant was found guilty on all charges
and sentenced to a term of incarceration of not less than nine months or more than
twenty three months.26 Appellant timely filed a post-trial motion, seeking a new trial on
the grounds that the weight of the evidence was insufficient to support conviction,27
which was denied by Order of Court dated June 08, 2016.28 On June 22, 2016,
Appellant filed his notice of appeal, and on that same day Appellant was ordered by this
Court to file his Concise Statement no later than July 13, 2016. On July 18, 2016,
Appellant served this Court with his concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.
1925(b), prompting this Opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a).
22
N.T. 104 of March 22, 2016.
23
N.T. 105 of March 22, 2016.
24
N.T. 166 of March 22, 2016.
25
N.T. 167 of March 22, 2016.
26
See Order of Court In Re: Sentence, filed May 24, 2016.
27
See Post-Sentence Motions, filed June 02, 2016.
28
See Order of Court In Re: Motion for New Trial, filed June 08, 2016.
4
Discussion
Appellant raises two errors on appeal, arguing that this Court improperly denied
his post-trial motion for a new trial and that Appellant was improperly found guilty of the
charges against him. These challenges invoke the weight of the evidence and the
sufficiency of the evidence, respectively. For the following reasons, this Court properly
denied Appellant's post-trial motion for a new trial, and properly accepted the findings of
the jury that Appellant was guilty on all charges.
i. Weight of the evidence
To begin, as stated by the Superior Court in Com. v. Galindes, 2001 Pa. Super.
315, 786 A.2d 1004, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001), when reviewing the weight of the
evidence:
[A] true weight of the evidence challenge 'concedes that
sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict' but questions
which evidence is to be believed.
Com. v. Galindes, supra, citing to Armbruster v. Horowitz, 1999 Pa. Super. 333, 744
A.2d 285, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999). The Galindes Court further stated:
An appellate court may review the trial court's decision to
determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, but it
may not substitute its judgment for that of the lower court.
Indeed, an appellate court should not entertain challenges to
the weight of the evidence since our examination is confined
to the "cold record." Com. v. Murray, 408 Pa. Super. 435,
597 A.2d 111, 113 (Pa. Super. 1991 ). Our Court may not
reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as
to shock one's sense of justice. Id. "Finally, the trier of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence." Com. v. Valette, 531 Pa. 384, 613
A.2d 548, 549 (Pa. 1992). Our review, therefore, is confined
to whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Com. v. Galindes, supra (emphasis original).
5
"It is the province of the jury to assess the credibility of witnesses, and a trial
judge will not grant a new trial merely because of a conflict in the testimony or because
he would have reached a different conclusion on the same facts. if he had been the trier
of fact." Corn v, VanDiviner. 599 Pa. 617, 630, 962 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009) (internal
citations omitted). Here, Appellant contends that this Court erred by abusing its
discretion in the denial of Appellant's motion for a new trial, as the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence due to the purported incredibilijy of co-Defendant's testimony
at trial. The facttinder, a duly-empaneled jury, had the opportunity to observe co-
Defendant as she testified and was free lo believe all, some or none of her testimony
against Appellant. Clearly, the factfinder found co-Defendant sufficiently credible to
support finding Appellant guilty of all of the charges against him. This Court did not find
the jury's conclusions regarding Appellant's guilt and the credibility or oo-Defendanl to
be shocking to its sense of justice, and properly denied Appellant's motion for a new
trial. As such, this Court's decision to deny Appellant's post-trial motion for a new trial
should property be affirmed on appeal.
ii. The sufficiency of the evidence
In the alternative, Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain guilty verdicts against him for the charges of burglary, criminal conspiracy -
burglary, criminal trespass and theft by unlawful taking. As stated by the Supreme
Court:
The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether accepting
as true all of the evidence reviewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable
inferences therefrom, the trier or fact could have found that
each element of the offenses charged was supported by
6
evidence and inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
J:;gmmonwealth v. Lovette. 450 A.2d 975, 977 (Pa. 1982).
Here. based on Appellant's concise statement of errors, it appears that he
concedes that all of the elements of the crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt
except for the identity of the perpetrator. Appellant's concise statement was examined in
light of Com. v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015), wherein the Superior
Court noted that the use of a boilerplate declaration that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction did not sufficiently identify the elements of the crime an appellant
contended were insufficiently proven. ]Q. Here, it appears that Appellant specified that
the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was the perpetrator of the crimes in question.
In other words, Appellant appears to concede that the crimes occurred in the location
and on the dale and time alleged, but challenges the jury's conclusion that he
committed them.
Co-Defendant testified that Appellant transported her to Trad es Cars and Trucks
two times between 1:00 AM. and approximately 3:00 A.M. on June 07, 2015, with the
intention of using co-Defendant's key and knowledge of the business to unlawfully enter
the business office and steal money located on-site. 29 Co-Defendant testified that, but
for her insislence that the money not be taken, Appellant would have unlawfully
removed the funds in question from the premises at approximately 3:00 A.M. Co-
Defendant further testified that Appellant called her at approximately 5:00 A.M . .'0 and
29
Whlle co-Oefendant testHied lhat shtt did not use her key to access the bustness, she furthe• testified that the
rt'a~ns for tht$ were that she did not want App.el!at'lt to know SM h;:d her key, and because she kne\\' a sp&re kev
was kept in the business m.-ilbox. N,T. 88, l1S-!l6of March 22, 20:!6.
'° co-Defendant tcstif"~d that the call was approxlmatetyone mlnut~ long. N.T. 93 of M;irdi 22, 2016.
7
briefly informed her that he returned lo Trades Cars and Trucks and completed the theft
without the further assistance of co-Defendant. James Layton, Sr., owner of Trades
Cars and Trucks, {hereinafter. "Victim") testified that Appellant had no authorization to
be on the premises whatsoever" and that co-Defendant did not have authorization to
be on the premises during the time frame in question.32 The business was usually
closed from 3:00 P.M. on Saturdays until 10:00 A.M. on the following Monday.33 Victim
further test~ied that only he, his son and co-Defendant had keys to the building.3' and
that his son did not handle any money whatsoever on behalF of the business. 35
Pursuant to Lovette, supra, that testimony must be considered in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, along with all reasonable inferences therefrom. That
testimony showed that Appellant and co-Defendant did not have authorization to be on
the premises, that Appellant was on the premises for the purpose of unlawfully entering
the business offioe, and that the objective or unlawfully entering the business office was
to steal money located in the business's cash drawer. The testimony further showed
that Appellant and co-Defendant did unlawfully enter the business office together to
steal the money in question, but were initially thwarted by co-Defendant's change of
heart Again, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. the testimony showed
u N.T. 32·33 of March 21, 2016 (stating that no Ont'! is authorized to be on the premises ovtsSde of normal business
hours without his express permission, and that co-Defendant did not have authorization to bring anyone onto the
premises after besmess hours).
11
N,T. 20 of March 2L, 2016.
,.. N,T, 21 or M;,1(h 21, 2015.
u N.T. 38 of March 21, 2016.
8
that Appellant returned to the business at approximately 5:00 A.M. without co-
Defendant, and successfully completed the theft. Appellant later told co-Defendant that
he wanted her to take sole responsibility for the crime in order to protect his career and
family life.36
In addition to the above testimony, the Commonwealth presented Appellant's
cellular telephone records. The records included locational metadata, providing the
approximate location of the caller and call recipient within a roughly two and a half mile
radius from the relevant cellular tower.37 The phone records indicated that Appellant-
placed an approximately·one minute long call to co-Defendant around 5:00 A.M. on the
day of the break-in, from a location within the cellular tower coverage range of Victim's
place of business.38
In short, co-Defendant testified regarding Appellant's direction of and
involvement in the break-in. The cellular metadata demonstrated a corroborating phone
call by Appellant to co-Defendant at approximately 5:00 A.M. on the morning of the
break-in, placed by Appellant from the vicinity of Victim's business. T-Mobile's business
records demonstrated that Appellant and co-Defendant communicated by voice and text
message numerous times between June 06, 2015, the evening before the break-in, and
June 12, 2015, the day co-Defendant participated in a police interview concerning the
36
See Note 23, supra.
37
N .T. 146 of March 22, 2016.
38
The cellular tower in question was located approximately two blocks from Victim's place of business. Appellant
placed the 5:00 A.M. phone call from within the two and a half mile radius of that specific tower. N.T. 168-169 of
March 22, 2016.
9
theft,39 following which all communications between the two ceased.'? It would be
reasonable for the jury to infer Appellant's involvement in the crimes, reviewing that
information in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. For the foregoing reasons,
the guilty verdicts reached by the jury were sufficiently supported by the evidence
submitted at trial, and the guilty verdicts should properly be sustained on appeal.
Conclusion
There was sufficient evidence produced at trial to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant entered into a criminal conspiracy with co-Defendant to break into
Trades Cars and Trucks, for the purpose of_stealing· approximately $10,000 in cash kept
in a locked cash drawer on the premises. The evidence showed that co-Defendant and
Appellant first entered the premises at approximately 3:00 AM. on June 07, 2015, after
an aborted attempt at 1 :00 AM., which was thwarted by the presence of nearby
potential witnesses. Appellant and co-Defendant removed the cash from the locked
cash drawer at that time, but returned it upon co-Defendant's insistence. Following the
3:00 AM. attempted theft, co-Defendant returned to her house while Appellant returned
to the business and successfully removed the $10,000. The Commonwealth submitted
sufficient evidence at trial to prove Appellant's participation in the theft, including
telephone records placing Appellant in the vicinity of the business at the time of the theft
and the testimony of co-Defendant implicating Appellant. The jury properly weighed the
credibility of co-Defendant in assessing her testimony against Appellant. Thus, the guilty
verdicts returned by the jury were properly supported by the available evidence
39
N.T. 174 of March 22, 2016 (wherein co-Defendant's phone records indicated six consecutive calls or text
messages between Appellant and co-Defendant on June 06, 2015, followed by the 5:07 A.M. call on the morning of
June 07, 2015).
40
N.T. 108-109 of March 22, 2016.
10
submitted at trial, which the jury carefully weighed and considered, and therefore should
properly be affomed on appeal.
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Matthew P. Smith, Esquire
District Attorney's Office
Joshua M. Yohe, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
Attorney for Defendant
AVG J 2 2016
11