In the Interest of: K.S., Appeal of: D.H.

J-A15030-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: D.H., MOTHER :
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: No. 84 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2021,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000014-2021.
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: July 26, 2022
D.H. (Mother) appeals the order involuntarily terminating her rights to
her son K.S. (Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a) and (b). After review, we affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows: The Child was
born in July 2019. The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families
(CYF) first became aware of the family in December 2018, and again in July
2019. CYF accepted a referral due to safety concerns for the Child. CYF
became aware that Mother had an active dependency case in New Jersey
regarding another child. While in New Jersey, it was determined that Mother
lacked adequate skills to parent and should not be reunified with that child.
Mother failed to meet her established reunification goals in New Jersey, and
that child has since been placed in foster care. Additionally, CYF learned that
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before the New Jersey proceedings, Mother had two other children removed
from her care and placed with their father in New York. While in New York,
Mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia, bi-polar, and depression. She has
an IQ level of 66.
On July 24, 2019, CYF obtained an Emergency Custody Authorization
(ECA) from the trial court, and CYF, along with members of the local police
department, went to Mother’s home to execute the ECA. The Child was
ultimately located on the property, the Child’s father, D.S., (Father) brought
him out of the house, and the Child was placed in foster care.1 At that time,
Mother did not permit CYF or the police to enter her home.
On July 26, 2019, the trial court held a shelter hearing. At its conclusion,
the court granted return of the Child to Mother conditioned upon Mother
having appropriate housing and the implementation of crisis in-home services.
On July 31, 2019, CYF attempted to complete a home assessment at Mother’s
residence. CYF was unable to complete a full assessment with Mother because
she refused to sign release of information forms. Due to Mother’s lack of
cooperation, CYF was unable to obtain basic psychological information about
Mother, and could not determine the correct level of services needed by the
family. As such, CYF was unable to return the Child to Mother’s home as
ordered at the shelter hearing.
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1 Father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he did not file an appeal.
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CYF then filed a dependency petition on August 2, 2019. At the
subsequent hearing, the trial court postponed the adjudication hearing,
ordered the Child to remain in foster care placement pending Mother’s mental
health evaluation, and permitted her supervised visitation with the Child. CYF
filed an amended dependency petition on August 29, 2019. After an expedited
adjudicatory hearing, the Child was adjudicated dependent on September 4,
2019. As noted by the trial court:
At the dependency proceeding, the [trial court] made the
following findings: Mother had three other children, one
dependent child in New Jersey, and two children in New York in
care of their father. Mother failed to meet the established goals
of the New Jersey matter. Father is from Georgia and arrived days
before [the] Child’s birth. [The] Child’s pediatrician . . . provided
information that he saw [the] Child multiple times following his
birth and had concerns regarding [the] Child’s weight and
Mother’s and Father’s ability to properly feed him. [The] Child
gained 11 ounces following his placement in foster care. [W]hen
CYF attempted to execute the ECA, [the] Child was present in the
home, but Mother stated he was not, and that he was in the care
of a babysitter named “Brittany Spears.”
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 8 (citations omitted). The trial
court adjudicated Child dependent because the court “could not return the
Child to parents even with the most intensive in-home crisis services because
the basic feeding schedule of this newborn would require 24-hour support
from various outside agencies.” Id. at unnumbered 9 (citation and footnote
omitted).
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On October 11, 2019, Child’s temporary foster placement was changed
to his current Foster Parents, who have retained custody of him. Child has
never returned to Mother’s care since his removal in July 2019.2
Ultimately, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s rights on January
21, 2021. The trial court held the termination hearing on December 10, 2021.
CYF presented the testimony of Dr. Gregory A. Lobb, an expert in child
psychology, and a CYF casework supervisor, as well as persons who worked
for organizations that provided services to Mother. Mother also testified.
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court granted the
petition and terminated Mother’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
Mother timely filed this appeal, in which she raises two issues for our
review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] §2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Mother’s parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the [Child] pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §2511(b)
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2 Mother gave birth to another child in June 2020, and that child was also
placed with the Foster Parents. Although the parties also discussed that child’s
dependency proceeding, the order at issue in this appeal involves only the
Child.
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Mother’s Brief at 6.
Mother’s issues involve whether termination was proper under Section
2511(a) and (b). We review these issues mindful of our well-settled standard
of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result.
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
With this standard in mind, we turn to the substantive law governing
the termination of parental rights. Termination of parental rights is governed
by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
child[.]
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). We need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc).
Instantly, the trial court terminated Mother’s rights under Section
2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). Here, we consider the trial court’s decision to
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), which
provides:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any
of the following grounds:
[…]
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes
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of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.” C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 262 (citation omitted). Parents are required
to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full
parental duties. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Here, the record supports the trial court’s finding that “CYF [had]
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Mother is unable to
parent due to her incapacity and neglect; and further, those conditions will
not be remedied within a reasonable time due to Mother’s lack of effort.” Trial
Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 11. The trial court considered the all
the testimony presented and found that Mother did not complete any of her
goals for reunification. The court first summarized the testimony regarding
Mother’s goal of addressing her cognitive limitations:
Goals in this case were established to foster reunification
between Mother and the Child. Mother was ordered to connect
with the Office of Intellectual Disabilities (“OID”) due to Mother’s
prior mental health diagnosis in order to address cognitive
obstacles as well as to have parenting support. Mother testified
that the reason she never connected with OID for support is
because CYF failed to provide a telephone number, contact person
or the location for the OID. CYF caseworker supervisor, Nikole
Ficorilli, credibly testified that CYF made the referral to OID for
Mother as well as [prompted her] many times to utilize the
referral. Mother’s testimony was also contradicted by Julianne
Bendzsuk from Achieva, who testified that Mother was offered
assistance with communicating and participating with any service
providers that may be beneficial to her and her children. Ms.
Bendzsuk testified that Achieva assisted Mother in making
telephone calls to connect with OID, but Mother failed to avail
herself of this additional opportunity for support and failed to take
the additional steps, including the interview and intake process.
Mother has been represented by legal counsel throughout the life
of this case as well as attended multiple permanency review
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hearings where the goal of OID was discussed. The court rejected
the testimony of Mother in favor of Ms. Ficorilli and Ms. Bendzsuk.
The [court] finds that Mother failed to remedy that goal for
reunification.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 11-12 (citations and excess
capitalization omitted).
The trial court also found that Mother failed to meet her goal of seeking
services to aid in her visitations with Child:
Another goal set for Mother was coached parenting
visitation, which transitioned into therapeutic visitation. Mother
was originally ordered to attend coached parenting visitation, but
there was a waiting list that prevented [] Mother from
commencing that service. CYF testified that upon further
discussion Mother needed a higher level of supervision with the
Child than coached parenting; a referral [was] made to Achieva
on January 2, 2020, for the more intensive therapeutic visitation.
Mother had her first supervised therapeutic visit through Achieva
on July 29, 2020. [Ms.] Bendzsuk, who oversees the parenting
support program, testified that Achieva was involved with the
supervision of Mother’s visits until the last in[-]person visit on
June 4, 2021. In addition to therapeutic visitation services,
Achieva offered Mother “wrap-around” supports to enhance her
parenting and life skills. Ms. Bendzsuk testified that Mother was
inconsistent with visitation, and “her visitation attendance was
dropping off more frequently and consistently: as the case
progressed. Mother’s inconsistent visitation caused the progress
to become stagnant, as large portions of her visits were
reacclimating Mother to the routine and structure previously
established. Ms. Bendzsuk opined that at the time of her last visit,
Mother still require[d] verbal prompting for parenting as well as
support. At the time of the hearing, Mother was not at the level
of parenting to be afforded the smallest amount of unsupervised
time – only fifteen (15) minutes alone without support. The court
accepted the testimony of Ms. Bendzsuk that Mother has not
progressed with therapeutic visitation for Achieva to recommend
return and reunification. Accordingly, the court finds that Mother
has failed to remedy the issues necessitating the services of
coached/therapeutic visitation.
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 12-13 (citations and excess
capitalization omitted).
Another goal the trial court found Mother did not meet involved her
mental health and her failure to make herself available for an evaluation of
her interaction with Child:
Another goal for Mother was to attend and participate in an
individual mental health evaluation as well as an interactional
evaluation with the Child. CYF wanted to ensure that Mother was
receiving the appropriate level of services for the mental health
issues identified in New Jersey. The purpose of the interactional
evaluation was to assess parental inadequacies as a result of the
New Jersey dependency proceedings and the referral of the case
at hand for child neglect. Mother received six (6) referrals to
attend these examinations. Dr. Gregory Lobb, a stipulated expert
in forensic and child psychology, testified that Mother failed to
appear in person for all the individual evaluations and he was only
able to interview her during a telephone call. Mother testified that
she was aware of how important the individual and interactional
evaluations were to reunification with her child, but no one ever
contacted her regarding the evaluations. Mother further
acknowledged the multiple court orders that ordered that Mother
shall follow the mental health recommendations from Dr. Lobb
after the scheduled evaluations[.] The court finds that Mother did
not meet this goal.
In this case, Mother had the goal of mental health treatment
that ran in parallel with the same New Jersey dependency goal.
Mother averred that she was engaged with Wesley Family Services
(“Wesley”) for outpatient mental health services. Mother signed
releases of information for CYF to discuss her mental health case
with Wesley. Ms. Ficorilli testified that CYF contacted Wesley and
learned that Mother is not consistently engaged in mental health
treatment. Mother testified that she is in compliance with her
mental health treatment, but offered no witnesses or exhibits to
support her position during the hearing. Mother thwarted CYF’s
attempts to ascertain Mother’s true mental health needs by failing
to attend the court ordered evaluations. This court gave heavy
weight to the expert testimony of Dr. Lobb who reviewed Mother’s
past mental health reports/treatment recommendations, and
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opined that Mother needed mental health treatment and
therapeutic intervention. The court that Mother failed to meet her
mental health goal.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 13-15 (citations and excess
capitalization omitted).
Finally, the trial court found that Mother failed to achieve her goal of
enjoying consistent visitation with the Child:
Visitation was Mother’s final goal. A cornerstone of
reunification with a child in placement is to make efforts to engage
with child through visitation. Multiple witnesses testified
regarding the lack of consistency by Mother. Dr. Lobb opined that
a parent working towards reunification with their child should be
attempting to increase his/her visitation time, and it caused him
concern that Mother had not visited the [Child] since June 4, 2021.
Mother’s visits with [the] Child occurred in her home requiring no
transportation or travel for her. Because of the inconsistency of
visits, since April 6, 2021, Mother was required to confirm her
visitation in advance. CYF filed a motion to decrease visitation on
June 2, 2021, due to Mother’s decrease in visit confirmations.
[That same day,] this court reduced Mother’s supervised visits to
one time per month. Mother provided no reasonable explanation
for her lack of visitation other than she worked overnight until
7:00 [a.m.], and her visits were from 9:00 [a.m.] until 11:00
[a.m.] One of Mother’s obstacles to consistent visitation was that
she was “tired” from working overnight and CYF was unable to
move the visits one hour earlier to 8:00 [a.m.] The court finds
Mother’s rationale as placing her own needs above the needs of
her infant child. The court takes particular note that Mother’s
visits were in the comfort of her own home and the Child was
transported to her. There was no effort required of Mother to
facilitate a visit other than remaining awake following her
overnight work schedule and later in the case to confirm the
scheduled visit to avoid [the Child] unnecessarily being
transported. Mother showed no remorse for the inconsistent
visitation per Dr. Lobb and failed to recognize the impediment she
created with therapeutic visitation. Again, at the time of the
hearing [Mother’s] visits continue[d] to be supervised.
Accordingly, the court finds that Mother failed to meet the goal of
visitation.
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 15-16 (citations and excess
capitalization omitted).
Having found that Mother failed to establish any of her goals, the trial
court found that :
The evidence clearly established the persistent nature of the
issues that have caused Mother to be unable to provide essential
care for Child. Given the fact that [the] Child has been in the care
of the foster family for 28 months, the court justifiably concluded
that Mother cannot or will not remedy the problems that have
made her incapable of functioning as [the] Child’s parent.
Therefore, CYF has satisfied grounds to terminate under
subsection (a)(2)[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 16-17 (excess capitalization
omitted).
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Given the
court’s discussion above, Mother’s bare assertion that “CYF offered no
evidence that [she] had not remedied the conditions that led to the removal”
of the Child is contradicted by the record and, therefore wholly meritless.
Mother’s Brief at 16. Moreover, Mother’s argument that Dr. Lobb “never
observed Mother with [the Child] and could not assess [her] parenting
capacity,” is disingenuous, given Mother’s failure to make herself available to
the expert despite six scheduled appointments. Id.In addition, while the record does support Mother’s claim that she had
“made some progress over time,” id., her inconsistency in visitation and her
failure to take advantage of the services offered her largely negated any
progress. Moreover, while it is true that Ms. Ficorilli, the CYF caseworker who
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testified was relatively new to the case, she reviewed the entire case file
before her testifying in this matter. See N.T., 12/10/21, at 52. Finally,
contrary to Mother’s claim that she testified credibly, the trial court found
otherwise. We cannot disturb that determination. T.S.M, supra.
In sum, we discern no error or abuse of discretion when the trial court
determined that CYF provided sufficient evidence of Mother’s inability and/or
refusal to provide parental care under Section 2511(a)(2), and that after 28
months, Mother’s failures could not or would not be remedied.
Having addressed the first prong of the termination analysis under
Section 2511(a), we turn now to Mother’s second issue, which concerns the
second prong under Section 2511(b).
Section 2511(b) provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(b).
This Court has explained that:
[S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
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In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of
a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,
but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary, and beneficial
relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child
had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting
bond to be too attenuated). We add, the court is not required to use expert
testimony to resolve the bond analysis but may rely on the testimony of social
workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Finally, we
emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child
is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). However, a parent’s own feeling
of love and affection for the child does not preclude the termination of parental
rights. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
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Instantly, the trial court determined that termination would best serve
the Child’s needs and welfare because the evidence presented established that
no bond existed between Mother and the Child, and that Child enjoys a strong
bond with Foster Parents. As the court explained:
Mother failed to attend the scheduled interactional
evaluations with [the] Child and Dr. Lobb, despite acknowledging
the value and importance for the dependency case and
reunification. Dr. Lobb was unable to render an expert opinion
regarding the bond between Mother and [the] Child because she
did not avail herself for the interactional evaluation(s). However,
[Ms.] Bendzsuk from Achieva testified regarding her observations
between Mother and [the] Child.
[Ms.] Bendzsuk offered a glimpse into the bond between
Mother and the Child where she explained that the gaps in
visitation would impact the infant child as to not be acclimated
with Mother and a portion of the visit was needed just to
reestablish engagement. In this case, the Child was removed
from [Mother] when he was only 19 days old. At the time of the
hearing, the Child has remained out of Mother’s care for
approximately 870 days or 2 years, 4 months, and 16 days. Given
the Child’s age of 29 months, it is impossible for the Child to
articulate any bond that may exist with Mother. The Child has had
no in person contact with Mother since June 2, 2021, and any
contact has only been a sporadic monthly virtual contact through
“Face-Time” arranged with foster mother.
Mother’s testimony at the hearing demonstrated the lack of
any significant bond when she stated, “I think he does recognize
me” when discussing a virtual interaction. Dr. Lobb’s report gave
guidance to this court, even though he was discussing Father and
not Mother, when he explained that “a bond between a parent and
child is not formed during brief virtual visits, it is formed, groomed
and maintained through constant contact with parent and child.
This court finds that Mother clearly loves [the] Child, but any bond
that may exist is only a unilateral bond on her part. There has
not been constant contact between Mother and the Child, and he
was only in her care for a mere 19 days out of the 889 days of his
life. Any bond that initially exist[ed] during those first 19 days of
life has not been maintained nor fostered during placement. The
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Child has no real relationship with Mother, and Mother does not
obtain a “default” bond by failing to avail herself for the
interactional evaluation.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 18-20 (citations and excess
capitalization omitted).
The trial court then discussed and compared the bond the Child has with
Foster Parents:
Conversely, Dr. Lobb observed the relationship with the
[Foster Parents] and [the] Child. It was clear to him that [the]
Child looks to the [Foster Parents] as his parental figures. It was
Dr. Lobb’s opinion that [the] Child goes to them for the things he
needs and that [the] Child appeared to feel safe and comfortable
with [the Foster Parents]. [The Foster Parents] demonstrated
positive parenting skills with [the] Child, are engaged with him
and it was clear that the Child feels comfortable with them. Dr.
Lobb described the attachment with the [Foster Parents] as a
“secure attachment” which is the healthiest attachment. Dr. Lobb
further opined that [the Foster Parents] are the psychological
parents for [the] Child, as he has known them his entire life. They
meet [the] Child’s needs on a daily basis and his biological brother
resides with the [Foster Parents].
Dr. Lobb’s ultimate opinion was [the] Child needs
permanency and it was evident that existed with the [Foster
Parents]. Being that Mother has had limited progress for the past
two years it was in [the] Child’s best interest that he have
permanency. Further, [the] Child would not suffer any
detrimental effects if termination occurred because [the] Child has
had limited contact with Mother. On the other hand, Dr. Lobb
believed that were [the] Child removed from the [Foster Parents],
it would be very difficult for him to make that change at this point
as they are his caretakers.
[The] Child deserves permanency. The court finds that a
strong and positive bond does exist with the [Foster Parents], who
provide a loving and safe environment that is fertile grounds for a
well-adjusted life, which is what the [Foster Parents provide]. In
comparison, the court relied on Dr. Lobb’s expert opinion that it
was apparent Mother had limited insight to what is going on and
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what her limitations are, which to him, meant knowing what those
limitations are and knowing what supports to have in place to keep
the [Child] safe.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at unnumbered 20-21 (citations and excess
capitalization omitted).
Given the above, the trial court found the Child’s need for stability and
permanence at his young age established that the developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare would be best served by terminating
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Our review of the record amply supports this conclusion. On appeal,
Mother reiterates her meritless claim that Dr. Lobb’s expert opinion should be
disregarded because he never saw her interact with the Child. While Mother
claims that the record is unclear if she ever received proper notice of the
scheduled appointments, the trial court found her testimony to be unworthy
of belief.
Mother further cites Ms. Bendzsuk’s testimony regarding her one
observation of her interaction with the Child and that her own testimony
“described in detail the benefits [the Child] would lose if the relationship
between [she] and [the Child] were terminated.” Mother’s Brief at 19 (citing
N.T., 12/10/21, at 195). Mother does not enumerate these benefits in her
brief. Moreover, although she cites to a page from her hearing testimony, our
reading reveals no benefits but only her belief that the Child recognizes her.
Finally, Mother asserts that the Child loves her, “derives the benefit of
affection and happiness from [his] relationship” with her, and that the Child
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deserves to have the relationship with her preserved. Mother’s Brief at 20.
The only testimony to support this conclusion was provided by Mother. Once
again, we cannot disturb the trial court’s finding that her testimony was not
credible. T.S.M., supra.
In sum, the record supports the trial court’s termination of Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/26/2022
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