Com. v. Lezinsky, J.

J-A23022-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES STEVEN LEZINSKY :
:
Appellant : No. 915 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-66-CR-0000222-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES STEVEN LEZINSKY :
:
Appellant : No. 916 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-66-CR-0000223-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 8, 2022
James Steven Lezinsky (Appellant) appeals from the judgments of
sentence entered at two dockets in the Wyoming County Court of Common
Pleas, following his guilty pleas to two counts of fleeing or attempting to elude
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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a police officer (fleeing), graded as felonies of the third degree.1 The trial
court imposed above-aggravated guideline range, maximum sentences of 42
to 84 months’ imprisonment at each count, to run consecutively, for an
aggregate term of seven to 14 years. On appeal, Appellant avers the court
abused its discretion by failing to consider mitigating factors, misconstruing
his prior record, and improperly weighing factors already accounted for in the
grading of the offenses and the sentencing guidelines. We affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
At trial docket CP-66-CR-0000222-2017 (Docket 222), the
Commonwealth alleged the following. On March 5, 2017, Meshoppen Borough
Police Chief John Krieg attempted to stop Appellant, who was driving a red
pickup truck, on SR 6 in Washington Township, Wyoming County. Appellant
“turned onto SR 4008 and slowed as if [he] was going to stop[, but] then
fled.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, Police Criminal Complaint, Docket 222,
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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a), (a.2)(2)(iii). We note the trial court issued separate
orders at each docket, and thus Walker is not implicated. See
Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018) (“[W]here a single
order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of
appeal must be filed for each case.”), overruled in part, Commonwealth v.
Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021) (reaffirming that Pa.R.A.P.
341 requires separate notices of appeal when single order resolves issues
under more than one docket, but holding Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits appellate
court to consider appellant’s request to remediate error when notice of appeal
is timely filed). In any event, Appellant properly filed two separate notices of
appeal. On August 10, 2021, this Court sua sponte consolidated the two
appeals.
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4/26/17, at 1. The officer pursued Appellant at speeds over 65 miles per hour
in a 40 miles per hour zone, and “had to slam the brakes” to avoid a herd of
deer that had jumped out. Id. The officer then continued to pursue Appellant,
who continued to flee, before losing sight of him. Id. Two days later,
Appellant’s ex-girlfriend reported that on the night of the incident, Appellant
called and asked her to pick him up. Appellant told her “he just out ran the
police by Tyler Hospital and [was] hiding in the woods.” Id. at 2. At this
time, Appellant had a suspended license for driving under the influence (DUI).
Id.
At trial docket CP-66-CR-0000223-2017 (Docket 223), the
Commonwealth alleged that on May 6, 2017, Pennsylvania State Trooper
Taylor Smith was on routine patrol on SR 92 in Nicholson Borough when he
observed a red pickup truck, driven by Appellant, with an inoperable taillight.
Trooper Smith followed Appellant a short distance. Appellant was following a
vehicle within 50 feet and activated “‘off road’ lighting” that was mounted on
the front of the truck. Affidavit of Probable Cause, Police Criminal Complaint,
Docket 223, 4/26/17, at 1. Trooper Smither activated his emergency lights
and siren, but Appellant failed to stop and instead
passed the vehicle it was following without signaling and
[traveled] at speeds of more than 80 MPH in a careless and
reckless manner. [Trooper Smith] pursued the truck[, which]
negotiate[d] turns in the opposing lane of travel at a high rate of
speed. . . .
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Id. Appellant “nearly crashed into the rear of [an] ambulance” that was
stopped, for an unrelated matter, with emergency lights activated. Id.
Appellant swerved into the oncoming lane without signaling, and nearly struck
an oncoming vehicle and the two ambulance personnel standing outside the
ambulance. These actions put the ambulance personnel at undue risk of
harm, serious injury, or death. Id.
On March 18, 2019, Appellant entered a guilty plea to fleeing at Docket
223 only. As a part of this plea agreement, the charges at Docket 222, as
well as unrelated docket “CR 103-17,” were nolle prossed, although Appellant
would pay restitution for those cases. Guilty Plea Agreement, Docket 223,
3/19/19. However, six months later, before sentencing, Appellant filed a
motion to withdraw his plea, asserting his innocence. The trial court granted
this motion on October 10, 2019.
Meanwhile, the reinstated charges at Docket 222 proceeded to a jury
trial on January 19, 2021. Appellant appeared, but before jury selection was
completed, he left the courthouse. Accordingly, that same day, the trial court
issued a bench warrant for Appellant’s arrest. Order, Docket 222, 1/19/21.
Appellant also failed to appear for a status conference at Docket 223 on
February 10th, and thus the trial court likewise issued a bench warrant in that
matter. Appellant was apprehended on February 24th, 36 days after he left
the courthouse. On May 11th, upon agreement of the parties, the trial court
scheduled a jury trial for the July 2021 term. Order, 5/12/11.
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However, Appellant subsequently agreed to an open plea deal, and on
May 25, 2021, proceeded to a combined plea and sentencing hearing on both
dockets.2 Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to one
count of fleeing at each docket, graded as felonies of the third degree. N.T.
at 5. While Appellant was on bail, he also incurred four new arrests — two in
Susquehanna County and two in Wyoming County.3 As part of his plea
agreement, Appellant would pay restitution of $695.07 for one of the cases,
“103 of 2018, which is to be nolle prossed[,]” and the charges at “magisterial
docket, R103445-6” would likewise be nolle prossed. Id.
Appellant was 63 years old at the time of the plea and sentencing
hearing. N.T. at 41. He had a prior record score of 5, and the offense gravity
score for each count of fleeing was 5. The standard range guideline for each
count was 12 to 18 months. The mitigated range guideline was 9 months and
the aggravated range 21 months. As stated above, each count was graded
as a felony of the third degree, and the statutory maximum sentence was 84
months, or 7 years. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3).
____________________________________________
2 The hearing was conducted by video. See N.T., 5/21/21, at 4.
3The given docket numbers for these matters were: (1) Susquehanna County
MDJ docket CR-181 of 2020; (2) Susquehanna County MDJ docket 227 of
2020; (3) Wyoming County criminal docket 103 of 2018; and (4) “OTN
R103445-6.” N.T. at 47-48.
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The Probation Department recommended an aggregate sentence of 24
months to 168 months, which was within the standard range. 4 Appellant
argued the trial court should adopt this recommendation. N.T. at 41. The
Commonwealth deferred to the court’s discretion. Id. at 46.
In his allocution, Appellant stated he left the trial on January 19, 2021,
because he was “scared and [his] anxiety got the best of” him. N.T. at 43.
With respect to the underlying charges of fleeing, Appellant stated he did not
“know why [he] didn’t pull over:” “I knew I was going to get caught. I should
have turned myself in. I . . . was confused . . . I made a bad decision[.]” Id.
at 43-44. Appellant’s counsel argued Appellant had health problems, including
a fall from a tree the previous summer, which resulted in “numerous cracked
ribs, some heart problems, some bleeding around his heart[,]” and three or
four hospitalizations. Id. at 37.
The trial court stated it reviewed “the extensive pre-sentence
investigation report” (PSI), as well as the affidavits of probable cause. N.T.
at 32-33. The court imposed sentences of 42 to 84 months’ imprisonment for
each fleeing count, to run consecutively, for an aggregate term of seven to 14
____________________________________________
4 This recommendation was set forth in a one-page, undated “Sentence
Recommendation Sheet,” prepared by the Probation Department. This sheet
was included in Appellant’s reproduced record as a part of the PSI; however,
it was not a part of the PSI that appears in the certified record. Nevertheless,
as the Commonwealth does not dispute the accuracy of this information, we
will consider it. See Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 697 n.5 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
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years. See id. at 46, 50. Each sentence was above the aggravated range
guideline, as well as at the statutory maximum.
The trial court acknowledged the sentences were outside the aggravated
guideline range, and provided six reasons for the sentences. First, Appellant’s
conduct posed “a severe threat” to the officers in pursuit, other motorists, and
the public. N.T. at 49. Second, Appellant was charged with four new crimes
while on bail: (1) possession of a firearm and hindering apprehension or
prosecution in Susquehanna County; (2) possession of drug paraphernalia,
also in Susquehanna County; (3) theft in Wyoming County; and (4) witness
tampering, also in Wyoming County. Id. at 47-48. The court acknowledged
Appellant “has only been charged and has not been convicted” of these
offenses, but the court considered it “highly unusual and the first time in [the
court’s] judicial career that a person has been charged with four separate
offenses in two different counties while on bail supervision.” Id. at 48. Next,
the court considered the above two factors — the commission of the
underlying offenses along with the four new criminal matters while on bail —
showed Appellant “is an extreme threat to himself and . . . society as a whole.”
Id. at 49.
The trial court’s fourth reason for sentencing above the aggravated
range guideline was Appellant’s “continual[ ] fail[ure] to take responsibility for
these matters.” N.T. at 48. The court acknowledged Appellant had a right to
seek withdrawal of his first plea, but nevertheless considered the “delay in
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reaching this matter to final conclusion.” Id. Fifth, the trial court considered
that Appellant left the courthouse, during his trial proceedings in January of
2019, “and became a fugitive from justice. [Appellant] was aware that he
was in violation of his bail conditions, [as] he was told by his attorney to turn
himself in[, but he] refused to do so, causing the US Marshal[ ] Service and
other law enforcement to arrest him[.]” Id. at 48-49. Finally, the trial court
considered Appellant’s “lengthy criminal record commencing in 1977[,] that
previously, all sentencing and/or probation has failed to address [his] criminal
propensities[,]” and that any sentence other “than a lengthy prison term
would [not] be appropriate[.]” Id. at 49.
Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions at each docket, which were
denied. He then filed timely notices of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statements of errors complained of on appeal.
II. Statement of Questions Involved
Appellant raises one issue for this Court’s review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing . . . Appellant
to manifestly excessive sentences, individually and in the
aggregate, and disproportionate to the circumstances by failing to
consider mitigating circumstances, relying upon reasons already
accounted for in the guidelines and motor vehicle statute and
disregarding Appellant’s age, serious health issues, acceptance of
responsibility, expression of remorse and the rehabilitative needs
of . . . Appellant, impact upon the community and the need for
protection of the public pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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III. Preservation of Discretionary Sentencing Claims
As Appellant presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, we note:
An appeal raising the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not
guaranteed as of right; rather, it is considered a petition for
permission to appeal. In order to reach the merits of a
discretionary aspects claim, we must engage in a four-part
analysis to determine:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720];
(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code.
* * *
The determination of what constitutes a substantial
question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A
substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing
judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a
specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.
See Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020) (some
citations omitted).
Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and timely post-sentence
motion. We observe, however, that he argues several mitigating factors for
the first time on appeal — (1) the fact that his parents and all of his siblings
are deceased, which has affected “his psychological makeup, . . . poor
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decisions and activity[;]” (2) his lifelong residence at the same address in
Susquehanna County; and (3) his long time self-employment, from which he
made “a respectable amount of money.”5 See Appellant’s Brief at 32-34.
Because these claims were not raised at the sentencing hearing or in
Appellant’s post-sentence motion, they are waived. See Mulkin, 228 A.3d at
916. See also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Appellant’s
argument, that the Commonwealth did not submit victim impact statements,
is similarly waived on the same basis. See Mulkin, 228 A.3d at 916;
Appellant’s Brief at 24.
However, Appellant’s remaining issues — discussed infra — were
properly preserved in his post-sentence motion. See Mulkin, 228 A.3d at
916. Furthermore, his brief includes a Rule 2119(f) concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Finally,
this Court has held that Appellant’s present claims — that the trial court relied
on impermissible factors and ignored mitigating evidence in imposing a
sentence above the aggravated range guidelines — raise a substantial
____________________________________________
5 Rather than stating the amount of his income, Appellant’s counsel twice
refers this Court to the PSI for that information. Appellant’s Brief at 12, 34.
The PSI, in turn, stated Appellant earned $30,000 weekly. Wyoming County
Pre-Sentence Investigation (undated), at 4 (unpaginated).
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question. See Mulkin, 228 A.3d at 916. Accordingly, we proceed to consider
his arguments.
IV. Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant advances multiple arguments that the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence.
Preliminarily, he points out the minimum sentences of 42 months were
“double the highest end of the aggravated range of the guidelines[,]”6 and the
maximum terms of seven years were “the maximum sentence[s] allowed at
law.” Appellant’s Brief at 19, 24. Appellant contends the Commonwealth did
not seek a sentence outside the standard range guideline. Id.
Appellant’s first claim is that the trial court failed to consider mitigating
factors, and merely made a “passing reference” to the PSI. Appellant’s Brief
at 29. He refers to: his age of 63; his attempt, though unsuccessful, to enroll
in the Wyoming/Sullivan County drug court;7 and his poor health, which
included anxiety, his “need to control his illicit drug use,” high blood pressure,
and serious injuries following a fall from a tree. Id. at 31-34. Appellant
maintains that, contrary to the court’s finding, he did accept responsibility for
his conduct; he reasons that “trial [was] scheduled for July 2021, [but he]
____________________________________________
6 As stated above, the aggravated range guideline was 21 months.
7 Appellant acknowledges he was a resident of Susquehanna County, which
was “an impediment” to admission into the Wyoming and Sullivan County drug
court. Appellant’s Brief at 33.
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instead chose to immediately plead guilty[.]” Id. at 35, 37. Appellant also
points out that the COVID-19 pandemic caused trial delays. Id. at 37-38.
Appellant’s next claim is that the trial court improperly considered
factors that had already informed the sentencing statutes and guidelines.
First, he contends the court improperly focused on his prior record because it
was already factored into his prior record score. Appellant’s Brief at 31. In
any event, he asserts, the trial court’s characterization of his prior history as
“lengthy” was inaccurate. Id. at 31. Instead, Appellant alleges, he merely
had “a sporadic past history, interspersed with long periods” of being crime-
free, and he did not have any “revolving door history[.]” Id. at 31, 41.
Appellant summarizes that he: (1) had two criminal charges in 1977 and two
more criminal charges 1980; (2) did not incur another criminal charge for 22
years; (3) had a DUI in 2004; and (4) nine years later, in 2017, committed
the instant two fleeing charges. Id. at 11-12.
Second, Appellant avers the trial court erred in considering that his
commission of the two underlying fleeing offenses placed others in danger,
because this element was already a part of the grading of the offense and
reflected in the offense gravity score. Appellant’s Brief at 39-40, citing 18
Pa.C.S. § 3733(a.2)(2)(iii) (fleeing is graded as a felony of the third degree if
offender endangers a law enforcement officer or member of general public due
to engaging in a high-speed chase).
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Third, Appellant alleges the court erred in considering his four new
charges. Appellant’s Brief at 36. He reasons that three of those matters “had
not even reached . . . a preliminary hearing” and none of the prosecutors
initially “sought or fully prosecuted revocation of . . . bail.” Id. at 36-37.
Appellant, however, concedes his bail was revoked when he absconded from
trial in January of 2021. Id. at 37. Furthermore, with respect to the charges
at docket 103-2018, which were nolle prossed, he nevertheless paid
restitution as a part of the instant plea deal. Id. Appellant also denies he
was a “fugitive” when he absconded from trial, as the trial court characterized
him. Id. at 38. In support, he asserts there was no “large manhunt” for him,
he did not have “to be physically taken down[,]” and he “was apprehended
within 36 days[.]” Id.
Appellant concludes this Court should vacate his judgment of sentence
pursuant to Sub-section 9781(c)(3) of the Sentencing Code, which mandates
a remand for resentencing if “the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.” Appellant’s Brief at
26, citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). We conclude no relief is due.
V. Standard of Review & Relevant Authority
We consider the relevant standard of review:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
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judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). “[W]hen imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad
discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a
particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances
before it.” Mulkin, 228 A.3d at 917.
This Court has also stated:
[W]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider
the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), that is, the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on
the victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant. . . .
Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide discretion in
sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the
appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a
sentence[.] The sentencing court, however, must also consider
the sentencing guidelines.
Clemat, 218 A.3d at 960 (citation omitted & paragraph break added).
When imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider
the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of
the defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior
criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for
rehabilitation.
However, where the sentencing judge had the benefit of a pre-
sentence investigation report . . . it will be presumed that he or
she was aware of the relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors.
Id. at 959-60 (citations omitted & paragraph break added).
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With respect to aggravated-range sentences and so-called “double
counting” factors, this Court has explained:
Generally, “[i]t is impermissible for a court to consider factors
already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole
reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated
or mitigated range.” However, “[t]rial courts are permitted
to use factors already included in the guidelines if they are
used to supplement other extraneous sentencing
information.”
When deciding whether a court improperly has based an
aggravated sentence on a factor that is already considered by the
sentencing guidelines, we have stated:
[t]he guidelines were implemented to create greater
consistency and rationality in sentencing. The guidelines
accomplish the above purposes by providing a norm for
comparison, i.e., the standard range of punishment, for
the panoply of crimes found in the crimes code and by
providing a scale of progressively greater punishment as
the gravity of the offense increases. . . . The provision
of a “norm” also strongly implies that deviation from the
norm should be correlated with facts about the crime that
also deviate from the norm for the offense, or facts
relating to the offender’s character or criminal history
that deviates from the norm and must be regarded as
not within the guidelines contemplation. Given this
predicate, simply indicating that an offense is a serious,
heinous or grave offense misplaces the proper focus. The
focus should not be upon the seriousness, heinousness
or egregiousness of the offense generally speaking, but,
rather, upon how the present case deviates from what
might be regarded as a “typical” or “normal” case of the
offense under consideration.
Moreover, “[a]n aggravated range sentence [is] justified to the
extent that the individual circumstances of [the defendant’s] case
are atypical of the crime for which [the defendant] was convicted,
such that a more severe punishment is appropriate.”
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Clemat, 218 A.3d at 960 (citations omitted & emphasis added). “It is well-
settled that where ‘the sentencing court proffers reasons indicating that its
decision to depart from the guidelines is not unreasonable, the sentence will
be upheld.’” Mulkin, 228 A.3d at 917.
Finally, “Section 9781(c) of the Sentencing Code directs this Court to
vacate a sentence and remand to the sentencing court if ‘the sentencing court
sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is
unreasonable.’” Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 567 (Pa. Super.
2019), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3).
VI. Analysis
First, we observe the trial court did not specifically address mitigating
factors. Nevertheless, the court stated both at the sentencing hearing and in
its opinion that it reviewed the “extensive” PSI. N.T. at 32; Trial Ct. Op.,
8/4/11, at 4. Accordingly, we may presume the court properly “weighed all
relevant information regarding the defendant’s character against any
mitigating factors.” See Mulkin, 228 A.3d at 917. Appellant’s argument,
that the court merely made a “passing reference” to the PSI, does not
undermine this presumption. See Appellant’s Brief at 29. In any event, at
the sentencing hearing, Appellant specifically argued the court should consider
his poor health, including heart problems and the injuries resulting from a fall
from a tree the prior summer. N.T. at 37, 40.
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Additionally, Appellant’s portrayal that he “chose to immediately plead
guilty” in May of 2021, following the scheduling of a second jury trial for July
of 2021, wholly ignores the fact he absconded from the first trial in January of
2021 and refused to turn himself in, against his attorney’s advice. See
Appellant’s Brief at 35. Elsewhere in his brief, Appellant minimizes the
significance of this evidence, by rationalizing there was no “large manhunt”
for him, he did not have “to be physically taken down[,]” and, ostensibly, he
was merely at large for 36 days. Appellant’s Brief at 38. However, the trial
court weighed the same evidence differently, and Appellant’s present
argument would require this Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor and
supplant the court’s findings with our own. This we may not do. Instead, we
defer to the trial court’s discretion in weighing the reasons for the delays in
this matter. See Clemat, 218 A.3d at 959.
Next, we find no abuse of discretion in the totality of the trial court’s
reasons for imposing sentence. As stated above, it is generally “impermissible
for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing
guidelines as the sole reason for increasing . . . a sentence to the aggravated
. . . range.” Clemat, 218 A.3d at 960 (emphasis added). A court may
consider “factors already included in the guidelines if they are used to
supplement other extraneous sentencing information.” Id. Here, we do not
review the court’s reasons for the sentence in isolation, but instead in context
with each other. Although the court considered the risk of danger caused by
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Appellant in the two underlying fleeing offenses, this factor was not the sole
reason for departing from the sentencing guidelines — and we note Appellant
does not claim it was. Instead, the trial court stated multiple, varied reasons
for the sentence, including Appellant’s absconding from the first jury trial and
his incurring four new charges in two different counties while on bail — which
the trial court noted was not only particularly unusual, but also the first the
court had encountered in its years on the bench. See N.T. at 50.
Furthermore, the trial court properly considered Appellant’s prior record.
We reiterate that Appellant committed the fleeing offenses while his license
was suspended due to a DUI conviction. His present attempt to portray his
criminal history, which is not in dispute, in a different light is again an appeal
to this Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor. While Appellant highlights
long periods of crime-free conduct, we defer to the trial court’s weighing of
his eight prior criminal cases, which included burglary, theft, manufacture of
controlled substances, and possession of firearms, and which spanned 43
years and four counties. See Wyoming County Pre-Sentence Investigation at
2. Again, the trial court considered this history along with, and in context of,
the fact Appellant absconded from the courthouse during trial proceedings
and incurred four new criminal cases while on bail on these charges.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court’s consideration of these factors
was so improper to warrant a remand for a new sentence. See Clemat, 218
A.3d at 959-60.
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Finally, we reiterate the trial court found prior prison and probation
terms have “failed to address [Appellant’s] criminal propensities” and “all
previous attempts of rehabilitation have failed.” N.T. at 49-50. Accordingly,
the court found a long prison term was necessary in light of his “lengthy
criminal record commencing in 1977[.]” Id. at 49. The court had wide
discretion in sentencing and properly considered all the relevant factors. See
Clemat, 218 A.3d at 960. Appellant has not established the court acted with
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will against him. See id. at 959. Thus, we
affirm the judgments of sentence.
VII. Conclusion
Having concluded no relief is due on Appellant’s sentencing challenge,
we affirm the judgments of sentence.
Judgments of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/8/2022
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