Jackson, C. v. Williams, R.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CRYSTAL JACKSON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RICHARD WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 56 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Dated December 13, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s):
1623 of 2021
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: AUGUST 2, 2022
Appellant Richard Williams appeals from the order granting Appellee
Crystal Jackson’s petition for a final protection from abuse order under the
Protection From Abuse (PFA) Act.1 Appellant argues that the trial court erred
in allowing Appellee to introduce electronic communications into evidence that
had not been properly authenticated. We affirm.
By way of background, Appellant and Appellee were in a relationship for
sixteen years2 and have three children together. N.T., 12/13/21, at 5-6.
Appellant and Appellee separated in 2019 and Appellant moved out of the
home they shared. Id. at 6.
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1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.
2 Appellant and Appellee are not married. N.T. at 6.
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Appellee filed a PFA petition on her behalf that included the parties’ three
minor children on September 8, 2021. That same day, the trial court issued
a temporary PFA order. On December 13, 2021, the trial court held a final
PFA hearing, at which both parties were represented by counsel.
At the PFA hearing, Appellee testified about an incident that occurred in
February of 2021 when Appellant came to Appellee’s house. Id. at 6-7. After
Appellee let Appellant into her home, Appellant began yelling and refused to
leave, even after Appellee told him to go. Id. at 7. Appellant threatened to
harm himself, got a steak knife from the kitchen, and held it against his neck.
Id. at 7-8. One of the parties’ children came downstairs. Id. at 8. Appellee
told their son to call 911, and Appellant chased their son up the stairs while
still holding the knife. Id. Appellee followed, and after a struggle, Appellant
went back downstairs. Appellee and her son tried to barricade themselves in
a bedroom with the other children. Id. at 9.
Appellant returned upstairs and pushed the bedroom door open. Id. at
10. Appellant demanded that Appellee and the children come into another
room and talk with him, or he would kill himself. Id. Appellee and the children
complied. Id. While his children watched, Appellant yelled and cut his arms
with the knife. Id. at 10-11. Appellee cried and screamed for Appellant to
stop. Id. at 11. Appellee was concerned for her safety and that of her
children. Id.
A neighbor entered the house and yelled from downstairs asking what
was happening. Id. at 11-12. Appellant told Appellee to tell the neighbor to
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leave. Id. at 11. Appellee did not do so because she was scared. Id. at 11-
12. Appellant ran downstairs and started fighting with the neighbor. Id. at
12. Appellee again barricaded herself in a room with the children and called
911. Id. Appellee came out of the room after the police arrived. Id. at 13.
Appellee saw her neighbor in an ambulance with a stab wound in his arm. Id.
Appellee did not see Appellant stab the neighbor. Id. at 27. Appellant was
eventually arrested after this incident. Id. at 21.
Appellee testified that after the incident in the house, Appellant began
attempting to contact her via social media. Id. at 13-14. Appellee explained
that although she blocked Appellant from contacting her, Appellant used other
people’s phones to send her messages. Id. at 14-15. Appellee also stated
that she believed Appellant created a new Facebook account. Id. At the
hearing, Appellee presented a copy of Facebook posts from an account with
the name “Richie Williams” as Exhibit 1. Id. at 15; see also Appellee’s Ex.
1. Appellee stated that she believed that Appellant authored those posts
because they were made “right after” the incident at her home. N.T. at 15.
The posts included statements such as “God please please im begging u let
me get my hands on a gun soon” and “whore always a whore.” Appellee’s Ex.
1 (verbatim).
Appellee also presented a copy of another Facebook post from the Richie
Williams account as Exhibit 2. N.T. at 17. That post stated: “When i cave
your skull in and your damaged for life i tried to tell u two.” Appellee’s Ex. 2
(verbatim). Appellee testified that the tone of the posts in these exhibits was
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consistent with other posts that she saw from the Richie Williams account.
N.T. at 17-18. Although Appellee acknowledged that none of these posts were
directed at a specific person, she believed that they were directed to her. Id.
at 16.
Appellee next submitted a series of text messages and photos that she
received on August 6, 2021, from a contact saved in her phone as “Rwill.” Id.
at 18-19; see also Appellee’s Ex. 3. In the text messages, the sender accused
Appellee of wanting to ruin the sender’s life and of being “ignorant and cruel
and backstabbing” towards the sender. Appellee’s Ex. 3. The photographs
depict a bloodied male forearm that was cut multiple times. N.T. at 18-20;
Appellee’s Ex. 3, 4, and 5. One photo depicts a man’s face holding a cell
phone. Appellee’s Ex. 3. Immediately following her receipt of these photos,
she received text messages stating: “Here’s goes another[,]” Appellee’s Ex.
4 (verbatim), and “F*** it tried five Times dude I’m doing it twice for every
time you don’t answer the f****** phone[,]” “That ten more[,]” and “Answer
the damn phone Jesus Chris[.]” Appellee’s Ex. 5 (verbatim).3 Appellee stated
that these messages made her feel scared. N.T. at 20.
Appellee testified that she was familiar with the telephone number
sending the text messages and that it may have been the number for a phone
that she had given to Appellant in the past. Id. at 24-25. However, Appellee
stated that Appellant had “a couple” of different phones. Id. at 25. She also
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3 Appellee’s Exhibit 5 is labeled as “Π6”, i.e., Appellee’s Exhibit 6, but was
introduced at the hearing as Appellee’s Exhibit 5. N.T. at 19.
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identified Appellant’s face in some of the pictures and recognized the bloody
arm from the photos as Appellant’s arm. Id. at 24, 29-30. Further, Appellee
described previous incidents involving Appellant when he yelled at her, shoved
her, and pulled her down the stairs while she was holding one of their children.
Id. at 21-22.
Appellee moved to admit these exhibits, but Appellant objected to their
admission. Id. at 23. Appellant argued that Appellee did not see the
messages being sent, and that, therefore, Appellee had not established an
adequate foundation to prove that Appellant was the author of the messages.
Id. at 27. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections and admitted all of
Appellee’s exhibits into evidence. Id. at 28-30. Appellant did not testify and
did not call any witnesses.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Appellee to be
credible and referred to Appellee’s Exhibit 3 in its findings of facts. Id. at 30-
31. The trial court granted the final PFA order which prohibited Appellant from
contacting Appellee for three years and awarded Appellee primary physical
custody of the parties’ three minor children. Final PFA Order, 12/13/21, at 3-
5 (unpaginated).
On January 7, 2021, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant
subsequently filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial
court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Appellant’s claim.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
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Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, and committed
an abuse of discretion, in admitting and considering five (5)
exhibits containing text messages, purportedly sent by Appellant,
when there was not sufficient evidence, either by sufficient direct
or circumstantial evidence, that the messages were sent by
Appellant?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Appellee’s exhibits because Appellee only offered circumstantial evidence to
establish that Appellant was the author of those messages. Id. at 7-9.
Appellant asserts that “‘mere confirmation that the number or address [of the
sender] belonged to a particular person[]’” is insufficient to authenticate
electronic communications. Id. at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Koch, 39
A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Appellant also contends that while
circumstantial evidence can sometimes be used to authenticate electronic
communications, the evidence in the instant case was “so unreliable and
questionable” that the trial court erred in admitting Appellee’s exhibits over
Appellant’s objection. Id. at 9.
“Our standard of review for PFA orders is well settled. In the context of
a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for an error of law or
abuse of discretion.” Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citation omitted). Further, “[t]his Court defers to the credibility
determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared before it.” K.B.
v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
This Court has explained:
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The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the
admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial
court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed
an error of law[.] A trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the
relevancy of evidence and its ruling will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion.
K.T. v. L.S., 118 A.3d 1136, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “An
evidentiary ruling which did not affect the verdict will not provide a basis for
disturbing the [fact-finder]’s judgment.” Renninger v. A & R Mach. Shop,
163 A.3d 988, 999 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Further, this Court has stated that “[t]o constitute reversible error, an
evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or unduly
prejudicial to the complaining party.” K.B., 208 A.3d at 130 (citation omitted
and formatting altered).
With respect to the authentication of evidence, Rule of Evidence 901
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.
(b) Examples. The following are examples only—not a complete
list—of evidence that satisfies the requirement:
* * *
(11) Digital Evidence. To connect digital evidence with a
person or entity:
(A) direct evidence such as testimony of a person with
personal knowledge; or
(B) circumstantial evidence such as:
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(i) identifying content; or
(ii) proof of ownership, possession, control, or access to
a device or account at the relevant time when
corroborated by circumstances indicating authorship.
Pa.R.E. 901(a), (b)(11).
Further, the Comment to Rule 901 explains:
“Digital evidence,” as used in this rule, is intended to include a
communication, statement, or image existing in an electronic
medium. This includes emails, text messages, social media
postings, and images. The rule illustrates the manner in which
digital evidence may be attributed to the author.
The proponent of digital evidence is not required to prove that no
one else could be the author. Rather, the proponent must produce
sufficient evidence to support a finding that a particular person or
entity was the author.
* * *
Circumstantial evidence of identifying content under Pa.R.E.
901(b)(11)(B)(i) may include self-identification or other
distinctive characteristics, including a display of knowledge only
possessed by the author. Circumstantial evidence of content may
be sufficient to connect the digital evidence to its author.
Circumstantial evidence of ownership, possession, control, or
access to a device or account alone is insufficient for
authentication of authorship of digital evidence under Pa.R.E.
901(b)(11)(B)(ii). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181
A.3d 1154, 1163 (Pa. Super. 2018) (social media account bearing
defendant’s name, hometown, and high school was insufficient to
authenticate the online and mobile device chat messages as
having been authored by defendant). However, this evidence is
probative in combination with other evidence of the author’s
identity.
Pa.R.E. 901, Cmt (some citations omitted).
In Mangel, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to
introduce Facebook posts and messages allegedly authored by the defendant
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in an aggravated assault case. Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1155-57. In support of
its motion, the Commonwealth presented testimony from an officer who
stated that the Facebook account listed the defendant’s name, hometown, and
school. Id. at 1156-57. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the officer’s
testimony was insufficient to corroborate the Commonwealth’s claim that the
defendant was the author of the Facebook communications in question. Id.
at 1157.
On appeal, this Court affirmed. In reaching that conclusion, the Mangel
Court explained:
[T]he Commonwealth presented no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, tending to substantiate that [the defendant]
created the Facebook account in question, authored the chat
messages, or posted the photograph of bloody hands. The mere
fact that the Facebook account in question bore [the defendant’s]
name, hometown and high school was insufficient to authenticate
the online and mobile device chat messages as having been
authored by [the defendant]. Moreover, there were no contextual
clues in the chat messages that identified [the defendant] as the
sender of the messages.
Id. at 1164.
In Commonwealth v. Murray, 174 A.3d 1147 (Pa. Super. 2017), the
defendant was arrested after he admitted to possessing a firearm during an
altercation with his housemate, which constituted a violation of his parole.
Murray, 174 A.3d at 1151 (citation omitted). After the defendant was taken
into custody, the parole agent reviewed the defendant’s phone and found text
messages indicating where the defendant had hidden the gun. Id. The
probation officer then searched the defendant’s residence and located the gun
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in the location described in the text messages. Id. After the defendant was
charged with firearms possession by a prohibited person, the Commonwealth
sought to introduce the defendant’s text messages into evidence. The trial
court concluded that “the text messages in question were properly
authenticated based on the contextual clues in the messages and the fact that
[the parole officer] retrieved the phone from [the defendant’s] person.” Id.
at 1157. On appeal, this Court affirmed. Id.
In the instant case, the trial court granted Appellee’s request to
introduce text messages and Facebook posts that were allegedly written by
Appellant. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:
Exhibit 1 is a copy of a Facebook post that bears the name of
“Richie Williams,” with a profile photo of Appellant. It states: “God
please please im begging u let me get my hands on a gun soon.”
[Appellee’s] Ex. 1 [(verbatim)]. [Appellee] testified that the post
was made “right after the incident at the house.” The post was
also one of a string of dozens of posts bearing Appellant’s name
and picture.
Exhibit 2 is a copy of a Facebook post that states: “When I cave
your skull in and your damaged for life I tried to tell u two.”
[Appellee’s Ex. 2 (verbatim)]. [Appellee] testified that these
messages were typical in tone for the majority of posts she saw.
This too was a post with the Appellant’s name and picture.
Exhibits 3 through [5] are copies of text messages and
photographs received by [Appellee] on August 6 and captured on
her phone under the contact “Rwill.” The photographs show a
progression of a bloodied male forearm that has been sliced open
an increasing number of times. One message interrupts the
photographs and states: “Here’s goes another.” [Appellee’s Ex. 5
(verbatim)]. Another states: “F*** it tried five Times dude I’m
doing it twice for every time you don't answer the f******
phone.” [Appellee’s Ex. 5 (verbatim)].
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[Appellee] testified that she was familiar with the telephone
number sending the text messages. She also identified the
Appellant’s forearm from the photos and testified that such
behavior was typical for the Appellant when he attempted to get
her to talk to him. [Appellee’s] testimony as to Appellant’s use of
a knife to harm himself and to threaten others demonstrates this
behavior was a key characteristic of the events of February 2021.
This court reviewed each exhibit individually with both parties’
counsel, and admitted all five into evidence, noting that
appropriate weight would be assigned to them.
Ultimately, this court found [Appellee’s] testimony to be credible
and, in announcing its decision, specifically referenced only Exhibit
3 and noted that it had been properly authenticated. The credible
testimony and single exhibit alone were sufficient to reach a
decision to grant the final PFA. However, in considering the
authenticity of the other exhibits, this court did not rely solely
upon evidence of Appellant’s “ownership, possession, control, or
access to a device or account.” Instead, for each exhibit, either
[Appellant’s] photo and name were displayed, his arm was
positively identified, and/or the content of the posts and texts was
related to the interactions and experiences of [Appellee] and
Appellant in such a way as supported a finding that he was the
author.
Trial Ct. Op., 2/18/22, at 4-5 (some citations omitted and formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in allowing Appellee to introduce the text messages and
photographs as evidence at trial. See K.T., 118 A.3d at 1165. As discussed,
Appellee testified that Appellant cut himself in Appellee’s presence, she
recognized the sender’s phone number as one that belonged to Appellant, and
she identified Appellant’s face and his bloody arm in the pictures. Further, the
trial court found Appellee’s testimony credible. See K.B., 208 A.3d at 128
(stating that this court “defers to the credibility determinations of the trial
court”). Therefore, we agree with the trial court that Appellee presented
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sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that Appellant was the author
of those messages. See Pa.R.E. 901(a), (b)(11); Murray, 174 A.3d at 1157.
Additionally, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the Facebook posts contained in Appellee’s Exhibits 1 and 2. See
K.T., 118 A.3d at 1165. Appellee testified that after she blocked Appellant
from contacting her, including on Facebook, she saw Facebook posts from the
“Richie Williams” account, which she believed was a new account that
Appellant created. See N.T. at 14-15. Unlike the Facebook posts at issue in
Mangel, which lacked any date stamps to link them to the date of the assault,
Appellee described these posts as having been made shortly after the incident
with Appellant in her home. See id. at 15; cf. Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1163.
Further, Appellee testified that the tone of the posts, which contained threats
of violence, was similar to the tone of other messages from Appellant. See
N.T. at 17-18. In Mangel, the Commonwealth attempted to authenticate the
Facebook posts that the defendant allegedly wrote with the testimony of police
officers who were not witnesses to the incident described in those posts. Here,
Appellee was in a sixteen-year relationship with Appellant, and she witnessed
Appellant’s attempted assault of their son and his violent acts of self-harm in
front of their children. Cf. Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1156-57. On this record, we
conclude that Appellee presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to
establish that Appellant was the author of those Facebook messages, and that
the trial court did not err in admitting them. See Murray, 174 A.3d at 1157;
Pa.R.E. 901(b)(11)(A)(ii) (providing that digital evidence may be
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authenticated by circumstantial evidence that a person had control or access
to an account at the relevant time, corroborated by circumstances indicating
authorship).
Further, the trial court credited Appellee’s testimony regarding her
violent encounter with Appellant in February of 2021, as well as previous
incidents of abuse. See N.T. at 7-13, 21-22. The trial court also relied on
Exhibit 3, which depicted threatening messages that Appellant sent to
Appellee’s phone and several pictures of Appellant’s bloody arm. See
Appellee’s Exhibit 3. Accordingly, on this record, the evidence of abuse was
overwhelming, and no relief is due to Appellant.
For these reasons, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Appellee, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the PFA
order. See K.B., 208 A.3d at 128 (explaining that “the court’s objective is to
determine whether the victim is in reasonable fear of bodily injury”).
Accordingly, we affirm. See K.B., 208 A.3d at 130; Boykai, 83 A.3d at 1045.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/2/2022
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