Long, M. v. Long, C.

J-A10020-22
2022 PA Super 129MONICA L. LONG : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTOPHER A. LONG :
:
Appellant : No. 538 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered April 1, 2021,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County,
Civil Division at No(s): 2018 CV 528.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 02, 2022
Appellant Christopher Long (Husband) appeals the order denying his
petition to modify the $1,800 monthly support obligation owed to Appellee
Monica Long (Wife), per their Marriage Settlement Agreement. The
Agreement treated the obligation as child support, but provided that if
Husband requested a modification, the difference between any downward
modification and the $1,800 payment would be converted to alimony. The
issue is whether Wife is entitled to alimony after she remarried. The Columbia
County Court of Common Pleas denied Husband’s modification petition and
concluded that the payments should not be treated as alimony at all, but as
“equitable reimbursement” payments. After careful review, we affirm in part
and reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.
J-A10020-22
The parties entered into a Marriage Settlement Agreement on June 2,
2018, and the trial court issued the divorce decree two months later.1 When
the parties entered into the Agreement, both of their children were minors
(born in 2000 and in 2006). The Marriage Settlement Agreement reflects the
parties’ effort to preserve the marital home for Wife, so that the children could
reside there until both graduated high school.
Husband agreed to transfer his interest in the martial residence to Wife.
See Marriage Settlement Agreement, 6/2/18 at ¶ 27. In exchange, Wife
agreed to refinance the residence and remove Husband’s name from the
mortgage; but the parties stipulated that if Wife could not refinance, or
otherwise sold the house before the youngest child graduated high school,
then the parties would split the proceeds of the sale. See id.To ensure Wife could afford to stay in the marital residence until both
children graduated, the Agreement provided that Husband would pay support
as follows:
SUPPORT
28. Except as provided below, the parties agree that neither
party shall be entitled to any spousal support, alimony
pendente lite or alimony as a result of this marriage.
CHILD SUPPORT:
____________________________________________
1 The Marriage Settlement Agreement indicates that Husband was
unrepresented by counsel when he entered into the Agreement but that the
legal effect of the Agreement was explained to him by Wife’s counsel. See
Marriage Settlement Agreement, 6/2/18 at ¶ 6.
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I. “Husband” agrees to pay child support for the
minor children in the amount of Eighteen
Hundred Dollars ($1,800.00) per month. It
is the parties[’] intention to maintain a
consistent payment throughout the
period until the last child graduates
from high school in June of 2024.
Therefore, if “Husband” requests a
modification of the child support during this
period of time, then the difference between
the child support and the $1,800.00 figure
shall be determined to be alimony. In either
case, the child support and alimony shall
cease after June of 2024.
Id. at ¶ 28 (emphasis added).
Wife refinanced the mortgage, and the parties operated under the
Agreement without issue. Husband continued paying the full amount of
support ($1,800) even after the parties’ older child reached the age of
majority in July 2018 and was removed from the Pennsylvania Automated
Child Support Enforcement System (PACSES).
The two events triggering the instant litigation occurred in the Fall of
2020. First, in September 2020, Husband obtained shared physical custody
of the parties’ remaining minor child; typically, a shared custody arrangement
reduces the amount of an obligor’s child support. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4
(Support Guidelines. Calculation of Support Obligation, Formula). Second,
Wife remarried, although it is unclear when.
In October 2020, Husband sought a child support modification before a
support officer, but the support officer dismissed the action without prejudice,
concluding that Husband first needed to file a motion with the trial court to
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modify the alimony provision. See Order of Court, 11/16/21. On January 15,
2021, Husband filed a “Petition to Modify and Interpret Marriage Settlement
Agreement to Allow Modification of Child Support.” The court set the matter
for a predisposition conference, which was held in February 2021.
Husband’s argument was threefold: 1) He was entitled to request a child
support modification; 2) Wife was barred from receiving alimony due to her
remarriage; and 3) because Wife was not entitled to alimony, his child support
obligation should be modified downward. Wife argued that her remarriage
was not a bar to alimony, relying on Zullo v. Zullo, 613 A.2d 544 (Pa. 1992)
(holding that the wife’s remarriage did not terminate the husband’s monthly
payments, because the payments should be treated as equitable
reimbursement rather than alimony). The trial court ultimately denied
Husband’s petition, and Husband timely-filed this appeal.2
Husband presents the following two issues for our review:
1. Did the lower court misapply the precedent of
Zullo v. Zullo, 613 A.2d 544 (Pa. 1992), as the
Marriage Settlement Agreement did not explicitly
state that the alimony was intended for the
maintenance of the Children’s home?
____________________________________________
2 The court initially denied Husband’s petition on March 10, 2021. Husband
filed motion for reconsideration, which the court granted on March 26, 2021.
The court set the matter for a hearing on April 1, 2021. After reconsidering
the parties’ positions and addressing whether additional testimony was
necessary, the court concluded that its original decision was correct. The court
then issued an order, also dated April 1, 2021, which “affirmed” its prior March
10, 2021 order. Because the trial court expressly granted reconsideration,
Husband’s appeal from the April 1, 2021 order is timely. See Pa.R.A.P.
1701(b)(3).
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2. Did the lower court err in failing to take into
consideration that the minor children now split
their time evenly between the homes of their
parents, which is a significant change in
circumstances?
Husband’s Brief at 4.
We address these issues contemporaneously. We begin our discussion
by recognizing that the principles governing contractual agreements are
different from those governing court-ordered awards. Because the instant
support obligation arose from an agreement, rather than a court-ordered
award, this matter is governed by contract law. See Little v. Little, 657 A.2d
12, 15 (Pa. Super. 1995); see also Rosiecki v. Rosiecki, 231 A.3d 928,
932-33 (Pa. Super. 2020). It is well-settled that under contract law, the court
must ascertain the intent of the parties when interpreting an agreement:
In cases of a written contract, the intent of the parties is the
writing itself. If left undefined, the words of a contract are
to be given their ordinary meaning. When the terms of a
contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the
parties is to be ascertained from the document itself. When,
however, an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is admissible
to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, irrespective of
whether the ambiguity is patent, created by the language of
the instrument, or latent, created by extrinsic or collateral
circumstances. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably
susceptible of different constructions and capable of being
understood in more than one sense.
Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).
In determining whether the trial court properly applied contract
principles, the reviewing Court must decide whether the trial court committed
an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Lewis, 234 A.3d 706, 711
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(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). We have explained the dichotomy as
follows:
When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial
court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of
discretion, we will not usurp the trial court's fact-finding
function. On appeal from an order interpreting a marital
settlement agreement, we must decide whether the trial
court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this
Court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation. Our
standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to
the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as
the appellate court may review the entire record in making
its decision. However, we are bound by the trial court's
credibility determinations.
Rosiecki, 231 A.3d at 933 (citation omitted).
Moreover, we are not limited by a trial court’s rationale, as we may
affirm its decision on any basis. Id.
At the outset, we observe that child support obligations are modifiable
by the court upon a showing of a changed circumstance, even when that
obligation arose from a marriage settlement agreement. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
3105(b); see also Love v. Love, 33 A.3d 1268, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citing Nicholson v. Combs, 703 A.2d 407 (Pa. 1997)).
In this matter, the trial court operated under the mistaken view that
unlike a court-ordered child support award, an agreement for child support
could not be modified downward, because parties may not bargain away the
child’s right to support. See, e.g., Knorr v. Knorr, 588 A.2d 503, 505 (Pa.
1991). Put another way, the trial court seemingly believed that, if a contract
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provides for child support above and beyond what a parent would owe under
the Statutory Guidelines,3 then the parent may not seek a downward
modification. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/21 (T.C.O.) at 5. This is not
entirely accurate.4
However, the principal reason why the trial court denied Husband’s
modification request, was because the request was, in the court’s view,
“academic.” Id. The court explained that, under Paragraph 28, whatever
downward child support modification Husband obtained would be irrelevant,
because alimony would then make up the difference.
The trial court’s rationale overlooks Wife’s remarriage and any pre-2019
tax consequences. Under the Divorce Code, an alimony obligation terminates
upon the payee’s remarriage or cohabitation. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(e),
3706. Relying on the Code, Husband reasoned that without alimony, he was
entitled to an actual reduction of his monthly support obligation.
____________________________________________
3See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322 (Statutory guideline); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
3 (“Support Guidelines. Basic Child Support Schedule.”).
4 In Nicholson v. Combs, our Supreme Court explained that courts must be
able to reduce the amount if the payor establishes an inability to pay, because
the failure to comply with a child support order can lead to incarceration.
Nicholson, 703 A.2d at 416-17. When there is a separate support order
based on a support agreement, the support order may be increased in the
best interests of the children, or modified downward upon a showing of
changed circumstances, which demonstrate the inability to pay. “The trial
court's power to modify the support order downward is not affected by the
existence of the agreement upon which the support order is based. The court
is modifying its own order, and not the parties' agreement.” Id. at 417.
“However, the support agreement remains a viable contract not subject to
downward modification, and the payee may seek relief in law or in equity.”
Id.
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Regarding Wife’s eligibility to receive alimony, despite her remarriage,
the trial court agreed with Wife’s reliance on Zullo, supra. See T.C.O. at 3-
4. The court concluded that Wife’s remarriage did not bar her from receiving
the payments, because payments were “an amalgam of child support and
equitable alimony designated for the benefit of the child.” Id. at 6 (emphasis
added).
On appeal, Husband argues that the trial court’s reliance on Zullo was
misplaced. In Zullo, the trial court adopted the master’s recommended
approach to eliminating the marital debt. Specifically, the master
recommended that husband render to the wife monthly payments “to assist
her in extinguishing the marital debt.” Zullo, 613 A.2d at 545. While the
husband was making these payments, the wife remarried. The husband then
sought to terminate his monthly alimony payments under the Divorce Code,
which mandated that alimony terminates upon the recipient’s remarriage.5
The trial court granted his request. This Court reversed the trial court, and
our Supreme Court affirmed our decision.
The High Court explained that the traditional purpose of alimony was to
provide one spouse with “sufficient income to obtain the necessities of life.”
Id. (citation omitted). However, the Court explained that “the wife was not
receiving alimony in the traditional sense, but as a way to compensate her for
the lack of property needed to satisfy joint obligations.” Id. at 546. The wife
____________________________________________
5 The husband in Zullo relied on the former Section 501(e), which is the
functional equivalent of the current Section 3701.
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was not in need of income to “obtain the necessities of life,” because she had
sufficient income to support herself. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that
although the monthly payments were designated as “alimony,” the payments
were not intended to be alimony; therefore, the designation was not binding.
Id. at 545.
A review of Supreme Court precedent illustrates how monthly payments,
issued by a court to facilitate its equitable distribution scheme, have been
called various names: “equitable reimbursements” or “reimbursement
alimony,” or “monthly payments in lieu of property settlement;” but despite
their nomenclature, these monthly payments were not treated as alimony,
because they were not designed to support a former spouse. See id. at 546
(citing Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552, 557 (Pa. 1992) (holding that the
husband’s monthly payments to the wife were not alimony, but “equitable
reimbursement” for contributions the wife made while husband sought his
chiropractic degree); see also Wagoner v. Wagoner, 648 A.2d 299, 301-
02 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the monthly payments were not alimony, but a
substitute for granting the payee-wife a share of the payor-husband’s
pension)).
In the case at bar, the trial court likened Husband’s payments to those
in Zullo, Bold, or Wagoner – nominally alimony, but really something else
entirely.
The primary purpose of alimony in this case was not to
provide [Wife] with sufficient income to obtain the
necessities of life. Rather, the purpose was to maintain the
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childhood home for the children until the youngest child
finished high school. That purpose still exists. The $1,800
per month payment is equitable reimbursement.
T.C.O. at 4.
Husband argues Zullo is inapplicable, because it arose from an award,
as opposed to a contract. We agree with Husband’s position. To be clear, the
learned trial court understood that it was bound by the law of contracts; it just
found Zullo to be factually analogous to the instant case. However, Zullo
and its progeny are too attenuated from the law of contracts to be of much
use here.
In Zullo, the courts were free to construe the monthly payments as
something other than alimony, because the payments were a product of a
court-ordered equitable distribution award. Here, by contrast, the trial court
could only look to the terms of the Marriage Settlement Agreement – terms
created by the parties, which unambiguously referred to the payments as
alimony. Thus, the parties’ alimony demands to be treated as alimony – not
as equitable reimbursement or anything else. Husband’s first appellate issue
has merit, but only insofar as Zullo was inapposite.
As we may affirm on any valid basis, we consider de novo whether the
parties’ Marriage Settlement Agreement prohibited Wife from receiving
alimony in light of her remarriage.
Husband argues that because the alimony agreement constitutes an
order of court under the Divorce Code, the Divorce Code’s bar to alimony
applies. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701, 3706.
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Section 3701 provides in relevant part:
(f) Status of agreement to pay alimony.—Whenever the
court approves an agreement for the payment of alimony
voluntarily entered into between the parties, the
agreement shall constitute the order of the court and
may be enforced as provided in Section 3703 (relating to
enforcement of arreages).
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(f) (emphasis added).
Husband reasons further, that because an agreement shall constitute an
order for alimony, Section 3701(e) also governs. Section 3701(e) provides:
(e) Modification and termination.--An order entered
pursuant to this section is subject to further order of the
court upon changed circumstances of either party of a
substantial and continuing nature whereupon the order may
be modified, suspended, terminated or reinstituted or a new
order made. Any further order shall apply only to payments
accruing subsequent to the petition for the requested
relief. Remarriage of the party receiving alimony shall
terminate the award of alimony.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(e) (emphasis added).
Finally, to drive the point home, Husband also relies on Section 3706:
No petitioner is entitled to receive an award of alimony
where the petitioner, subsequent to the divorce pursuant to
which alimony is being sought, has entered into
cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex who is
not a member of the family of the petitioner within the
degrees of consanguinity.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3706
Husband’s reliance is misplaced, because his argument fails to
appreciate the interplay between alimony awards and alimony agreements.
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Section 3701(f) provides that an alimony agreement may be treated as
a court order, but only for enforcement purposes. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(f);
see also Woodings v. Woodings, 601 A.2d 854, 859 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“It
is to be noted that the treatment of orders approving agreements is treated
separately from orders directly entered by the court and the jurisdiction of the
court is limited to enforcement only unless the agreement provides
otherwise.”) (emphasis original).
Put another way, Section 3701(f) unlocks the statutory remedies listed
in Section 3703 (“Enforcement of arrearages”) whenever a payor is in arrears,
regardless of whether the payments were born of a marriage settlement
contract or a court award. See also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(a) (“Effect of
agreement between parties”) (“A party to an agreement…may utilize a remedy
or sanction set forth in this part to enforce the agreement to the same extent
as though the agreement had been an order of the court except as provided
to the contrary in the agreement.”) (emphasis added).
Yet, these provisions do not grant courts carte blanche to treat alimony
agreements as if they were alimony awards. For instance, Section 3105(c)
provides that an alimony agreement shall not be subject to modification (in
the absence of a specific contract provision to the contrary. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3105(c). Likewise, Section 3701(e) (“Remarriage of the party receiving
alimony shall terminate the award of alimony”) and Section 3706 (“Bar to
alimony”) only apply to awards, in the absence of a contrary provision in the
agreement. See Woodings 601 A.2d at 859.
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Parties to an alimony agreement often incorporate statutory language
to govern their rights and responsibilities. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, -- A.3d
--, 2019 WL 2602186 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision)
(observing that the parties’ alimony agreement provided, in part: “This
alimony shall be modifiable in accordance with the provisions of 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3701, et. seq.”). Generally speaking, however, courts may not turn to the
statutory law of alimony to interpret an agreement unless they are invited to
do so. See Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1165 (Pa. 2004) (infra).
Instantly, the parties’ Marriage Settlement Agreement is entirely silent
on the issue of alimony modification and termination, except to say that
alimony will terminate after June 2024. The parties could have inserted
language into their Agreement barring alimony upon Wife’s remarriage, but
they did not to do so. Thus, the question becomes, what effect does Wife’s
remarriage have upon her ability to receive alimony, when the Agreement is
silent on that issue; and does this silence render the Agreement ambiguous.
We find Woodings v. Woodings, 601 A.2d 854, 855 (Pa. Super. 1992)
to be on point. There, the husband agreed to pay alimony for approximately
three and a half years. The agreement provided that “the payments shall be
non-modifiable and shall terminate on the death of the wife.” Woodings, 601
A.2d at 855. Meanwhile, the wife began cohabitating with a person of the
opposite sex, which would typically bar alimony under the Divorce Code. Id.
at n.1 (noting that former Section 507 (“Bar to Alimony”) is substantially the
same as the current Section 3706 (“Bar to Alimony”)). The husband sought
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to terminate his alimony obligation. The trial court concluded that if the
parties had intended for the payments to cease upon cohabitation, they could
have so provided. Id. at 857. On appeal, we affirmed.
We explained that the wife’s “right to payments is not based on an award
but is instead based on the signature of [the] husband to a contract.” Id. The
statutory bar to alimony did not come into play.
The intent of the inclusion of alimony agreements only in
the enforcement process of the Divorce Code did not extend
application of other Code provisions relating to alimony to
agreements. Alimony awards are governed by statute and
provisions such as the bars relating to cohabitation and
termination upon remarriage take effect by operation of law
because the award is governed by the statute.
[…]
When an agreement is entered for a specific amount for a
stated period of time, without conditions for modifications
or termination, it cannot be presumed that the parties
intended the statutory bar or termination sections to apply.
[…]
To incorporate extraneous statutory provisions to modify or
terminate the agreement when not provided in the
agreement may seriously impair the rights of the
contracting parties.
Id. at 859 (citations omitted) (emphasis original).
Here, while the parties’ Agreement may be treated as an order under
the Divorce Code for enforcement purposes, other aspects of the Divorce Code
– i.e., the bar to alimony – do not extend to the Agreement without a provision
saying so. Id. Moreover, when – as here – an agreement is entered for a
specific amount, for a stated period of time, without conditions for modification
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or termination, we may not presume that the parties intended to include the
statutory bar to apply. Woodings, 601 A.2d at 859.
For these reasons, we do not find that the Agreement’s silence on the
bar to alimony renders the Agreement to be ambiguous. See id. But even if
we did, we recognize that it is improper to consult the alimony statutes to
resolve an ambiguity in an alimony agreement. See Kripp, 849 A.2d at 1165
(“There is nothing in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3706 [(“Bar to Alimony”)] or in the Divorce
Code to show that the General Assembly intended that the definition of
cohabitation set forth in the statute be incorporated into or control private
agreements or that the courts are foreclosed from applying the law of
contracts to determine the parties' intent on such a matter. Nor is there a
principle of law that would compel any one of these results.”).
Thus, we agree with the trial court that the Agreement obligates
Husband to pay the full $1,800 amount. However, with due respect to the
trial court, a formal allocation of child support and alimony is not necessarily
academic. Indeed, there could be potential tax consequences to the parties.
Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 – and given that the parties’
Agreement was executed before January 1, 2019 – Husband might be able to
deduct the alimony portion of his support obligation from his taxable income.
See Clarification: Changes to Deduction for Certain Alimony Payments
Effective in 2019, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.,
https://www.irs.com/forms-pubs/clarification-changes-to-deduction-for-
certain-alimony-payments-effective-in-2019 (last visited June 28, 2022). In
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any event, Paragraph 28 enables Husband to pursue a formal allocation of his
child support and alimony obligations, retroactive to January 15, 2021 – the
date of Husband’s original filing with the trial court.
To conclude: the trial court’s reliance on Zullo was misplaced;
nevertheless, the court ultimately did not err when it denied Husband’s
request to terminate his obligation to pay alimony upon a child support
reduction. In our de novo review of the Marriage Settlement Agreement, we
conclude that the Agreement was not ambiguous, and that in the absence of
a provision to the contrary, Wife was not barred from receiving alimony upon
remarriage. However, we conclude the court erred when it denied Husband’s
petition. We clarify that Husband is still entitled to seek support modification
under Paragraph 28 of the parties’ Agreement, even though the difference
between the reduction in child support and the $1,800 figure shall be
converted to alimony.
Order vacated insofar as it prohibited Husband from seeking a formal
allocation of his child support and alimony obligations, totaling $1,800 per
month. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/02/2022
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