In the Int. of: R.A., Appeal of: J.A.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.A., MOTHER :
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: No. 608 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000022-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.M.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.A., MOTHER :
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: No. 609 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 25, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000709-2021
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED AUGUST 10, 2022
J.A. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree and order entered by the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on January 25, 2022, involuntarily
terminating Mother’s parental rights to her daughter, R.A., a/k/a R.M.A.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“Child”), born in March 2018, and changing Child’s permanency goal to
adoption.1 In addition, counsel for Mother (“Counsel”), has filed an application
to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.
2009). After review, we grant the application to withdraw, affirm the
termination decree, and dismiss the appeal from the goal change order as
moot.
We begin by restating the relevant facts and procedural history of this
matter.2 Mother herself was adjudicated dependent following a hearing on
September 26, 2016, when she was sixteen years old. See Juvenile Ct. Op.,
3/14/22, at 1. Mother resided with her maternal grandmother until July 8,
2017, when she was hospitalized for mental health treatment. See Petition
for Goal Change to Adoption (“Goal Change Petition”), 11/24/21, Exhibit A
(Statement of Facts re: R.M.A a/k/a R.A.), at ¶¶ j-k. Mother was discharged
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1 The decree entered on January 25, 2022, also terminated the parental rights
of Z.G. (“Father”). Father did not file a notice of appeal, and he is not a party
to this appeal.
2 We note the factual dearth contained in the record. The entirety of the
termination hearing transcript is 14 pages in length. Mother did not testify or
present any witnesses in her defense. Therefore, we have gathered the
factual record from the juvenile court opinion, the permanency review orders,
the petition for goal change to adoption, and the termination hearing
transcript.
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on August 23, 2017. However, after discovering that she was pregnant, DHS
moved her to a mother/baby group home. Id. at ¶ l.
When Child was born, Mother was 17 years old and kept Child in her
care while living in the group home until July 17, 2020. On that date, the
Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) received a general
protective services (“GPS”) report alleging that Mother was not adequately
feeding Child and had been selling her welfare benefits to buy drugs. See
Juvenile Ct. Op. at 1. The report also alleged that Mother tested positive for
drugs multiple times and appeared under the influence of drugs. Id. That
report was determined to be valid. Id. at 2. The juvenile court discharged
Mother’s own personal dependency on October 1, 2018, after she turned 18
years old. Id. at 1 n.1.
On November 20, 2019, DHS received a second GPS report alleging that
Mother had abandoned Child with her maternal great aunt, M.R. See Juvenile
Ct. Op. at 2. The report further alleged that Mother was now refusing to
retrieve Child from M.R.’s care, that Mother had a history of drug use, had
voluntarily “absconded from placement” in the group home, and was currently
transient. Id. at 2; see also Goal Change Petition at ¶ s. The report further
stated that K.G., another of Child’s maternal great-aunts, wanted to provide
kinship care for Child. See Juvenile Ct. Op. at 2. That report was also
determined to be valid. Id. at 2.
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DHS filed its petition to adjudicate Child dependent on January 7, 2020.
Child was adjudicated dependent after a hearing on February 5, 2020. N.T.,
1/25/22, at 4. The court placed Child in kinship care with K.G. and ordered
Mother to attend twice-weekly visits supervised by DHS at K.G.’s home. See
Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 2/5/20, at 2. It further referred Mother
for parenting classes, housing and employment services, family school, full
drug and alcohol screens, a dual diagnosis assessment, monitoring, and three
random drug tests prior to the next court date, which was set for April 28,
2020. Id.
Thereafter, Community Umbrella Agency ("CUA”) established single
case plan objectives (“SCP”), including: (1) attend the Clinical Evaluation Unit
(“CEU”) and obtain three random drug tests; (2) maintain supervised
visitation at the agency; (3) attend the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”)
for parenting and housing; and (4) drug and alcohol treatment. These
objectives remained substantially unchanged throughout the case. See N.T.,
1/25/22, at 4-6.
For the next year-and-one-half, the court conducted regular
permanency review hearings at which it maintained Child’s commitment and
placement, and goal of reunification. At the first permanency review hearing
on July 9, 2020, Mother was found to be in full compliance, and the court
noted moderate progress toward alleviating the circumstances necessitating
placement. See Permanency Review Order, 7/9/20, at 1. Mother was
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permitted twice weekly supervised visitation with Child by the agency, though
the court ordered such visitation to be virtual due to COVID-19. Id. at 2.
Then, on November 19, 2020, the court characterized Mother as non-
compliant regarding the permanency plan. See Permanency Review Order,
11/19/20, at 1. Notably, Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. See id.
Mother’s last communication with CUA was in August of 2020. See id.
The next permanency review hearing occurred on April 6, 2021. There,
Mother participated via telephone and was “re-referred” for the same services.
See Permanency Review Order, 4/6/21, at 2. The court further ordered
Mother’s visitation be supervised, “line of sight[,]” by the agency. Id.
Mother, however, did not attend the September 15, 2021, permanency
review hearing, where the court found she had minimally complied with her
SCP. See Permanency Review Order, 9/15/21, at 1. According to the DHS
caseworker, “Mother had not attended a single visit with the Child since the
Child was adjudicated dependent nearly two years prior.”3 Juvenile Ct. Op. at
2; see also N.T., 1/25/22, at 5, 10. Despite a court order for her appearance
at visits, Mother did not adhere to the court’s directive. Id.
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3 The DHS caseworker testified that Mother had also reached out the day
before the termination hearing on January 25, 2022. See N.T., 1/25/22, 5,
10.
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On November 24, 2021, DHS filed petitions to change Child’s
permanency goal to adoption and involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).
On January 25, 2022, the juvenile court held a combined hearing on the
petitions. The only witness was the DHS caseworker assigned to the matter,
Macy Johnston. Mother did not attend but was represented by Counsel.4
Moreover, the counsel for DHS indicated that Mother received proper notice
of the petitions and hearing date, to which Counsel did not object. See N.T.,
1/25/22, at 4. Child was nearly four years old at the time, and was
represented by Harry Levin, Esquire, as Child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) (also
referred to as a child advocate).5 At the conclusion of the proceeding, the
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4 During the hearing, Mother was represented by Attorney Lelabari Giwa-Ojur,
who is misidentified as “Lela Barigawa” and “Ms. Barigawa” in the notes of
testimony. N.T., 1/25/22, at 2-14. Her name and signature correctly appear
on her notice of appeal and statement of intent to file an Anders brief in lieu
of a statement of errors complained of on appeal, both dated and filed on
February 24, 2022.
5 Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to verify sua sponte that the
court appointed counsel to represent a child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a),
and if counsel served in a dual role, that the court determined before
appointment that there was no conflict between a child’s best and legal
interests. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020). If a
child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome of
the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best interests,
and a child’s Subsection 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by an attorney-
guardian ad litem (GAL) who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s
best interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018). In this
case, because Child was nearly four years old at the time of the subject
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights on all grounds asserted
in the involuntary termination petition. Id. at 14. In addition, the court
changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Id.
On February 24, 2022, Mother timely filed notices of appeal.
Contemporaneous with the notices, Counsel for Mother filed a statement of
intent to file an Anders brief in lieu of filing a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). This Court sua
sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals on March 23, 2022. Counsel filed an
application to withdraw and Anders brief in this Court on April 13, 2022.
We begin by reviewing Counsel’s application to withdraw and Anders
brief. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(“‘When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the
merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
withdraw.’”) (citation omitted); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa.
Super. 1992) (extending the Anders procedure to appeals from involuntary
termination decrees). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
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proceeding, we conclude that her statutory right to counsel was satisfied by
Attorney Levin.
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Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation omitted). With respect to the third Anders requirement, this
Court has held counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of
the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.”
Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has directed that Anders
briefs must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Here, Counsel has filed an Anders brief and application to withdraw
stating she has conducted a review of the record and determined that Mother’s
appeal is frivolous. See Application to Withdraw as Counsel, 4/13/22, at 2.
Attached to her brief is a copy of a letter Counsel sent to Mother. While
Counsel uses the incorrect name in the salutation, the letter is properly
addressed to Mother and explains her rights pursuant to Millisock, supra.Likewise, Counsel has filed an Anders brief that substantially complies
with the requirements set forth in Santiago, supra. In concluding that the
appeal is wholly frivolous, Counsel’s Anders brief presents neither the
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controlling law nor an application of the law to the relevant facts.
Nevertheless, Anders and Santiago require substantial, not perfect
performance. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super.
2007). As we find the applicable law regarding termination to be
straightforward and referenced in part by Counsel’s discussion, we conclude
that Counsel’s brief substantially complies with Anders and Santiago. See
Wrecks, 934 A.2d at 1290 (stating, “While the brief fails to cite the law
relevant to the question of timeliness, we find the applicable time limits to be
straightforward.”).
We next “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there
are any additional non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.”
Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(footnote omitted). Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issues:
1. Did the [juvenile] court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights?
2. Did the [juvenile] court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by changing [Child’s] permanency goal from
reunification with parent to adoption?
Anders Brief at 2.
Our standard of review requires us to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). The court “is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise
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free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73–74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations
omitted). We defer to the court because it often has “first-hand observations
of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267
(citations and quotation marks omitted). If the record supports the court’s
findings, we must determine whether the court committed an error of law or
abused its discretion. Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250. An abuse of discretion
does not occur merely because the record could support a different result. In
re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 587 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). An
abuse of discretion will only be found upon “demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Pennsylvania’s
Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101-2938. To involuntarily terminate a
parent’s rights to their child, the Act requires the court to conduct a bifurcated
analysis in which the court focuses on parental conduct pursuant to Section
2511(a) and the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). If the court finds that the
movant has established grounds to terminate parental rights under Section
2511(a), the court must then analyze the evidence under Section 2511(b).
Id. Section 2511(b) critically focuses on whether the child has a bond with
his or her parent, and what effect severing that bond may have on the child.
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Id. The movant is burdened to show “clear and convincing” grounds for
termination under both Sections 2511(a) and (b). In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516,
520 (Pa. Super. 2006).
In this case, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). As we need only agree
with the juvenile court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), we will analyze the termination decree pursuant to
Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc). Those sections state the following:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
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With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), this Court previously explained:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of
conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of
the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to
relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be
terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the
parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of
inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct;
(2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and
child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of
parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added). This Court has also instructed: “[I]t is the six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition that is most critical to
our analysis. However, the [juvenile] court must consider the whole history
of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provisions,
but instead consider the individual circumstances of each case.” In re D.J.S.,
737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This requires the
Court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all
explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her parental
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rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” In re B., N.M.,
856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Further, we have stated:
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must
be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the
psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious
intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child
relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity
to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish
his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
question.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has emphasized
the following:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child.
A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has
held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, the juvenile court reasoned that terminating Mother’s parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(1) was valid because Mother “demonstrated a
settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the Child and failed to
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perform parental duties for at least six months immediately preceding the
filing of the termination petition[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. The GPS report that
first brought Child to DHS’s attention stated Child was underfed because
Mother had been selling her welfare benefits to buy drugs. See Goal Change
Petition at ¶ o; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 1. Mother then abandoned Child with
her great-aunt and never visited Child in person since Child was removed from
her care. See N.T., 1/25/22, at 5-6; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 2. The record
only shows Mother to have ever scheduled a single visit with Child, and she
failed to attend without providing any explanation. See N.T., 1/25/22, at 10.
Mother knew of her own parenting objectives and did not attempt to
progress in them. N.T., 1/25/22, at 2, 5-6. Mother has been made aware of
her objectives at multiple times throughout the life of the case. Id. at 12.
The DHS caseworker testified that Mother would often not respond to the
agency’s contact efforts. Id. at 5-6. Mother failed to complete parenting
classes, seek or receive behavioral health consultation, and did not obtain
housing support, despite court referrals. Id. Mother never submitted herself
for court-ordered drug testing since Child was born. Id. Even if Mother had
complied with her plan objectives, her progress could not be verified because
she did not respond to DHS efforts to have her sign documentary releases.
Id. at 5.
At this juncture, we note that Counsel raises the issue of whether DHS
failed to provide reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with Child. Specifically,
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Counsel states, “the record arguably does not support a finding that . . .
necessary services were provided” insofar as (1) the CUA caseworker
communicated with Mother one time in the three months prior to the subject
proceeding; (2) following the COVID-19 pandemic, Mother was permitted in-
person supervised visitation starting on April 6, 2021; and (3) “in the first
critical months of” Child’s case, parenting classes were not available due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. Anders Brief at 9-10.
Nevertheless, Counsel concludes that this claim is arguably without
support because Mother did not maintain contact with her CUA caseworker,
she did not take advantage of the services offered after the pandemic
restrictions lifted, and she did not visit Child even though Child was in kinship
care placement. Anders Brief at 10. Finally, Mother did not appear at the
subject proceeding or present any evidence on her own behalf. Our review of
the record confirms these facts.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that neither Section 2511(a)
nor (b):
requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a
parent prior to termination of parental rights. Nevertheless, th[e]
Court has observed that the provision or absence of reasonable
efforts may be relevant to a court’s consideration of both the
grounds for termination and the best interests of the child.
In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
Thus, because the evidence establishes Mother failed to perform
parental duties or maintain a relationship with Child in the two years since
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abandoning her, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). See B.,
N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (explaining that a parent “must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting the obstacles” which limit his or her ability to maintain a
parent/child relationship). As we discern no abuse of discretion, we do not
disturb the court’s findings.
We next review whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b).
As to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M. a/k/a
L.C., Jr.], [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that
the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and
child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In
re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, . . . [an] evaluation of a child’s
bonds is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-
63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
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well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted).
Moreover,
[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Here, Child has lived in the same kinship care placement for two years
and has formed a loving, safe, stable, and supportive parent-child bond with
her kinship mother. See N.T., 1/25/22, at 6-7. The DHS caseworker who has
handled the case for the past two years testified that Mother does not provide
for any of Child’s general, medical, or emotional needs, and severing Mother’s
parental rights would cause Child no irreparable harm. See id. at 8-9.
Mother’s counsel did not proffer any evidence to the contrary. Comparatively,
the testimony showed that Child’s kinship family provides for all her general,
medical, and emotional needs. See id. at 7. As such, the record supports
the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Accordingly, based on our review of the record, Counsel did not overlook
any non-frivolous issues. We conclude that the juvenile court properly
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terminated Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b), and
Mother is not entitled to relief. Therefore, we grant Counsel’s application to
withdraw and affirm the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Finally, we decline to review Mother’s appeal to the order changing
Child’s permanency goal in light of our disposition on the appeal from the
termination decree. By affirming the termination decree, Mother’s appeal
from the goal change order is moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227
A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling
upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or
effect.”) (citation omitted).
Application to withdraw granted. Decree affirmed. Appeal from order
changing Child’s permanency goal dismissed as moot.
Judge Pellegrini joins the Memorandum.
Judge McLaughlin Concurs in the Result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/10/2022
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