Judges: Stevens, Panella, Olszewski
Filed Date: 6/3/2004
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/26/2024
¶ 1 Appellant Shawn Reed appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Honorable David L. Ashworth on May 6, 2003. Following a non-jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of obstructing administration of law or other governmental function
¶2 Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant argues that his conviction is in direct violation of his federal and state guarantees of freedom from unreasonable searches. Second, Appellant contends that the trial court’s finding of
¶ 3 The facts involved in this case are essentially undisputed. On November 16, 2002, Officer Bret McFarland of the Lancaster City Bureau of Police received a call from Lancaster County Communications at approximately 2:06 a.m. N.T., 5/6/2003 at 9-10. The call center informed McFarland of a tip received from Connie McMul-len in New Jersey regarding the possible location of her runaway stepdaughter. Id. at 10. Ms. McMullen believed that her stepdaughter, Nicole McMullen, was residing with her aunt, Bernice McMullen, at 58 North Prince Street in the second floor apartment. Id. Officer McFarland was given a description of Nicole and then proceeded to 58 North Prince Street. N.T., 5/6/2003 at 11.
¶ 4 Officer McFarland arrived at 58 North Prince Street at approximately 2:15 a.m. and observed a woman waiting at the outside door to the building. Id. The door was locked from the inside and required the assistance of a resident to open. Id. at 12. Officer McFarland learned that the woman was there to visit with a resident of the third floor and was waiting for him to come down and open the door. ■ Id. at 11.
¶ 5 Shortly after Officer McFarland’s arrival, Appellant walked down the stairs and opened the outside door. Id. at 12. Officer McFarland confirmed that Appellant was the third floor resident and proceeded to force his way into the building. Id. at 13. Appellant blocked Officer McFarland’s entrance and asked the officer if he had a warrant. Id. Appellant further questioned Officer McFarland regarding his purpose at the building. Id. Officer McFarland responded that it was none of Appellant’s business why he was there and said “just let me get by and do my job”. Id. at 15.
¶ 6 Appellant continued to impede Officer McFarland’s progress into the building and up the stairs to the second floor. Id. at 13. While ascending the stairs, Appellant leaned his weight on Officer McFarland. Id. at 38. McFarland “walked” Appellant up the stairs chest-to-chest with McFarland’s arm creating space between them. Id. at 39. Once they reached the second floor landing, Officer McFarland pushed Appellant who responded by pushing back at the officer. Id. at 37. At this point, Officer McFarland decided to arrest Appellant with the intention of charging him with disorderly conduct. Id. at 42. After consulting with his sergeant, however, Officer McFarland decided to charge Appellant with obstructing administration of law. Id.
¶ 7 Appellant first contends that he cannot be convicted of obstructing administration of law as Officer McFarland was engaged in an illegal search at the time. Appellant argues that the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions’ protections from unreasonable searches gave him the right to block McFarland’s entry into the building. The primary purpose of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is to “protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.” In the Interest of D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). Furthermore, the right to exclude evidence pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is more expansive than the right granted by the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Valentin, 748 A.2d 711, 713 (Pa.Super.), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 731, 766 A.2d 1247 (2000).
¶ 8 To determine whether an area is protected from searches, we analyze
¶ 9 In Carriger, the Sixth Circuit ruled that tenants have a protected privacy interest in common areas that are accessible only through a locked entrance. Specifically, the court held “[t]he officer’s entry into this locked apartment building without permission and without a warrant of any kind was an illegal entry and violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Carriger, 541 F.2d at 550. Carriger continues as valid precedent in the Sixth Circuit. See U.S. v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.2001). The Ninth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion on this issue. See U.S. v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir.1976).
¶ 10 However, the Third Circuit has expressly rejected Carriger and Fluker. In U.S. v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3rd Cir.1992), the Third Circuit addressed the issue of a tenant’s protected privacy interest in the common areas of an apartment building. The Third Circuit was faced with a record that indicated the common area in question “was easily accessible to tenants, visitors, solicitors, workmen, and other members of the public.” Acosta, 965 F.2d at 1252. When it began its analysis of this factual scenario, the Third Circuit first examined the rule in the Second Circuit as set forth in U.S. v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d. Cir.1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125, 105 S.Ct. 2657, 86 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985).
¶ 11 The defendant in Holland was arrested when he opened the outside door to a hallway shared with other apartments in the building. The Second Circuit held that the arrest did not occur within the defendant’s protected zone of privacy, pursuant to three separate rationales. First, the Supreme Court cases which define the area protected from unreasonable searches consistently refer to invasions of living quarters. Second, pursuant to Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the court reasoned that only when a defendant has the ability and right to exclude others from entrance to an internal area would a reasonable expectation of privacy arise. Finally, the court opined that a rule that extended an individual’s zone of privacy to common areas would prevent police from protecting the tenants’ actual residences. Holland, 755 F.2d at 255-256.
¶ 12 The Acosta court found itself “in agreement with the Second Circuit’s analysis in Holland as applied to the facts [before it]”. Acosta, 965 F.2d, at 1252. The Third Circuit recognized that two circuits had held that common areas were protected. Acosta, 965 F.2d at 1252 (citing Carriger, supra, and Fluker, supra). However, the Acosta court found the Second Circuit’s analysis in Holland most persuasive. As a result, the court held that “[o]n this record, defendants had no way to exclude anyone and, therefore, could not have reasonably expected their privacy to extend beyond their apartment door.” Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 13 A similar conclusion was reached by this Court independently in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 698 A.2d 85 (Pa.Super.1997). In Thomas, a police officer used a fire escape to gain access to the rooftop of a building. On the roof was a free-standing apartment as well as a small garden. The officer observed marijuana
¶ 14 In Thomas the defendant argued that the officer’s use of the fire escape violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. This Court, on appeal, affirmed the judgment of sentence, holding that a fire escape utilized by several apartments was not an area protected from unreasonable searches and seizures.
¶ 15 Appellant attempts to distinguish Thomas by arguing that “[ajccess to the fire escape was not limited to the tenants of the building, however, as the fire escape was unlocked and open to the public.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, this Court specifically stated in Thomas that “the suppression court judge’s finding that the fire escape was used on a daily basis for ingress and egress is not supported by the record.” Although the record did not support a finding that the fire escape was routinely used by other tenants, we emphasized that the fire escape was an emergency route open to all occupants of the building: “the officer did not stray from the path that the residents of appellant’s apartment or the adjacent building would have taken during an emergency.” Thomas, 698 A.2d at 86. Accordingly, we read the Thomas opinion to hold that an area that was not routinely used by other tenants, but could have been used in' an emergency by the tenants, was not protected:
¶ 16 The crucial distinction between protected and unprotected areas, as set forth in the above cited cases, is whether an unrelated person has unfettered access to the area.
¶ 17 As applied to the instant case, the record establishes that Appellant did not have the right to exclude the residents of the second floor apartments from the hallway or stairs. The hallway and stairs in the apartment building which Appellant asserts a privilege to exclude a police officer may, at the very least, be used by the other residents of the building in an emergency. Charles Murray, the landlord of the building testified that each resident had. a key to the door that accessed this hallway and staircase. Under these circumstances, Appellant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the hallway or stairs, and therefore had no right to exclude the other residents of the building, nor their invited guests, from the hallway and stairs. Since no evidence was provided that the other residents were in any way related to Appellant, Appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in these common areas under the law. Accordingly, neither the United States Constitution
¶ 18 In his second issue on appeal, Appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence of record to establish that he had the intent required for a conviction of obstruction of the administration of law. The trial court, in its Opinion dated July 18, 2008 states “Officer McFarland was in full uniform, so there was no confusion about his authority.” Trial Court Opinion, July 18, 2008 at 2. Furthermore, the trial court states that “There is no requirement that an officer inform curious citizens as to his or her intent when conducting official police business.” Trial Court Opinion, July 18, 2003 at 4.
¶ 19 “When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court must view all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner and must determine whether the evidence was such as to enable a fact finder to find that all of the elements of the offense[] were established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Rucci, 543 Pa. 261, 670 A.2d 1129, 1132 (1996) (citation omitted). In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Commonwealth v. Repko, 817 A.2d 549, 553 (Pa.Super.2003). Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. Id. (citations omitted). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
¶ 20 Initially, we must address the trial court’s finding that since Officer McFarland was in uniform, Appellant could not have been confused about Officer McFarland’s authority. We conclude that this presumption is too broad.
¶21 It is well established that a citizen need not respond to every statement or question uttered by a police officer in uniform. See Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884 (2000). In fact, we doubt even the Commonwealth would advocate a bright line test that would declare that all actions taken by a uniformed officer, no matter how egregious, are done with the express authority of the Commonwealth. However, if a uniformed officer states that he is acting pursuant to police authority, a citizen must accept this as true at the time, or face the possibility of prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Biagini, 540 Pa. 22, 655 A.2d 492 (1995) (no right to resist an arrest even if defendant believed arrest was unlawful).
¶ 22 The trial court, in its opinion, opines that requiring an officer to state the nature of his business would be detrimental to law enforcement. However, we fail to see how cautionary words that the officer is on official business would have any detrimental effect. A comment identifying official business reveals nothing about the specific business at hand, and serves to notify the public that interfering with the officer will be interference with the administration of law.
¶ 24 Judgment of sentence is affirmed:
¶ 25 Judge OLSZEWSKI-files a Concurring Opinion.
. 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5101
. Clearly, the free access of family members or intimate partners does not vitiate a person’s expectation of privacy in an otherwise exclusive area. Furthermore, landlords occupy a unique position in this analysis owing to their common ownership interest in the area leased to the tenant. Therefore, the unfettered right of access of a landlord, or a landlord's agents to a tenant’s apartment is not controlling on this issue.
. No inference that Reed attempted to keep anything in the hallway or staircase as private from the other unrelated persons living in the building can be drawn from these facts. Therefore, Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) does not counsel for a different result.