Com. v. Green, C.

J-A18030-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHARLES E. GREEN :
:
Appellant : No. 931 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at CP-02-CR-0004680-2020
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 7, 2022
Charles E. Green (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following his convictions, after a stipulated bench trial, of Driving
Under the Influence (DUI) (Controlled Substance or Metabolite), DUI
(Controlled Substance Impaired Ability), and sun screening and other
materials prohibited.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts underlying this appeal as
follows:
[O]n March 4, 2020, Trooper Matthew Shiner with the
Pennsylvania State Police was patrolling southbound traffic at a
crossover on I-279. Trooper Shiner credibly testified that he
witnessed a beige Chevrolet Impala with tint on the windows that
was “not factory window tint[, and] dark enough where [he] was
unable to see any occupants within the vehicle.” [N.T., 6/3/19,
at 5.] As a result, the trooper initiated a traffic stop. Trooper
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1) & (2), 4524(e)(1).
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Shiner further testified that after stopping the vehicle, he was able
to confirm that the window tint was dark enough that he was
unable to see inside the vehicle. [Id. at 6.] After approaching
the vehicle, Trooper Shiner observed several “open and unopened
cigar wrappers indicative of marijuana.” [N.T., 6/9/21, at 12.]
The trooper also noted that [Appellant’s] eyes were bloodshot and
glassy, and there was an “odor of raw marijuana emanating from
his person.” [Id. at 6.] [Appellant] admitted to the trooper that
he had smoked marijuana prior to going to work early in the
morning. [Id. at 14.] Trooper Shiner had [Appellant] complete
several Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, which [Appellant] failed
by exhibiting signs indicative of marijuana consumption. [Id. at
13-14.] At this time, [Appellant] was arrested and searched
incident to arrest, and the trooper observed a small piece of
marijuana near [Appellant’s] mouth. Upon questioning,
[Appellant] stated that he consumed the raw marijuana prior to
the traffic stop. [Id. at 14. Appellant] subsequently submitted to
a blood test, which yielded positive results for THC. [Id. at 15.]
Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/21, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted, citations moved to
body).
On May 26, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized
during the traffic stop. Appellant argued “police unlawfully stopped him
without reasonable suspicion and no exception applies under Article I, Section
8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” Motion to Suppress, 5/26/21, ¶ 5. The trial court
conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 3, 2021, and thereafter denied
Appellant’s motion. Trial Court Order, 6/9/21.
Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of
the aforementioned offenses. For DUI (Controlled Substance or Metabolite),
the trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 days on electronic home monitoring,
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six months’ probation, and a $1,000 fine. The court imposed no further
penalties on the remaining convictions.
On July 1, 2021, the trial court granted Appellant permission to file a
nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion,
which the trial court denied on July 14, 2021. Trial Court Order, 7/14/21.
Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial
court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
suppress, where the trooper’s suppression hearing testimony
failed to establish that he had the requisite quantum of cause to
stop [Appellant’s] vehicle for a suspected violation of the window
tint statute, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1)?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Preliminarily,
[a]n appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.
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Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 266 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation
omitted).
It is undisputed Trooper Shiner stopped Appellant’s vehicle for a sun
screening violation under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). Section 4524(e)
provides, in relevant part:
(1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening
device or other material which does not permit a person to see or
view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or
side window of the vehicle.
(2) This subsection does not apply to:
(i) A vehicle which is equipped with tinted windows of the type
and specification that were installed by the manufacturer of
the vehicle or to any hearse, ambulance, government vehicle
or any other vehicle for which a currently valid certificate of
exemption has been issued in accordance with regulations
adopted by the department.
(ii) A vehicle which is equipped with tinted windows, sun
screening devices or other materials which comply with all
applicable Federal regulations and for which a currently valid
certificate of exemption for medical reasons has been issued
in accordance with regulations adopted by the department.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1), (e)(2)(i)-(ii).
Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion
because Trooper Shiner’s testimony did not support a finding of probable
cause to justify a traffic stop under Section 4524(e)(1). Appellant’s Brief at
13. In support, Appellant relies on this Court’s decision in Prizzia, supra.
Appellant argues that in Prizzia,
the facts demonstrated [the trooper] could discern, from his initial
observation of Appellant’s vehicle, that [the driver’s] window tint
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violated section 4524(e)(1) because the trooper could not see into
[the] car. [The trooper] did not state that his stopping Appellant’s
vehicle served any investigable purpose. Thus, he was required
to possess probable cause to conduct the traffic stop for the
section 4524(e)(1) violation.” [Prizzia, 260 A.3d] at 269.
Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant claims that Trooper Shiner’s testimony in
the instant case is substantially similar to the trooper’s testimony in Prizzia.
Id. at 21-22. Applying Prizzia, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
applying a reasonable suspicion standard to the traffic stop. Id. at 21.
Appellant further argues that Trooper Shiner failed to establish probable
cause to justify the traffic stop. Id. at 24. According to Appellant, Trooper
Shiner established only that it was difficult for him to see inside of the vehicle
prior to the traffic stop. Id. at 23-24. Upon careful review, we conclude the
trial court applied the appropriate reasonable suspicion standard in denying
Appellant’s suppression motion.
The Pennsylvania legislature has codified the level of suspicion a
police officer must possess before initiating a traffic stop:
Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is
engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is
occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request
or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration,
proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or
engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary
to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added). However, this Court has
recognized that a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion must serve an
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investigatory purpose, while a stop based on an observed Vehicle Code
violation or “non-investigable offense” must be supported by probable
cause. Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017).
In Prizzia, this Court addressed the validity a traffic stop for a sun
screening prohibited violation. We stated:
[I]n our view, the appropriate quantum of cause necessary to
validate a traffic stop based on a violation of section 4524(e)(1)
is dependent on the specific facts of each case. In some
situations, … a probable cause standard will apply because the
officer’s testimony establishes that a window-tint violation was
immediately apparent to the officer, and no further investigatory
purpose was served by the traffic stop. In other cases …, a
reasonable suspicion standard could apply because the officer’s
testimony demonstrates that he or she stopped the vehicle to get
a closer and/or unobstructed view of the windows, in further
investigation of whether the tint violates section 4524(e)(1).
Accordingly, our decision today should not be read as precluding
application of a reasonable suspicion standard to a stop for a
window-tint violation, if the specific facts of the case demonstrate
that an investigatory purpose was served by the stop.
Prizzia, 260 A.3d at 269 n.2.
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the circumstances presented in Prizzia,
which compelled application of a probable cause standard, are distinguishable
from those presented in the instant case. In Prizzia,
[w]hile on patrol, [Pennsylvania State Trooper Anthony Spegar]
observed a vehicle on the road with windows tinted to the degree
that [he] could not see the operator inside the vehicle. Trooper
Spegar testified that prior to initiating a traffic stop, he
followed [the appellant’s] white Scion TC for a period of
time and at no distance could he see through the side,
front, [or] passenger windows. Trooper Spegar further
testified that in his experience as a Pennsylvania State Trooper,
he is aware that at the distances from which he observed [the
appellant’s] vehicle prior to conducting a traffic stop,
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manufacturer-installed tint would not render the windows too dark
to see through. Based on his observations, Trooper Spegar
conducted a traffic stop of [the appellant’s] vehicle based on illegal
window tint.
Prizzia, 260 A.3d at 265 (emphasis added; citations and quotation marks
omitted). We applied a probable-cause standard and concluded Trooper
Spegar had probable cause to stop the appellant’s vehicle:
Trooper Spegar testified that the windows on [the appellant’s]
vehicle were so darkly tinted that he could not see inside. This
testimony was corroborated by still photographs entered into
evidence at the suppression hearing, which showed that “at
certain angles, the side panel windows on [Appellant’s] car [were],
indeed, darkly tinted to a degree that seeing through [the] same
[was] difficult, if not impossible.” Trooper Spegar’s testimony,
and the corroborating evidence, demonstrated that the trooper
could not see through [the appellant’s] windows, thus establishing
probable cause to stop her vehicle for a violation of section
4524(e)(1).
Id. at 269-70 (citations omitted).
Here, by contrast, the circumstances warranted application of a
reasonable suspicion standard. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Shiner
testified that at 9:50 a.m. on March 4, 2020, he parked his vehicle at a
crossover to observe southbound traffic on Interstate 279. N.T., 6/3/20, at
4-5. Trooper Shiner parked perpendicular to the interstate, with the front of
the police vehicle “facing the two lanes of traffic[.]” Id. at 5. As Appellant’s
Chevrolet Impala drove past, Trooper Shiner observed the vehicle’s front
windshield, driver’s window and left passenger window. Id. According to
Trooper Shiner,
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[a]s the vehicle passed my location, I observed the vehicle to have
not [sic] factory window tint dark enough where I was unable to
see any occupants within the vehicle as it passed my location.
Id. Unlike the trooper in Prizzia, Trooper Shiner did not follow the vehicle
for further investigation prior to the traffic stop.
Our review further discloses that Trooper Shiner’s traffic stop served a
valid investigatory purpose. Trooper Shiner testified:
As I approached the vehicle, I was still able to ascertain that
the window tint was still dark enough I was unable to
observe anybody inside, at which point [Appellant] did roll
down his driver’s side window at which time I engaged him in
conversation.
Id. (emphasis added). Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly
concluded:
For these specific and articulable reasons, Trooper Shiner had
reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code was occurring. In turn, he was permitted to initiate
a traffic stop under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) to investigate. Based
on the evidence and testimony presented, Trooper Shiner acted
properly when he briefly detained [Appellant] for the purposes of
investigating the possible violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/21, at 4. Under these circumstances, we discern
no error in the trial court’s application of a reasonable suspicion standard, and
its conclusion that the Commonwealth established reasonable suspicion of a
window tint violation.2 Prizzia, supra.
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2 Even applying a probable cause standard, we would reach the same
conclusion as this Court in Prizzia. Trooper Shiner testified that because of
the sun screening, he could not see the vehicle’s occupants as it drove past.
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Appellant further asserts this Court wrongly decided Prizzia.
Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant challenges Prizzia’s holding that the cause
necessary to support a traffic stop under Section 4524(e)(1) “can be either
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, depending on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Id. According to Appellant, the
statutory exceptions to the window-tint restriction require an officer to
conduct an investigation upon stopping the vehicle. Id. at 19-20. Appellant
posits: “[T]here is always something for the police officer to investigate –
i.e., whether the exemption applies to the vehicle that she just stopped.” Id.
at 20 (emphasis in original). We disagree.
We recently reiterated that both “this Court and the trial court
are bound by ‘existing [Superior Court] precedent[.]’” Smith v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 270 A.3d 1185, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also Commonwealth
v. May, 271 A.3d 475, 482 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“This panel is bound by existing
precedent and, therefore, lacks the authority to overturn another panel
decision.”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant's argument
that Prizzia was wrongly decided.
Further, we have held that the Section 4524(e)(1) exceptions function
as affirmative defenses to criminal culpability, which the defendant may
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N.T., 6/3/20, at 5. Trooper Shiner’s observation established probable cause
of a violation of the sun screening statute, as the sun screening on Appellant’s
windows prevented him from seeing the occupants of the vehicle. See
Prizzia, 260 A.3d at 269-70.
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choose to raise at trial. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 106
(Pa. Super. 2013). Therefore, an officer who observes a window-tint violation
under Section 4524(e)(1) has no burden to confirm the inapplicability of a
Section (e)(2) exception. Id.; see also May, supra. Applying Rodgriguez,
an investigation is not always necessary to determine a violation of Section
4524(e)(1).
For the foregoing reasons, we cannot grant Appellant relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/7/2022
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