In the Int. of: K.C.K.S., Appeal of: K.S.

J-A21041-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.C.K.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.S., MOTHER :
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: No. 1355 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered April 22, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001581-2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.-C.K.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.S., MOTHER :
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: No. 1356 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 22, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court
Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000535-2021
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2022
K.S. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered April 22, 2022, in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her son K.C.K.S. (Child), born in June 2015.1 Mother also
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1 On April 22, 2022, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.W.
(“Father”) and any unknown putative father. At this time, only Mother filed
an appeal.
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appeals from the April 22, 2022, order related to Child’s dependency case,
which changed his permanency goal from reunification to adoption. After
careful review, we affirm the termination decree and dismiss the appeal from
the goal change order as moot.
On October 3, 2019, the Department of Human Services (DHS) received
a General Protective Services (GPS) report alleging Mother was verbally
abusive to Child and hit him in the chest with a blue plastic baseball bat. See
N.T., 4/22/22, at 9-10. The report also indicated that Mother had sex with a
paramour while Child was in the room. Id. at 10. During this incident,
another woman was in the room doing drugs and Child reported touching the
woman’s private parts. Id. Finally, the report stated that Mother severely
struggles with her mental health and that she abuses phencyclidine (PCP).
Id.
Accordingly, DHS obtained an order of protective custody (OPC) for
Child. On October 4, 2019, at a shelter care hearing, the trial court lifted the
OPC and ordered the temporary commitment to DHS to stand. On October
25, 2019, the court adjudicated Child dependent, who was then four years
old. On the same day, the court entered an aggravated circumstances order
because Mother previously had her parental rights terminated to four of her
other children. See Aggravated Circumstances Order, 10/25/19, at 1.
DHS provided Mother with single case plan (SCP) objectives: 1) attend
Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for parenting and employment classes;
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2) attend the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a forthwith drug screen, an
assessment, and three random drug screens; 3) participate in a mental health
evaluation at Behavioral Health Services (BHS); and 4) attend supervised
visits with Child. See N.T. at 13.
During the pendency of the case, Mother did not comply with these
objectives. Mother did not make any progress towards alleviating the
circumstances that brought Child into the custody of DHS. See N.T. at 16-
17. CUA made numerous referrals on behalf of Mother, but Mother never
availed herself of the ARC classes, CEU assessment, drug and alcohol
treatment, drug screens, or the BHS mental health evaluation. Id. at 13-16.
Additionally, Mother was inconsistent with visitation, and on July 21, 2021, at
the conclusion of a permanency review hearing, the trial court suspended her
visitation.2 Id. at 15-16. Her visits were suspended because Mother
repeatedly tried to leave the facility with Child and told Child, without further
specification in the record, to touch younger girls inappropriately. Id. at 15.
On September 21, 2021, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b), and a separate petition to change Child’s permanency
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2 Mother appealed the trial court’s order suspending her visitation. This Court
affirmed the order on January 5, 2022, because Mother posed a “grave threat”
to Child and no other therapeutic intervention or other support would protect
Child from Mother. In the Interest of K.C.K.S., 1688 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super.
Jan. 5, 2022) (unpub. memo.). Mother’s visitation remained suspended
through the termination of her parental rights on April 22, 2022.
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goal from reunification to adoption. The trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on April 22, 2022. At this time, Child was six years old and was
represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and separate legal counsel.
Mother was represented by counsel and testified. DHS presented the
testimony of CUA case manager, Rochelle Richards.
At the conclusion of the April 22nd hearing, the trial court granted DHS’s
petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and change Child’s permanency goal to
adoption. Mother filed timely notices of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a
Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 13, 2022. This Court consolidated Mother’s
appeals sua sponte on June 16, 2022.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit or
unwilling to perform parental duties?
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and 2511(b) in the
absence of clear and convincing that termination of Mother’s
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
[Child]?
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that termination would best serve the
needs and welfare of Child?
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4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights and
changing [Child’s] goal to adoption, where the trial court
caused the deteriorated bonds between [Mother] and
[Child] by suspending her visits with [Child] several months
prior to the goal change/termination of parental rights
hearing?
Mother’s Brief at 3.3
We review an appeal from an order terminating parental rights with the
following deference to the trial court’s determination:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of
parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
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3 Legal counsel for Child filed a letter joining DHS’s brief in support of
terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing Child’s permanency goal to
adoption. We note, with disapproval, that Child’s GAL did not a file a brief or
letter in this appeal.
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).4 Here, we analyze the court’s termination
decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
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4 In order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with
the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section
2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must show three
components: (1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent
for at least 12 months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of
J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Unlike other subsections, Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court
to evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led
to the placement of the children. In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super.
2017). “[T]he relevant inquiry” regarding the second prong of
Section 2511(a)(8) “is whether the conditions that led to removal have been
remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at
the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Further, the Adoption Act prohibits the court from considering, as part of the
Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, “any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described [in the petition] which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
We observe that Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b) both require a court
considering a termination petition to assess the needs and welfare of the
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relevant child or children. However, the needs and welfare analysis required
by Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the needs and welfare analysis required
by Section 2511(b), and must be addressed separately. See In re C.L.G.,
956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
This Court has recognized “that the application of [Section 2511(a)(8)]
may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward
resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children.” In re
Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).
However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led
to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute
implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates
only a short period of time, to wit [18] months, in which to
complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child
who has been placed in foster care.
Id. (citations omitted).
With respect to subsection 2511(b), we consider whether termination of
parental rights will best serve the Children’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs, and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.
Super. 2010). “In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy
an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted,
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upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citation omitted).
“When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use
expert testimony. [Instead, s]ocial workers and caseworkers can offer
evaluations as well.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted).
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103
(Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks omitted. “Above all else . . . adequate
consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s
own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination
of parental rights.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a) because DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence. See
Mother’s Brief at 7. Specifically, regarding Section 2511(a)(8), Mother posits
that DHS did not prove that the conditions that contributed to Child’s
placement continue to exist and cannot or will not be remedied by Mother
within a reasonable period of time. Id. at 12. Mother argues that she
attempted to complete her SCP objectives. Id. at 13. She baldly asserts that
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she reached out to CUA case manager, Ms. Richards, for assistance, but
Mother did not receive the requested support. Id. Without support from CUA,
Mother contends that it was impossible for the trial court to determine if the
conditions that contributed to Child’s placement could be remedied in a
reasonable time. Id. Mother’s argument is belied by the record.
In its opinion, the trial court aptly stated,
Throughout the life of the case, Mother has been ordered to the
CEU for an assessment and to submit random drug screens. She
was also ordered to BHS for a mental health evaluation and to
ARC for parenting classes. Since the Child was adjudicated,
Mother has not engaged in any of her single case plan objectives.
Additionally, Mother failed to visit Child consistently, and her visits
were eventually suspended due to her behavior and the effect on
the Child when she did attend. (Trial Ct. Order 10/28/20 at 1
(stating that Mother had missed 42 visits with Child). . . .
Moreover, the CUA [c]ase [m]anager testified that Mother has not
met any of the Child’s needs since he was removed from her care,
and that she has not remedied any of the issues that led to the
Child’s placement.
Trial Ct. Op., 6/13/22, at 12 (some record citations omitted).
A careful review of the record supports the trial court’s findings.
Primarily, at the time of the termination hearing, Child had been in the care
of DHS for over thirty months. Regarding the second factor of Section
2511(a)(8), Child was placed with DHS due to physical and emotional abuse,
concerns over Mother’s mental health, and Mother’s drug use. As related
supra, Mother did not avail herself of any of the referred resources. Mother’s
argument relies on a passing reference that she informed Ms. Richardson that
she was unable to participate in ARC classes electronically. N.T. at 29-31.
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Mother also stated that after her home was burglarized, she asked Ms.
Richardson for help, but CUA could not provide assistance because Child did
not reside with her. Id.
Ms. Richardson testified that multiple referrals were made on behalf of
Mother to ARC, CEU, and BHS, but Mother never participated in any of these
programs. N.T. at 13-16. BHS told Ms. Richardson that they did not want to
work with Mother due to her aggressive behavior, but Ms. Richardson referred
Mother again. Id. at 14-15. Subsequently, Mother arrived late for her
appointment and then attacked the guards because they would not let her in
the closed courthouse. Id.
Mother was also inconsistent with visitation, and when Mother did visit,
she told Child to disobey his caregivers and to touch the younger girls
inappropriately at his daycare. N.T. at 15. Additionally, Mother frequently
attempted to remove Child from the visitation facility. Id. at 15, 24.
Ultimately, as set forth above, in July 2021, the trial court suspended
visitation, which remained suspended through the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. Id. at 15-16. Furthermore, Mother testified that because
her house was burglarized, her home was no longer appropriate for Child until
repairs were made. Id. at 16, 30-31. Thus, the trial court was well within its
discretion to find that the conditions which led to the removal or placement of
Children still exist and reunification was not imminent.
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In her brief’s second issue, Mother combines the analysis of the third
factor in Section 2511(a)(8) with Section 2511(b), but as referenced supra,
the needs and welfare analysis required by Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from
the needs and welfare analysis required by Section 2511(b) and must be
addressed separately. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc). Accordingly, we address the third factor of Section
2511(a)(8) first.
The trial court correctly determined that termination would best serve
the needs and welfare of Child. Ms. Richardson testified that Child has a close
relationship with his resource parent who provides him with love, safety,
stability, and support. N.T. at 21. Ms. Richardson also testified that Child
receives specialized services, and the resource parent is very engaged in
ensuring that Child receives all necessary services. Id. at 22. Child calls the
resource parent “mommy” and has stated that he wants “my mommy to be
my mommy.” Id. at 23, 26. In contrast, Ms. Richardson stated that, Mother
does not meet any of Child’s needs and Child would not suffer irreparable
harm if the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 22-23.
Based on the foregoing testimony, the trial court was well within its
discretion to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8)
because: (1) Child has been removed from Mother’s care far in excess of the
12-month statutory minimum; (2) the conditions which led to Child’s removal
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continue to exist; and (3) termination would best serve the needs and welfare
of Child.
In Mother’s second issue, she argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by involuntarily terminating her parental rights under Section
2511(b) where DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
terminating Mother’s rights would best service the emotional needs and
welfare of Child. See Mother’s Brief at 13. Mother argues that the trial court
failed to consider the parent-child bond between Mother and Child, specifically
when the trial court, at the termination hearing, stated that “[i]t’s clear to me
that [Mother] loves [Child].” Mother’s Brief at 15-16; N.T. at 37. Mother
further contends that evidence of Child’s bond with the resource parent is
unreliable because legal counsel hired a social worker to speak with Child on
his behalf and Ms. Richardson stated that Child did not specifically indicate
that he wants to be “adopted.” Mother’s Brief at 16.
At the close of the termination hearing, the trial court indicated that it
is clear that Mother loves Child, but “[u]nfortunatley, loving your child isn’t
enough sometimes. You have to be able to meet your child’s needs both
emotionally, mentally, [and] physically.” N.T. at 37. In its opinion, the trial
court determined that “termination is in the best interest of the Child as he
has established a strong parent-child bond with his kinship caregiver who has
provided the Child with consistent love, safety, stability, and support.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 13.
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The record confirms the trial court’s findings. Mother’s argument that
the trial court did not consider the bond she shared with Child is unsupported
by the record. The trial court explicitly acknowledges at the close of the
termination hearing that Mother loves Child, but that love is not enough. N.T.
at 37. As related supra, “[a]bove all else . . . adequate consideration must
be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s own feelings of love
and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Further, the trial court heard testimony from Ms. Richardson that Mother
influenced Child in a negative manner whenever she visited. See N.T. at 15-
16. Additionally, Ms. Richardson testified that Child does not want to see
Mother. Id. at 23. Ms. Richardson further stated that Child would not suffer
irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and that it would
be in Child’s best interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated. Id. at 21-23.
Finally, although Child, who was six years old at the time of the
termination hearing, did not specifically state that he wants to be “adopted,”
he informed Ms. Richardson that he wants the resource parent to be his
“mommy.” N.T. at 23. Legal counsel confirmed Child’s desire to be adopted.5
N.T. at 35-36. Therefore, Mother’s second issue fails, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that termination best serves Child’s
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5 Legal counsel did not speak with Child directly. Counsel contracted with a
social worker, Roya Paller, to speak with Child on his behalf. N.T. at 35-36.
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developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section
2511(b).
In her third issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption where
DHS failed to provide sufficient evidence that a goal change would best suit
Child’s needs and welfare. See Mother’s Brief at 16. Given our disposition
affirming the termination decree, Mother’s argument pertaining to the order
is moot. Therefore, we do not review it. See In the Interest of D.R.-W.,
227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in
ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force
or effect.”) (citation omitted).
In Mother’s final issue, she argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in terminating her parental rights and changing Child’s goal to
adoption where the trial court caused the bond between Mother and Child to
deteriorate by suspending visitation several months prior to the
termination/goal change hearing. See Mother’s Brief at 18. Mother argues
that the termination of Mother’s parental rights should be reversed because
the suspension of her visitation directly impacted the bond between her and
Child. Id.Mother’s argument is without merit because a panel of this Court
affirmed the suspension order. See In the Interest of K.C.K.S., supra.
Therefore, that order is not before us. Further, Mother’s argument indicates
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that she still fails to take responsibility for her actions as the trial court did not
arbitrarily decide to suspend her visitation. Indeed, Mother caused her
visitation to be suspended and any subsequent deterioration of her bond with
Child based on that suspension. Accordingly, Mother’s final issue is without
merit.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s
parental rights and dismiss as moot Mother’s appeal of the order changing
Child’s permanency goal to adoption.
Termination decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/28/2022
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