Com. v. Huntley, V.

J-S32022-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
VINCENT VANDELE HUNTLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 598 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0003066-2003
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: NOVEMBER 7, 2022
Appellant, Vincent Vandele Huntley, appeals pro se from the post-
conviction court’s March 21, 2022 order dismissing, as meritless, his second
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§
9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the background of this matter as follows:
On November 1, 2004, [Appellant] pled guilty to 1st Degree
Murder,1 five (5) counts of Criminal Conspiracy,2 Aggravated
Assault,3 Endangering Welfare of Children,4 and Abuse of Corpse.5
The Honorable Jeannine Turgeon sentenced [Appellant] to an
aggregate term of life imprisonment plus a consecutive twenty-
three and one-half (23½) to forty-seven (47) years in a state
correctional institution. While still represented by counsel,
[Appellant] filed a pro se Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on
November 8, 2004, [but] he [later] withdrew [that motion] before
[t]he [c]ourt on January 7, 2005. [Appellant] did not file a direct
appeal from the judgment of sentence.
1 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 2502(a)[.]
2 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 903[.]
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3 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 2702(a)(1)[.]
4 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 4304[.]
5 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 5510[.]
On October 13, 2005, [Appellant] filed his first timely petition for
relief under the [PCRA,] and counsel was appointed to represent
him. On January 25, 2006, PCRA [c]ounsel filed a [p]etition to
[w]ithdraw as [c]ounsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,
544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988). On June 30, 2006, PCRA [c]ounsel was
granted leave to withdraw, and [Appellant] was given notice of
[t]he [c]ourt’s intention to dismiss his PCRA [petition without a
hearing] pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On August 22, 2006,
[Appellant’s] PCRA [petition] was dismissed, and he subsequently
filed a [n]otice of [a]ppeal to the Superior Court. On July 11,
2007, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of [Appellant’s] PCRA
[petition]. [Commonwealth v. Huntley, 932 A.2d 254 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum).] On December 20,
2007, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Appellant’s]
[p]etition for [a]llowance of [a]ppeal. [Commonwealth v.
Huntley, 940 A.2d 363 (Pa. 2007).]
On December 20, 2021, [Appellant] filed a second[, pro se]
petition for relief under the PCRA. On December 27, 2021, we
appointed Damian DeStefano, Esquire, as PCRA [c]ounsel. On
February 22, 2022, Attorney DeStefano filed a [p]etition for
[l]eave to [w]ithdraw as [c]ounsel, and an accompanying
[m]emorandum in support thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)[,] and Turner, supra.
PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 2/24/22, at 1-2.
On February 24, 2022, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 907.
Therein, the court also granted Attorney DeStefano’s petition to withdraw and
provided Appellant with twenty days to respond to its Rule 907 notice. On
March 7, 2022, Appellant filed a request for an extension of time to file an
objection to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, and for leave to file an amended
pro se PCRA petition to respond to Attorney DeStefano’s no-merit letter and
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petition to withdraw. Thereafter, on March 9, 2022, the PCRA court granted
Appellant’s request for an extension of time but denied his request to file an
amended PCRA petition, instead directing that Appellant could set forth any
arguments he wished to raise in support of his claim for PCRA relief in his
response to the Rule 907 notice.
Despite the PCRA court’s ruling, Appellant filed another motion for leave
to file an amended PCRA petition, along with an amended PCRA petition, on
March 17, 2022. In his amended petition, he claimed that Attorney DeStefano
provided ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with Appellant’s
second PCRA petition by failing to conduct a proper, independent review of
the record, and by misstating material facts. In addition, on March 17, 2022,
Appellant also filed an objection to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice.
On March 21, 2022, the PCRA court issued a final order dismissing
Appellant’s PCRA petition. Therein, the court noted that Appellant’s amended
petition attempted to make a claim of ineffectiveness under Commonwealth
v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).1 However, it determined that, because
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1 In Bradley, our Supreme Court held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a
PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se,
raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so,
even if on appeal.” Id. at 401 (footnote omitted).
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of the baldness of Appellant’s ineffectiveness allegation and the frivolity of his
claims for relief, it declined to appoint new PCRA counsel.2
Thereafter, on April 15, 2022, Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of
appeal. The PCRA court subsequently directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and he timely
complied. The trial court later issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which it relied
on the reasoning set forth in its Rule 907 notice for dismissing Appellant’s
petition.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion when it dismissed
[Appellant’s] most recent PCRA [p]etition without an evidentiary
hearing with respect to his [a]fter-[d]iscovered [f]acts claim
related to [c]o-defendant Ann Daw’s letter, where said court held
that [Appellant] met the standard of the [n]ewly-[d]iscovered
[f]acts exception to the PCRA time-bar, thereby entitling him to
a[n] evidentiary hearing on his Brady[3] claim where a possible
miscarriage of justice may have occurred[?]
2. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion by denying [Appellant’s]
request to file an amended PCRA petition relating to PCRA
counsel[’s] ineffectiveness in accordance with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in … Bradley, and in direct contradiction
of the purpose of the Rule 907 [n]otice, thereby violating
[Appellant’s] [d]ue [p]rocess [r]ights[?]
3. Did … PCRA counsel render ineffective assistance when he failed
to conduct his own independent investigation of the entire record
concerning [Appellant’s] [n]ewly-[d]iscovered [f]acts claim[,]
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2 That same day, Appellant filed a motion to disregard his amended PCRA
petition or, in the alternative, to consider it as an addendum to his objection
to the court’s Rule 907 notice, as he said he prematurely filed it, incorrectly
anticipating that the court would grant him leave to do so.
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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which … sounded in a miscarriage of justice based upon a Brady
claim[?]
4. Is [Appellant] entitled to an evidentiary hearing based upon all
of the above claims, where there is a strong showing that the
Commonwealth based its case and the subsequent conviction of
[Appellant] and his [c]o-defendant on [f]raud[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary emphasis omitted).
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin by addressing the
timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate
our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the
merits of a petition. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa.
2007) (stating PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be
altered or disregarded to address the merits of the petition). Under the PCRA,
any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one,
must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes
final, unless one of the following exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges
and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the
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Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
period provided in this section and has been held by
that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, Section 9545(b)(2) requires that
any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within one
year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on February 9,
2005, and thus, he had until February 9, 2006, to file a timely petition.4
Consequently, his petition is facially untimely and, for this Court to have
jurisdiction to review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that he meets
one of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b).
Instantly, Appellant claims that he meets the newly-discovered-fact
exception pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Specifically, in his petition, he
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4 The trial court entered an order on January 10, 2005, permitting Appellant
to withdraw his post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(c) (“If the
defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be
filed … within 30 days of the entry of the order memorializing the withdrawal
in cases in which the defendant withdraws the motion.”).
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averred that his co-defendant — Ann Daw — sent him a letter, in which she
relayed that she
came across this [information] in [her] Defendant’s Supplement
page 6[, which] states that defendants is [sic] innocent of charges
of murder and conspiracy to commit murder because it was
insufficient evidence that the defendants possessed the requisite
specific intent for a first & third degree murder conviction.
Appellant’s Second PCRA Petition, 12/20/21, at Exhibit A at 4.5 Appellant
claimed, verbatim, that he “first learned of this previously undisclosed facts of
the Commonwealth not having sufficient evidence which would have
supported or proved a conviction for murder let a lone murder of the first or
third degree. The Commonwealth’s failure to disclose these facts is/was a
direct violation of Brady….” Id. at 6-7. See also id. at 8 (“[T]he
Commonwealth withheld the fact that its case and the evidence upon which it
was alleged was insufficient to support the charge(s) and/or convictions of
murder of the first or third degree, thus, rendering [Appellant’s] alleged pleas
invalid due to them being based upon a Brady violation and under the
circumstances can only be viewed as [f]raud….”) (emphasis omitted); id. at
10 (“[T]he prosecutors [sic] failure to disclose these facts that the evidence
was insufficient to support or prove the defendants guilty of first or third
degree was prosecutorial misconduct because it was intentionally suppressed
while the prosecutor sought a sentence of death or life imprisonment.”).
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5Based on Appellant’s arguments, it appears that Ms. Daw pled guilty to third-
degree murder. See PCRA Petition at 2 (indicating that Ms. Daw entered a
negotiated plea to third-degree murder).
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Here, the PCRA court determined that Appellant’s claim did not meet
the newly-discovered-fact exception, reasoning:
[W]e do not find that [Appellant] has satisfied the timeliness
exception under [Section] 9545(b)(1)(ii).[6] While [Appellant]
has blanketly claimed to be without knowledge of the alleged
statement within some document within Ms. Daw’s possession, he
has failed to provide any specific details of his claim. For example,
he has not secured a copy of whatever document Ms. Daw claims
to have containing the statement in question. He clearly assumes
that it is a police report and that it was not provided to his
attorneys. However, other than invoking his Brady claim, he
never actually alleges that the “report” in question was not
provided to his attorneys. Simply because [Appellant] himself was
unaware of something does not mean that it was withheld from
him. Likewise, [Appellant] fails to address how the document
could not have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
Even if we were to consider [Appellant’s] claim timely, it is devoid
of merit. As already stated, we cannot even assume that the
document is, in fact, a police report. The letter references it as
“Defendant’s Supplement.” This seems an odd title for a police
report, but we are left only to wonder and speculate. The
operative opinion of [Appellant’s] innocence could have been
made by a police officer or it could have been made by Ms. Daw’s
attorney in a document prepared for her. If so, there is not even
the pretense of a Brady claim.
If we, once again, presume that the document is a report prepared
by a police officer, [Appellant’s] claim is still without any merit.
The statement upon which [Appellant] relies does not actually
reveal some previously unknown admissible fact. At best, it
reveals a police officer’s conclusory opinion from applying a set of
facts to the applicable law. Such is the role of juries and not
witnesses and would not have been admissible at trial. Therefore,
we cannot find that [Appellant] suffered a constitutional violation
which prevented a reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence from
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6We note that the PCRA court ascertained that Appellant satisfied Section
9545(b)(2), by filing his petition within one year of the date the claim could
have been presented. See PCO at 4. However, we remind Appellant that he
must fulfill the requirements of both Section 9545(b)(1) and (b)(2).
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taking place, or that the so-called newly[-]discovered evidence
was exculpatory and would have changed the outcome of the trial
if it had been introduced. 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9545(a)(2)(i) and (vi).
PCO at 4-5.7
We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claim does not meet the
newly-discovered-fact exception of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). That some
unknown person in some unknown document opined that there was
‘insufficient evidence that the defendants possessed the requisite specific
intent for a first & third degree murder conviction’ does not constitute a new
fact for purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). As our Supreme Court has pointed
out:
Black’s Law Dictionary explains the distinction [between ‘law’ and
‘fact’] thusly: “Law is a principle; fact is an event. Law is
conceived; fact is actual. Law is a rule of duty; fact is that which
has been according to or in contravention of the rule.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 592 (6th ed.1991). Put another way, “A ‘fact,’ as
distinguished from the ‘law,’ … [is that which] is to be presumed
or proved to be or not to be for the purpose of applying or refusing
to apply a rule of law.” Id. Consistent with these definitions, an
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7 In response to the PCRA court’s observation that it is unclear what kind of
document ‘Defendant’s Supplement’ is, as Appellant had not secured a copy
of it, Appellant asserted in his objection to the court’s Rule 907 notice that:
As to [Appellant’s] not being able to produce a copy of the
document that is in the possession of Ms. Daw, [Appellant] asserts
that [the] Department of Corrections[’] policies prohibited Ms.
Daw from sending [Appellant] that type of mail. Moreover, the
information contained in the … document in the possession of Ms.
Daw is not and cannot be a police report as the court suggest[s].
This information was clearly received by Ms. [D]aw, after she was
seen by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
Objection to Rule 907 Notice, 3/17/22, at ¶ 8. See also Appellant’s Brief at
11 (claiming that Ms. Daw could not send him the ‘Defendant’s Supplement’
because the Department of Corrections does not permit inmates to possess
other inmates’ mail).
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in-court ruling or published judicial opinion is law, for it is simply
the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual events.
Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986-97 (Pa. 2011).
Someone’s opinion that there was ‘insufficient evidence that the
defendants possessed the requisite specific intent for a first & third degree
murder conviction’ does not constitute an ‘event,’ but instead is more akin to
‘the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual events.’ Accord PCO
at 5 (“The statement upon which [Appellant] relies does not actually reveal
some previously unknown admissible fact. At best, it reveals a police officer’s
conclusory opinion from applying a set of facts to the applicable law. Such is
the role of juries and not witnesses and would not have been admissible at
trial.”). In other words, the at-issue statement is a legal conclusion reached
by someone, not a new fact. Thus, Appellant has not shown that he meets
the newly-discovered-fact timeliness exception.
Appellant also complains that the PCRA court abused its discretion by
denying his request to file an amended PCRA petition. See Appellant’s Brief
at 13. Despite the PCRA court’s denial of his request, the docket reflects that
Appellant nevertheless filed an amended petition, and that the PCRA court
considered it in issuing its final order dismissing Appellant’s petition. See
Order, 3/21/22, at 1 (unpaginated) (“We also note that [Appellant’s]
[a]mended PCRA [p]etition attempts to make a claim of the ineffectiveness of
PCRA counsel…. This claim is based upon [his] contention that PCRA [c]ounsel
failed to ‘conduct a proper independent review of the entire record.’
Considering the baldness of this allegation and the frivolity of [Appellant’s]
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claims for relief, we decline to appoint new PCRA counsel.”). Thus, as the
PCRA court considered the claims made in Appellant’s amended petition, no
relief is due on this basis.
Finally, Appellant says that Attorney DeStefano “render[ed] ineffective
assistance when he failed to conduct his own independent investigation into
the entire record concerning Appellant’s [n]ewly-discovered[-]facts claim.”
Appellant’s Brief at 18. Specifically, Appellant argues that Attorney DeStefano
should have contacted he or Ms. Daw about the ‘Defendant’s Supplement.’
Id. at 20. We agree with the PCRA court that, given the frivolity of Appellant’s
claim that he learned a ‘new fact’ because some unidentified person opined
that there was insufficient evidence to prove Appellant possessed the requisite
specific intent in his case, Attorney DeStefano did not act ineffectively. See
Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 979 A.2d 908, 910 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“To
prevail on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, the [a]ppellant
must overcome the presumption of competence by showing that: (1) his
underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct
pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate
his interests; and (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the challenged proceedings would have been
different.”) (cleaned up; emphasis added).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/07/2022
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