Coyle, J. v. Young, T.

J-A22024-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOSEPH COYLE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TAMMY YOUNG :
:
Appellant : No. 429 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Civil Division at No(s):
10258 CD 2020
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2022
Tammy Young (“Mother”) appeals from the March 17, 2022 Order
entered in the Indiana County Court of Common Pleas that granted shared
legal and physical custody of N.C. (“Child”) to Mother and Joseph Coyle
(“Father”). Upon review, we affirm.
In its March 17, 2022 Opinion and Order of Court, the trial court set
forth a detailed procedural and factual history, as well as a summary of
evidence, which we adopt for purposes of this appeal. See Opinion, filed
3/17/22, at 1-10. In sum, Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) were
never married and are parents to four-year-old Child, who was born in
November of 2017. Parents were in a long-term romantic relationship and
lived together until they broke up when Child was eight months old. Father
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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has two older children from a previous marriage. Father is currently remarried
to Stepmother, who also has an older child from a prior relationship.
When Parents broke up, Mother had primary physical custody of Child
and Father had informal visitation. On January 10, 2020, when Child was two
years old, Father filed a Complaint for Custody requesting shared physical and
legal custody of Child. An interim custody order provided Father with visitation
every other weekend and Wednesday evenings. The court held a custody trial
on February 28, 2022, and March 1, 2022.
The court heard extensive testimony from numerous witnesses,
including: Father, Stepmother, a visitation supervisor, Parents’ friend,
Father’s ex-wife, Parents’ co-worker, Mother’s cousin, Mother’s aunt, and
Mother’s parents. After evaluating the sixteen custody factors, the court found
that the factors did not favor one party over the other. The court awarded
shared physical and legal custody to Parents, with a schedule that increased
Father’s custody every few weeks over the summer months until shared
physical custody was 50/50.
Mother timely appealed and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The
trial court relied on its March 17, 2022 Opinion and Order of Court in lieu of a
Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error of
law when its consideration of the custody factors was based
on factual findings and inferences that were not contained in
the evidence of [] record.
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2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error of
law by not giving full consideration to the best interests of
[Child] (including but not limited to the impact to the child of
the substantial change in custody and whether that change
served to enhance a parent/child relationship) when moving
from Mother as the primary physical custodian to (eventually)
a shared 50/50 schedule for Mother and Father and by relying
on inaccurate information.
Mother’s Br. at 18.
A.
This court reviews a custody determination for an abuse of discretion,
and our scope of review is broad. S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa.
Super. 2014). This court will not find an abuse of discretion “merely because
a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion.” In re K.D.,
144 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Super. 2016). This Court must accept the findings of
the trial court that the evidence supports. S.W.D., 96 A.3d at 400.
Importantly, “[o]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer
to the findings of the trial judge who has had the opportunity to observe the
proceedings and demeanor of the witnesses.” K.T. v. L.S., 118 A.3d 1136,
1159 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). We can interfere only where the
“custody order is manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence of
record.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted). Further, in a custody case, relief is not warranted unless the party
claiming error suffered prejudice from the mistake. J.C. v. K.C., 179 A.3d
1124, 1130 (Pa. Super. 2018).
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The Custody Act requires a trial court to consider all of the Section
5328(a) custody factors when “ordering any form of custody,” and further
requires the court to give “weighted consideration to those factors which affect
the safety of the child[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). A trial court must “delineate
the reasons for its decision when making an award of custody either on the
record or in a written opinion.” S.W.D., 96 A.3d at 401. See also 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 5323(a) and (d). However, “there is no required amount of detail for the
trial court’s explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are
considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.”
M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013).
When reviewing child custody matters and the trial court’s consideration
of the Section 5328(a) custody factors, our paramount concern is the best
interests of the child. See Saintz, 902 A.2d at 512 (explaining that this
Court’s “paramount concern and the polestar of our analysis” in custody cases
is the best interests of the child) (citation omitted). “The best-interests
standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all factors which
legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual, moral, and
spiritual well-being.” D.K.D. v. A.L.C., 141 A.3d 566, 572 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations omitted). “Common sense dictates that trial courts should strive,
all other things being equal, to assure that a child maintains a healthy
relationship with both of his or her parents, and that the parents work together
to raise their child.” S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 218 A.3d 905, 916 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Finally, in any action regarding the custody of the child between the parents
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of the child, there shall be no presumption that custody should be awarded to
a particular parent and no preference based upon gender. 23 Pa.C.S. §§
5327(a) and 5328(b).
B.
In both of her issues, Mother avers that the trial court abused its
discretion when its consideration of the custody factors was based on factual
findings and inferences that were not contained in the record. Mother’s Br. at
23. Mother concedes that the trial court did an analysis of the sixteen custody
factors but contends that the trial court made two factual findings that were
not supported in the record. Id. at 25-26.
Mother first avers that the trial court erred when it found that both
parties live in the United School District because the record reflects that only
Mother lives in that school district. Id. at 26-27.
Our review of the record confirms Mother’s assertion and reveals that
Father does not live in the United School District, but Mother does. N.T. Trial,
2/28/22, at 7, 30-31; N.T. Trial, 3/1/22, at 290. Father testified that he would
like Child to attend the school in Mother’s school district when Child is school
age because the school is highly rated. N.T. Trial, 2/28/22, at 30-31. When
analyzing custody factor four—the need for stability and continuity in the
child’s education, family life, and community life—the trial court found, in
relevant part:
[Child] is currently too young for school and both parties live in
the United School District. While the [c]ourt recognizes that
[Child] has spent more time with Mother throughout his life,
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Father desires to be more active in [Child]’s life. The evidence
supports a finding that Father’s increased involvement in [Child]’s
life will promote better continuity with his family, including two
step-siblings. The testimony presented by both [p]arties show
that each party is involved in [Child]’s life and want what is best
for [Child]. The [c]ourt finds that both parties are not only
capable, but have shown a[] desire and intent to provide stability
and continuity in [Child]’s life. Accordingly the [c]ourt finds this
factor is neutral.
Trial Ct. Op., filed 3/17/22, at 15 (emphasis added).
As stated above, we agree with Mother’s assertion that the trial court
made a mistake of fact when it found that Father lived in the United School
District. However, Mother fails to explain how this incorrect factual finding
impacted the trial court’s analysis of custody factor four or the trial court’s
overall disposition. Notably, Child was not yet old enough to attend school
when the trial court analyzed factor four—the need for stability and continuity
in Child’s life. Essentially, Mother fails to assert that she suffered any actual
harm as a result of the trial court’s mistake. Accordingly, Mother is not entitled
to relief on this issue. See J.C., 179 A.3d at 1130 (explaining that, in a
custody case, relief is not warranted unless the party claiming error suffered
prejudice from the mistake).
Mother next avers that the court erred when it found that both parties
are boilermakers by trade and only work several weeks per year because the
record reflects that it is Mother who works up to six weeks out of the year
while Father works a full-time job. Mother’s Br. at 27. Mother argues that
the trial court relied on this inaccurate information about Father’s work
schedule when it increased Father’s physical custody. Id. at 31. Mother avers
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that the practical effect of this custody change is a significant increase in
physical custody time to Stepmother, who will be watching Child when Father
is at work, and a significant decrease in physical custody time for her. Id. at
31. Finally, Mother argues that increased time with Stepmother is not in
Child’s best interest and fails to further the trial court’s intended effect of
strengthening the bond between Child and Father. Id.
Upon review, we agree with Mother that the trial court made a mistake
of fact regarding Father’s work schedule. At trial, Father testified that he
currently has a three-month contract working as a welder fabricator with a set
work schedule of 6:00 AM to 2:00 PM Monday through Friday. N.T. Trial,
2/28/22, at 12. Father further testified that he intends to continue working
when his contract ends in two months, and he recently had an interview for a
job as a boiler operator, which would be a rotating shift. Id. at 13. Father
and Stepmother both testified that Stepmother would be available to help care
for Child when, and if, Father’s work schedule changes. Id. at 31, 44, 115.
When analyzing custody factor twelve—each party’s availability to care
for the child or ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements—the trial
court found:
Both parties are boilermakers by trade and work several weeks
out of the year. Accordingly, child-care would likely not be
needed. However, in the event that child-care is needed, Father’s
wife works from home and has flexible hours, allowing for her to
watch [Child] when needed. Mother also testified that her parents
and aunt can watch [Child] if needed. This [c]ourt finds that both
parties have presented appropriate child[-]care arrangements.
Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 20-21.
We agree that the trial court incorrectly characterized Father’s work
schedule as part-time when analyzing custody factor twelve. However, we
are unpersuaded by Mother’s argument that the trial court relied on this
mistake of fact when the court increased Father’s physical custody and,
therefore, Mother was prejudiced. Notably, the court heard evidence that
Father’s employment was temporary at the time of trial. When analyzing
custody factor twelve, the trial court made an alternative finding and
concluded that, in the event child-care was needed, both parents presented
appropriate child-care arrangements. This finding is supported by evidence
in the record. Moreover, it is well-settled that a parent’s work schedule may
not deprive a parent of custody if suitable arrangements are made for the
child’s care in the parent’s absence. Johnson v. Lewis, 870 A.2d 368, 374
(Pa. Super. 2005). Finally, Mother offers no legal authority to support her
position that a trial court should not increase a parent’s physical custodial time
to 50/50 if the practical effect is spending more time with a stepparent and
other household members.
C.
In conclusion, Mother fails to establish that the trial court’s two mistakes
of fact prejudiced her or impacted the trial court’s overall disposition.
Accordingly, she is not entitled to relief.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2022
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